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THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY 
IN  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


BY 

JOHN  FISKE 


Bellum  atrox,  multiplex,  immane,  pertinax 
cui  simile  nulla  usquam  narrat  antiquitas 

JORNANDES,  De  Rebus  Gelicit,  zL 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 
HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 
press,  £ambri&o* 


/IV  0 


COPYRIGHT,  1900,  BY  JOHN  FISKE 
ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 


TO 

MT  OLD  FRIEND  AND  COLLEAGUE 

MARSHALL  SOLOMON   SNOW 

PROFESSOR  OF  HISTORY  IN  THE 

WASHINGTON  UNIVERSITY  AT  ST.  LOUIS 

THIS  BOOK  IS  AFFECTIONATELY 

INSCRIBED 


03668 


PREFACE 

IN  the  course  of  iny  annual  visit  to  St.  Louis,  in 
the  spring  of  1886, 1  gave  four  lectures  in  the  great 
theatre  of  the  Exposition  Building,  in  aid  of  the 
fund  for  erecting  a  monument  to  General  Grant. 
These  lectures  touched  upon  many  of  the  points 
treated  in  chapters  i.— viii.  of  the  present  work,  end 
ing  with  the  battle  of  Chattanooga.  It  is  pleasant 
to  remember  the  warm  interest  shown  in  the  lectures 
by  General  Sherman,  who  "  presided  "  on  each  oc 
casion,  and  enlivened  the  suppers  which  followed 
with  his  abounding  good-fellowship  and  his  flashes 
of  quaint  wit.  Those  were  evenings  not  to  be  for 
gotten. 

The  lectures  —  illustrated  with  maps,  diagrams, 
views  of  towns  and  fortresses,  landscapes  and  por 
traits,  with  the  aid  of  the  stereopticon  —  were  given 
during  two  years  in  many  cities  north  of  Mason  and 
Dixon's  line,  from  Lewiston  in  Maine  to  Portland 
in  Oregon.  For  illustrating  battles  a  stereopticon 
is  most  useful,  enabling  a  lecturer  to  throw  upon 
the  screen  his  diagrams  and  his  landscapes  by  turns, 
so  that  each  helps  to  elucidate  the  other.  It  is  de 
sirable,  however,  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout  for  acci- 


vi  Preface 

dents  ;  as  I  was  once  rudely  reminded  in  Buffalo, 
when  my  operator's  hydrogen  unexpectedly  gave 
out,  leaving  me  to  expound  the  battle  of  Shiloh 
with  nothing  but  a  blackboard  and  piece  of  chalk ! 

After  an  interval  of  some  years  there  was  a  re 
newed  call  for  these  lectures,  and  in  the  autumn  of 
1895  they  were  given  in  Sanders  Theatre  at  Har 
vard  University.  The  interest  thus  freshly  aroused 
led  me  to  prepare  the  present  volume.  It  contains 
a  great  deal  of  material  that  I  never  put  into  the 
lectures,  some  of  it  written  before  1886,  some  of 
it  after.  The  ninth  chapter,  on  the  "crowning 
mercy  "  of  Nashville,  has  been  added  quite  lately. 

The  present  volume  does  not  belong  to  the  series 
in  which  I  have  for  several  years  been  dealing  with 
the  history  of  the  United  States.  Should  I  ever, 
in  the  course  of  that  work,  arrive  at  the  Civil  War, 
it  will  of  course  be  treated  on  a  very  different  plan 
from  that  of  this  book,  which  is  a  purely  military 
narrative,  restricted  in  its  scope,  and  detached 
from  the  multitude  of  incidents  which  in  a  general 
history  would  form  its  context. 

In  preparing  this  narrative  I  have  had  due 
recourse  to  the  abundant  printed  sources  of  infor 
mation,  and  owe  much  besides  to  personal  associa 
tion  with  many  of  the  actors.  While  the  war  was 
going  011  it  was,  to  me  as  to  others,  a  subject  of 
most  intense  moment,  and  its  incidents  were  burnt 


Preface  vii 

into  the  tablets  of  memory.  I  kept  large  maps, 
and  marked  the  movements  of  the  Union  and 
Confederate  forces,  as  reported  from  day  to  day, 
with  blue-headed  and  red-headed  pins.  Among 
the  friends  of  my  childhood  who  gave  up  their 
lives  for  their  country,  one  in  the  army  and  another 
in  the  navy  —  General  Mansfield  and  Commander 
Kenshaw  —  stand  before  me  with  especial  vivid 
ness.  In  later  years  I  valued  highly  the  friend 
ship  of  Sherman,  McDowell,  and  Ericsson ;  and  I 
had  more  or  less  acquaintance  —  sometimes  slight, 
but  unfailingly  fruitful  in  suggestions — with  Sheri 
dan,  Meade,  McClellan,  Rosecrans,  Garfield,  Gib 
bon,  Pope,  Geary,  Francis  Walker,  "Baldy"  Smith, 
Hazen,  Hancock,  Beauregard,  Preston  Johnston, 
and  one  of  the  noblest  Romans  of  all,  Joseph 
Johnston,  whose  hand-grip  at  eighty  years  of  age 
was  like  that  of  a  college  athlete,  and  whose  shrewd 
and  kindly  talk  was  as  delightful  as  his  presence 
was  imposing. 

Among  those  to  whom  specific  thanks  are  due  for 
valuable  counsel  must  be  mentioned  Colonel  Snead, 
chief  of  staff  to  Sterling  Price  and  member  of  the 
Confederate  congress,  author  of  that  excellent  book, 
"  The  Fight  for  Missouri ;  "  Major  Hutchinson, 
chief  of  staff  to  General  Bowen,  whose  heroic 
resistance  to  Grant  is  mentioned  on  page  230 ; 
Colonel  Samuel  Simmons,  first  on  Lyon's  staff  and 


viii  Preface 

later  on  that  of  Rosecrans  ;  Colonel  Henry  Hitch 
cock,  of  Sherman's  staff  ;  Colonel  Henry  Stone,  of 
Thomas's  staff  ;  General  Fullerton,  chief  of  staff  to 
Gordon  Granger  ;  General  Fry,  chief  of  staff  to 
Buell ;  General  Cullum,  chief  of  staff  to  Ilalleck  ; 
and  especially  my  dear  friends,  now  passed  away, 
Dr.  Eliot,  chancellor  of  Washington  University, 
and  Colonel  Gaiitt,  sometime  of  McClellan's  staff, 
whose  hospitable  house  was  for  many  years  my 
home  during  my  visits  to  St.  Louis. 

To  that  profound  student  of  military  history, 
the  late  John  Codman  Eopes,  my  obligations  are 
greater  than  I  can  express,  not  so  much  for  any 
specific  suggestions  intended  for  this  book,  as  for 
the  liberal  education  which  came  from  knowing 
him.  During  a  peculiarly  intimate  friendship  of 
thirty  years,  the  cosy  midnight  hours  that  we  spent 
in  discussing  his  favourite  themes  were  many  and 
full  of  profit. 

It  may  be  observed  that  this  book  sometimes 
alludes  to  the  Confederates  as  "  rebels."  I  have 
been  surprised  to  find  how  generally  people  seem 
to  think  that  some  sort  of  stigma  is  implied  by  that 
word.  For  my  own  part,  I  have  sympathized  with 
so  many  of  the  great  rebellions  in  history,  from  the 
revolt  of  the  Ionian  cities  against  Darius  Hystaspes 
down  to  the  uprising  of  Cuba  against  the  Spaniards, 
that  1  am  quite  unable  to  conceive  of  "  rebel  "  as  a 


Preface  ix 

term  of  reproach.  In  the  present  case,  it  enables 
one  to  avoid  the  excessive  iteration  of  the  word 
"  Confederate,"  while  it  simply  gives  expression  to 
the  undeniable  fact  that  our  Southern  friends  were 
trying  to  cast  off  an  established  government.  In 
England,  to  this  day,  Cromwell's  admirers  do  not 
hesitate  to  speak  with  pride  of  the  Great  Rebellion. 
While  my  own  sympathies  have  always  been  in 
tensely  Northern,  as  befits  a  Connecticut  Yankee,  I 
could  still  in  all  sincerity  take  off  my  hat  to  the 
statue  of  Lee  when  I  passed  it  in  New  Orleans. 
His  devotion  to  the  self-government  which  seemed 
to  him  in  mortal  peril  was  no  more  reprehensible 
than  the  loyalty  of  Falkland  to  the  prerogative  of 
Charles  I.,  though  in  both  cases  the  sentiments 
were  evoked  under  circumstances  which  made  them 
dangerous  to  the  nation's  welfare. 

In  treating  such  a  subject  as  the  present  one,  the 
difficulties  in  ensuring  complete  accuracy  of  state 
ment  and  perfect  soundness  of  judgment  are  man 
ifold.  If  my  opinions  are  sometimes  strongly 
expressed,  they  are  always  held  subject  to  revi 
sion. 

CAMBRIDGE,  February  24,  1900. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

FROM   ST.   LOUIS   TO   BELMONT 

Scope  of  the  present  narrative  ..  41  ...  1 
Importance  of  the  border  states  in  1861  ....  2 

Of  Virginia 3,  4 

Of  Maryland 4,  5 

Of  Kentucky  and  Missouri .  5,  6 

Position  of  Missouri  in  the  causal  sequence  of  events  .  6,  7 
Some  account  of  Francis  Preston  Blair  and  his  family  .  .  8,  9 
Claiborne  Jackson  and  his  schemes  .....  10 
Nathaniel  Lyon,  and  Blair's  "  Home  Guards "  .  .10 

Plots  and  counter-plots  ;  "  rebellion  against  Missouri "  .  11 
President  Lincoln,  through  General  Scott,  authorizes  certain 

gentlemen  to  act  as  a  Committee  of  Safety  ...  12 
Lyon  removes  the  arms  from  the  arsenal  and  guards  the 

neighbouring  hills  13 

The  state  troops  select  a  camping  -  ground  on  LindeU's 

Meadow  and  enclose  it 13 

Camp  Jackson,  its  avenues  and  its  denizens  ...  14 
Why  Blair  and  Lyon  deemed  prompt  action  necessary  .  .  14 

Arrival  of  arms  from  Baton  Rouge 15 

Hospitalities  at  Camp  Jackson  ;  a  visitor  in  bombazine  .  15, 16 

A  lady  with  spurs 16 

Lyon  summons  the  Committee  of  Safety  .  .  .  .17 
Replevin  vs.  capture  .  .  .  .  *  .  -  »  .  18 
Camp  Jackson  surrenders  to  Lyon  .  .  .  .  .19 

A  secessionist  flag  in  Pine  Street  is  hauled  down  *  .  20 
Colloquy  on  a  street-car  .  .  .  .  ...  .20 


xii  Contents 

The  governor  appoints  Sterling  Price  to  command  his  seces 
sionist  militia 21 

Lyon  and  Blair  have  a  conference  with  Jackson  and  Price 

at  the  Planters'  Hotel 22 

Lyon  takes  possession  of  Jefferson  City  .         .         .         .22 

And  routs  the  secessionists  at  Booneville   ....          23 

Sigel's  fig-ht  at  Carthage          .         .  .      .         .         .         .       24, 25 

Appointment  of  Fremont  to  command  the  Department  of 

the  West 25 

Battle  of  Wilson's  Creek,  and  death  of  Lyon  .  .  26,  27 
His  great  qualities  ........  28 

Causes  of  Fremont's  popularity 28,  29 

His  "  emancipation  proclamation  "      .....          29 

His  military  incapacity    ........     30 

Fate  of  Mulligan's  detachment  at  Lexington      .         .         .31,  32 
Fremont  is  superseded  by  Hunter  .         .         .         .         .33 

Who  in  turn  is  superseded  by  Halleck        ....          34 

Halleck's  incapacity         ........     34 

Curtis  defeats  Van  Dora  at  Pea  Ridge        ....    35-37 

Importance  of  these  early  campaigns      .         .         .         .         .38 

Affairs   in  Kentucky  ;    attempt  to  preserve  an  attitude  of 

neutrality 39,  40 

Previous  career  of  Leonidas  Polk  ;  he  enters  Kentucky  and 

fortifies  the  bluffs  at  Columbus 41 

Zollicoffer  advances  through  Cumberland  Gap   ...         41 

Kentucky  declares  for  the  Union 42 

Previous  career  of  Ulysses  Simpson  Grant  ...          43 

He  is  made  brigadier-general  of  volunteers  ....  44 
He  seizes  Paducah  ;  importance  of  the  movement  .  .  45 
Oglesby  goes  in  pursuit  of  guerrillas  .  .  .  .  .46 
Grant  defeats  Pillow  on  the  flats  of  Belmont  ...  47 
His  troops  disperse  for  pillage,  but  are  with  difficulty  set  in 

order 48 

The  Confederates   attempt  unsuccessfully  to  cut   off   their 
retreat  48,49 


Contents  xiii 

Comments  on  the  Belmont  affair 49-51 

Brant's  own  comment 51 

CHAPTER  II 

FORT   DONELSON   AND   SHILOH 

The  first  Confederate  line  of  defence 52 

Albert  Sidney  Johnston 53 

George  Henry  Thomas     ........     54 

He  destroys  Zollicoffer's  force  at  Mill  Spring  ...  55 

Grant  captures  Fort  Henry 56 

Position  of  Fort  Donelson  .  .  .  .'  .  .  .  57 
Its  commanders,  —  Floyd,  Pillow,  and  Buckner  .  .  .58 
Grant  moves  upon  Fort  Uonelson  and  invests  it  .  .  58,  59 
Artillery  battle  between  fort  and  gunboats  .  .  .  .60 

Sortie  of  the  Confederate  garrison 61 

Ferguson  Smith  storms  the  Confederate  entrenchments  .  62 
While  Lew  Wallace  seizes  the  Charlotte  road  and  cuts  off 

their  retreat 62,63 

Escape  of  Floyd  and  Pillow 63 

Grant's  only  terms :  "  Unconditional  surrender  "  .  .  .63 

Importance  of  the  victory 64 

It  completely  shattered  the  first  Confederate  line  of  defence  65 

Halleck's  injustice  toward  Grant 66-69 

Strategic  importance  of  Corinth  •.  69 

The  assembling  of  forces  at  Corinth  .  .  .  .  .70 

Arrival  of  Braxton  Bragg 70,  71 

Importance  of  Pittsburg  Landing  .  .  .  .  .  .71 

Opinion  of  the  Count  of  Paris 72 

The  position  at  Pittsburg  Landing  ....  72-74 

Arrangement  of  the  Federal  forces  at  Shiloh  ...  73 
The  open  front  between  Owl  and  Lick  creeks  .  .  .74 
The  eve  of  battle  ;  difference  of  opinion  between  Johnston 

and  Beauregard 75 

How  far  were  the  Federals  surprised  at  Shiloh  ?  .  .  .76 


xiv  Contents 

Grant  was  not  expecting  any  attack  on  Sunday  morning1,  nor 
\vas  Sherman   .........          77 

The  Federals  were  surprised 78 

The  opening1  attack  on  Prentiss's  division  .         .         .   78,  79 

Grant  hastens  up  from  Savannah  Landing  and  meets  Lew 

Wallace  at  Crump's  Landing 79 

How  Wallace's  march  was  delayed      .  80 

Grant's  order  should  have  been  more  specific  .  .  .81 
Johnston's  plan  of  attack  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  81 

The  slow  pushing  back  of  Prentiss 82 

And  of  McClernarid  and  Sherman  .....  82,  83 
Glorious  stand  of  Prentiss  in  the  "  Hornet's  Nest,"  supported 

by  Hurlbut  and  William  Wallace 84 

Death  of  Johnston       ........          84 

Victory  was   not  within   his   grasp  ;   grave   mistake  in  his 
tactics  ..........     85 

The  long  stoppage  at  the  Hornet's  Nest  was  fatal  to  the  Con 
federates          85,86 

Prentiss  is  captured  and  William  Wallace  mortally  wounded  80 
Failure  of  the  Confederates  to  take  Pittsburg  Landing  .  87 

Difference  of  opinion  between  Bragg  and  Beauregard        .          88 

The  fundamental  facts  in  the  case 89 

Arrival  of  Nelson  and  Lew  Wallace 90 

Buell's  arrival  at  Savannah  on  Saturday  evening    .  .     91 

Nelson's  report  of  Grant's  expectations  on  that  evening  .  91 
Grant's  letter  to  Buell  written  Sunday  noon  .  .  .  .92 
How  Buell  and  Grant  spent  the  remainder  of  the  day  .  92 
A  cold  bivouac  in  the  rain  .......  9.3 

Arrival  of  Crittenden  and  McCook 94 

The  opposing  forces  on  Monday 94,  95 

Conditions  of  Monday's  battle  ;  defeat  of  the  Confederates  .  96 
Why  was  there  no  pursuit  after  Shiloh  ?  .  .  .  .97,  98 
Sherman's  humorous  explanation  .  .  .  .  •  .99 
Terrible  slaughter  .  ...  99 
Significance  of  the  battle 100 


Contents  xv 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS 

The  second  Confederate  line  of  defence          ....  101 

Island  Number  Ten 101^ 

Pope  captures  New  Madrid 102 

How  the  Federal  army  sawed  out  a  channel  through  the  sub 
merged  forest 103 

How  the  Carondelet  ran  past  the  batteries  .  .  .  104,  105 
Surrender  of  the  garrison  ;  results  of  the  victory  .  .  100 
Importance  of  rivers  and  of  the  river  fleets  in  the  Civil 

War 107,108^ 

The  Titanic  work  done  by  the  navy    ....        108-110 

Naval  inferiority  of  the  South 110,  111 

Military  importance  of  New  Orleans  .         .         .        .        .112 

Need  for  prompt  action 113 

Views  of  President  Lincoln  and  Commander  Porter  .         .        114  " 
Benjamin  Franklin  Butler,  his  military  qualifications     .         .  115 
Previous  career  of  David  Farragut ;  he  is  appointed  to  com 
mand  the  fleet 115,  116 

Character  of  the  fleet 117 

Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip 118 

The  chain  of  anchored  schooners,  and  the  Confederate  rams     119 

A  difficult  task  for  wooden  vessels 120 

Porter  bombards  Fort  Jackson   ......        121 

Difference  of  opinion  between  Farragut  and  Porter  .  121,  122 
The  gunboat  Itasca  breaks  the  chain  of  schooners  .  122,  123 
The  fleet  advances  up  the  Mississippi  river  .  .  .  123,  124 

Farragut's  flag-ship  in  danger 125 

Destruction  of  the  Confederate  fleet ;  fate  of  the  ram  Manas- 

sas        .        . 126 

Farragut's  arrival  at  New  Orleans       ....       127,  128 
Surrender  of  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip      .         .         .    128,  129 
Arrival  of  Butler  ;  the  selection  of  such  a  man  to  govern 
New  Orleans  was  an  insult  to  the  people  of  the  city   .        .  129 


xvi  Contents 

Opinion  of  the  Count  of  Paris  as  to  the  execution  of  Mum* 

ford 130 

The  notorious  "  woman  order  ;  "  "  Beast  Butler  "       .        131,  132 
Value  of  prompt  action  in  warfare 132 

CHAPTER  IV 

FROM   CORINTH   TO    STONE   RIVER 

Halleck  takes  the  armies  of  Pope,  Grant,    and  Buell,  and 

advances  against  Corinth 133 

Which  Beauregard  forthwith  evacuates      ....        134 

Much  cry  and  little  wool 135 

*   Breaking  of  the  second  Confederate  line  of  defence  .         .        136 

Naval  battle  at  Memphis 137 

Van  Dorn  begins  to  fortify  Vicksburg         .         .         .         .138 

The  Confederate  ram  Arkansas 139 

Destruction  of  the  Arkansas ;  Van  Dorn  fortifies  Port  Hud 
son  140 

A  melancholy  tale  of  lost  opportunities  .         .         .         .141 

Military  and  political  importance  of  Chattanooga        .        142,  143 

Mitchel's  brilliant  raid  in  Alabama 143 

Why  Buell  was  "  slow ;  "  because  he  had  an  Old  Man  of  the 

Sea,  yclept  Halleck,  bestriding  his  shoulders  .         .        144 

Halleck's  innocent  hope  that  the  enemy  would  do  what  he 
desired  him  to  do          ........  145 

V  Beauregard   is   superseded  by   Braxton   Bragg,  who  leaves 
Van   Dorn  to  cover  Vicksburg,  while  he  himself  seizes 

Chattanooga 145 

How  Halleck  frittered  away  a  golden  opportunity          .         .  146 
How  the  said  Halleck  was  called  to  Washington  as  general- 
in-chief,    because    of   Grant's   victory   at    Fort    Donelson, 
Grant's  and  Buell's  at  Shiloh,  and  other  western  successes        147 
How  he  forthwith  proceeded  to  do  as  the  enemy  wished  by 
removing  McClellan's  army  from  the  James  river,  and  thus 
exposing  the  northern  states  to  invasion       ....  148 


Contents  xvii 

Bragg  is   emulous  of  Lee,  and  prepares  the  way  by  great 
cavalry  raids    ...         ......        149 

Meanwhile  Buell  is  "  slow  "  because  the  government  will  give 
him  no  help  in  getting  cavalry,  but  expects  him  to  chase 
cavalry  with  infantry  ........  149 

Kirby  Smith  defeats  Nelson  at  Richmond,  in  Kentucky     .        149 
Bragg  invades  Kentucky          .......  150 

Panic  throughout  the  northern  states  ....        151 

Defect  in  the  Confederate  strategy  ;  Kirby  Smith's  move 
ments  should  have  been  distinctly  controlled  by  Bragg ; 
too  many  cooks  .........  152 

Battle  of  Perryville 153 

Battle  of  luka 154 

Rosecrans  defeats  Van  Dorn  at  Corinth  ....  155 
Van  Dorn  is  unwisely  superseded  by  Pemberton  .  .  .155 
Buell  is  made  a  scapegoat  for  Halleck  ....  156 
How  Buell  incurred  the  enmity  of  Oliver  Morton  and  Andrew 

Johnson 157,  158 

Buell  is  superseded  by  Rosecrans  ....  159,  160 
The  battlefield  of  Stone  river  or  Murfreesboro,  and  the 

arrangement  of  the  Confederate  troops         ....  161 
The  arrangement  of  the  Union  troops  at  Stone  river .         .       162 

Rosecrans's  plan  of  attack 163 

Bragg's  plan  of  attack        .......       164 

Faulty  position  of  the  Union  right  wing          .        .        .  165,  166 

McCook's  want  of  vigilance 167 

The  Confederate  attack,  and  rout  of  two  Union  divisions  167,  168 
The  Union  army  thrown  upon  the  defensive  .  .  .  169 

Sheridan's  magnificent  fighting 170 

Thomas  stands  invincible,  while  Rosecrans  forms  a  new  battle- 
front  171 

Failure  of  Bragg's  original  plan 172 

Terrific  but  fruitless  attacks  upon  Palmer,  who  holds  the 

Round  Forest 173 

The  Confederates  baffled  .  174 


xviii  Contents 

Results  of  the  day's  fighting  175 

Renewal  of  the  battle  ;  retreat  of  the  Confederates        .        .  176 
Comments 177,  178 

CHAPTER  V 

THE   VICKSBURG   PROBLEM 

Physical  characteristics  of  the  Mississippi  river       .         .         .  179 ' 

The  bayous 180 

The  bluffs 181 

Mutual  relations  of  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson         .        182,  183 
Unapproachableness  of  Vicksburg  from  the  South          .         .  184 

And  from  the  north 185 

How  Halleck  lost  the  opportunity  in  1862      ....  186 
Grant's  position  and  forces  at  Corinth          ....        187 
Grant's  first  movement  against  Vicksburg  by  way  of  the 
Mississippi  Central  railroad  .....  188,  189 

The  outflanking  strategy 189,  190 

The  task  of  supplying  an  army  ;    difficulties  and  dangers 

attendant  upon  lengthening  the  line  of  communications  191, 192 
Rivers  more  secure  than  lines  of  railroad    .         .         .        193,  194  ' 
Insecurity  of  Grant's  position  at  Oxford           .         .         .  194,  195 
Sherman  moves  down  the  Mississippi  river   against   Vicks 
burg          196 

Mr.  Davis's  mistake  in  reinforcing  Vicksburg  from  Tennessee, 

rather  than  from  Arkansas 197 

Forrest's  raid  upon  the  railroads  and  telegraph  lines  in  Ten 
nessee       198 

Van  Dorn  captures  Holly  Springs,  and  Grant  is  thus  com 
pelled  to  retreat  upon  Grand  Junction         ....  199 
Sherman  is  defeated  at  Chickasaw  bayou    .         .         .       200-202 

McClernand's  ambitious  schemes 202-205 

Capture  of  Arkansas  Post 205 

McClernand  and  his  "  star  " 206 

Evils  of  amateur  generalship 207 


Contents  xix 

Why  Grant  moved  to  the  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi  .  .  208 
His  first  plan,  thus  abandoned,  was  the  correct  one,  had  he 

been  properly  supported  by  the  government  .         .          .        209 
The  situation  in  front  of  Vicksburg  ;  various  alternatives  210,  211 

"  Grant's  big  ditch  " 212 

The  Lake  Providence  experiment 213,  214 

The  Yazoo  Pass  experiment 214-217 

Fort  Pemberton  proves  an  insuperable  obstacle  .  .  217,  218 
The  Big  Sunflower  experiment 218-220 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE   FALL   OF   VICKSBURG 

The  armoured  gunboats  Queen  of  the  West  and  Indianola  221, 222 

Moral  effect  of  a  dummy  monitor 222 

Farragut's  fleet  runs  past  the  batteries  of  Port  Hudson  .  .  224 
Complaints  against  Grant ;  a  gloomy  outlook  .  .  224,  225 
Grant's  dogged  determination  ......  225 

Fresh  alternatives 226 

The  great  southward  movement  to  Bruinsburg  .  .  227,  228 
Grant  crosses  to  the  east  bank  of  the  Mississippi  .  228,  229 

First  victory  ;  at  Port  Gibson 229,  230 

The  Confederates  evacuate  Grand  Gulf       ....        230 
The  critical  moment  in  a  great  career     .....  231 
A  situation  bristling  with  difficulties            ....       232 
Grant's  sublime  audacity  ;  he  cuts  loose  from  his  communi 
cations  233,  234 

Grierson's  extensive  cavalry  raid 234 

Grant  moves  eastward  toward  the  city  of  Jackson  .  .  .  235 
Second  victory  ;  at  Raymond  ......  236 

Third  victory ;  at  Jackson 236 

Pemberton  completely  hoodwinked  ;  Grant  turns  westward  237 
Fourth  victory  ;  at  Champion's  Hill ;  decisive  .  .  .  238 

Fifth  victory  ;  at  Big  Black  river 239 

Fall  of  Haines  Bluff  .  240 


xx  Contents 

A  marvellous  campaign       .         .         .         .         .         .         .241 

Vicksburg  is  invested 242 

Two  unsuccessful  assaults  ;  why  the  second  one  was  made  243 

Dismissal  of  McClernand  for  insubordination           .         .         .  244 

The  siege  of  Vicksburg  ;  mule  meat  in  demand          .         .  245 

Surrender  of  Vicksburg            .......  246 

The  turning  point  of  the  Civil  War 247 

CHAPTER  VII 

CHICKAMAUGA 

Importance  of  Chattanooga 248 

The  loyal  mountaineers  of  the  Alleghanies         .         .         .       249 
The  upper  Tennessee  river  not  a  good  line  of  communica 
tions     250 

How  the  opportunity  was  lost  in  1862         ....       251 

The  cavalry  raids  of  1863 252 

Their  diligence  in  the  destruction  of  railroads  .  .  .  253 
Why  Rosecrans  was  so  long  in  starting  .....  254 
How  Halleck  tried  to  hasten  matters,  and  how  Rosecrans 

snubbed  him 254,  255 

Comparative  "  slowness  "  of  Rosecrans  and  Buell  .         .         .  255 

Rosecrans  decides  to  move 256 

By  skilful  manoeuvres  he  drives  Bragg  back  upon  Chatta 
nooga     ..........  256,  257 

Description  of  the  difficult  mountainous  approaches  to  Chat 
tanooga     258-260 

In  moving  over  the   mountains  Rosecrans   greatly  extends 

his  front 201 

Bragg  evacuates  Chattanooga  and  moves  to  Lafayette  .  262 
Seeds  of  disaster  in  the  extension  of  the  Union  lines  .  .  262 
Two  alternatives  presented  to  Rosecrans  ....  263 

He  chooses  the  wrong  one 263,  264 

An  appalling  situation 264 

Bragg  loses  the  golden  opportunity          .....  265 


Contents  xxi 

Rosecrans  slowly  concentrates  his  forces ;  McCook's  delay, 

and  its  evil  results 266 

Arrival  of  Long-street  with  his  corps 267 

The  problem  at  Chickamauga 268 

First  day  of  the  battle 269 

Morning  of  the  second  day  ;  the  fatal  order  .  .  .  270 
The  dire  catastrophe  ;  rout  of  the  Federal  right  wing  .271,  272 

An  appalling  crisis 272 

Thomas,  with  the  left  wing,  retreats  to  Horseshoe  Ridge  .  273 
Some  of  the  most  desperate  fighting  recorded  in  history  .  274 

The  "  Rock  of  Chickamauga  " 275 

Rosecrans  and  Garfield  misinformed 276 

A  brave  man  stunned  by  sudden  calamity  ....  277 
The  battle  was  lost,  but  Thomas  saved  the  army  .  .  278 
Awful  slaughter 279,  280 

CHAPTER  VIII 

CHATTANOOGA 

Bragg  seizes  Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge,  and 

lays  siege  to  Rosecrans  in  Chattanooga  .  .  .  281,  282 
Joseph  Wheeler  attacks  the  supply  trains,  and  the  rain 

proves  even  a  worse  enemy 283 

Hooker  arrives  upon  the  scene  with  two  corps  .  .  .  284 
Grant  is  placed  in  command  of  all  the  forces  west  of  the 

Alleghanies,  and  supersedes  Rosecrans  by  Thomas  .  285 
Jefferson  Davis  utters  a  prophecy  from  Pulpit  Rock  .  .  286 

Grant  arrives  at  Chattanooga 287 

A  happy  thought  occurs  to  "  Baldy  "  Smith  ....  287 
The  scheme  for  opening  a  new  line  of  communications 

through  Brown's  Ferry 288,  289 

Its  complete  success         ........  290 

Hooker  occupies  Lookout  valley  and  repels  a  midnight 

attack  by  Longstreet 291 

The  siege  of  Chattanooga  was  thus  raised  .  .  .  292 


xxii  Contents 

Bragg  sends   Longstreet  into   eastern   Tennessee   to   crush 

Burnside 293 

What  could  have  induced  him  thus  to  weaken  his  army  ?      .  294 

A  possible  explanation 295 

Sherman  starts  from  Vicksburg-  for  Chattanooga,  and  shows 
that,  while  weighted  with  Halleck,  he  can  move  as  slowly 

as  Buell 296 

But  a  despatch  from  Grant  frees  him,  and  he  arrives         .       297 

Importance  of  Chickamauga  station 298 

Sherman's  stealthy  advance  toward  it  ...  298,  299 
Thomas  captures  Orchard  Knob  and  the  adjacent  hills  .  300 
Breaking  of  the  bridge  at  Brown's  Ferry  ....  301 
Sherman  reaches  the  north  end  of  Missionary  Ridge  .  301,  302 

His  disappointment 302,  303 

Effect  of  the  broken  bridge  upon  Hooker's  movements  303,  304 
Geary  leads  the  way  up  Lookout  Mountain  .  .  .  305 
Hooker  follows ;  storming  of  the  mountain ;  the  "  battle 

above  the  clouds  " 306 

The  stars  and  stripes  hoisted  over  Pulpit  Rock  .         .       307 

Absurdity  of  the  notion  that  the  battle  of  Chattanooga  was 

fought  as  Grant  originally  planned  it  ...   307,  308 

Progress  of  Sherman's  attack  upon  Bragg's  right  .  .  308 
Hooker  moves  against  Bragg's  left  by  way  of  Rossville  .  309 
Bragg  weakens  his  centre  to  strengthen  his  right  .  .  310 
Grant  decides  to  threaten  Bragg's  centre,  in  order  to  aid 

Sherman's  attack 310 

The  orders  to  the  storming  line  .         .         .         .         .        311 

Magnificent  bayonet  charge  of  Thomas's  four  divisions  .  311 

Without  orders  they  continue  the  charge  up  the  slope  of  Mis 
sionary  Ridge  .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .312 

A  moment  of  anxiety  for  Grant  and  Thomas  .         .         .  312 

The  four  divisions  reach  the  crest  of  the  ridge  and  crush 
Bragg's  centre          ........       313 

While  Hooker  routs  his  left  wing  ;  total  defeat  of  the  Con 
federates  .   313,314 


Contents  xxiii 

Greatness  of  the  Union  victory 314 

Grand  scenery  of  the  battlefield 315 

The  Mississippi  valley  recovered 316 


CHAPTER  IX 

NASHVILLE 

At  the  beginning  of  1864  each  of  the  four  cardinal  victories 

in  the  West  had  been  won  under  the  leadership  of  Grant    .  317 
But  Lee,  in  the  East,  still  maintained  as  bold  a  front  as  ever  317 

Need  for  unity  of  operations 318 

Grant  is  made  lieutenant-general  and  placed  in  command  of 
all  the  armies  of  the  United  States      ....   318,  319 

In  his  first  Virginia  campaign  he  was  outgeneralled  by  Lee      320 
The  popular  notion  that  Grant  was  averse  to  mano3uvring     .   321 
In  fact  his  maiuBuvres  were  frequent  and  skilful         .       321 ,  322 
After   three  months  of   alternate  hammering   and  manoeu 
vring,  Grant's  problem  was  reduced  to  detaining  Lee  at  Pe 
tersburg  until  the  whole  Confederacy  should  be  knocked 
away  from  behind  him         .......  323 

The  latter   part  of   the  work  was  done  by  the  army  with 

which  Sherman  started  from  Chattanooga  for  Atlanta   .       323 
Sherman,    having   succeeded   Grant  in   the    chief  command 
of   the  West,  unites  its  three  armies  under  McPherson, 

Thomas,  and  Schofield 324 

Bragg  is  superseded  by  Joseph  Johnston              .         .         .       324 
Sherman's   object  is  secondarily  to   take  Atlanta,  but  pri 
marily  to  destroy  Johnston's  army 325 

How  the  golden  opportunity  was  lost  at  Resaca          .       325,  326 
Johnston,  having  been  slowly  pushed  back  upon  Atlanta,  is 

superseded  by  Hood 327 

Hood's  previous  career         .......       328 

What  the  Union  generals  thought  of  his  appointment     .         .  329 
Finding  it  impossible,  after  hard  fighting,  to  save  Atlanta, 


xxiv  Contents 

Hood  evacuates  it,  and  thus  creates  a  difficult  situation  for 

Sherman 33d» 

Hood  assumes  the  offensive  and  strikes  at  Sherman's  com 
munications          .         .        .         .         .         .         .         .         .331 

He  makes  up  his  mind  to  invade  Tennessee  .  .  .  332 
His  dreams  of  glory,  and  his  fatal  delay  at  Tuscumbia  .  333 

Sherman  marches  to  the  sea-coast,  leaving  Thomas  to  dispose 

of  Hood 334 

Ought  not  Sherman  to  have  left  more  men  with  Thomas  ?  .  335 
Thomas's  forces,  present  and  prospective  .  .  .  330,  337 
Hood  crosses  the  Tennessee  river  at  Florence,  and  marches 

northward 337 

Schofield's  retreat  through  Spring  Hill  to  Franklin  .  .  338 
Hood  loses  an  opportunity  .  .  .  „  .  .  339 

Position  of  the  Federal  army  at  Franklin  ....  340 
Further  retreat  upon  Nashville  ordered  by  Thomas  .  .  341 
Furious  charge  of  the  Confederates  upon  the  Federal  lines  at 

Franklin  .         .         . 341,342 

They  are  defeated  with  terrible  slaughter       .         .         •   343,  344 
Wilson  defeats  the  Confederate  cavalry      ....       343 

Schofield  effects  a  junction  with  Thomas  at  Nashville    .         .  344 
Hood  follows  and  entrenches  himself  close  by     .         .        344,  345 
Why  Thomas  was  not  ready  to  attack  Hood  .         .         .   345,  346 
Grant's  impatience       .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .       347 

He  sends  Logan  on  a  needless  journey  to  Louisville,  and 
going-  himself  to  Washington,  is  barely  saved  from  com 
mitting  a  gross  act  of  injustice 348 

Grant's  unsatisfactory  account  of  this  affair  in  his  "  Memoirs  "  349 
Position  of  Thomas's  army  at  Nashville  ....  350 
Position  of  Hood's  army  .  .  .  .  .  •  .351 

Hood's  imminent  peril          .......        352 

Splendid  tactics  of  Thomas 353,  354 

Advance  of  the  Federal  right  wing  ....  354,  355 
Outposts  taken  ;  Hood's  left  wing  broken  ....  355 
Hood's  new  position  next  day  ;  the  salient  at  Shy  Hill  .  356 


Contents  xxv 

The  assault  upon  Overton  Hill 357 

The  assaults  upon  Shy  Hill ;  total  rout  of  the  Confederates  358 
A  pursuit  of  ten  days,  and  annihilation  of  Hood's  army  .  350 
Results  of  Thomas's  great  victory  ....  359,  360 

MAPS 

(All  from  sketches  by  the  author) 

The  Campaigns  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky         Frontispiece 
The  Strategic  Position  of  Missouri      .         .         .  Facing  page     24 

Fort  Donelson,  February  13-16,  1862 56 

Shiloh,  April  6,  1862,  morning 74 

Shiloh,  April  6,  1862,  evening 86 

Shiloh,  April  7,  1862,  morning 94 

New  Madrid  and  Island  Number  Ten,  March  3-April  7, 1862  102 
Stone  River,  December  31,  1862,  morning  .  .  .  .162 
Stone  River,  December  31,  1862,  evening  ....  172 
Grant's  First  Movement  against  Vicksburg,  November  24, 

1862-January  10,  1863 188 

The  Lake  Providence  Experiment,  February  and  March,  1863  214 
The  Yazoo  Pass  and  Big  Sunflower  Experiments,  February 

and  March,  1863 216 

Vicksburg  and  its  Approaches,  May,  1863  ....  226 
Chattanooga  and  its  Approaches,  September,  1863  .  .  260 

Chickamauga,  September  19,  1863 266' 

Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863,  morning       ...       268 

Chickamauga,  the  fatal"  order 270 

Chickamauga,  September  20,  1863,  evening  ...  274 
Environs  of  Chattanooga,  October-November,  1863  .  .  288 
Campaigns  of  Sherman  and  Thomas  in  1864  ...  326 

Franklin,  November  30,  1864 340 

Nashville,  December  15,  1864 350 

Nashville,  December  16,  1864 356 


THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY 
IN  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


CHAPTER  I 
FROM   ST.   LOUIS   TO   BELMONT 

MY  object  in  the  present  narrative  is  to  exhibit 
an  outline  of  the  military  events  which  brought 
about  the  overthrow  of  the  Southern  Confederacy 
by  turning  its  left  flank.  In  this  mighty  work 
the  successive  conquests  of  Vicksburg  and  Chatta 
nooga  were  cardinal  events  of  no  less  importance 
than  the  final  conquest  of  Richmond.  We  have 
here  to  follow,  from  their  first  small  beginnings  in 

the  state  of  Missouri,  the  military  trans-   c 

J  t  Scope  of  the 

actions,  growing  ever  vaster  in  dimen-   present  nar- 
sions,  which  culminated  in  the  course   ratlve- 
of  the  year  1863  in  the  capture  of  the  two  great 
strongholds  that   dominated   the  lower  waters  of 
the  Mississippi  and  the  upper  reaches  of  the  Ten 
nessee.     After  the  close  of  this  continuous  story, 
a   crowning   episode  will   claim  our  attention,  in 
the  decisive  victory  at  Nashville,  which  left  Sher 
man's  army  free  to  advance  upon  the  rear  of  Vir- 


2     The,  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

ginia,  thus  sealing  the  doom  of  the  exhausted  Con 
federacy.  Our  story  may  best  begin  by  calling 
attention  to  the  circumstances  which  made  Ken 
tucky  and  Missouri  supremely  important  in  the 
spring  of  1861. 

While  all  the  Gulf  states  were  prompt  in  follow 
ing  the  lead  of  South  Carolina  and  passing  ordi 
nances  of  secession,  the  action  of  their  neighbours 
to  the  northward  was  slow  and  vacillating.  The 
people  of  the  border  states  did  not  in  general  wish 
to  secede,  but  many  of  them  believed  in  the  con 
stitutional  right  of  secession,  and  held  that  if  the 
Gulf  states  wished  to  leave  the  Union  the  Federal 
Importance  government  had  no  right  to  retain  them 
of  the  border  by  force.  Accordingly  there  was  no 
decisive  action  until  after  the  fall  of 
Fort  Sumter  and  President  Lincoln's  proclamation 
calling  upon  the  loyal  states  for  75,000  men  to 
aid  in  restoring  the  authority  of  the  government. 
Then  the  southern  zone  of  border  states  —  North 
Carolina,  Tennessee,  and  Arkansas  —  at  once  se 
ceded  from  the  Union  and  joined  the  Confederacy. 
Enormous  political  consequences  now  depended 
upon  the  action  of  the  four  remaining  border 
states,  —  Maryland,  Virginia,  Kentucky,  and  Mis 
souri.  The  most  powerful  of  the  four,  —  the  state 
which  had  given  birth  to  Washington  and  Jefferson 
and  Marshall ;  the  state  which  had  once  been  as- 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  3 

rayed  in  sympathy  with  Massachusetts  and  in  op 
position  to  South  Carolina  in  its  attitude  toward 
negro  slavery,  —  the  great  state  of  Virginia,  was 
won  over  to  the  side  of  the  Confederacy,  yet  not 
without  a  bitter  struggle.  So  irreconcilable  was  the 
diversity  of  interests  and  sentiments  that  the  state 
was  torn  in  twain,  the  doctrine  of  secession  received 
an  unexpected  and  unwelcome  illustration,  and  the 
sturdy  Virginians  west  of  the  Alleghanies  straight 
way  formed  a  new  commonwealth  pledged  to  the 
defence  of  the  Union.  But  even  as  thus  curtailed, 
the  accession  of  Virginia  to  the  southern  cause  was 
an  event  of  the  first  importance.  When  once  her 
hand  had  found  this  thing  to  do,  she 
did  it  with  all  her  might,  and  for 
lavish  expenditure  of  blood  and  treasure  Virginia 
was  foremost  in  the  War  of  Secession.  It  was  not 
simply,  however,  in  the  physical  strength  which 
she  added  to  the  Confederacy  that  the  accession  of 
Virginia  was  so  important.  There  was  the  moral 
prestige  of  the  grand  historic  associations  which 
clustered  about  the  home  of  Washington ;  there 
was  the  military  advantage  of  a  position  which 
threatened  the  Federal  capital  and  exposed  the  soil 
of  the  northern  states  to  invasion  ;  there  was  the 
spell  which  these  things  cast  upon  the  imagination 
of  European  statesmen,  tempting  them  to  interfere 
in  the  struggle ;  and  moreover,  Virginia  was  still, 


4     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

as  in  the  Revolutionary  period,  a  country  fertile 
in  leaders  of  men.  But  for  her  secession  it  would 
doubtless  have  been  Robert  Lee,  with  Stonewall 
Jackson  as  his  right  arm,  that  would  have  led  the 
Union  soldiers  to  speedy  victory.  Take  away  from 
the  history  of  the  southern  army  these  names  with 
those  of  Joseph  Johnston,  Ambrose  Hill,  Ewell, 
Stuart,  Early,  and  Pickett,  and  how  different  that 
history  would  have  been !  It  is  not  too  much 
to  say  that,  except  for  Virginia,  the  summer  of 
1862  might  have  seen  the  rebellion  completely 
suppressed.  Was  it  not  Virginia  that,  stubborn 
and  defiant  to  the  last,  held  even  the  indomitable 
conqueror  of  the  southwest  at  bay  until  his  great 
lieutenant,  sweeping  from  the  mountains  to  the  sea 
and  turning  northward  straight  toward  Richmond, 
had  cut  away  from  her  all  the  rest  of  the  Confed 
eracy,  leaving  her  to  fall  alone,  vanquished  but  not 
humiliated  ? 

The  task  of  suppressing  so  great  a  rebellion 
was  herculean.     All  the  world  except  the  Ameri 
cans  of  the  northern  states  —  and  some  even  of 
these  —  believed  it  to  be  impossible.     If  the  re 
maining   border  states  had    followed  the  lead  of 
Virginia,  it  might  have  proved  to  be  impossible. 
The    attitude  of   Maryland   in  April, 
1861,   was   very   dangerous.     Endless 
gratitude  is  due  to  the  unwavering  loyalty  of  Gov- 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  5 

ernor  Hicks,  and  to  the  promptness  with  which 
John  Andrew  hurried  the  forces  of  Massachusetts 
to  the  front.  But  for  these  men  the  first  task  of 
the  Federal  army  might  have  been  to  win  back  the 
Federal  capital. 

As  the  action  of  Maryland  was  thus  important 
by  virtue  of  her  position,  so  the  action  of  Ken 
tucky  and  Missouri  was  important  by  virtue  of 
their  sheer  magnitude.  Not  that  the  strategic 
position  was  not  here,  too,  of  vast  importance. 
The  panic  along  the  right  bank  of  the  Ohio,  upon 
General  Bragg's  approach  in  the  summer  of  1862, 
may  serve  to  remind  us  how  unpleasant  it  would 
have  been  for  the  North  had  the  area  and  the 
forces  of  Kentucky  been  added  to  the  Confeder 
acy  ;  and  the  mischief  that  might  have  Kentucky 
been  wrought  by  a  seceding  Missouri,  and  Missouri, 
controlling  the  Father  of  Waters  as  far  as  Bur 
lington  and  taking  the  state  of  Illinois  in  flank, 
would  perhaps  have  been  still  more  serious.  But 
the  magnitude  of  these  two  states  was  alone 
enough  to  make  their  action  of  critical  impor 
tance.  South  Carolina,  with  her  six  attendant 
states  upon  the  Gulf,  contained  a  population  of 
about  5,000,000  souls ;  the  secession  of  the  south 
ern  zone  of  border  states  immediately  added  2,500,- 
000  to  this  ;  the  secession  of  Virginia  added  an 
other  million.  It  was  high  time  for  this  to  stop. 


6     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Missouri  and  Kentucky,  if  they  had  left  the 
Union,  would  have  carried  over  yet  another  2,500,- 
000  souls  to  the  Confederacy,  besides  adding  to  it 
an  area  nearly  as  large  as  Italy.  Once  saved  to 
the  Union,  the  military  aid  rendered  by  Kentucky 
in  putting  down  the  rebellion  was  at  least  two 
thirds  as  great  as  that  rendered  by  Michigan ; 
and  gallant  Missouri,  with  25,000  fewer  white  men 
of  military  age  than  Massachusetts,  had  a  death- 
roll  in  the  Union  army  of  13,887,  while  that  of 
Massachusetts  was  13,942. 

It  would  be  difficult,  therefore,  to  overrate  the 
services  of  the  heroic  men  who  at  the  first  outbreak 
of  rebellion  succeeded  in  crushing  out  the  nascent 
secessionist  tendencies  in  those  two  powerful  states. 
Especial  praise  is  due  to  the  men  who  acted  thus 
decisively  and  promptly  in  Missouri.  If  they  had 
failed,  it  would  have  fared  ill  with  the  Union  cause 
in  Kentucky  also.  Flanked  on  the  right  by  so 
powerful  a  state  as  Missouri,  the  friends  of  the 
Federal  government  in  Kentucky  would  have  found 
it  hard  to  put  forth  their  full  strength.  But  as 
the  campaigns  of  McClellan  and  liosecrans  in 
West  Virginia  freed  Kentucky  from 

Missouri. 

lateral  pressure  on  the  east,  so  the 
prompt  action  of  a  few  high-minded  and  resolute 
men  in  Missouri  freed  her  from  lateral  pressure 
on  the  west,  and  made  it  possible  for  Grant  to 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  7 

strike  that  great  blow  at  Fort  Donelson  which 
first  carried  the  Union  forces  into  the  interior  of 
the  Confederacy.  It  was  in  Missouri  that  the 
long  series  of  events  was  set  in  motion  which  ter 
minated  in  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion.  From 
the  seizure  of  Camp  Jackson  in  1861  down  to  the 
appearance  of  Sherman's  army  in  the  rear  of  Vir 
ginia  in  1865,  there  may  be  traced  an  unbroken 
chain  of  causation.  As  we  look  along  this  line 
we  can  see  something  like  a  steady  progression 
of  events  toward  the  final  goal.  In  spite  of  occa 
sional  reverses  here  and  there,  we  see  the  Union 
arms  steadily  gaining  ground,  and  the  forces  of 
the  Confederacy  steadily  weakening,  from  the  be 
ginning  to  the  end  of  the  struggle.  A  different 
impression  is  obtained  if  we  confine  our  attention 
to  Virginia.  There  we  see  the  formidable  Lee  de 
feating  or  baffling  one  Union  general  after  another, 
remaining  unconquered  and  apparently  unconquer 
able,  until  at  last  with  his  swift  and  sudden  over 
throw  the  rebellion  seems  all  at  once  to  collapse 
like  a  bubble.  The  obstinate  resistance  of  Lee 
served  for  a  long  time  to  mask  the  desperate  con 
dition  into  which  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy 
were  sinking ;  and  the  student  of  that  history  can 
not  obtain  an  adequate  view  without  carefully  fol 
lowing  the  sequence  of  events  in  the  Mississippi 
Valley.  Bearing  this  in  mind,  we  shall  the  better 


8     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

appreciate  the  significance  of  the  stirring  scenes 
which  the  streets  of  St.  Louis  witnessed  in  the 
spring  and  summer  of  1861. 

Among  the  staunch  defenders  of  the  Union  at 
that  most  anxious  and  critical  moment,  the  fore 
most  name  was  that  of  the  younger  Francis  Preston 
Blair.  He  was  of  the  family  of  that  redoubtable 
Scottish  parson,  Dr.  James  Blair,  first  president 
of  William  and  Mary  College,  in  conflict  with 
whom  three  royal  governors  of  Virginia  had  one 
after  another  come  to  grief.1  His  father,  the 
elder  Francis  Preston  Blair,  long  time  editor  of 
the  "  Globe,"  was  one  of  the  ablest  exponents  of 
Jacksonian  Democracy,  and  deserved  high  honour 
for  the  energy  with  which  he  fought  against  the 
doctrine  of  nullification.  His  courage  and  weight 
of  sense  gave  him,  great  influence  with  President 
Lincoln,  of  whose  cabinet  his  eldest  son,  Montgom 
ery  Blair,  was  a  member.  The  younger  Francis 
Preston  Blair  had  lived  in  St.  Louis  since  1842, 
and  for  several  years  had  been  recognized  as  one 
of  the  leaders  of  the  Benton  wing  of  the  Demo- 
Francis  Pres-  cratic  party.  While  he  had  approved 
ton  Blair.  of  ^he  annexation  of  Texas,  and  had 
served  with  credit  in  the  ensuing  war  against  Mex 
ico,  he  was  always  consistently  opposed  to  the  exten 
sion  of  slavery  into  the  territories,  and  during  the 

1  See  my  Old  Virginia  and  Her  Neighbours,  ii.  118,  123,  oSU. 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  9 

stormy  administrations  of  Pierce  and  Buchanan 
he  set  his  face  unflinchingly  against  every  measure 
that  hinted  even  remotely  at  secession.  Few  men 
of  that  day  were  so  highly  endowed  with  political 
sagacity,  or  realized,  as  he  did,  the  tendency  of 
public  events  and  the  tremendous  nature  of  the 
struggle  into  which  we  were  drifting.  Along  with 
this  rare  foresight  he  was  endowed  with  a  lofty 
and  unselfish  public  spirit,  a  weight  of  character 
that  impressed  itself  upon  every  one,  and  a  cour 
age  that  nothing  could  daunt.  Such  a  man  is  a 
power  in  any  state.  I  have  heard  thoughtful  peo 
ple  in  Missouri  say  that  if  Virginia,  during  the  ten 
years  which  preceded  the  Civil  War,  had  possessed 
one  such  citizen  as  Francis  Blair  maintaining  such 
a  political  attitude  as  he  maintained  in  Missouri, 
she  might  have  been  found  in  1861  devoting  all 
her  mighty  energies  to  the  preservation  of  the 
Union.  I  have  heard  this  said  repeatedly  by  men 
accustomed  to  weigh  their  words,  and  —  whatever 
may  be  thought  of  the  implication  as  to  Virginia 
—  it  serves  to  show  the  esteem  in  which  Blair  was 
held  by  those  who  knew  him. 

The  most  interesting  moment  in  the  career  of 
this  man  was  the  spring  of  1861.  It  had  been 
largely  due  to  him  and  the  able  men  whom  he  di 
rectly  influenced  that  the  Union  sentiment  in  Mis 
souri  was  so  strong  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 


10     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

It  needed  all  the  strength  it  could  summon,  for 
the  friends  of  secession  were  busy  and  shrewd. 
Among  them  was  counted  the  governor,  Claiborne 
Jackson,  who  sought  to  veil  his  purpose  with  fair 
professions  of  loyalty.  The  governor  was  secretly 
helped  by  a  considerable  party  in  the  legislature. 
Secrecy  was  forced  upon  them  by  the  action  of  the 
state  convention  in  February  in  declaring  itself 
emphatically  opposed  to  secession.  The  efforts  of 
the  conspirators  were  directed  toward  the  gath 
ering  of  a  secessionist  state  militia  and  the  seizure 
of  the  United  States  arsenal  at  St.  Louis,  which 
contained  some  60,000  stand  of  arms  with  a  great 
store  of  other  munitions  of  war.1 

But  Blair  was  beforehand  with  them.  He  sent 
intelligence  to  Washington  which  led  General  Scott 
to  despatch  a  small  force  of  regular  troops  for 
the  protection  of  the  arsenal  under  command  of 
Nathaniel  Lyon,  of  Connecticut,  a  captain  of  the 
Second  United  States  Infantry,  a  man  of  bound 
less  energy  and  untiring  vigilance.  Lyon  soon 
succeeded  in  getting  together  some  500  men ;  and 
Nathaniel  when  in  April  the  governor  refused  to 
Lyon.  ca;Q  for  troops  in  answer  to  President 

Lincoln's  proclamation,  Blair  took  the  matter  in 
hand,  and  on  his  own  responsibility  raised  several 
regiments  of  loyal  militia,  known  as  "  Home 

1  Snead,  The  Fight  for  Missouri,  p.  100. 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  11 

Guards."  Blair  and  Lyon  were  kindred  spirits  ; 
a  warm  friendship  sprang  up  between  them,  and 
they  worked  zealously  and  efficiently  together. 
Governor  Jackson  solicited  a  supply  of  arms  and 
ammunition  from  the  Confederate  government, 
and  began  recruiting  volunteers  for  the  defence 
of  the  state.  The  enemy  against  whom  such  de 
fence  was  deemed  necessary  was  the  United  States. 
The  governor's  outward  show  of  loyalty  was  such 
that  it  was  difficult  to  offer  any  opposition  to  his 
proceedings  at  this  early  stage ;  but  to  wait  for  an 
overt  act  which  should  publish  to  the  world  his 
true  intentions  would  be  the  height  of  folly.  It 
would  be  simply  giving  him  the  initiative,  and 
Blair  was  not  the  man  to  commit  such  pi0ts  and 
a  blunder.  He  could  thwart  a  plot  by  <*>unter- 

J     plots ;"  rebel- 

a  counterplot,  if   necessary;   and   for   lion  against 
some  time  his   actions  wore  the  sem-   Missouri-" 
blance  of  rebellion  against  the  legally  constituted 
government  of  Missouri.     What  he  represented  in 
that  state  was  the  authority  of  the  United  States, 
which  the  state  government  could  not  be  trusted 
to  support.     Under  such  abnormal  circumstances 
a  certain  amount  of  irregularity,  distressing  to  the 
souls  of  those  dear  old  parchment  worthies,  John 
Doe  and  Richard  Roe,  was  unavoidable. 

On  the  last  day  of  April  the  following  remark 
able  order  was  addressed  by  the  War  Department 


12     27ie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

at  Washington  to  "  Captain  Nathaniel  Lyon,  com 
manding  Department  of  the  West :  " 

"The  President  of  the  United  States  directs 
that  you  enroll  in  the  military  service  of  the 
United  States  loyal  citizens  of  St.  Louis  and  vi 
cinity,  not  exceeding,  with  those  heretofore  en 
listed,  ten  thousand  in  number,  for  the  purpose 
of  maintaining  the  authority  of  the  United  States 
and  for  the  protection  of  the  peaceable  inhabit 
ants  of  Missouri,  and  you  will  if  deemed  neces 
sary  for  that  purpose  by  yourself  and  Messrs.  Oli 
ver  D.  Filley,  John  How,  James  O.  Broadhead, 
Samuel  T.  Glover,  J.  J.  Witzig,  and  Francis  P. 
Blair,  Jr.,  proclaim  martial  law  in  the  city  of  St. 
Louis." 

On  the  back  of  this  document  was  written 
by  General  Scott,  general-in-chief  of  the  United 
States  Army,  "It  is  revolutionary  times,  and 
therefore  I  do  not  object  to  the  irregularity  of 
this.  —  W.  S. ;  "  and  the  whole  was  confirmed  by 
the  terse  endorsement :  "  Approved  April  30, 1861. 
-A.Lincoln."1 

A  few  days  before  the  arrival  of  this  order  — 
which  virtually  constituted  Blair  and   Lyon  and 
the  other  five  gentlemen  named  into  a  revolution 
ary  Committee  of  Safety  —  Lyon  had   taken  the 
precaution  of  moving  the  greater  portion  of  the 

1  Snead,  The  Fight  for  Missouri,  p.  165. 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  13 

arms  stored  in  the  arsenal  into  the  state  of  Illinois 
for  safe-keeping.  This  sudden  removal  check 
mated  a  neat  little  scheme  of  Governor 

Keraoval  ot 

Jackson.  In  accordance  with  a  stat-  arms  from 
ute  of  1858  it  was  the  custom  for  the  thearsenal- 
commander  of  each  militia  district  in  Missouri  to 
assemble  his  men  on  the  3d  of  May  every  year 
at  some  convenient  place  within  his  district,  and 
there  go  into  encampment  for  one  week.  It 
was  Jackson's  intention  to  have  the  camp  for  the 
First  District  assembled  on  the  hills  near  the 
arsenal,  in  a  position  favourable  for  a  coup  de 
main  upon  that  coveted  place.  But  before  April 
was  over  Lyon  had  not  only  removed  the  arms, 
but  had  occupied  the  hills  with  batteries  guarded 
by  infantry.  The  commander  of  the  district, 
therefore,  —  Daniel  Frost,  a  gentleman  whose  loy 
alty  to  the  state  government  could  be  counted  on, 
—  selected  another  place  for  his  encampment.  It 
was  a  charming  spot  known  as  Lindell's  Meadow, 
just  southeast  of  the  intersection  of  Grand  Avenue 
and  Olive  Street,  which  were  then  mere  plank 
roads.  This  camping  -  ground  was  entirely  en 
closed  by  a  strong  fence.  It  was  bap-  Camp  Jack- 
tized  Camp  Jackson,  in  honour  of  the  son< 
governor  ;  and  in  spite  of  that  gentleman's  profes 
sions  of  loyalty,  its  true  proclivities  were  betrayed 
by  the  names  "  Beauregard  "  and  "  Jeff  Davis  " 


14     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

applied  to  its  two  chief  avenues.1  In  this  pleasant 
field  of  May  were  gathered  about  700  men,  by 
no  means  all  secessionists,  but  all  bound  to  serve 
the  legally  constituted  government  of  the  state  of 
Missouri.  It  would  not  do  to  let  them  stay  there, 
and  on  May  7  Blair  and  Lyon  made  up  their 
minds  to  capture  Camp  Jackson. 

But  why  was  such  a  step  necessary  ?  The  legal 
existence  of  Camp  Jackson  would  terminate  within 
four  days  ;  why,  then,  such  haste  ?  Because  Gen 
eral  William  Selby  Haruey,  who  was  expected  to 
return  from  Washington  within  a  few  days,  was 
commander  of  the  Department  of  the  West,  and 
General  Captain  Lyon  was  only  acting  com- 

Hamey.  mander  during  his  absence.  Upon  Har- 

ney's  return  the  activity  of  Lyon  would,  for  a  while 
at  least,  be  held  in  abeyance.  Harney  was  a  brave 
and  loyal  soldier,  but  did  not  comprehend  the 
political  situation.  He  was  no  match  in  chicanery 
for  Jackson  and  his  friends,  who  would  be  sure 
to  find  reasons  for  keeping  Camp  Jackson  in  ex 
istence  as  long  as  suited  their  purposes.  On  the 
7th  of  May,  therefore,  it  was  high  time  for  Lyon 

1  This  was  denied  by  General  Frost  in  an  open  letter  to  me  in 
The  Republican,  St.  Louis,  April  22,  1886  ;  at  least  the  general 
remembered  nothing  of  the  sort.  On  the  other  hand,  Colonel 
Samuel  Simmons,  in  some  personal  reminiscences,  declares  that 
these  names  were  marked  upon  sign-boards.  See  Globe  Democrat, 
St.  Louis,  May  10,  1881. 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  15 

and  Blair  to  strike,  and  the  next  day  furnished 
them  with  an  excellent  occasion. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Governor  Jackson 
had  solicited  from  the  Confederate  government  at 
Montgomery  a  supply  of  warlike  material.     On 
the  night  of  May  8  the  siege  guns  and  howitzers 
sent  in  response  by  Jefferson  Davis  arrived  on  a 
steamer  from  Baton  Eouge,  packed  in    Armg  for 
boxes  marked  "Marble,"   shipped  as   Camp  Jack- 
merchandise,   and   consigned    to   per 
sons  well  known  for  their  Union  sentiments.     De 
spite  these  elaborate  blinds,  the  boxes  were  met 
at  the  wharf  by  the  persons  for  whom  they  were 
really  intended,  and  no  time  was  lost  in  hauling 
them  out  to  Camp  Jackson. 

A  fine  cordial  hospitality  was  dispensed  at  the 
camp  in  those  balmy  days  of  early  May.  The 
surgeon  of  Blair's  regiment  had  dined  there  on 
the  8th,  and  he  could  have  told  anybody,  says 
General  Frost,  "that  it  was  a  very  attractive 
place,  because  he  saw  it  filled  with  the  fairest  of 
Missouri's  daughters,  who  '  from  morn  to  dewy 
eve '  threaded  its  mazes  in  company  with  their 
sons,  brothers,  and  lovers.  He  could  also  have 
described  the  beautiful  United  States  flag  which 
waved  its  folds  in  the  breeze  from  the  flagstaff 
over  my  tent."  *  One  of  the  visitors  next  day 

1  Open  letter  from  General  Frost  to  Professor  Fiske,  The  Re 
publican,  St.  Louis,  April  22,  1886. 


16     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

came  in  a  light  open  carriage  then  known  as  a 
A  visitor  in  "Jenny  Lind,"  and  was  leisurely 
"bombazine.  driven  by  a  coloured  servant  up  and 
down  the  avenues  "  Jeff  Davis,"  "  Beauregard," 
and  "  Sumter,"  and  the  rest.  This  visitor, 
dressed  in  a  black  bombazine  gown  and  closely 
veiled,  was  a  familiar  sight  on  the  streets  of  St. 
Louis,  as  she  took  the  air  daily  in  her  light  car 
riage.  Everybody  recognized  her  as  Mrs.  Alexan 
der,  the  mother  of  Mrs.  Blair,  but  nobody  accosted 
her  or  expected  recognition  from  her  because  she 
was  known  to  be  blind.  What  should  have 
brought  this  elderly  lady  to  Camp  Jackson  ?  was 
it  simply  the  negro  coachman  gratifying  some 
curiosity  of  his  own  ? 

A  couple  of  hours  later,  as  Blair  was  sitting  in 
the  porch  of  the  southern  house  of  the  arsenal, 
chatting  with  Colonel  Simmons  and  a  few  other 
friends,  the  Jenny  Lind  carriage  drove  up,  and  the 
familiar  figure,  in  its  black  gown  and  veil,  alighted 
and  came  up  the  steps.  It  was  natural  enough 
that  Blair  should  greet  his  wife's  mother  and  escort 
her  into  the  house.  But  as  they  stepped  upon  the 
threshold,  a  slight  uplifting  of  the  bombazine  skirt 
A  lady  with  disclosed  a  sturdy  pair  of  cavalry  boots 
spurs.  J.Q  the  eyes  of  Colonel  Simmons  and 

another  gentleman,  who  glanced  at  each  other  sig 
nificantly  but  said  never  a  word. 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  17 

Had  the  close  veil  been  lifted,  it  would  have 
revealed  the  short  red  beard  and  piercing  blue  eyes 
of  Nathaniel  Lyon,  the  "  little  Connecticut  aboli 
tionist,"  as  some  called  him.1  His  Committee  of 
Safety  was  promptly  summoned  to  the  arsenal,  to 
hear  him  tell  how  he  had  "  satisfied  himself  by  per 
sonal  inspection  that  the  men  [at  Camp  Jackson] 
had  in  their  possession  arms  and  ammunition  which 
had  been  taken  from  the  United  States  Arsenal  at 
Baton  Rouge,  and  which,  therefore,  rightfully  be 
longed,  in  his  opinion,  to  the  Federal  government." 
It  was  necessary,  he  said,  to  seize  Camp  Jackson 
and  hold  its  men  as  prisoners  of  war.  In  this 
opinion  Blair,  Broadhead,  Witzig,  and  Filley  con- 

1  In  my  opening  lecture  at  St.  Louis,  April  15, 1880, 1  mentioned 
the  fact  of  Lyon's  visiting  Camp  Jackson  disguised  in  woman's 
clothes.  For  this  statement  I  was  taken  to  task  in  some  of  the 
newspapers,  which  derided  it  as  an  "  old  woman's  story,"  too  ab 
surd  for  belief.  I  was  thereupon  assured  by  several  members  of 
the  Blair  family,  friends  of  mine,  that  the  story,  although  an  old 
woman's,  was  literally  true.  In  proof  thereof  General  Blair's  son, 
Francis  Preston  Blair  the  third,  took  me  to  call  upon  his  grand 
mother,  Mrs.  Alexander,  a  fine  old  lady  of  eighty-three.  From 
her  lips  I  heard  the  story,  just  as  I  have  above  given  it,  and  she 
showed  me  the  bombazine  gown  and  close  veil  which  she  had  lent 
to  Lyon.  As  to  the  Simmons  incident,  it  was  told  me  by  Colonel 
Simmons  himself,  who  was  soon  afterward  on  Lyon's  staff,  and  at 
a  later  date  on  the  staff  of  General  Rosecrans  at  Stone  river. 

Mrs.  Alexander  was  Myra  Madison,  only  daughter  of  George 
Madison,  governor  of  Kentucky,  and  niece  of  James  Madison, 
bishop  of  Virginia  and  president  of  William  and  Mary  College. 


18     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

curred,  but  Glover  and  How  deprecated  any  rash 
action.  They  urged  that  inasmuch  as  Camp  Jack 
son  kept  the  stars  and  stripes  flying  and  had  not 
been  concerned  in  any  breach  of  the  peace,  it  would 
be  best  to  allow  its  brief  term  of  existence  to  ex 
pire  quietly ;  if  it  contained  stolen  property  of  the 
United  States,  the  best  way  to  get  it  was  to  send 
Replevin  vs.  tne  United  States  marshal  with  a  writ 
capture.  of  replevin,  supported  if  necessary  by 

Lyon's  troops.  Lyon  replied  that  the  camp  was  a 
mere  "  nest  of  traitors,"  that  the  legislature,  which 
had  just  been  convened  at  Jefferson  City,  might 
indefinitely  prolong  its  term  of  existence,  and  that 
as  for  Harney,  there  was  no  counting  upon  him. 
To  these  arguments  How  and  Glover  yielded,  but 
were  still  disposed  to  insist  upon  the  writ  of  re 
plevin,  which  to  Blair  and  Lyon  seemed  not  only 
a  subterfuge,  but  a  lame  one. 

Nevertheless,  at  a  meeting  of  Glover  with  two 
or  three  confidential  friends  that  night,  a  writ  was 
duly  prepared,  in  case  it  should  be  wanted  ;  and 
early  next  morning  my  dear  old  friend,  Colonel 
Thomas  Tasker  Gantt,  armed  with  the  precious 
document,  set  out  on  horseback  to  find  Blair. 
Gantt  himself  was  far  from  convinced 

burrender 

of  Camp          of  the  efficacy  of  the  replevin  method, 

but  he  was  willing  to  submit  the  case 

once  more  to  Blair's  master  mind.     A  few  miles 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  19 

below  the  city,  on  the  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  the 
solitary  horseman  met  his  friend  marching  up 
with  1000  men  from  Jefferson  Barracks.  "  Well, 
Frank,"  said  Gantt,  "  I  have  the  writ  of  replevin 
here  in  my  pocket."  Blair's  reply  was  more  forci 
ble  than  elegant ;  but  like  Cambronne's  famous 
exclamation  at  Waterloo,  it  was  forever  final,  and 
a  sense  of  relief  lightened  Colonel  Gantt's  mind 
as  he  reined  his  horse  about.  The  march  ended 
in  a  rendezvous  with  Lyon's  forces,  and  by  two 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  that  vigorous  commander 
had  invested  Camp  Jackson,  planted  his  batteries, 
and  sent  in  to  General  Frost  a  summons  to  sur 
render.  No  alternative  was  possible.  The  cap 
ture  was  effected  without  firing  a  shot,  but  it  was 
followed  by  an  unfortunate  affray  between  some  of 
Lyon's  troops  and  the  street  mob,  in  the  course  of 
which  about  thirty  lives  were  lost.  Next  day  all 
the  prisoners  but  one  were  released  on  parole. 

This  capture  of  Camp  Jackson  was  the  first 
really  aggressive  blow  at  secession  that  was  struck 
anywhere  within  the  United  States.  In  the  city 
of  St.  Louis  the  immediate  effect  seemed  magical. 
Secessionists  were  cowed,  and  Union  men  jubilant. 
On  Pine  Street,  near  Fifth,  there  was  a  building 
in  which  enemies  of  the  Union  were  wont  to  as 
semble,  and  for  some  time  it  had  flaunted  from 
one  of  its  windows  some  kind  of  a  rebel  flag.  As 


20     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

the  startling  news  from  Camp  Jackson  came  down 
Rebel  flag  Pine  Street,  an  authoritative  shout 
hauled  down,  ordered  the  emblem  of  secession  to 
be  taken  down,  and  down  it  came,  nevermore  to  be 
hoisted  in  St.  Louis.  The  scene  was  witnessed 
by  a  quiet  and  modest-looking  man,  who  forthwith 
stepped  upon  a  street-car  headed  toward  the  ar 
senal,  whither  he  was  going  to  congratulate  Lyon 
and  Blair.  A  dapper  youth,  voluble  with  rage 
and  scorn,  and  craving  sympathy,  came  on  board 
and  addressed  this  quiet  person  :  "  Things  have 
come  to  a  d — d  pretty  pass  when  a  free  people 
Colloquy  on  a  can?t  choose  their  own  flag.  Where 
street-car.  I  came  from,  if  a  man  dares  to  say 
a  word  in  favour  of  the  Union,  we  hang  him  to  a 
limb  of  the  first  tree  we  come  to."  The  quiet  man 
replied,  "  After  all,  we  are  not  so  intolerant  in  St. 
Louis  as  we  might  be ;  I  have  not  seen  a  single 
rebel  hung  yet,  nor  heard  of  one  ;  there  are  plenty 
of  them  who  ought  to  be,  however."  At  this  un 
expected  retort  the  dapper  young  man  collapsed. 
The  modest  person  who  uttered  it  was  a  middle- 
aged  man  quite  unknown  to  fame,  a  leather-dealer 
named  Ulysses  Simpson  Grant.1  On  that  same 
day,  among  the  bystanders  who  witnessed  some  of 
its  stirring  scenes  was  William  Tecumseh  Sher 
man,  president  of  the  Fifth  Street  railroad.2  The 

1  Grant's  Memoirs,  i.  2oG,  237. 

2  Sherman's  Memoirs,  i.  172-174. 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  21 

next  day  Grant  had  crossed  the  river  to  muster  in 
the  21st  regiment  of  Illinois  infantry,  of  which  he 
was  soon  afterward  appointed  colonel ;  and  three 
days  later  Sherman  was  called  to  Washington  to 
the  colonelcy  of  the  13th  Regular  infantry. 

On  the  memorable  afternoon  when  Camp  Jack 
son  surrendered,  the  governor  was  sitting  in  the 
state-house  at  Jefferson  City,  plotting  secession 
with  his  legislature.  At  the  news  of  Lyon's 
stroke,  flashed  over  the  telegraph  wires,  many 
cheeks  turned  pale  with  chagrin.  Fearing  that  he 
might  even  then  be  marching  on  the  capital,  the 
governor  took  the  precaution  to  have  a  railroad 
bridge  burned,  while  the  legislature  remained  in 
session  all  night  to  consider  what  had  best  be  done. 
Shortly  afterward  a  military  bill  was  passed,  cloth 
ing  the  governor  with  quasi-dictatorial  powers,  in 
virtue  of  which  he  went  on  diligently  organizing  a 
secessionist  militia,  and  appointed  to  command  it 
General  Sterling  Price,  an  active  and  sterling 
enterprising  officer,  born  in  Virginia,  Price- 
who  had  served  in  the  Mexican  War,  and  had 
been  governor  of  Missouri.  For  a  fortnight  Price 
seemed  to  be  having  everything  as  he  wished. 
After  Harney's  return,  on  May  11,  Price  inveigled 
him  into  an  arrangement  by  which  he  secured  for 
himself  the  initiative  in  all  the  work  of  calling  out 
the  military  force  of  the  state,  while  Harney's  at- 


22     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

titude  was  reduced  to  that  of  a  bystander.  Under 
these  favourable  circumstances  Price  worked  vigor 
ously  in  organizing  rebellion,  and  secretly  invited 
the  government  of  Arkansas  to  send  an  armed 
force  to  assist  him.  But  his  scheme  was  fathomed 
by  the  ever  watchful  Blair,  who  sent  such  reports 
to  Washington  that  on  the  18th  of  May  Presi 
dent  Lincoln  privately  authorized  Blair  to  remove 
General  Harney  from  the  chief  command  of  the 
department  whenever  he  should  deem  such  a  step 
required  by  the  public  safety.  In  pursuance  of 
this  order  Harney  was  removed  on  the  30th,  and 
Lyon  was  appointed  in  his  place,  with  the  rank  of 
brigadier-general. 

This  act  brought  things  to  a  crisis.  Jackson 
and  Price  understood  that  they  were  now  dealing 
with  men  who  could  not  be  hoodwinked,  but  before 
taking  extreme  measures  they  sought  an  interview 
with  Lyon  and  Blair.  A  safe-conduct  was  granted 
them,  and  on  the  llth  of  June  the  conference  was 
held  at  the  Planters'  Hotel  at  St.  Louis  ;  but  it 
came  to  nothing.  The  governor  insisted  that  the 
Home  Guards  should  be  disbanded  and 

The  crisis. 

all  .b  ederal  troops  sent  out  ot  the  state. 
Blair  would  not  listen  to  this,  but  insisted  that  the 
governor  should  disband  his  own  militia.  So  they 
parted.  Jackson  and  Price  returned  the  same 
night  to  Jefferson  City,  and  next  day,  throwing  off 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  23 

the  mask  which  could  no  longer  be  worn,  the  gov 
ernor  issued  a  proclamation  calling  for  50,000  men 
to  protect  the  state  against  the  Federal  "  invaders." 
But  Lyon  was  ready  to  strike.  He  embarked  his 
forces  on  three  swift  steamboats  and  ascended  the 
Missouri  river,  landing  at  Jefferson  City  on  the 
15th.  Once  more  the  stars  and  stripes  were  hoisted 
over  the  state-house.1  The  governor,  carrying 

1  In  my  lecture  for  the  Grant  monument  fund,  April  15,  1886, 
I  said  that  Governor  Jackson,  on  his  return  to  Jefferson  City, 
hoisted  a  secession  flag  over  the  state-house,  and  that  Lyon,  on 
the  15th,  hauled  down  this  flag  before  raising  the  stars  and 
stripes.  As  these  statements  were  called  in  question,  I  inquired 
of  Hon.  P.  T.  Miller,  of  the  state  treasury,  who  lived  in  Jeffer 
son  City  in  1861.  After  due  verification  of  his  recollections,  his 
reply  was,  "  No  flag  ever  floated  over  the  state  capitol  other  than 
the  stars  and  stripes."  Accepting  this  as  conclusive,  and  looking 
about  for  the  source  of  my  error,  I  found  it  in  my  too  hasty  read 
ing  of  two  despatches  printed  in  the  St.  Louis  Daily  Democrat, 
June,  1861.  The  two  are  as  follows  :  — 

"  Our  patriotic  governor,  with  his  no  less  patriotic  Commander- 
in-chief  of  that  band  of  traitors,  the  Missouri  State  Guard,  has 
returned  to  the  capital  and  issued  a  proclamation  ivhich  casts  aside 
all  pretences  of  loyalty,  and  raises  boldly  the  secession  flag,  under 
which  he  has  been  fraudulently  organizing  ever  since  the  Harney 
indulgence."  —  Letter  from  Jefferson  City,  June  13,  1861,  signed  H. 

"  [General  Lyon  and  his  troops]  marched  in  good  order  through 
the  city,  cheered  at  several  points,  and  finally  occupied  Capitol 
Hill  amid  tremendous  applause.  W.  II.  Lusk  was  the  happy 
individual  selected  to  raise  again  the  stars  and  stripes  over  the 
cupola,  which  he  did,  while  the  Jefferson  band  played  the  '  Star- 
Spangled  Banner.'  .  .  .  Old  ladies  wept,  and  every  one  seemed 
overjoyed  at  the  sight  once  more  of  the  old  flag."  —  Desjwtch 
from  Jefferson  City,  June  15,  1861. 


24     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

with  him  the  great  seal  of  the  state,  fled  fifty  miles 
up  the  river  to  Booneville,  while  Price  kept  on 
still  farther  to  Lexington.  Both  these  towns  were 
places  of  rendezvous  for  the  secessionist  militia,  but 
Lyon  understood  the  value  of  time  and  did  not 
leave  them  to  assemble  unmolested.  lie  left  the 
capital  on  the  16th,  arrived  at  Booneville  next 
Skirmish  at  morning,  and  in  a  short,  sharp  action 
Booneville.  routed  the  secessionists,  taking  their 
guns  and  many  prisoners.  Jackson  fled  toward 
the  southwestern  part  of  the  state,  with  Lyon  in 
hot  pursuit,  and  Price,  with  the  forces  gathered  at 
Lexington,  set  out  by  a  converging  route  to  join 
the  governor.  Meanwhile  Blair  had  despatched 
Colonel  Franz  Sigel,  a  veteran  of  the  German 
revolution  of  1849,  from  St.  Louis,  with  1500 
men,  to  intercept  Jackson  and  attack  him  before 
Price  could  come  to  the  rescue.  On  the  5th  of 
July  Sigel  met  Jackson  with  4000  men  not  far 
from  Carthage.  •  A  fight  ensued  in  which  Sigel 

On  reading1  these  two  paragraphs  carefully,  with  especial  refer 
ence  to  the  words  which  I  have  italicized,  it  appears  that  it  is  not 
the  governor  hut  the  proclamation  that  raises  the  secession  flag- ; 
and  that,  therefore,  the  phrase  is  metaphorical.  The  sense  would 
have  been  made  cleai'er  by  omitting  the  superfluous  comma  after 
"loyalty."  I  dare  say  it  was  this  comma  that  turned  my  mind 
back  to  "  governor  "  as  the  subject  of  "  raises." 

According-  to  Mr.  Miller,  the  State  Guard,  when  commanded  by 
Sterling  Price,  carried  the  flag  of  Missouri,  containing-  the  state 
arms  on  a  blue  field  with  yellow  fringe. 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  25 

for  some  hours  had  the  advantage,  but  Jackson's 
superiority  in  cavalry  enabled  him  to  sigel's  fight 
threaten  Sigel's  baggage-train  in  his  at  Carthage. 
rear  and  thus  compel  him  to  retreat.  During  the 
night  Jackson  was  reinforced  not  only  by  Price, 
but  also  by  several  thousand  troops  from  Arkan 
sas,  Texas,  and  Louisiana  under  the  noted  Texan 
ranger,  McCulloch.  Sigel's  position  thus  became 
perilous,  but  he  effected  his  escape  in  a  skilful 
retreat  which  won  him  higher  encomiums  than 
his  subsequent  career  ever  justified  ;  henceforth  to 
"  fight  mit  Sigel "  became  a  favourite  war-cry  of 
enthusiastic  Germans  throughout  the  country. 

On  July  9  the  incapable  Fremont  was  appointed 
to  command  the  Department  of  the  West,  with 
disastrous  results,  the  first  of  which  fell  upon  the 
devoted  Lyon  and  his  little  army.  When  on  the 
13th  Lyon  arrived  at  Springfield  and  joined  his 
forces  to  those  of  Sigel,  it  was  found  that  their 
united  strength  was  unequal  to  maintaining  that 
position.  The  enemy,  in  retreating  into  the  south 
western  corner  of  the  state,  had  retreated  upon 
reinforcements,  and  was  now  growing  stronger 
daily.  Presently  the  news  of  Bull  Run  embold 
ened  the  secessionists  all  over  Missouri,  and  the 
rebel  army,  commanded  by  Benjamin  McCulloch, 
increased  till  it  numbered  12,000  men.  Lyon  had 
barely  6000  to  oppose  to  this  force,  and  in  face 


26      The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

of  such  odds  it  was  difficult  either  to  attack  or  to 
retreat.  After  waiting  in  vain  for  reinforcements 
which  ought  to  have  been  sent  him  by  General 
Fremont,  he  made  up  his  mind  to  strike  such  a 
blow  as  would  cripple  the  enemy,  and  thus  secure 
for  himself  an  unmolested  retreat  upon  Rolla,  the 
terminus  of  the  railroad  from  St.  Louis.1  On  the 
morning  of  the  10th  of  August  he  accordingly  at 
tacked  McCulloch  in  his  position  at  Wilson's  Creek, 
near  Springfield.  Lyon's  plan  was  bold,  even  to 
rashness.  He  sent  Sigel,  with  1200  men  and  a  bat 
tery  of  six  pieces,  to  turn  the  enemy's  right  flank, 

while  he  himself,  with  3700  men  and 
"Wilson's  ten  guns,  attacked  in  front.  The  nature 
Creek ;  death  of  the  ground  was  such  as  to  favour  this 

audacious  movement.  Sigel's  march 
was  successfully  accomplished,  and  his  assault  was 
admirably  begun,  but  his  force  was  inadequate  to 

1  The  night  before  the  battle  Lyon  sent  a  letter  to  Fremont 
explaining1  his  situation.  I  cannot  forbear  quoting  Colonel  Snead's 
remarks  on  this  occasion,  in  his  The  Fight  for  Missouri,  p.  2(>0. 
Colonel  Snead,  a  most  gallant  Confederate  officer,  thus  writes 
of  his  noble  foe  :  "  Not  one  word  about  the  desperate  battle  he 
was  to  fight  on  the  morrow,  not  one  fault-finding  utterance,  not 
a  breath  of  complaint !  But,  true  to  his  convictions,  true  to  his 
flag,  true  to  the  Union  men  of  Missouri  who  confided  in  and  fol 
lowed  him,  true  to  himself,  and  true  to  duty,  he  went  out  to 
battle  against  a  force  twice  as  great  as  his  own,  with  a  calmness 
that  was  as  pathetic  as  his  courage  was  sublime." 

This  is  the  best  thing  I  have  ever  read  about  Lyon. 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  27 

the  task  assigned  it.  He  was  soon  overwhelmed 
by  numbers,  and  repulsed  with  the  loss  of  five  of 
his  guns.  The  fight  in  front  was  kept  up  for  six 
hours  with  desperate  gallantry,  and  neither  side 
was  able  to  prevail.  After  being  twice  wounded, 
the  brave  Lyon  was  slain  while  leading  a  charge. 
By  noon  both  armies  were  tired  out  and  ceased 
fighting,  and  while  the  Confederates  busied  them 
selves  in  strengthening  their  defences,  the  Union 
forces  retired  in  good  order,  and  after  five  days  of 
marching  reached  Rolla  unmolested.  The  Con 
federate  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  1095,  or 
rather  less  than  one  tenth  of  the  number  engaged ; 
the  Federal  loss  was  1236,  or  about  one  fifth  of 
the  number  engaged.  In  its  dimensions,  there 
fore,  the  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek  resembled  the 
battles  of  the  Revolutionary  War.  The  dimen 
sions  were  small,  but  the  losses  showed  staunch 
fighting ;  and  the  indecisiveness  of  the  result  was 
like  that  of  many  another  and  far  bloodier  conflict 
during  the  next  four  years,  in  which  Americans, 
arrayed  against  one  another,  gave  repeated  proof 
of  that  wonderful  staying  power  in  which  we  have 
always  resembled  our  British  forefathers,  and  which 
seldom  can  be  made  to  understand  that  it  is  beaten. 
The  one  thing  really  lamentable  in  the  battle  of 
Wilson's  Creek  was  the  death  of  the  noble  Lyon. 
Like  the  death  of  Joseph  Warren  at  Bunker  Hill, 


28     The  Mississip2)i  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

it  was  a  loss  that  could  not  be  made  good.  In  Iris 
brief  career  Lyon  had  shown  extraordinary  quali 
ties.  He  was  sagacious  and  dauntless,  quick  and 
sure,  and  always  ready  to  assume  responsibility. 
If  his  plan  of  attack  at  Wilson's  Creek  is  perhaps 
Lyon's  great  liable  to  the  charge  of  rashness,  it 
qualities.  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  after  all 
it  achieved  a  drawn  battle  against  overwhelming 
odds.  All  our  best  generals  on  either  side  —  Grant 
and  Lee  as  well  as  the  rest  —  had  something  to 
learn  from  hard  experience  ;  and  if  Lyon  had  lived 
to  see  the  end  of  the  war,  he  would  very  likely 
have  taken  place  in  the  front  rank  of  our  great 
commanders.  With  the  vigour  and  skill  which 
had  characterized  his  movements  down  to  the  day 
of  his  death,  it  is  instructive  to  contrast  the  in 
capacity  and  sloth  which  ensued  thereupon. 

On  the  9th  of  July  General  Fremont  had  been, 
as  we  have  seen,  appointed  to  command  the  West 
ern  Department,  which  now  comprised  the  states 
of  Illinois,  Kentucky,  Missouri,  and  Kansas,  with 
the  adjacent  territories.  Fremont's  work  in  con- 
General  Fre-  nection  with  the  exploration  of  the 
mont.  Rocky  Mountains  and  the  conquest  of 

California  had  made  him  a  favourite  with  many  of 
the  western  people  ;  and  moreover,  having  so  lately 
been  the  first  candidate  of  the  Republican  party 
for  the  presidency,  he  was  at  that  time  an  impor- 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  29 

tant  personage  whom  it  seemed  quite  natural  to 
select  for  high  positions.  But  neither  from  a  mili 
tary  nor  from  a  political  point  of  view  was  his 
career  in  the  Civil  War  such  as  to  justify  the  ex 
pectations  which  his  admirers  had  fondly  cher 
ished.  He  gave  no  proof  of  military  insight,  or 
political  acumen.  His  most  memorable  act  at  St. 
Louis  was  a  proclamation  on  the  30th  of  August 
which  declared  all  slaves  belonging  to  parties  in 
arms  against  the  United  States  to  be  free,  and 
threatened  instant  death  to  all  persons  bearing 
arms  within  a  district  which  he  arbitrarily  assigned. 
By  such  a  decree  Fremont  not  only  assumed  dic 
tatorial  powers  which  did  not  belong  to  him,  but 
he  showed  a  lamentable  incapacity  for  w.  „ 

1          *•  ±iis     emanci- 

comprehending  the  political  situation,  pation  procla- 
Important  as  the  slavery  question  was, 
the  question  of  national  sovereignty  was  far  more 
important,  and  at  this  critical  moment  with  such 
slave  states  as  Missouri  and  Kentucky,  where  there 
was  such  a  struggle  between  conflicting  motives, 
it  was  in  the  highest  degree  imprudent  to  hint  at 
the  forcible  emancipation  of  negro  slaves.  Such  a 
hint  was  calculated  to  alarm  many  a  loyal  slave 
holder  and  array  him,  against  his  better  judg 
ment,  on  the  side  of  the  Confederates.  President 
Lincoln's  unfailing  political  sagacity  was  quick 
to  disavow  this  rash  act,  and  to  remind  General 


30     The  Mississiftpi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Fremont  that  his  powers  as  military  commander 
were  strictly  limited. 

Soon  after  Governor  Jackson  had  taken  the 
field  in  behalf  of  the  Confederacy,  the  state  con 
vention  of  Missouri  met  at  Jefferson  City,  de 
clared  all  the  state  offices  vacant,  and  inaugurated 
a  new  provisional  government,  with  its  headquar 
ters  at  St.  Louis.  After  the  battle  of  Wilson's 
Creek,  McCulloch  withdrew  his  troops  to  Arkan 
sas,  but  the  indefatigable  Price  made  his  presence 
felt  more  keenly  than  ever  in  the  western  counties 
of  Missouri.  Fremont  had  forces  enough  to  pre 
vent  his  doing  any  serious  mischief,  if  they  had 
only  been  properly  concentrated.  He  had  in  all 
56,000  men,  but  they  were  scattered  in  small 
detachments  in  thirteen  different  places.  To  a 
certain  extent  this  scattering  was  unavoidable,  as 
there  was  a  vast  area  to  be  protected ;  but  Fre 
mont  showed  himself  singularly  deficient  in  han 
dling  the  elementary  problem  of  moving  troops 
from  places  where  they  were  idle  to  places  where 
they  were  needed.  His  failure  to  relieve  Lyon 
was  an  instance  in  point,  and  a  still  more  flagrant 
one  was  forthcoming. 

At  Lexington,  on  the  Missouri  river,  Fremont 
had  stationed  Colonel  Mulligan,  with  2800  men 
and  eight  field-pieces,  and  ordered  him  to  stay 
there  until  relieved.  Price  made  up  his  mind 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  31 

to  overwhelm  this  detachment,  and  accordingly 
on  the  llth  of  September  he  appeared  before 
Lexington  with  a  force  of  14,000  men,  which 
daily  reinforcements  soon  swelled  to  more  than 
20,000.  On  his  approach  Colonel  Mulligan  en 
trenched  himself  on  an  elevated  plateau  some 

fifteen  acres  in  surface,  a  little  east  of 

Fate  of  Mul- 

the  city  and  close  to  the  broad  river,  lean's  de- 
He  had  a  good  steamer  at  his  dis-  tachment- 
posal,  upon  which  he  might  have  withdrawn  his 
force  to  the  opposite  bank,  but  in  the  absence  of 
further  orders  he  deemed  it  his  duty  to  remain. 
He  sent  word  to  Fremont  that  he  should  defend 
the  place  to  the  last  extremity,  and  begged  for 
speedy  reinforcements.  It  would  not  have  been 
difficult  from  the  garrisons  at  St.  Louis  and  Jef 
ferson  City,  and  from  General  Pope's  detachment 
in  the  northwest,  to  assemble  20,000  men  for  the 
protection  of  Lexington.  Some  time  was  afforded 
for  such  a  movement,  inasmuch  as  the  Confeder 
ates,  worn  out  with  forced  marches  and  short  of 
ammunition,  contented  themselves  for  the  moment 
with  investing  Mulligan's  position,  and  allowed 
six  days  to  elapse  before  making  a  general  attack. 
But  although  not  only  the  city  of  St.  Louis  but 
every  town  in  the  loyal  states  was  alive  with 
anxiety  over  Mulligan's  situation,  Fremont  could 
not  make  up  his  mind  what  to  do.  He  sent  no 


32     Tlie,  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

instructions  whatever  and  no  reinforcements  until 
too  late,  so  that  the  gallant  Mulligan  was  left  to 
contend  with  a  foe  that  outnumbered  him  seven 
fold.  On  the  18th  the  Confederates  seized  the 
steamer,  and  carried  by  storm  a  large  building 
used  as  a  hospital,  which  overlooked  Mulligan's 
works.  A  desperate  struggle  ensued  about  this 
building.  The  Federals  recaptured  it  and  drove 
out  the  enemy,  but  presently  numbers  prevailed  ; 
the  Confederates  won  it  again  and  held  it,  cutting 
off  Mulligan's  approaches  to  the  river.  There 
was  neither  spring  nor  cistern  on  the  plateau,  the 
weather  was  intolerably  hot,  and  the  devoted  gar 
rison  soon  began  to  suffer  the  torments  of  thirst. 
Next  day  a  scanty  reinforcement,  tardily  sent, 
arrived  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river,  but  was 
unable  to  cross.  Nevertheless,  all  that  day  and 
night,  and  through  the  forenoon  of  the  20th,  a 
stout  resistance  was  kept  up,  while  the  besiegers 
steadily  pounded  away  with  artillery.  At  length 
a  general  assault  was  made,  the  Confederates  roll 
ing  large  bales  of  hemp  in  front  of  them  as  a 
movable  entrenchment,  under  cover  of  which  they 
pushed  close  to  the  works  on  every  side.  Mulli 
gan  then  surrendered,  to  avoid  useless  bloodshed. 

The  horse  being  thus  stolen,  Fremont  at  last 
set  out  to  lock  the  stable  door.  A  cry  of  indigna 
tion  went  up  throughout  the  northern  states.  In 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  33 

Missouri  the  Union  party  was  despondent,  and 
loud  complaints  were  visited  upon  the  command 
ing  general.  On  the  27th  he  started  for  Lexing 
ton  with  20,000  men  and  86  guns,  but  Price  had 
no  mind  to  await  him  in  that  neighbourhood. 
Having  dealt  his  blow,  he  knew  how  to  get  out  of 
the  way.  He  crossed  the  great  state  by  forced 
marches,  and  was  soon  in  his  southwest  corner  near 
the  friendly  borders  of  Arkansas.  By  the  middle 
of  October  Fremont  had  increased  his  Fremont's 
army  to  nearly  40,000.  With  this  movements, 
force  he  felt  sure  of  overwhelming  Price,  and  even 
talked  of  a  triumphant  progress  of  a  thousand 
miles  down  the  Mississippi  valley  to  New  Orleans. 
The  absurdity  of  such  a  dream  was  not  so  appar 
ent  then  as  now,  for  few  people  at  the  North 
could  realize  how  tremendous  the  task  of  crushing 
the  Confederacy  was  going  to  be.  On  the  1st  of 
November,  having  reached  Springfield,  Fremont 
made  up  his  mind  that  Price  must  be  close  by 
Wilson's  Creek,  and  he  prepared  to  attack  him 
there.  In  point  of  fact  the  Confederate  general 
was  at  Cassville,  about  sixty  miles  distant;  but 
before  this  had  been  ascertained,  and  while  the 
preparations  were  going  on,  there  came  an  order 
from  the  President  removing  Fremont  and  ap 
pointing  General  Hunter  in  his  place. 

With  all  his  military  incapacity,  Fremont  had 


34     The,  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

engaging  personal  qualities  which  endeared  him 
to  his  soldiers,  and  his  departure  was  regretted  by 
many.  Hunter  retained  his  command  but  a  single 
week.  On  the  1st  of  November  the  aged  Gen 
eral  Scott  had  retired  from  the  position  of  gen- 
eral-in-chief  of  the  Federal  armies,  and  General 
McClellan  had  succeeded  him.  In  remodelling 
the  military  arrangements,  McClellan  appointed 
General  Halleck  to  command  the  new  Department 
of  the  Missouri,  including  the  part  of  Kentucky 
west  of  the  Cumberland  river,  and  Hunter  was 
thus  superseded.  The  good  fortune  of  Halleck  in 
General  tnis  western  command  —  vouchsafed 

Halleck.  him  \yy  an  inscrutable  •  Providence  — 

was  soon  to  carry  him  to  Washington  and  to  the 
supreme  position  in  the  army,  yet  he  was  a  worse 
than  mediocre  man.  He  had,  or  was  supposed  to 
have,  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  art  of  war  as  it 
exists  in  books ;  he  was  familiar  with  military 
law ;  he  could  sit  in  his  study  and  plan  campaigns 
with  amazing  profundity  and  precision  ;  and  he 
looked  so  owlishly  wise  that  the  soldiers  commonly 
called  him  "  Old  Brains ; "  but  with  all  this  he 
had  little  power  of  grappling  with  practical  diffi 
culties,  he  accomplished  nothing  in  the  field,  and 
after  he  had  become  general-in-chief  his  incapacity 
was  responsible  for  some  of  the  most  terrible  dis 
asters  of  the  war.  Ilis  beginnings  in  the  West, 
however,  were  auspicious. 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  35 

During  the  month  of  December  Generals  Pope 
and  Prentiss,  with  vigorous  marching  and  skir 
mishing,  but  without  any  serious  engagement, 
restored  the  Federal  authority  in  all  the  northern 
and  central  portions  of  Missouri.  Price  main 
tained  himself  for  a  while  at  Springfield,  but  late 
in  January,  1862,  General  Samuel  Curtis  moved 
against  him  with  12,000  men  and  50  pieces  of 
artillery.  On  the  approach  of  this  force  the  Con 
federate  general  retreated  into  Arkansas,  where 
he  was  once  more  joined  by  McCulloch,  and 
both  were  placed  under  the  command  of  the  able 
and  enterprising  General  Van  Dorn.  Curtis,  an 
excellent  officer,  pursued  cautiously  until  he 
reached  an  eminence  known  as  Pea  Ridge,  in  the 
Ozark  Mountains.  Here  he  waited  Battle  of 
in  a  strong  position,  contenting  him-  Pea  Ridge, 
self  with  observing  the  enemy,  for  his  line  of  com 
munications  was  already  very  long,  and  he  could 
not  safely  penetrate  farther  into  a  hostile  coun 
try.  He  had  left  small  detachments  en  echelon 
to  protect  his  communications  along  the  main 
post-road  from  Missouri  which  led  to  Fayetteville 
in  Arkansas,  and  which  was  his  only  available 
line  of  retreat.  This  left  him  just  10,250  men 
and  48  guns  with  which  to  meet  the  enemy.  Van 
Dorn,  having  collected  more  than  20,000  men, 
besides  5000  civilized  Choctaws  and  Cherokees 


36     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

from  the  Indian  Territory  under  the  lead  of  an 
adventurer  from  Massachusetts  named  Albert 
Pike,  thought  himself  strong  enough  to  destroy 
or  capture  the  Union  army.  A  bold  and  well- 
planned  march  brought  him  into  Curtis's  rear,  so 
that  by  seizing  and  holding  the  post-road  he  could 
cut  off  that  general's  retreat  and  compel  him  to 
surrender.  Such  movements,  however,  are  often 
fraught  with  danger  to  the  attacking  party.  The 
nature  of  the  ground  was  such  that  in  executing 
the  manoeuvre  the  two  wings  of  the  Confederate 
army  became  separated,  and  on  the  first  day  of 
the  battle,  while  Van  Dorn  with  his  left  wing 
succeeded  in  defeating  the  Union  right  and  estab 
lishing  himself  upon  the  post-road,  on  the  other 
hand  his  right  wing  was  completely  crushed,  and 
McCulloch,  its  commander,  was  slain. 

Curtis's  situation  at  the  close  of  that  day,  the 
7th  of  March,  was  critical.  He  had  routed  and 
scattered  half  of  the  rebel  army,  but  the  other 
Total  defeat  half  still  outnumbered  him  and  cut  off 
of  the  Con-  his  retreat.  It  was  an  anxious  night, 
but  the  next  day,  with  great  skill,  Cur 
tis  so  extended  his  line  of  battle  as  to  envelop 
both  of  Van  Dora's  flanks  and  subject  him  to  a 
murderous  cross-fire,  which  soon  drove  him  in  con 
fusion  from  the  field.  The  Confederate  army  had 
lost  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  not  less  than 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  37 

5000  men,  and  was  completely  shattered.  The 
Union  loss  was  1351.  Among  the  contests  of  the 
Civil  War  this  well-fought  battle,  out  on  the  dis 
tant  borders  of  western  Arkansas,  was  peculiar 
by  reason  of  the  presence  of  Indian  auxiliaries. 
These  red  men  were  of  small  use  to  the  Confeder 
ates.  Amid  the  roar  of  artillery  and  the  obstinate 
fighting  of  a  stronger  race,  they  quite  lost  their 
heads,  and  only  added  to  the  confusion  of  defeat. 
So  far  as  the  state  of  Missouri  was  concerned, 
the  victory  at  Pea  Ridge  went  far  toward  ending 
the  serious  business  of  the  war.  There  was  more 
or  less  cruel  and  vexatious  guerrilla  fighting  after 
this,  but  the  rebels  never  again  succeeded  in  in 
vading  the  state  in  force.  Van  Dorn  was  called 
away  to  Corinth,  where  the  Confederacy  was  mass 
ing  its  strength  for  the  coming  struggle  of  Titans 
at  Shiloh ;  and  Curtis  was  thus  enabled  to  march 
at  leisure  through  Arkansas,  until  he  came  out 
at  Helena  on  the  bank  of  the  Mississippi  river  in 
the  midsummer  following. 

The  interest  of  these  early  campaigns  is  some 
what   meagre   as   compared   with   the   j 
mighty  struggles  which  were  to  come,    of  these  early 
But  their  place  in  the  line  of  causal -campaigns' 
sequence  which  ended   in  the   overthrow   of   the 
rebellion  is  profoundly  interesting.     Already  they 
begin  to  reveal  the  prodigious  value  of  the  initia- 


38     Tfie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

live  that  was  taken  by  Lyon  and  Blair.  The  scene 
of  our  story  is  now  to  shift  to  eastward  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  river,  into  central  regions,  where  it  is  no 
longer  a  question  of  saving  a  single  state,  but  of 
aiming  a  blow  at  the  heart  of  the  rebellion.  The 
events  which  now  come  crowding  upon  our  atten 
tion  are  conceived  upon  a  grander  scale,  and  their 
glory  and  terror  are  such  as  to  absorb  the  atten 
tion  and  make  it  easy  to  forget  the  significance 
of  these  earlier  and  more  restricted  movements. 
But  without  the  work  which  we  have  just  passed 
in  review,  the  history  of  these  grander  operations 
would  have  been  very  different.  Until  the  great 
state  of  Missouri  had  been  secured,  it  would  have 
been  impossible  for  a  Federal  army,  without  dan 
gerously  exposing  its  right  flank  and  its  line  of 
communications,  to  have  advanced  upon  the  first 
Confederate  line  of  defence  in  Kentucky.  That 
line  of  defence,  as  we  shall  see,  ran  through  the 
southern  portion  of  Kentucky,  making  at  one  place 
a  slight  bend  into  Tennessee. 

If  Kentucky  could  have  been  persuaded  to  cast 
in  her  lot  with  the  Confederacy,  the  first  defen 
sive  line  would  have  been  formed  by  the  Ohio 
river,  and -no  pains  were  spared  by  Jefferson 
Davis  to  secure  so  desirable  an  object.  But  the 
Union  sentiment  in  Kentucky  was  strong.  Party 
feeling  ran  very  high  there,  as  it  did  in  Missouri 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  39 

and  all  along  the  border,  and  many  a  house  was 
divided  against  itself.  Of  the  sons  of  Affairs  in 
the  venerable  Crittenden,  who  had  Kentucky, 
lately  sought  to  avert  the  irrepressible  conflict  by 
crying  Peace  !  when  there  was  no  peace,  one  rose 
to  the  rank  of  corps  commander  in  the  Union 
army,  while  his  brother  became  almost  equally 
conspicuous  among  Confederate  generals ;  and  this 
instance  was  but  typical  of  hundreds.  The  gov 
ernor,  Beriah  Magoffin,  was  a  secessionist,  and 
refused  to  obey  President  Lincoln's  requisition  for 
troops.  The  legislature  resolved  "  that  this  state 
and  the  citizens  thereof  should  take  no  part  in  the 
Civil  War  now  being  waged,  except  as  mediators 
and  friends  of  the  belligerent  parties  ;  and  that 
Kentucky  should  during  the  contest  occupy  the 
position  of  strict  neutrality." 

For  a  few  weeks  a  sincere  attempt  was  made  to 
preserve  this  attitude  of  neutrality,  but  Attempt  at 
events  made  it  daily  more  manifest  neutrality, 
that  this  was  impossible.  The  State  Guard,  num 
bering  some  15,000  men,  and  possessing  nearly  all 
the  serviceable  arms  owned  by  the  commonwealth, 
was  largely  commanded  by  secessionist  officers  ;  its 
inspector-general,  Simon  Bolivar  Buckner,  we  shall 
soon  see  in  high  command  under  the  Confederacy. 
Humphrey  Marshall  began  collecting  and  drilling 
a  rebel  force  within  thirty  miles  of  the  capital, 


40      The,  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

•while  William  Nelson  showed  equal  zeal  in  form 
ing  a  camp  of  Union  men.  Thousands  of  seces 
sionists  left  their  homes  to  enlist  with  the  Confed 
erates  in  Tennessee,  while  in  like  manner  great 
numbers  went  north  into  Ohio  and  Indiana  and 
enrolled  themselves  in  the  Union  ranks.  As  it 
became  evident  that  neutrality  could  not  long  be 
preserved,  the  aversion  to  secession  increased. 
The  leaders  of  the  Confederacy  assumed  a  bully 
ing  tone,  hinting  that  Kentucky  belonged  to  them 
and  knew  it,  but  was  afraid  to  take  the  responsibil 
ity  of  leaving  the  Union.  This  sort  of  talk  gave 
great  offence,  and  in  the  August  election  the  seces 
sionist  party  barely  obtained  a  third  of  the  mem 
bers  in  either  house.  On  the  3d  of  September  the 
Confederates,  laughing  to  scorn  this  attempted 
neutrality,  invaded  the  soil  of  Kentucky  and  took 
up  a  strong  position. 

It  was  General  Leonidas  Polk  who  thus  opened 
the  war  in  this  part  of  the  world.  This  very  able 
Leonidas  commander  was  one  of  the  picturesque 
figures  of  that  time.  A  nephew  of 
President  Polk,  he  had  been  educated  at  West 
Point,  but  had  soon  left  the  army  and  turned  his 
attention  to  theology.  He  became  a  clergyman  in 
the  Episcopal  Church,  and  had  now  for  twenty 
years  been  Bishop  of  Louisiana.  His  martial 
spirit  reviving  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  he 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  41 

exchanged  his  surplice  for  the  uniform  of  a  major- 
general,  and  was  at  once  placed  in  command  of  the 
forces  gathering  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Missis 
sippi.  There  was  a  curious  flavour  of  mediae valisni 
in  the  appearance  of  this  bishop  at  the  head  of 
an  army  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
The  latest  instance  of  a  fighting  divine  before  the 
Right  Eeverend  Dr.  Polk  would  seem  to  have  been 

O 

the  Bishop  of  Derry,  who  was  slain  at  the  battle 
of  the  Boyne  in  1690.  A  characteristic  touch  of 
ecclesiasticism  appeared  in  the  first  general  order, 
which  declared  that  "  the  invasion  of  the  South  by 
the  Federal  armies  had  brought  with  it  a  contempt 
for  constitutional  liberty  and  the  withering  influ 
ences  of  the  infidelity  of  New  England  and  of  Ger 
many  combined  !  "  With  sound  military  instinct, 
Polk  saw  the  importance  of  the  town  of  Cairo, 
situated  at  the  junction  of  the  Ohio  river  with  the 
Mississippi,  and  advancing  toward  this  goal  he 
entered  Kentucky  and  fortified  himself  at  Colum 
bus,  on  a  bold  bluff  completely  commanding  the 
Mississippi  river,  about  twenty  rniles  below  Cairo. 
At  the  same  time  General  Zollicoffer,  coming  from 
eastern  Tennessee,  invaded  Kentucky  by  way  of 
Cumberland  Gap,  and  threatened  the  eastern  por 
tion  of  the  state. 

This  simultaneous  invasion  at  points  three  hun 
dred  miles  apart  revealed  the  deliberate  purpose 


42     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

of  the  Confederates  to  seize  the  state  by  force,  and 
at  once  all  thought  of  neutrality  was  at  an  end. 
The  stars  and  stripes  were  defiantly  hoisted  over 
the  capitol  at  Frankfort,  and  the  legislature  re 
solved  that  Governor  Magoffin  should  "inform 
Kentuck  those  concerned  that  Kentucky  expects 
declares  for  the  Confederate  troops  to  be  with- 
on*  drawn  from  her  soil  unconditionally." 
The  governor  vetoed  this  resolution,  and  it  was 
instantly  passed  over  the  veto.  As  soon  as  it  was 
known  that  Polk  had  occupied  Columbus,  a  Federal 
detachment  crossed  the  Ohio  and  occupied  Padu- 
cah.  A  motion  in  the  legislature  that  the  gov 
ernor  should  request  the  removal  of  these  troops 
also  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  more  than  two 
thirds.  A  few  days  later  it  was  voted  to  raise  an 
armed  force  and  drive  the  Confederates  from  the 
state.  Most  of  the  State  Guard  now  went  over  to 
the  enemy,  and  with  them  went  Buckner,  John 
Morgan,  afterward  so  famous  as  a  guerrilla  chief 
tain,  and  John  Breckinridge,  who  had  lately  been 
Vice-President  of  the  United  States.  The  loyalty 
of  these  men  to  the  Confederacy  thus  seems  to 
have  outweighed  their  loyalty  to  their  own  state, 
which  had  now  decisively  and  finally  arrayed  itself 
on  the  side  of  the  Union. 

General  Polk's  designs  upon  Cairo  had  already 
been   anticipated   and    foiled   by    Federal   troops 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  43 

assembled  in  Illinois.  There  had  just  entered 
upon  the  scene  a  thoughtful  and  silent  man,  of 
whom  our  story  has  already  caught  a  glimpse  upon 
a  street-car  in  St.  Louis,  rebuking  a  flippant  seces 
sionist.  Ulysses  Simpson  Grant  was  , 

J  Ulysses 

then  thirty-nine  years  of  age.  He  was  Simpson 
the  eldest  son  of  a  leather-dealer,  of  Grant- 
Scottish  descent,  and  was  born  at  Point  Pleasant 
in  Ohio  on  the  27th  of  April,  1822.  He  was  edu 
cated  at  West  Point,  and  was  present  in  every 
battle  of  the  Mexican  War  except  Buena  Vista. 
In  his  humble  rank  of  lieutenant  he  had  been 
distinguished  for  personal  gallantry  so  far  as  to 
attract  the  attention  for  a  moment  of  General 
Scott,  the  commander-in-chief,  and  of  his  staff- 
officer,  Robert  Edward  Lee.  In  1854,  having 
reached  the  grade  of  captain,  he  gave  up  his  com 
mission  and  engaged  thereafter  in  business  as  wool- 
dealer,  auctioneer,  real-estate  agent,  achieving  little 
success,  until  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  1861 
found  him  at  Galena  in  Illinois,  earning  a  scanty 
subsistence  in  the  leather  trade.  At  that  time  he 
was  regarded  as  a  broken  and  disappointed  man, 
for  whom  no  one  would  have  dreamed  of  predicting 
a  brilliant  future. 

When  the  President's  call  for  troops  came  in 
April,  Grant  assembled  and  drilled  a  company  of 
volunteers  at  Galena,  and  presently  led  it  to 


44     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Springfield,  the  capital  of  Illinois.  He  then  wrote 
a  very  modest  letter  to  the  War  Department  at 
Washington,  saying  that  since  he  had  been  edu 
cated  at  the  expense  of  the  Federal  government, 
he  now  felt  it  his  duty  to  offer  his  services,  and  he 
accordingly  asked  for  a  commission.  No  notice 
was  taken  of  this  letter.  Disappointed  here,  Grant 
went  to  Cincinnati,  where  McClellan  was  in  com 
mand  of  the  Ohio  volunteers,  hoping  that  he  might 
obtain  a  place  on  that  general's  staff.  But  after 
calling  twice  at  headquarters  and  not  finding  the 
general,  he  returned  baffled  but  not  disheartened 
to  Illinois.  There  his  zeal  and  skill  in  organiza 
tion  soon  became  so  conspicuous  that  the  governor 
placed  him  in  command  of  a  regiment,  with  which 
he  marched  to  northern  Missouri  and  put  himself 
under  the  orders  of  General  Pope.  The  Federal 
army  was  now  increasing  its  dimensions  so  rapidly 
and  suddenly  that  there  was  a  great  demand  for 
general  officers,  and  men  who  had  been  trained  at 
West  Point  and  seen  active  service  were  sometimes 
promoted  straightway  from  the  grade  of  captain 
to  that  of  brigadier-general,  as  had  been  the  case 
with  Lyon.  Members  of  Congress  from  Illinois, 
who  had  observed  Grant's  zeal  and  efficiency,  now 
recommended  him  to  President  Lincoln  for  promo 
tion,  and  he  was  accordingly  made  brigadier-gen 
eral  while  Fremont  was  holding  the  chief  command 
in  the  West. 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  45 

When  the  cardinal  position  at  Cairo  was  threat 
ened  by  Polk,  Grant  seized  it  and  made  it  his 
headquarters  on  the  same  day  that  Polk  occupied 
Columbus.  Grant  thus  gained  an  initiative  which 
he  was  not  slow  in  using.  Polk's  position  at 
Columbus  blockaded  the  Mississippi  river  up  to 
that  point ;  by  next  seizing  Paducah,  he  would 
blockade  the  lower  Ohio  likewise,  and  command 
the  mouths  of  the  Tennessee  and  the  Cumberland, 
two  broad  rivers  which  served  as  indispensable 
military  highways  leading  for  hundreds  of  miles 
through  the  central  portion  of  the  Confederacy. 
The  bishop  sent  scouts  to  inspect  Paducah,  but 
Grant  was  again  beforehand,  and  occu-  Grant  seizeg 
pied  the  town  just  at  the  moment  when  Paducah. 
the  good  state  of  Kentucky  was  throwing  off  the 
incubus  of  secession.  His  behaviour  in  this  affair 
was  characteristic.  Comprehending  the  military 
situation  at  a  glance,  he  telegraphed  to  Fremont 
that  he  should  strike  at  Paducah  unless  withheld 
by  positive  orders.  Then  he  went  on  and  seized 
the  position,  and  on  returning  to  Cairo  found  Fre 
mont's  despatch  authorizing  him  to  make  the  at 
tempt  if  he  felt  strong  enough.  We  see  here  the 
same  qualities  which  we  had  observed  in  Lyon,  — 
the  ardour  and  quickness  to  strike,  combined  with 
the  sagacity  which  knows  where  to  aim  the  blow. 
With  Paducah  in  Union  hands,  it  was  no  longer 


46     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

possible  for  the  Confederates  to  gain  a  defensive 
line  along  the  Ohio  river  without  a  desperate 
battle.  Shortly  afterwards  the  movement  was 
completed  by  sending  General  C.  F.  Smith  to  hold 
the  mouth  of  the  Cumberland.  Grant  now  asked 
permission  to  attack  Columbus,  but  the  request 
was  unheeded.  Several  weeks  were  passed  in 
organizing  and  drilling  the  troops,  while  Polk 
strengthened  the  bluff  at  Columbus  with  earth 
works  mounting  142  heavy  guns.  Strong  fortifica 
tions  were  also  begun  by  the  Confederates  lower 
down  the  river  at  New  Madrid  and  Island  Number 
Ten,  and  still  lower  at  Fort  Pillow. 

On  the  1st  of  November,  while  Fremont  was 
advancing  against  Price  as  above  mentioned,  Grant 
was  directed  to  make  demonstrations  on  both 
banks  of  the  Mississippi,  in  order  to  prevent  Polk 
from  sending  troops  into  Missouri.  At  the  same 
time  he  was  ordered  to  detach  a  small  force  to  aid 
in  the  pursuit  of  the  guerrilla  chieftain  Thompson. 
For  this  duty  Grant  detailed  3000  men  under 
Colonel  Oglesby,  while  with  about  the  same  num 
ber  under  his  own  command  he  sailed  down  the 
river  under  convoy  of  two  gunboats,  and  landed 
soon  after  daybreak  of  November  7  on  the  Mis 
souri  shore  some  three  miles  above  Columbus,  at  a 
point  where  he  was  screened  by  thick  woods  from 
the  view  of  the  enemy.  Just  opposite  Columbus, 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  47 

and  completely  commanded  by  its  guns,  were  three 
wooden  shanties  built  on  a  low  flat,  scarcely  above 
the  level  of  the  water.  The  place  was  Battle  of 
named  Belmont,  on  the  same  principle  Belmont- 
that  will  sometimes  lead  well-meaning  parents  to 
christen  a  little  brunette  daughter  "  Blanche."  To 
this  point  Polk  had  just  sent  General  Pillow  with 
2500  men,  intending  to  cut  off  the  detachment 
under  Oglesby.  Perceiving  the  aim  of  this  move 
ment,  Grant  decided  to  frustrate  it  by  an  imme 
diate  attack.  Few  of  the  men  on  either  side  had 
ever  been  under  fire,  but  they  fought  very  well  for 
nearly  four  hours,  until  Pillow  retreated  in  dis 
order  and  the  Union  troops  took  possession  of  his 
camp. 

It  was  now  time  for  them,  having  struck  their 
blow,  to  get  away  from  Belmont  at  once,  for  under 
the  hostile  guns  of  Columbus  the  place  was  unten 
able.  But  the  undisciplined  Union  soldiers,  elated 
with  victory,  dispersed  to  pillage  the  camp,  shout 
ing  and  cheering,  while  their  officers,  scarcely  less 
raw  than  themselves,  made  speeches  presaging  the 
speedy  overthrow  of  the  rebellion  and  the  summary 
hanging  of  Jeff  Davis  "  on  a  sour  apple  tree." 
Finding  the  language  of  command  insufficient  to 
restore  order,  Grant  set  fire  to  the  camp,  while  the 
batteries  at  Columbus,  seeing  it  now  occupied  only 
by  foes,  opened  a  heavy  plunging  fire.  These 


48     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

energetic  warnings  sufficed  to  bring  the  men  to 
their  senses,  and  falling  into  place  again  they 
started  in  good  order  for  the  boats. 

But  meanwhile  Pillow  had  rallied  his  defeated 
troops,  and  being  joined  by  three  fresh  regiments 
from  across  the  river,  had  succeeded  in  taking  a 
position  between  the  Union  men  and  their  boats, 
so  as  to  cut  off  their  retreat.  For  a  moment  there 
were  symptoms  of  confusion  in  the  Federal  ranks, 
which  Grant  allayed  by  remarking  that  victorious 
soldiers  who  had  cut  their  way  in  could  cut  their 
way  out  again.  A  spirited  charge  soon  repulsed 
the  enemy,  who  disappeared  from  sight  as  he  had 
done  before,  —  but  this  time  only  to  await  the 
arrival  of  the  high-decked  steamers  which  were 
crossing  the  river  crowded  with  reinforcements 
and  bringing  General  Polk  himself  upon  the  scene. 

These  fresh  troops  arrived  in  time  to  assault  the 
Federals  in  flank  just  as  they  were  reaching  the 
shore,  but  it  was  too  late  to  cut  them  off.  Their 
embarkation  was  effected,  not  without  much  con 
fusion  and  the  loss  of  some  parties  who  had  been 
sent  to  bring  in  the  wounded,  but  they  carried 
away  two  of  the  cannon  which  they  had  captured, 
as  well  as  a  few  prisoners.  Grant  was  the  last  to 
leave  the  field,  and  narrowly  escaped  capture  or 
death.  As  he  sat  on  his  horse,  covered  with  a 
cloak  which  disguised  his  rank,  Polk  saw  him  and 


From  St.  Louis  to  Belmont  49 

exclaimed,  "  There  's  a  Yankee,  my  boys,  if  you 
want  to  try  your  aim !  "  The  last  Federal  steamer 
was  just  unmooring,  but  Grant's  horse  slid  down 
the  bank  on  his  haunches,  a  plank  was  thrown  out, 
and  the  general  trotted  aboard  amid  a  hail  of 
musket-balls,  which  for  the  most  part  flew  harm 
lessly  over  the  deck.  As  the  men  were  all  em 
barked,  the  gunboats  now  poured  grape  and  canis 
ter  into  the  Confederates  on  shore  until  they  sought 
shelter  in  the  woods.  Late  in  the  evening  Grant 
reached  Cairo,  having  accomplished  his  main  pur 
pose  in  occupying  Folk's  attention  and  diverting 
reinforcements  from  the  Confederate  army  in  Mis 
souri.  The  wary  bishop  now  kept  his  men  to 
gether  at  Columbus  in  anticipation  of  further 
attacks. 

Whether  in  the  life  of  Grant  or  in  the  history 
of  our  Civil  War,  the  fight  at  Belmont  was  but  a 
slight  incident ;  yet  at  one  time  it  provoked  much 
discussion.  Both  sides  claimed  a  victory.  The 
Federals  claimed  it  as  having  won  the  morning's 
fight,  as  having  effected  their  object,  and  as  having 
come  away  after  inflicting  a  heavier  loss  upon  the 
enemy  than  they  had  sustained  themselves.  The 
Confederates  claimed  it  as  having  at  Comments  on 
last  compelled  the  Federals  to  with-  Belmont. 
draw  in  hurry  and  confusion.  Public  opinion  at 
the  North  adopted  the  Confederate  view  of  the 


50     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

case,  and  seeing  nothing  but  the  fact  of  an  advance 
in  the  morning  followed  by  retreat  in  the  after 
noon,  hastened  to  the  conclusion  that  this  was 
another  fiasco  like  Big  Bethel  and  Ball's  Bluff. 
Whenever  an  engagement  occurred  at  that  early 
period  of  the  war,  the  northern  people  looked  for 
overwhelming  victory  followed  by  a  long  stride 
southward;  they  cared  little  for  demonstrations 
and  diversions,  and  having  met  with  a  long  series 
of  slight  reverses,  the  importance  of  which  was 
much  exaggerated,  they  were  naturally  in  a  cap 
tious  and  fault-finding  mood.  The  affair  at  Bel- 
mont  was  accordingly  made  the  theme  of  angry 
sarcasm,  and  although  this  mood  was  soon  dis 
pelled  by  the  great  victory  at  Fort  Donelson,  the 
sarcasm  was  revived  in  later  years  with  far  less 
excuse,  when  Grant  became  a  candidate  for  the 
presidency.  Democratic  newspapers  in  1868  made 
much  of  Belmont,  while  indulging  in  criticisms 
that  were  as  ill-considered  as  ill-natured.  Grant's 
military  object  in  the  movement  was  sound,  and, 
as  we  have  seen,  was  accomplished.  His  conduct 
of  the  movement  was  excellent ;  but  for  his  cool 
ness  and  steadiness  it  would  not  have  escaped  the 
disaster  so  nearly  incurred  through  the  insubor 
dination  of  the  troops.  Had  they  obeyed  orders 
instead  of  stopping  to  riot  in  the  enemy's  camp, 
they  would  have  been  withdrawn  as  promptly  as 


From  St.  Louis  to  Bclmont  51 

they  bad  advanced,  instead  of  waiting  for  the 
enemy  to  rally  and  gather  reinforcements  ;  and  the 
affair  would  have  worn  the  aspect  of  a  brilliant 
dash  instead  of  a  repulse.  Such  untoward  inci 
dents  are  characteristic  of  fights  between  perfectly 
raw  troops.  But  the  affair  showed  at  the  same 
time  of  what  excellent  righting  stuff  these  novices 
were  made.  It  was  hotly  contested  on  both  sides. 
The  Federal  loss  was  485  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing  ;  the  Confederate  loss  was  641.  Compared 
with  the  forces  engaged,  these  figures  show  bold 
ness  and  persistence ;  in  the  Revolutionary  War 
such  an  affair  would  have  ranked  as  a  very  con 
siderable  battle. 

In  defence  of  the  battle  of  Belmont  no  more 
pithy  and  incisive  comment  has  ever  been  made 
than  the  simple  remark  with  which  Grant  himself, 
in  his  "  Memoirs,"  dismisses  the  subject :  "  If  it 
had  not  been  fought,  Colonel  Oglesby  would  prob 
ably  have  been  captured  or  destroyed  with  his 
3000  men.  Then  I  should  have  been  culpable 
indeed." 


CHAPTER   II 

FORT   DONELSON    AND    SHILOH 

EVENTS  were  now  crowding  upon  the  scene 
which  made  Belmont  and  all  that  had  gone  before 
seem  insignificant.  Baffled  in  their  hopes  of  gain 
ing  the  Ohio  river,  the  Confederates  had  estab 
lished  their  defensive  line  in  southern  Kentucky, 
stretching  from  Columbus  on  the  Mississippi  to 
Cumberland  Gap  in  the  Alleghanies.  The  weak 
spot  in  this  line  was  the  part  where  it  was  crossed 
The  first  Con-  ^y  tne  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  riv- 
federate  line  ers,  which  afforded  access  to  the  Fed 
eral  navy.  It  was  thought  that  the 
ascent  of  these  streams  might  be  blocked  by  for 
tresses,  as  Polk  had  blocked  the  descent  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  ;  and  to  this  end  Fort  Henry  was  erected 
on  the  Tennessee,  and  Fort  Donelson,  about  twelve 
miles  distant,  on  the  Cumberland.  Both  strong 
holds  were  within  the  state  of  Tennessee,  a  little 
beyond  the  Kentucky  border,  just  where  the  as 
cending  courses  of  the  two  parallel  rivers  begin  to 
diverge.  Ninety  miles  northeast  of  Fort  Donelson, 
the  post  of  Bowling  Green,  forming  a  salient  in 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  53 

the  long  line,  was  held  by  General  Buckner.  At 
an  equal  distance  to  the  east  of  Bowling  Green, 
General  Zollicoffer,  in  an  entrenched  camp  at  Mill 
Spring,  formed  the  right  wing  of  the  whole  line, 
and  guarded  the  approaches  to  the  Cumberland 
Mountains.  The  chief  command  west  of  the  Alle- 
ghanies  had  been  given  to  Albert  Sidney  Johnston, 
who  was  then  regarded  in  all  parts  of  the  country 
as  one  of  the  ablest  of  American  soldiers.  General 
Johnston  was  a  native  of  Kentucky,  of  New  Eng 
land  descent.  A  graduate  of  West  Point,  he  had 
served  with  distinction  in  the  Texan  army  in  1836, 
and  afterward  in  the  Mexican  War,  and  in  1857 
had  conducted  the  memorable  expedition  to  Utah. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  Civil  War  he  Albert  Sid- 
had  been  opposed  to  secession,  and  it  ney  Johnston, 
was  intended  to  offer  him  one  of  the  highest  com 
mands  in  the  Federal  army.  But  when  the  state 
of  Texas,  of  which  he  had  long  been  a  citizen, 
seceded,  he  did  as  so  many  others  did  and  "  went 
with  his  state."  He  was  then  in  his  fifty-ninth 
year,  handsome  in  person  and  winning  in  manner, 
of  lofty  character,  heroic  courage,  and  undoubted 
ability.  On  assuming  command  he  had  completed 
the  defensive  line  just  described  by  throwing  Buck 
ner  forward  into  Bowling  Green,  and  was  now 
busily  employed  in  collecting  an  army  sufficient  to 
hold  so  vast  a  territory.  Opposed  to  his  left  was 


54     Tfie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Grant,  at  Cairo,  now  acting  under  orders  from 
Halleck,  at  St.  Louis.  Opposed  to  his  centre  and 
right  was  the  army  which  had  been  assembled  in 
northern  Kentucky  under  Don  Carlos  Buell.  Five 
divisions  of  this  army,  under  Generals  McCook, 
Crittenden,  Nelson,  Wood,  and  Mitchel,  lay  to  the 
northward  of  Bowling  Green.  A  sixth,  watching 
the  extreme  rebel  right,  was  commanded  by  George 
Henry  Thomas,  of  Virginia,  one  of  the  greatest 
soldiers  produced  by  the  Civil  War,  as  well  as  one 
of  the  most  attractive  characters  in  American  his 
tory  since  George  Washington.  General  Thomas 
had  been  educated  at  West  Point,  and  had  served 
with  distinction  in  the  Mexican  War.  As  a  Vir 
ginian  of  Virginians  he  was  confronted  with  the 
painful  question  of  allegiance  which  beset  Lee  and 
George  Henry  both  the  Johnstons  and  so  many  other 
Thomas.  high-minded  men  ;  but  in  his  case  love 
for  the  Union  prevailed  over  his  intense  attach 
ment  to  his  native  state ;  and  he  became  such  a 
power  in  the  Federal  army  that  Virginia,  which 
fought  so  hard  to  dismember  the  Union,  may  now 
congratulate  herself  that  in  giving  us  Thomas  she 
also  did  much  to  help  save  it.  A  man  of  rare  and 
exquisite  refinement,  whole-souled  devotion  to  duty, 
perfect  sincerity  and  perfect  modesty,  he  was  every 
inch  a  soldier.  His  military  judgment  was  unerr 
ing,  and  when  he  struck  it  was  with  the  blow  of  a 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloli  55 

trip-hammer.  We  shall  see  him  growing  in  fame 
and  in  achievement  until  at  Nashville,  in  the  con 
cluding  period  of  the  war,  he  annihilates  a  great 
Confederate  army  on  the  field  of  battle.  His  first 
victory  was  similar  in  completeness,  though  small 
in  scale.  On  the  19th  of  January,  1862,  in  a 
short,  sharp  fight  near  Mill  Spring,  in  Battie  Of  Mill 
which  Zollicoffer  was  killed,  Thomas  Spring. 
destroyed  the  Confederate  force  and  cleared  all 
that  part  of  Kentucky  at  a  single  blow.  By  this 
victory  the  Federals  gained  Cumberland  Gap  and 
were  brought  within  support  of  the  loyal  popula 
tion  of  eastern  Tennessee ;  the  eastern  extremity 
of  Johnston's  line  was  demolished,  and  his  salient 
at  Bowling  Green  was  threatened  on  its  flank. 
But  still  graver  ill  fortune  was  preparing  for  him 
in  the  other  direction,  where  Grant  was  about  to 
take  the  initiative. 

As  Colonel  Preston  Johnston  tersely  observes, 
in  his  biography  of  his  father,  "  there  has  been 
much  discussion  as  to  who  originated  the  move 
ment  up  the  Tennessee  river.  Grant  made  it, 
and  it  made  Grant.  It  was  obvious  enough  to 
all  the  leaders  on  both  sides."  Sherman,  Buell, 
and  Grant  agreed  in  urging  it  upon  Halleck,  but 
McClellan,  general-in-chief,  thought  it  should  be 
postponed  for  a  while,  until  after  eastern  Ten 
nessee  should  have  been  occupied.  Halleck  seems 


56     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

to  have  understood  the  value  of  the  movement,  but 
when  Grant  asked  permission  to  make  it,  Halleck 
silenced  him  so  sharply  as  to  make  it  appear  that 
he  deemed  it  a  gross  blunder.  Halleck  thought 
the  enterprise  should  not  be  undertaken  with  less 
than  60,000  men ;  but  Grant  persisted,  and  Com 
modore  Foote,  commanding  the  gunboat  flotilla, 
added  his  solicitations,  until  at  last  the  requisite 
permission  was  obtained ;  and  on  February  2 
Grant  and  Foote  started  up  the  Tennessee  with 
17,000  men  and  seven  gunboats.  The  success  of 
the  movement  was  due  to  its  promptness,  as  is 
usual  in  warfare,  in  which  more  strikingly  than  in 
any  other  pursuit  of  life  we  see  the  truth  of  the 
Capture  of  adage  that  time  is  money.  Fort  Henry 
Fort  Henry.  was  Joomed  by  the  mere  quickness  of 
the  movement.  General  Tilghman,  the  command 
ant,  had  but  3400  men,  and  saw  at  once  that  it 
was  too  late  for  reinforcements  to  reach  him.  Ac 
cordingly  he  sent  most  of  his  force  over  to  Fort 
Donelson,  remaining  himself  with  a  small  detach 
ment  to  cover  the  retreat.  This  was  sound  policy 
and  apparently  the  only  course  open  to  the  com 
mander  of  Fort  Henry ;  the  struggle  must  be  made 
at  Fort  Donelson.  General  Tilghman  worked  his 
few  men  and  guns  admirably,  and  after  a  brief 
bombardment  by  the  fleet  he  surrendered  Fort 
Henry  with  only  96  men.  A  convenient  base  was 


FORT   DOXELSON,    FEBRUARY   13-16,  1862 


Fort  Donelson  and  ShiloJi  57 

thus  established  against  Fort  Donelson,  to  which 
the  Union  forces  now  hastened. 

Fort  Donelson  was  situated  on  a  plateau  near  the 
great  bend  of  the  Cumberland  river,  elevated  about 
one  hundred  feet  above  the  shore-line.  Position  of 
It  "  consisted  of  two  water-batteries  on  Fort  Donel- 
the  hillside,  protected  by  a  bastioned 
earthwork  of  irregular  outline  on  the  summit,  en 
closing  about  one  hundred  acres."  1  To  the  north 
of  it  Hickman  creek,  flowing  into  the  Cumberland 
and  filled  at  this  season  with  backwater,  formed  an 
impassable  barrier.  About  half  a  mile  to  the  south 
Indian  creek  emptied  into  the  river,  and  just  south 
of  Indian  creek  stood  the  little  town  of  Dover, 
whence  ran  the  road  to  Nashville  by  way  of  Char 
lotte,  affording  the  only  available  line  of  retreat  in 
case  of  an  overwhelming  land  attack.  To  the  west 
or  rear  of  fortress  and  town  the  country  is  cut  up 
by  several  small  brooks  flowing  into  Hickman  and 
Indian  creeks,  and  leaving  a  series  of  ridges  from 
fifty  to  eighty  feet  in  height  and  for  the  most  part 
parallel  to  the  river.  Starting  from  Hickman 
creek  on  the  north,  at  a  point  rather  more  than 
a  mile  from  the  river,  a  continuous  line  of  ridges 
was  fortified  with  rifle-pits  and  abattis  difficult  to 
penetrate.  Broken  only  at  one  spot  by  the  valley 
of  Indian  creek,  this  line  of  defences  was  carried 

1  Davis,  Else  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,  ii.  28. 


58     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

southward  and  eastward  as  far  as  the  river,  enclos 
ing  the  town  of  Dover  and  commanding  the  road 
to  Charlotte.  Nine  batteries  were  placed  at  inter 
vals  along  the  line. 

This  strong  position  was  occupied  by  an  army 
of  18,000  men,  commanded  by  General  Pillow,  an 
Its  command-  officer  whose  vanity  far  exceeded  his 
merit.  Second  in  command  was  Gen 
eral  Buckner,  an  excellent  soldier,  whose  relations 
with  Pillow  were  not  altogether  cordial.  On  the 
13th  of  February,  the  day  after  Grant  arrived  with 
his  army,  a  third  general,  senior  in  rank  to  Pillow, 
came  in  and  took  command.  This  was  John  Floyd, 
lately  secretary  of  war  under  President  Buchanan. 
He  was  a  person  unfit  for  any  such  responsible 
position ;  and  Johnston  clearly  made  a  capital  mis 
take  in  sending  him  there  at  a  critical  moment. 

Fort  Henry  had  fallen  on  the  6th,  and  Grant, 
realizing  the  need  of  striking  quickly,  had  hoped 
to  attack  Fort  Donelson  on  the  8th ;  but  the  roads 
were  flooded,  supplies  were  slow  in  coming,  and  the 
fleet  had  a  long  distance  to  travel  in  descending 
one  river  and  ascending  the  other.  The  sun  was 
setting  on  the  12th  when  the  divisions  of  McCler- 
nand  and  C.  F.  Smith,  numbering  about  15,000 
men,  arrived  before  the  works.  A  third  division 
of  2500  men,  under  Lew  Wallace,1  had  been  left  at 

1  An  able  officer,  since  better  known  as  the  gifted  author  of 
Ven-IIur  and  The  Fair  God. 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiluh  59 

Fort  Henry,  but  this  was  brought  up  next  day,  as 
the  forces  were  insufficient  to  surround  the  works. 
During  the  13th  the  investment  was  Investment  of 
completed.  McClernand  held  the  Char-  Fort  Donel- 
lotte  road  with  his  right  and  stretched 
his  left  nearly  as  far  as  Indian  creek.  On  his  left 
came  the  centre  division  under  Lew  Wallace,  and 
beyond,  stretching  northward  to  Hickman's  creek, 
was  stationed  C.  F.  Smith  with  the  left  wing. 
The  line  was  still  a  slender  one,  and  Grant's  con 
duct  in  coming  up  so  quickly  had  been  marked 
by  audacity.  It  is  seldom  in  history  that  a  force 
behind  entrenchments  has  allowed  itself  to  be 
quietly  invested  by  a  force  no  greater  than  itself. 
If  the  enemy  had  harassed  him  on  the  march  from 
Fort  Henry,  or  vigorously  attacked  him  on  the 
morning  of  the  13th,  it  might  have  interfered  seri 
ously  with  his  plans  ;  but  during  those  two  days 
the  Confederates  behaved  as  if  paralyzed.  Grant's 
conduct  indicates  that  he  gauged  the  calibre  of 
Pillow  and  Floyd,  and  took  it  into  the  account. 
When  his  lines  were  completed  on  the  13th,  he 
ordered  an  attack  by  way  of  feeling  the  enemy's 
strength.  None  of  the  works  were  carried,  but 
McClernand's  hold  upon  the  Charlotte  road  became 
firmer. 

The  night  was  a  dismal  one  for  the  soldiers. 
Their  supplies  were  delayed,  and  food  was  getting 


60     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

scarce.  The  weather  had  been  warm,  and  many  of 
these  inexperienced  men  had  forgotten  or  thrown 
away  their  blankets.  Now  the  temperature  dropped 
to  twenty  degrees  below  the  freezing-point,  while 
the  camps  were  swept  by  a  furious  storm  of  snow 
and  sleet.  Many  were  frost-bitten,  some  were 
frozen  to  death,  in  others  were  sown  the  seeds  of 
fatal  disease.  The  morning,  however,  brought  the 
gallant  fleet,  convoying  the  transports  with  the 
provisions  so  sorely  needed,  and  5000  fresh  troops, 
which  wrere  added  to  Wallace's  division  and  essen 
tially  increased  the  strength  of  the  besieging  line. 
Commodore  Foote,  pushing  up  within  500  yards 
An  artillery  of  the  water-batteries,  opened  a  furious 
duel.  fire^  which  succeeded  in  silencing  several 

guns ;  but  at  length  their  plunging  fire  disabled 
his  two  best  gunboats  and  compelled  him  to  with 
draw  out  of  range,  leaving  the  river  above  the  fort 
still  open  to  the  enemy.  The  works  on  the  river 
front  were  knocked  out  of  shape,  but  the  fort 
seemed  as  far  as  ever  from  surrender,  and  at  night 
fall  of  the  14th  Grant  began  to  think  it  might  be 
necessary  to  have  recourse  to  siege. 

But  Floyd  had  held  a  council  of  war  that  morn 
ing  in  which  it  was  decided  that  the  situation  was 
alarming,  and  that  the  best  thing  for  the  Confed 
erates  to  do  was  to  cut  their  way  out,  retire  upon 
Charlotte,  and  reopen  land-communication  with 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  61 

Nashville.  The  sortie  was  to  have  been  made  that 
day,  but  at  Pillow's  instance,  it  was  gortie  of  fche 
postponed  till  next  morning.  Early  Confederate 
on  the  15th  Grant  had  gone  on  board  garrison' 
one  of  the  gunboats  to  consult  with  Foote,  who 
was  suffering  from  a  wound  received  the  day 
before,  and  could  not  come  ashore.  Soon  after 
daybreak  Pillow  hurled  8000  men  upon  McCler- 
nand's  right,  and  after  an  obstinate  struggle  not 
only  pushed  him  off  the  Charlotte  road,  but  threw 
his  whole  line  into  confusion  and  drove  him  in 
upon  Wallace.  The  avenue  of  escape  was  thus 
opened,  and  if  the  Confederates  had  taken  immedi 
ate  advantage  of  it,  though  they  would  have  lost 
the  fort,  they  could  probably  have  saved  their 
army. 

But  Pillow,  flushed  with  his  success,  now  at 
tempted  altogether  too  much.  He  sent  a  despatch 
to  Johnston,  announcing  a  Confederate  victory, 
and  attacked  Lew  Wallace  in  the  hope  of  rolling 
him  up  on  Smith  and  turning  the  whole  Federal 
position.  In  this  he  was  aided  by  Buckner,  but 
the  Confederates  were  exhausted  with  their  morn 
ing's  work  and  made  little  headway.  Presently 
there  came  a  lull  in  the  battle,  and  just  at  this 
moment  Grant  rode  upon  the  field.  There  was 
no  thought  of  siege  in  his  mind  then.  He  saw 
the  state  of  affairs  and  the  error  the  Confederates 


62     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

had  committed  ;  and  he  knew  that  at  such  critical 
moments  success  waits  upon  a  bold  initiative.  He 
ordered  Wallace  to  retake  the  positions  lost  in  the 
morning,  while  Smith  was  to  charge  upon  the  en- 
Ferguson  trenchments  on  the  left.  The  veteran 
Smith  storms  Charles  Ferguson  Smith,  one  of  the 

the  Confeder 

ate  entrench-  truest  men  and  finest  officers  in  the 
ment,  Federal  service,  led  the  assault  in  per 

son,  inspiring  his  raw  troops  with  his  own  daunt 
less  courage.  "  I  was  nearly  scared  to  death," 
said  one  of  his  soldiers  afterwards,  "  but  I  saw  the 
old  man's  white  mustache  over  his  shoulder,  and 
went  on."  Under  a  withering  fire  of  rifles  they 
swept  up  the  ridge  and  encountered  the  tangled 
boughs  of  the  abattis.  "  No  flinching  now," 
shouted  the  old  hero,  waving  his  cap  aloft  on  the 
point  of  his  sword,  "  here  's  the  way,  come  on  !  " 
and  in  a  few  minutes  they  had  scrambled  through 
and  driven  the  defenders  from  their  rifle-pits. 
The  ridge  was  carried,  and  the  right  of  the  Con 
federate  line  was  in  our  possession. 

This  achievement  at  once  relieved  the  pressure 
upon  the  Federal  right.  Buckner  brought  over  a 
whole  division  to  drive  Smith  from  the  ride  he 


while  Wai-       ^ad   *a^en'  but  a^  to  no  purpose  ;  he 

lace  cuts  off     could   not  stir  him   an  inch.      Mean 

while    Wallace,   assaulting  the   enfee 

bled  forces  on  his  right,  pushed  them  back  into 


Fort  Donelson  and  ShiloJi  63 

their  works,  seized  the  Charlotte  road,  and  occu 
pied  every  yard  of  ground  to  the  river's  edge. 
The  situation  of  the  Confederates  was  far  worse 
than  in  the  morning.  They  had  lost  more  than 
2000  men  in  the  battle,  their  escape  was  cut  off, 
and  Smith's  position  commanded  their  works. 

In  the  night  an  extraordinary  scene  ensued.  A 
council  of  war  decided  that  nothing  was  left  but 
to  surrender.  But  Floyd,  who  was  at  that  mo 
ment  under  indictment  at  Washington  for  embez 
zlement  of  public  funds,  declared  he  would  rather 
die  than  surrender.  "  Yes,"  said  Pillow,  "  there 
are  no  two  men  the  Yankees  want  more  than  you 
and  me,  and  they  shall  not  have  us."  Floyd  asked 
Buckner  if  they  would  be  allowed  to  depart  in 
case  they  should  turn  over  the  command  to  him. 
Buckner  replied  yes,  if  they  should  leave  before 
terms  of  surrender  were  agreed  on.  So  these  un 
worthy  chiefs  forsook  their  men  and  escaped  up 
the  river  on  a  small  steamboat,  while  Colonel  For 
rest  pushed  his  cavalry  across  a  half-frozen  marsh 
formed  by  backwater  and  got  away,  leaving  part 
of  his  force  in  the  hands  of  the  wakeful  foe.  At 
daybreak  Buckner  sent  a  messenger  to  learn  what 
terms  would  be  accepted.  "  No  terms,"  "jjncondi 
answered  Grant,  "but  unconditional  tional  surren- 
surrender.  I  propose  to  move  imme 
diately  upon  your  works."  The  Confederate  com- 


64     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

mander  complained  of  such  treatment  as  "  unchiv- 
alrous,"  but  was  fain  to  submit. 

The  surrender  delivered  up  to  Grant  nearly 
15,000  prisoners,  with  65  cannon  and  17,000 
muskets.  His  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  miss 
ing,  had  exceeded  3000,  and  that  of  the  enemy 
had  been  not  far  from  the  same.  For  physical 
dimensions  it  was  the  greatest  military  achieve 
ment  that  the  American  continent  had  yet  wit 
nessed  ;  but  its  strategic  value  was  not  to  be 
measured  by  its  physical  dimensions.  The  two 
great  rivers  were  laid  open  for  hundreds  of  miles, 
Im  ortance  so  ^at  Union  gunboats  sailed  far  into 
of  the  vie-  Alabama.  The  victory  of  Thomas  at 
Mill  Spring  had  already  led  Johnston 
to  evacuate  Bowling  Green  and  retire  upon  Nash 
ville.  Now  it  was  necessary  to  abandon  Nashville 
also,  for  the  great  suspension  bridge  over  the 
Cumberland  was  Johnston's  only  available  line  of 
retreat,  and  there  was  now  nothing  to  hinder  Foote 
from  coming  up  to  destroy  it.  If  the  army  stayed 
in  its  jeopardized  situation,  he  would  be  sure  to 
come.  There  was  a  panic  in  Nashville.  The 
state  government  fled,  with  the  archives  and  all 
the  money  in  the  treasury,  Johnston  fell  back  to 
Murfreesboro,  and  just  a  week  after  Buckner's 
surrender  a  division  of  Buell's  army  occupied  the 
capital  of  Tennessee.  On  the  Mississippi  river 


Fort  Donelson  and  ShiloJi  65 

the  results  were  equally  decisive.  By  staying  in 
Columbus,  Polk  would  only  invite  the  fate  which 
had  overtaken  Buckner,  and  he  accordingly  re 
treated  as  far  as  Corinth,  in  Mississippi. 

Thus  the  first  Confederate  line  of  defence  was 
shattered  throughout  its  whole  length,  and  the 
silent  man  who  had  dealt  such  a  blow  stepped  at 
once  from  obscurity  into  a  national  fame.  The 
American  people  had  happily  had  but  little  expe 
rience  in  military  matters,  and  knew  little  of  the 
dynamics  of  warfare ;  and  when  they  saw  position 
after  position  thus  surrendered,  and  a  wide  stretch 
of  country  abandoned,  as  the  immediate  result  of 
Grant's  victory,  the  feeling  was  one  of  amazement, 
and  a  hopeful  mood  was  enkindled  that  was  as  yet 
premature,  because  none  could  yet  comprehend 
the  enormous  difficulty  of  the  task  which  had  to 
be  performed.  Grant  had  now  won  a  foothold  in 
the  confidence  of  the  people  which  did  him  and 
the  country  good  service  in  the  trying  time  to 
come,  when  at  Vicksburg  he  was  confronted  with 
a  problem  immeasurably  more  complicated  and 
difficult  than  that  which  he  had  now  solved  at 
Fort  Donelson.  In  the  gloomy  record  of  the  anx 
ious  and  impatient  year  which  had  just  passed, 
this  great  victory  was  the  one  bright  spot.  The 
victor  became  a  popular  hero,  and  the  phrase 
"  Unconditional  Surrender,"  humorously  associated 


66     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

with  the  initials  of  his  name,  became  the  watch 
word  of  the  northern  people,  and  the  index  of  the 
policy  which  was  to  be  pursued  until  the  spectre  of  ' 
secession  should  be  exorcised  and  the  work  of 
the  men  who  founded  this  nation  guaranteed  in 
safety  forever. 

The  correct  and  studious  Halleck,  who  had  been 
so  slow  to  sanction  Grant's  forward  movement, 
Halleck  and  now  telegraphed  to  Washington,  beg- 
Grant.  ging  to  have  his  own  command  so 

enlarged  as  to  cover  all  the  armies  west  of  the 
Alleghanies,  and  added,  with  droll  inconsistency, 
that  "  hesitation  and  delay  are  losing  us  the 
golden  opportunity."  President  Lincoln  immedi 
ately  appointed  Grant  major-general  of  volunteers, 
and  presently  Buell,  Pope,  Smith,  McClernand, 
and  Wallace  were  raised  to  the  same  rank.  On 
the  llth  of  March  Halleck's  command  was  en 
larged  according  to  his  request,  and  divided  into 
three  departments,  Pope  in  Missouri  commanding 
the  right,  Grant  on  the  Tennessee  the  centre, 
and  Buell  at  Nashville  the  left. 

A  fortnight  before  these  arrangements  were 
made,  Grant  found  it  necessary  to  go  for  one  day 
to  Nashville,  to  consult  with  Buell,  and  during  his 
absence  some  of  his  undisciplined  men  indulged 
themselves  in  marauding.  On  his  return  they 
were  promptly  arrested,  but  the  news  of  the  inci- 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  67 

dent,  magnified  and  highly  coloured  in  an  anony 
mous  letter,  led  Halleck  to  send  the  following  de 
spatch  to  McClellan  at  Washington :  "I  have  had 
no  communication  with  General  Grant  for  more 
than  a  week.  He  left  his  command  without  my 
authority,  and  went  to  Nashville.  His  army  seems 
to  be  as  much  demoralized  by  the  victory  of  Fort 
Donelson  as  was  that  of  the  Potomac  by  the  defeat 
of  Bull  Run.  It  is  hard  to  censure  a  successful 
general  immediately  after  a  victory,  but  I  think 
he  richly  deserves  it.  I  can  get  no  returns,  no 
reports,  no  information  of  any  kind  from  him. 
Satisfied  with  his  victory,  he  sits  down  and  enjoys 
it,  without  any  regard  to  the  future.  I  am  worn 
out  and  tired  by  this  neglect  and  inefficiency. 
C.  F.  Smith  is  almost  the  only  officer  equal  to  the 
emergency." 

Halleck  sent  this  extraordinary  despatch  before 
complaining  to  Grant  or  giving  him  a  chance  to 
justify  himself.  No  wonder  that  on  receiving  it 
McClellan  should  have  felt  bound  to  reply :  "  The 
future  success  of  our  cause  demands  that  proceed 
ings  such  as  General  Grant's  should  at  once  be 
checked.  Generals  must  observe  discipline  as  well 
as  private  soldiers.  Do  not  hesitate  to  arrest  him 
at  once  if  the  good  of  the  service  requires  it,  and 
place  C.  F.  Smith  in  command.  You  are  at  liberty 
to  regard  this  as  a  positive  order,  if  it  will  smooth 
your  way." 


68     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

By  Halleck's  command  the  army  had  just  been 
moved  back  from  Fort  Donelson  to  Fort  Henry, 
preparatory  to  ascending  the  Tennessee  river  for 
the  capture  of  Corinth.  Halleck  now  availed  him 
self  of  McClellan's  message  so  far  as  to  place 
Smith  in  command  of  the  expedition,  while  he 
charged  Grant  with  disobedience  and  directed  him 
to  remain  at  Fort  Henry.  Sorely  astonished  and 
hurt,  Grant  asked  to  be  relieved  of  his  command. 
An  interchange  of  telegrams  followed  for  several 
days,  in  the  course  of  which  Grant  completely  justi 
fied  himself,  and  was  replaced  in  charge  of  the  ex 
pedition,  greatly  to  the  relief  of  Smith,  who  had 
been  one  of  Grant's  teachers  at  West  Point,  and 
thoroughly  believed  in  him.  Smith  was  shocked 
and  amazed  at  this  readiness  of  Halleck  to  con 
demn  his  subordinate  unheard,  and  at  the  moment 
after  a  great  victory  ;  but  the  explanation  is  not 
far  to  seek.  In  common  with  many  of  the  older 
officers,  Halleck  was  strongly  prejudiced  against 
Grant,  who  had  been  somewhat  under  a  cloud 
when  he  left  the  regular  army.  It  is  unquestion 
able  that  Grant  shared  with  Daniel  Webster,  and 
many  other  men  of  strong  and  massive  natures,  a 
somewhat  overweening  fondness  for  John  Barley 
corn.  The  fact  was  made  much  of  by  ill-disposed 
people,  and  was  of  course  duly  brought  to  the 
attention  of  President  Lincoln,  who  estimated  it 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  69 

with  his  customary  humorous  shrewdness.  "I 
should  like,"  said  Lincoln,  "  to  find  out  the  kind 
of  whiskey  he  drinks :  I  would  send  whiskey  and 
a  barrel  of  it  to  every  one  of  my  gen-  war- 
erals !  "  There  is  nothing  to  show  that  Grant's 
usefulness  as  a  commander  was  ever  impaired  by 
this  personal  trait,  but  it  seems  to  have  been  what 
Halleck  had  in  mind  when  he  acted  so  precipi 
tately  upon  the  anonymous  letter. 

The  little  town  of  Corinth,  in  northern  Missis 
sippi,  which  was  now  threatened  by  the  approach 
of  the  Union  army,  was  the  meeting-point  of  two 
great  railroads  that  connected  the  Mississippi  river 
and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  with  Virginia  and  the  Car- 
olinas.  By  seizing  this  strategic  point  and  driving 
the  enemy  from  his  positions  on  the  river  at  New 
Madrid,  Island  Number  Ten,  Fort  Pillow,  and 
Memphis,  the  whole  country  would  be  strategic 
laid  open  as  far  as  Vicksburg.  The  importance 

,         .  .  ,  /.  of  Corinth. 

task  ot  opening  the  great  river  irom 
above  was  entrusted  to  General  Pope,  with  whom 
the  greater  part  of  Commodore  Foote's  fleet  was 
now  to  cooperate ;  and  an  expedition  was  already 
fitting  out  for  the  capture  of  New  Orleans  and  the 
conquest  of  the  river  from  below.  The  task  of 
taking  Corinth  was  assigned  to  the  united  forces 
of  Grant  and  Buell,  which  Halleck  was  to  command 


70     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

in  person.  The  Confederates  were  straining  every 
nerve  to  secure  this  important  position,  and  make 
it  the  base  for  an  offensive  campaign  which  should 
retrieve  the  disaster  of  Fort  Donelson.  General 
Beauregard,  who  had  won  such  laurels  at  Bull  Run, 
was  sent  to  Mississippi,  and  had  already  occupied 
Corinth  in  force.  Loud  and  bitter  complaints  were 
poured  upon  Johnston  for  losing  Fort  Donelson 
and  Nashville,  and  the  Confederate  government 
was  urged  to  remove  him  from  his  command ;  but 
Mr.  Davis,  after  listening  patiently  to  an  angry 
delegation  from  Tennessee  who  begged  him  to  give 
them  a  general,  replied  with  great  earnestness,  "  If 
Sidney  Johnston  is  not  a  general,  the  Confederacy 
has  none  to  give  you."  A  special  committee  was 
appointed  to  inquire  into  the  causes  of  the  late 
disasters,  and  Floyd  and  Pillow  were  removed  from 
command  ;  but  Johnston  was  retained  in  his  high 
position,  with  Beauregard  as  his  chief  lieutenant, 
and  by  the  end  of  March  they  had  assembled  at 
Corinth  an  army  of  nearly  50,000  men.  Polk  was 
brought  thither  on  his  retreat  from  Columbus,  and 
Braxton  Bragg  came  up  with  10,000  men  from 
Pensacola.  This  able  general  was  a  native  of 
North  Carolina.  At  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista,  in 
Braxton  ^ie  Mexican  War,  he  had  by  a  timely 

Bragg.  movement  saved  from  destruction  the 

regiment  of  Jefferson  Davis,  and  this  service  was 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  71 

never  forgotten  by  the  President  of  the  Confeder 
acy,  who  always  befriended  Bragg  through  good 
and  evil  fortune.  Bragg  was  a  man  of  refinement 
in  feature  and  expression,  somewhat  stern  and  re 
served  in  demeanour,  an  excellent  disciplinarian 
and  organizer,  but  wanting  in  strategic  power.  To 
complete  this  gathering  of  the  forces,  General  Van 
Dorn,  scarcely  recovered  from  his  recent  crushing 
defeat  at  Pea  Ridge,  was  ordered  to  bring  over 
his  army  from  Arkansas ;  but  although  he  moved 
with  alacrity,  he  only  succeeded  in  getting  up  one 
regiment  in  time  for  the  coming  battle. 

Just  before  the  misunderstanding  between  Grant 
and  Halleck,  General  Beauregard  sent  a  couple  of 
regiments  with  a  field-battery  to  take  possession 
of  the  bluff  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  about  twenty 
miles  northeast  from  Corinth,  but  this  force  was 
driven  away  by  two  of  Foote's  gunboats.  A  few 
days  later  General  C.  F.  Smith,  coming  pittsburg 
up  the  river  with  his  forces,  selected  Landing, 
this  spot  as  the  rendezvous  for  the  two  Union 
armies.  Halleck  had  designated  Savannah,  on 
the  eastern  bank,  nine  miles  below  or  northward 
from  Pittsburg  Landing,  but  Smith  was  authorized 
to  make  a  different  arrangement  if  he  saw  fit. 
When  Grant  arrived,  he  recognized  the  importance 
of  the  position  and  adopted  it.  Many  persons 
found  fault  with  him  after  the  battle  for  taking 


72     Tfie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

position  on  the  west  side  of  the  river,  but  the  ablest 
critics  seem  to  agree  with  the  Count  of  Paris  that 
the  position  was  ''extremely  well  chosen."  It  was 
Grant's  theory  of  the  campaign  that  he  was  to 
attack  and  crush  the  enemy,  and  the  east  side  of 
the  river  was  not  the  place  in  which  to  do  this. 
It  would  not  do  to  give  up  the  bluff  at  Pittsburg 
Landing  to  Johnston  and  Beauregard.  The  posi 
tion  was  an  exceedingly  strong  one,  and  while  the 
gunboats  commanded  the  river  Grant  might  expect 
to  have  sufficient  means  of  transport  at  hand  in 
case  of  disaster.  It  was  his  plan  to  wait  in  this 
position  until  the  arrival  of  Buell's  army,  after 
which  the  united  forces  were  to  advance  upon  the 
enemy  at  Corinth.  Meanwhile,  as  Buell  was  ex 
pected  to  arrive  at  Savannah,  Grant  kept  his  head 
quarters  there  for  the  present,  but  spent  a  large 
part  of  each  day  with  the  army  at  Pittsburg  Land 
ing. 

The  position  was  a  quadrilateral  nearly  enclosed 
by  natural  obstacles,  but  open  on  the  southwest, 
the  side  facing  toward  Corinth.  The  north  was 
covered  by  Snake  creek,  emptying  into  the  river 
a  little  below  the  landing.  Owl  creek,  a  tributary 
of  Snake  creek,  enclosed  the  northwest  side.  To 
the  southeast  Lick  creek  flows  into  the  river  above 
the  landing,  and  at  that  time  its  volume  was  greatly 
swelled  by  backwater.  All  three  streams,  indeed, 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  73 

were  more  or  less  flooded.  The  space  included 
between  them  measured  about  three  miles  in  either 
direction.  The  ground  was  uneven  and  thickly 
wooded.  A  number  of  small  roads  intersected  it, 
and  on  one  of  these,  running  out  toward  Corinth 
near  the  right  of  the  position,  was  a  rude  meeting 
house  built  of  logs  and  known  as  Shiloh  church. 
The  greater  part  of  the  army  was  arranged  across 
the  open  front  of  the  quadrilateral  between  Owl 
and  Lick  creeks  which  protected  its  two  flanks. 
The  right  wing,  near  the  crossing  of 

e  Arrangement 

Owl  creek  by  the  road  from  Pittsburg   Of  Federal 
Landing  to  Purdy,  was  commanded  by   for.ces  at 

Shiloli. 

a  general  who  for  profound  knowledge 
of  strategy,  and  versatility  of  resource,  must  be 
ranked  among  the  masters  of  the  military  art. 
William  Tecumseh  Sherman  had  succeeded  Grant 
in  command  at  Cairo,  and  now  in  the  gathering  of 
the  forces  had  come  to  take  charge  of  a  division  in 
the  advance  upon  Corinth.  On  Sherman's  left, 
and  somewhat  overlapping  him  to  the  rear,  was 
McClernand,  and  next  to  him  Prentiss,  while 
Stuart's  brigade  of  Sherman's  division  held  the 
extreme  left,  resting  upon  Lick  creek.1  About  a 

1  These  positions  as  marked  on  the  map  indicate  approxi 
mately  the  relative  positions  of  the  Federal  camps  on  Sunday 
morning1,  rather  than  the  fluctuating  lines  of  battle  which  were 
formed  under  fire. 


74     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

mile  and  a  half  to  the  rear,  stretching  from  a  point 
slightly  above  Pittsburg  Landing  across  to  Snake 
creek,  the  divisions  of  Hurlbut  and  C.  F.  Smith 
were  stationed  in  reserve ;  but  the  gallant  Smith 
was  never  again  to  take  the  field.  He  had  hurt 
his  leg  in  jumping  into  a  yawl,  and  this  slight 
injury,  joined  with  the  effects  of  exposure  at  Fort 
Donelson,  brought  him  in  a  few  weeks  to  the  grave. 
He  was  then  lying  ill  at  Savannah,  and  his  divi 
sion  was  commanded  by  William  Wallace.  Lew 
Wallace's  division  was  five  miles  down  the  river 
at  Crump's  Landing,  whence  a  road  runs  westward 
to  the  town  of  Purdy.  Movements  of  the  enemy 
were  possible  in  this  direction,  and  Wallace  re 
mained  to  watch  the  Purdy  road.  Another  road 
parallel  with  the  river  connected  Wallace  directly 
with  the  right  of  the  Union  reserve  by  a  bridge 
lately  built  over  Snake  creek. 

The  only  quarter  in  which  the  Union  army  was 
exposed  to  assault  was  the  open  front  between  Owl 
and  Lick  creeks.  At  a  later  period  of  the  war 
this  line  would  doubtless  have  been  entrenched, 
and  the  whole  position  made  invulnerable.  But 
the  need  of  entrenching  was  not  then  so  keenly 
felt  as  it  came  to  be  afterward.  It  took  just  such 
terrible  affairs  as  Shiloh  to  reveal  the  need  of  it. 
For  it  was  even  in  this  strong  position  that  John 
ston  resolved  to  attack  and  crush  Grant's  army 


SHILOH,  APRIL  6,  1862,  MORNING 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  75 

before  BuelTs  should  have  joined  it.  Could  this 
be  done,  it  might  repair  the  disaster  of  The  eve  of 
Fort  Donelson  and  regain  to  the  Con-  battle- 
federacy  the  lost  territory.  At  the  very  least,  it 
would  save  Corinth  and  restore  the  prestige  of  the 
southern  arms.  Johnston  waited  as  long  as  he 
dared  for  the  arrival  of  Van  Dorn  from  Arkansas, 
with  20,000  men,  but  swollen  streams  and  miry 
roads  made  him  wait  in  vain.  On  the  other  hand, 
Buell's  march  from  Nashville  was  delayed  by  un 
looked-for  obstacles.  There  was  a  freshet  in  Duck 
river,  and  a  bridge  had  to  be  rebuilt,  which  took 
several  days.  In  the  early  spring  American  roads 
are  at  their  worst,  and  marching  was  slow.  Still 
Buell  made  progress,  and  on  Saturday  evening,  the 
5th  of  April,  the  head  of  his  foremost  division, 
under  Nelson,  arrived  at  Savannah.  At  that 
moment  the  Confederate  lines  were  already  de 
ployed  and  ready  for  battle  in  front  of  the  Federal 
army,  but  hidden  from  view  in  the  forest.  The  at 
tack  had  been  planned  for  Saturday  morning,  but 
some  misunderstanding  of  orders  had  bred  delay 
until  it  was  too  late  to  attack  before  the  morrow. 
Beauregard  now  argued  that  the  plan  of  surprising 
Grant's  army  had  evidently  failed,  and  he  held  the 
element  of  surprise  to  be  so  important  that  in  its 
absence  the  attack  had  better  not  be  made.  It 
would  be  wiser,  said  Beauregard,  to  retire  upon 


76     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Corinth ;  but  Johnston  persisted,  and  ordered  the 
attack  for  next  morning  at  daybreak. 

Perhaps  no  other  battle  of  the  nineteenth  cen 
tury  save  Waterloo  has  been  the  occasion  of  so 
much  difference  of  opinion  as  the  battle  of  Shiloh. 
One  of  the  points  most  hotly  discussed  has  been 
the  question  how  far  the  Federal  army  was  taken 
by  surprise  on  the  morning  of  that  bloody  Sunday. 
Rumour  had  it  for  a  while  that  the 

How  far  were 

the  Federals     presence  of  an  enemy  was  so  far  un- 

Sldlohf^  susPected  that  in  Prentiss's  camp, 
where  Johnston's  first  blow  fell,  men 
were  captured  by  wholesale  in  their  beds.  It  has 
also  been  contended  that  the  end  of  the  day  found 
the  Federal  army  so  completely  shattered  that  no 
thing  but  Buell's  timely  arrival  could  have  saved 
it  from  utter  destruction  or  capture.  A  sober  study 
of  the  documentary  evidence  seems  hardly  to  jus 
tify  such  extreme  statements ;  yet  doubtless  they 
come  much  nearer  to  the  truth  than  Grant  and 
Sherman,  in  their  published  Memoirs,  are  willing 
to  admit. 

So  long  as  Grant  felt  it  necessary  or  desirable  to 
keep  his  headquarters  at  Savannah,  it  was  doubly 
incumbent  on  him  to  secure  the  position  of  his 
army  by  every  practicable  means.  If  he  thought 
it  better  to  employ  his  raw  troops  in  drilling  than 
in  throwing  up  earthworks,  it  was  an  error  in  jiulg- 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  77 

ment  excusable  in  view  of  his  want  of  experience, 
but  none  the  less  an  error.  His  inat-  Grant  was  not 
tention  to  the  exposed  front  between  exPectine  the 

attack  on 

Owl  and  Lick  creeks  is  pretty  clear  Sunday  mom- 
proof  that  he  was  not  expecting  an  ing' 
attack  in  that  quarter  for  the  morning  of  Sun 
day,  April  6.  Had  he  been  on  the  lookout  for 
such  an  event,  would  he  not  have  spent  Saturday 
night  at  Pittsburg  Landing  instead  of  Savannah? 
and  would  he  not  have  lodged  some  appropriate 
instructions  with  Lew  Wallace,  instead  of  waiting 
till  Sunday  morning  ? 

These  considerations  have  all  the  more  weight 
since  in  Grant's  absence  from  the  field  it  was  not 
at  all  clear  who  represented  him  there.  Lew 
Wallace  and  McClernand  were  the  only  major- 
generals,  so  that  the  latter  was  ranking  officer  at 
the  front.  As  Sherman's  camp,  however,  was 
situated  furthest  forward,  it  would  seem  to  have 
been  especially  incumbent  on  him  to  watch  for  in 
dications  of  the  enemy's  presence  in  the  neighbour 
hood.  Here  a  cavalry  force  would  have  been  use 
ful,  but  for  want  of  such  aid  the  army  was  virtually 
blindfold.  Under  such  circumstances  it  would 
seem  that  Sherman  should  have  taken  more  than 
ordinary  pains  to  learn  all  that  could  nor  was 
be  elicited  from  the  forest  by  pickets  Sherman- 
and  scouts.  His  failure  to  do  so,  his  evident  fail- 


78     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

ure  to  realize  the  need  for  it,  was  simply  a  mark 
of  inexperience.  It  is  truly  remarkable  that  an 
army  of  40,000  Confederates  should  have  ap 
proached  on  Saturday  afternoon  within  a  distance 
of  two  or  three  miles,  and  not  have  sharply  aroused 
the  attention  of  the  Federal  camps.  The  point  is 
one  on  which  General  Sherman  in  later  years  was 
unduly  sensitive.  I  have  often  heard  him  repu 
diate  with  scorn  the  charge  of  having  been  taken 
by  surprise  at  Shiloh,  and  there  can  of  course  be 
no  doubt  as  to  his  perfect  sincerity  of  conviction. 
The  Federals  Nevertheless,  the  undeniable  fact  that 
were  sur-  when  the  Confederates  attacked  in  full 

force  on  Sunday  morning,  the  Federals 
were  in  camp  and  not  in  line  of  battle,  would  seem 
to  furnish  absolute  demonstration  that  the  attack 
was  not  expected. 

The  first  Union  officer  to  take  the  alarm  was  the 
West  Virginian  brigadier,  Benjamin  Prentiss,  who 
on  Saturday  descried  indications  of  the  presence 
of  cavalry  in  the  neighbourhood  and  strengthened 
his  pickets.  Soon  after  five  o'clock  on  Sunday 

morning  the  battle  was  begun  by  the 

The  opening         ,.  *  ,    ..  ,     ,       . &,  J    ... 

attack  upon  skirmishing  or  the  rebel  pickets  with 
Prentiss's  those  of  Prentiss ;  and  scarcely  had  that 

division. 

general  formed  his  division  and  thrown 
it  a  quarter  of  a  mile  forward,  when  it  was  struck 
by  the  mighty  rush  of  the  Confederates.  On  they 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  TO 

came  in  three  parallel  lines,  one  following  another 
at  intervals  of  about  half  a  mile.  First  came 
Hardee,  with  about  10,000  men,  then  Bragg,  with 
10,000  more  ;  while  the  rear  line  comprised  Folk's 
10,000  to  leftward  and  Breckinridge's  6000  to 
the  right.  When  the  full  line  of  battle  was  de 
veloped,  this  arrangement  brought  forward  Polk 
on  the  extreme  left,  by  Owl  creek,  with  Hardee 
as  left  centre,  Bragg  as  right  centre,  and  Breck- 
inridge  on  the  extreme  right,  by  Lick  creek. 
Besides  these  36,000  infantry  there  were  4000 
cavalry,  scarcely  effective  in  that  tangle  of  forest. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Union  army  numbered 
about  40,000  men,  but  7000  of  these  were  with 
Lew  Wallace  at  Crump's  Landing,  leaving  33,000 
to  confront  the  enemy's  attack. 

Grant  was  taking  an  early  breakfast  at  Savannah 
when  suddenly  he  heard  the  heavy  firing,  and  forth 
with  started  up  the  river,  leaving  a  note  for  Buell. 
At  Crump's  Landing  he  found  Lew  ? 

Wallace  awaiting  him  in  a  boat.  Tell-  structionsand 
ing  Wallace  to  hold  himself  in  readi-  Lew  Wal~ 

lace  s  march. 

ness  for  an  immediate  start,  Grant  has 
tened  to  the  battlefield.  Arriving  at  eight  o'clock, 
and  finding  that  the  enemy  had  evidently  massed 
his  whole  strength  in  our  front,  he  sent  a  verbal 
order  to  Wallace  to  march  at  once.  The  distance 
was  only  five  muddy  miles,  but  after  five  hours  of 


80     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

obstinate  fighting,  in  the  course  of  which  the 
Federal  front  was  driven  back  more  than  a  mile, 
nothing  had  yet  been  heard  from  Wallace,  and 
two  of  Grant's  staff  —  James  McPherson  1  and 
John  Rawlins  —  were  sent  to  look  for  him.  The 
cause  of  delay  was  a  misunderstanding  such  as 
one  is  continually  meeting  with  in  every-day  life. 
It  had  not  occurred  to  Grant  that  Wallace  would 
move  by  any  other  route  than  the  direct  road  from 
the  vicinity  of  Crump's  Landing  to  the  bridge 
over  Snake  creek.  But  it  happened  that  some  of 
Wallace's  brigades  had  been  thrown  out  for  some 
distance  along  the  Purdy  road,  and  it  seemed  to 
him  sufficiently  direct  to  come  by  a  route  parallel 
to  that  which  Grant  had  in  mind,  crossing  Snake 
creek  a  couple  of  miles  higher  up.  When  Mc 
Pherson  and  Rawlins  found  him,  he  had  nearly 
reached  the  creek ;  but  now  he  learned  from  them 
that  to  pursue  this  route  would  be  dangerous.  It 
would  lead  him  to  the  point  where  the  road  from 
Purdy  to  Pittsburg  Landing  crosses  Owl  creek,  and 
now  that  the  Federal  line  had  been  driven  back, 
this  would  bring  him  on  the  field  in  an  isolated 
position,  where  he  would  be  liable  to  be  separately 
attacked.  It  thus  became  necessary  for  Wallace 
to  retrace  his  steps  for  some  three  miles,  and  then 

1  Afterward  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and 
one  of  the  ablest  generals  in  the  war. 


Fort  Donelson  and  /Shiloh  81 

to  take  a  cross  road  to  the  Snake  creek  bridge 
below.  All  this  marching  and  countermarching 
used  up  the  day,  so  that  Wallace  did  not  arrive 
upon  the  scene  of  action  till  seven  in  the  evening. 
His  was,  comparatively  speaking,  a  division  of 
veterans,  and  its  absence  was  severely  felt.  This 
serious  peril  might  have  been  prevented  had  Grant 
in  the  first  place  sent  to  Wallace  a  businesslike 
written  order,  specifying  his  line  of  march.  It  is 
in  such  minute  attention  to  details  that  great  gen 
eralship  largely  consists.  Napoleon  in  his  best 
days  left  but  little  room  open  for  contingencies 
and  misunderstandings. 

Johnston's  plan  of  battle  was  very  simple.     It 
was  to  push  back  the  Federal  army  in  such  wise  as 
to  turn  its  left  flank,  and  to  interpose  Bragg  and 
Breckinridge  between  that  flank  and   the   river. 
Thus  by  cutting  off  the  Federals  from   johnston^s 
Pittsburg  Landing  and  driving  them,    plan  of  at- 
in  more  or  less  disorganized  condition, 
into  the  pocket  formed  by  Snake  creek,  he  might 
even  hope  to  force  them  to  surrender.    The  desper 
ate  valour  and  dogged  persistency  with  which  his 
first  charges  were  received,  however,  were  such  as 
to  make  it  doubtful  whether  one  long  day  would 
suffice  for  his  programme.     We  have  seen  how  the 
first  fury  of  the  assault  fell  upon  Benjamin  Pren- 
tiss  about  half  past  five  in  the  morning.     That 


82     The  Mississipin  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

general  held  his  ground  nobly,  gaining  time  for 
the  other  divisions  to  form  in  line  of  battle ;  but 
presently  the  enemy  pushed  in  between  Prentiss 
and  Sherman,  whose  left  regiment  soon  gave  way 
Prentiss  in  disorder.  This  obliged  Prentiss  to 

pushed  back,    f au  back  to  save  ^is  right  flank ;  and 

so  he  alternately  stood  firm  and  yielded  a  little, 
until  he  had  been  pushed  back  half  a  mile  to  a 
point  where  Hurlbut  reinforced  him.1  When  this 
was  accomplished,  it  was  nine  o'clock,  or  three 
hours  and  a  half  since  this  division  had  first  been 
struck. 

Meanwhile  the  disaster  to  Sherman's  left  wing, 
with  the  retirement  of  Prentiss,  exposed  McCler- 
nand's  left  flank,  and  he  endeavoured  to  make  a 
partial  change  of  front  to  meet  the  danger ;  but 
McClemand  un^er  the  fierce  onset  of  the  enemy, 
and  Sherman  his  line  was  driven  back  with  the  loss 

pushed  back.    of    gix   gung^    and    -t   wag    not    ^^    to 

recover  itself  and  make  a  fresh  stand  until  it  had 
yielded  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  mile.  By  this  time 
Sherman's  third  brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel 
Hildebrand,  had  completely  lost  its  organization 
and  melted  away,  leaving  on  the  ground  more  than 

1  For  many  of  these  details  I  am  indebted  to  General  Buell's 
paper,  "  Shiloh  Reviewed,"  in  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil 
War,  i.  487-5.06  ;  one  of  the  most  masterly  pieces  of  military  criti 
cism  that  I  have  ever  read  in  any  language. 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  83 

300  killed  and  wounded.  The  rest  of  Sherman's 
division  fought  with  great  obstinacy,  and  inflicted 
frightful  loss  upon  their  assailants ;  but  the  Con 
federates  were  so  much  stronger  at  the  point  of 
contact  that  mere  heroism  was  of  no  avail  against 
them,  and  by  noon  Sherman's  division  had  ceased 
to  exist  as  an  organized  body.  Fragments  of  its 
regiments  and  companies  took  shelter  among  their 
friends  of  McClernand's  division,  which  through 
these  irregular  accretions  became  quite  an  amor 
phous  body,  taking  its  orders  indifferently  from 
McClernand  or  from  Sherman.  After  two  hours 
more  of  desperate  fighting,  these  generals  retired 
their  division  across  Tillman  creek  and  took  up 
a  strong  position  along  the  road  from  Snake  creek 
to  Hamburg. 

In  this  position  their  left  flank  was,  in  a  mea 
sure,  protected  by  the  line  of  reserve  which  Hurl- 
but  and  William  Wallace  had  maintained  since  an 
early  hour  of  the  day.  Upon  an  advanced  portion 
of  this  line  Prentiss  had  retired,  and  toward  the 
same  point  Stuart's  brigade,  on  the  extreme  Union 
left,  was  driven,  but  not  until  thrice  its  own 
numbers  had  been  massed  against  it.  About  the 
left  centre  of  the  Federal  line  was  a  wooded  area 
with  dense  undergrowth,  admirably  adapted  for 
defence  ;  and  there  the  indomitable  Prentiss,  rein 
forced  by  Stuart  and  by  brigades  from  Wallace 


84     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

and  Hurlbut,  maintained  his  ground  from  nine  in 
the  morning  till  five  in  the  afternoon.  Again  and 
again  the  Confederate  assaults  were  repulsed  with 
heavy  slaughter.  So  savagely  were  they  received 
that  they  bestowed  upon  the  place  the  name  of 
The  Hornet's  "  Hornet's  Nest."  The  long  struggle 
at  this  point  proved  fatal  to  Johnston's 
scheme  for  turning  the  Federal  left,  and  if  among 
the  Federal  generals  there  is  any  one  who  deserves 
especial  commemoration  as  having  "  saved  the  day," 
it  is  Benjamin  Prentiss  for  the  glorious  stand  which 
he  made  in  the  Hornet's  Nest. 

It  was  in  an  open  field  on  the  eastern  margin 
of  this  fiercely  contested  area,  shortly  after  a  spir 
ited  charge  at  about  2.30  p.  M.,  that  General 
Johnston  was  struck  by  a  rifle-ball  which  cut  an 
Death  of  artery  in  the  leg.  The  wound  need  not 
Johnston.  ^ave  ^een  fatal.  Although  no  surgeon 

happened  to  be  near  at  hand,  the  general  or  any 
of  his  comrades  might  easily  have  extemporized  a 
tourniquet  that  would  have  put  him  out  of  danger. 
But  Johnston  was  so  absorbed  in  his  work  that  he 
took  no  heed  of  the  wound  until  suddenly  he  sank 
and  died  from  loss  of  blood.  The  command  of 
the  army  then  devolved  upon  General  Beauregard, 
who  was  at  that  moment  in  the  rear,  at  Shiloh 
church. 

The  death  of  Johnston  was  a  bitter  loss  to  the 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  85 

Confederacy.  Jefferson  Davis  afterward  declared 
his  belief  that  "  the  fortunes  of  a  country  hung  by 
the  single  thread  of  the  life  that  was  yielded  on 
the  field  of  Shiloh."  l  Johnston's  death  deprived 
us  of  the  data  requisite  for  testing  the  soundness  of 
this  opinion ;  but  of  the  theory  that  if  he  had  lived 
he  would  certainly  have  crushed  the  Federal  army 
that  evening,  something  may  be  said.  The  often 
repeated  statement  that  Beauregard  threw  away 
what  Johnston  had  won  seems  unfair  to  the  former 
and  inconsistent  with  the  history  of  the  remainder 
of  the  day.  In  point  of  fact,  the  Confederates 
had  not  yet  won  the  battle.2  The  advanced  divi 
sion  of  Buell's  army,  under  Nelson,  was  approach 
ing  on  the  further  bank  of  the  Tennessee  river ; 
and  in  order  to  gain  a  victory,  it  was  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  Confederates  to  capture  Pitts- 
burg  Landing  and  cut  off  Grant's  army  from  rein 
forcements.  The  long  stoppage  at  the  Hornet's 

1  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,  ii.  69. 

2  Indeed,  Johnston  had  not  even  gone  to  work  in  the  way 
best  fitted  to  carry  out  his  plan  of  turning  the  Federal  left  flank. 
For  that  purpose  his  right  wing  ought  to  have  been  much  more 
heavily  massed,  and  his  heaviest  blow  should  have  fallen  upon 
Stuart  rather  than  Prentiss.     By  following  this  line  of  action  and 
pressing  northward  upon  the  Hamburg  road,  perhaps  the  Hor 
net's  Nest  might  have  been  turned  and  Pittsburg  Landing  cap 
tured,  which  would  have  made  the  Confederate  victory  certain. 
It  was  a  grave  mistake  to  hammer  for  hours  at  the  Hornet's  Nest 
instead  of  pursuing  the  course  thus  outlined. 


86     Tfie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the,  Civil  War 

Nest  had  used  up  so  much  of  the  day  as  to  leave 
scarcely  time  enough  for  this  crowning  achieve 
ment.  After  Johnston's  death,  more  than  two 
hours  elapsed  before  the  tremendous  pressure  upon 
Hurlbut's  left  flank  compelled  him  to  retire  toward 
Pittsburg  Landing,  while  a  similar  attack  upon 
William  Wallace's  right  wing  pushed  it  back,  dis 
ordered  and  partially  crumbled.  These  events 
left  the  remaining  Federal  force  in  that  part  of 
the  field,  consisting  of  the  remnants  of  Wallace's 
and  Prentiss's  divisions,  with  both  wings  in  the 
Capture  of  &W-  Thus  a  little  before  six  o'clock 
Prentiss.  about  six  regiments,  numbering  over 
2200  men,  were  encompassed  and  captured  by  the 
enemy.  Prentiss  was  taken  prisoner,  and  Wal 
lace  received  a  mortal  wound. 

This  great  success  for  the  Confederates  was  far 
from  being  an  unmixed  success,  for  the  sending  of 
so  many  captives  to  the  rear  entailed  further  delay 
when  every  minute  was  precious.  The  position  at 
Pittsburg  Landing  was  covered  by  a  ravine  partly 
overflowed  with  backwater.  On  bluffs  overlooking 
this  ravine  a  battery  of  twenty  pieces  was  planted 
just  as  three  Confederate  brigades  were  advancing 
to  the  attack.  As  the  enemy,  flushed  with  victory, 
came  on,  these  batteries  opened  upon  them,  while 
at  the  same  time  the  gunboats  Tyler  and  Lexing 
ton  took  part  in  the  contest  and  enfiladed  the 


SHILOH,  APRIL  6,  1862,   EVENING 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  87 

rebel  lines  with  their  giant  balls.     Moreover,  Nel 
son's  division  was  crossing  the  river,   Failure  of  the 

and  Ammen's  brigade,  its  first  brigade,    Confederates 

to  take  Pitts- 
arrived  upon  the  scene  to  support  the  burg  Land- 
Federal  artillery.  The  Confederates  in^- 
were  driven  back,  and  presently  orders  from  Beau- 
regard  were  passed  along  their  advanced  lines 
directing  them  to  desist  from  further  attacks  and 
to  retire  out  of  range  of  the  gunboats.  By  some 
southern  writers  Beauregard  has  been  severely 
censured  for  these  orders ;  it  is  maintained  that  if 
he  had  ordered  one  last  grand  charge,  it  would 
surely  have  routed  or  destroyed  the  Union  army. 
This  opinion  is  open  to  grave  doubt.  If  Beaure 
gard  could  at  that  moment  have  put  6000  or  8000 
fresh  reserves  into  the  fight  against  his  weary  an 
tagonist,  he  might  in  all  probability  have  routed 
him.  But  here  at  nightfall,  after  more  than  twelve 
hours  of  desperate  fighting,  his  own  men  were  as 
weary  as  the  enemy ;  and  it  was  now  Grant,  not 
Beauregard,  who  could  bring  fresh  troops  into  ac 
tion,  for  the  big  steamboats  were  delivering  Nel 
son's  men  by  the  thousand  at  Pittsburg  Landing. 

Thus,  in  spite  of  their  magnificent  valour  and 
dash,  aided  by  the  initial  advantage  of  the  sur 
prise,  the  Confederates  at  the  end  of  the  day  fell 
just  short  of  victory.  Their  utmost  efforts  left  the 
line  of  communication  between  Grant's  army  and 


88     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

the  reinforcing  army  unbroken.  Had  Buell's 
arrival  been  further  delayed,  they  might  perhaps 
have  completed  their  victory  on  Monday,  but  now 
the  conditions  were  entirely  changed.  It  was  in 
Bragg  and  an  agony  of  rage  and  disappointment 
Beauregard.  ^  Bragg  ^  nightfall  received  Beau- 
regard's  orders  to  suspend  the  fight  till  morning. 
It  is  a  principle  often  illustrated  in  war  that  when 
two  armies  have  fought  until  their  strength  is  well- 
nigh  spent,  the  one  that  can  soonest  summon  its 
jaded  energies  to  a  final  assault  is  almost  sure 
to  win.  Upon  this  principle  Bragg  would  have 
risked  everything  upon  a  grand  attack  on  Sunday 
evening.  When  Beauregard's  staff-officer  brought 
him  the  order  to  desist,  Bragg  inquired  if  he  had 
already  promulgated  the  order  to  other  generals. 
The  officer  replied  that  he  had.  Then  quoth  the 
disconsolate  Bragg,  "  If  you  had  not,  I  would  not 
obey  it.  The  battle  is  lost."  l  It  is  upon  this 
view  of  the  case  that  some  writers  have  built  the 
inference  that  Beauregard  threw  away  the  advan 
tage  which  Johnston  had  virtually  won.  Of  course 
nobody  can  tell  what  would  have  ensued  had  Bragg 
made  his  attack,  but  the  general  history  of  the 

1  See  Colonel  William  Preston  Johnston's  interesting  paper  in 
Battles  and  Leaders,  i.  568.  A  more  correct  view  (as  it  seems  to 
me)  of  the  situation  is  given  by  General  Beauregard  in  the  follow 
ing  paper,  i.  590,  591. 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  89 

day  supports  Beauregard's  view  that  it  would  have 
ended  in  a  repulse.  What  was  the  fundamental 
fact  in  the  case  which  prevented  the  Confederates 
from  approaching  Pittsburg  Landing,  the  goal  of 
their  endeavours,  until  their  commanding  general 
judged  the  opportunity  for  seizing  it  to  be  gone? 
Doubtless  that  fundamental  fact  was 


the  wonderful  staying  power  of  the  mental  facts 
Federal  troops.  Man  for  man,  they 
were  just  as  good  fighters  as  the  Confederates. 
The  latter  began  with  such  an  immense  initial 
advantage,  in  the  surprise,  that  it  lasted  them  all 
day.  From  the  outset  the  several  Union  divisions 
were  placed  at  the  dire  disadvantage  of  forming 
under  furious  pressure,  so  that  in  many  cases  a  line 
was  swept  from  its  ground  while  in  process  of  for 
mation.  The  rallying  of  such  lines  often  brought 
fragments  of  one  division  into  adherence  to  an 
other,  thus  seriously  disturbing  the  organization. 
During  the  entire  day  no  opportunity  was  offered 
for  making  a  firmly  knit  Federal  line  of  battle. 
Gaps  were  made  which  allowed  one  division  after 
another  to  be  taken  in  flank  and  compelled  to 
fall  back.  Had  these  things  occurred  upon  open 
ground,  a  judicious  use  of  the  Confederate  cavalry 
might  have  completed  the  disorganization  of  the 
Union  army  and  routed  it.  Such  a  disaster  was 
prevented  by  the  broken  and  wooded  country. 


90     The,  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

With  this  one  circumstance  in  their  favour  the 
Federals,  in  spite  of  the  tremendous  disadvantage 
with  which  they  started,  disputed  every  inch  of 
ground  so  obstinately  that  the  day  was  not  long 
enough  for  the  Confederates  to  reach  their  goal,  but 
just  as  it  seemed  almost  within  their  grasp,  the  con 
ditions  were  radically  changed  by  the  arrival  of 
Buell's  army.  Such  were  the  fundamental  facts  in 
Sunday's  battle. 

At  seven  in  the  evening  the  Federals  preserved 
a  sufficiently  continuous  line  of  battle  from  the 
vicinity  of  the  Snake  creek  bridge  to  that  of  Pitts- 
Arrival  of  burg  Landing.  Its  connections  were 

Nelson  and  preserved  with  Nelson  on  the  left,  and 
Lew  Wallace. 


rived  at  Snake  creek,  on  the  right.  These  rein 
forcements  added  to  each  wing  about  7000  men, 
and  Grant  tells  us  that  with  his  strength  thus 
restored  he  should  have  assumed  the  aggressive  on 
Monday  morning,  even  without  further  aid.  Prob 
ably  he  would  have  done  so.  It  was  characteristic 
of  him  not  to  know  when  he  was  beaten,  and  we 
have  his  own  word  that  he  never  for  a  moment 
doubted  of  ultimate  victory  ;  but  it  was  fortunate 
that  his  disorganized  divisions  were  not  called 
upon  to  assume  the  aggressive  next  morning  with 
out  fresh  support. 

We  may  now  turn  our  attention  for  a  moment 


Fort  Donelson  and  ShiloJi  91 

to  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Tennessee  river,  and 
observe  how  the  relieving  army  arrived  upon  the 
scene.  When  General  Buell  reached  Savannah, 
early  Saturday  evening,  he  found  that  Nelson's 
division  had  arrived  there  and  gone  into  camp. 
Grant  had  not  yet  come  down  from  Pittsburg 
Landing  for  the  night,  and  Buell  soon  went  to 
Nelson's  camp,  so  that  the  two  generals  did  not 
meet  that  night.  Grant  had  already  visited  Nel 
son's  camp  and  told  that  officer  that  Qrant'sex. 
he  would  send  steamboats  down  for  pectatkms  on 
him  on  "  Monday  or  Tuesday,  or  some 
time  early  in  the  week."  Grant  added,  "There 
will  be  no  fight  at  Pittsburg  Landing ;  we  will 
[i.  e.,  shall]  have  to  go  to  Corinth,  where  the 
rebels  are  fortified.  If  they  come  to  attack  us  we 
can  whip  them,  as  I  have  more  than  twice  as  many 
troops  as  I  had  at  Fort  Donelson."  :  These  re 
marks  are  in  harmony  with  the  other  indications 
which  show  that  Grant  was  taken  by  surprise  on 
Sunday  morning. 

At  sunrise  on  that  memorable  day  Buell  and 
Nelson  were  at  breakfast  when  the  sound  of  heavy 
firing  burst  upon  their  ears.  Nelson's  men  were 
at  once  put  in  marching  order,  and  Buell,  finding 
that  Grant  had  already  started  up  the  river,  pro 
cured  a  small  steamboat  and  followed  him.  Pre- 

1  Buell,  "  Shiloh  Reviewed,"  in  Battles  and  Leaders,  i.  492. 


92     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

sently  a  descending  steamer  handed  to  Bucll  a 
letter  from  Grant,  in  substance  as  follows  :  "  The 
attack  on  my  forces  has  been  very  spirited  since 

early  this  morning.     The  appearance 
His  view  of 
the  situation     o*  iresn  troops  on  the  field  now  would 

at  Sunday        have    a  powerful   effect,  both   by    in- 

noon.  .   . 

spiring  our  men  and  disheartening  the 
enemy.  If  you  will  get  upon  the  field,  leaving  all 
your  baggage  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  it  will 
be  a  move  to  our  advantage,  and  possibly  save  the 
day  to  us.  The  rebel  forces  are  estimated  at  over 
100,000  men."  Soon  Buell  found  Grant  upon  a 
steamboat  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  after  a  brief 
conference  the  two  went  ashore.  Guides  were  sent 
to  Nelson  for  his  difficult  march,  and  steamboats 
were  collected  at  Savannah  to  bring  up  the  di 
visions  of  Crittenden  and  McCook,  the  former  of 
which  was  just  arriving  at  that  point.  For  the 
rest  of  the  day  both  Grant  and  Buell  were  busy 
on  the  battlefield.  The  latter  found  much  work 
to  be  done  in  rallying  and  reorganizing  stragglers, 
and  in  preparing  for  the  rapid  disembarkation  of 
his  troops.  As  for  Grant,  we  catch  glimpses  of 
him  during  the  day  in  various  parts  of  the  field, 
now  with  Sherman  on  the  right  wing,  now  in  the 
Hornet's  Nest  with  Prentiss,  now  on  the  right 
again.  We  do  not  hear  of  any  notable  movement 
or  tactical  manoeuvre  performed  by  him,  for  the 


Fort  Donelson  and  ShiloJi  93 

circumstances  admitted  nothing  of  the  sort.  The 
work  for  a  commander  consisted  chiefly  in  myriads 
of  readjustments  here  and  there,  sustaining  the 
efforts  of  single  brigades  or  regiments,  or  the  frag 
ments  of  such  ;  and  in  this  we  cannot  doubt  that 
on  all  parts  of  the  field  the  stubborn  bravery  of 
the  men  gained  fresh  inspiration  from  the  indom 
itable  spirit  of  their  commander.1 

In  order  to  avoid  the  fire  from  the  Union  gun 
boats,  which  was  kept  up  all  night,  the  Confed 
erates  fell  back  about  a  mile  and  occupied  the 
camps  in  which  the  Federals  had  slept  the  night 
before.  The  tents  thus  served  to  shelter  them 
from  the  cold  pelting  rain  which  came  down  in 
torrents.  The  Federals  lay  in  the  A  bivouac  in 
mud,  scantily  protected  by  the  leafless  the  rain- 
trees.  General  Grant,  whose  ankle  had  been 
badly  bruised  by  a  fall  of  his  horse,  sought  refuge 
from  the  storm  in  a  log-house  ;  but  the  surgeons 
had  taken  possession  of  the  place,  and  its  sights 
and  sounds  were  so  doleful  that  the  general  soon 
retreated  into  the  chilling  rain. 

During  the  night  the  remainder  of  Nelson's 
division  crossed  the  river,  and  Crittenden's  came 

1  The  last  paragraph  of  General  Buell's  admirable  paper  (Bat 
tles  and  Leaders,  i.  536),  though  apparently  somewhat  severe,  is 
thoroughly  borne  out  by  the  judicious  criticism  of  Mr.  Ropes, 
Story  of  the  Civil  War,  ii.  84. 


94     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

up  from  Savannah  on  steamboats,  followed  after 
Arrival  of  an  in^rval  by  McCook's,  which  ar- 
Crittenden  rived  early  in  the  morning.  The  steam 
boats  also  brought  Nelson's  artillery. 
These  reinforcements  numbered  20,000  men,  and 
in  organization  and  discipline  they  were  confess 
edly  superior  to  Grant's  army ;  for  they  had  been 
trained  for  several  months  under  the  eyes  of  Buell 
himself,  who  was  unsurpassed  as  an  organizer. 
As  they  arrived  in  succession,  these  divisions  were 
arranged  for  the  morrow's  line  of  battle  ;  Nelson 
on  the  left,  next  to  the  river,  then  Crittenden  on 
his  right,  then  McCook.  Next  came  the  remnants 
of  Hurlbut's  and  McClernand's  divisions,  mended 
with  fragments  from  those  of  William  Wallace 
and  Sherman ;  while  the  extreme  right,  near  Owl 
creek,  was  occupied  by  the  fresh  division  of  Lew 
Wallace.  Besides  Buell's  20,000  men  and  Wal 
lace's  7000,  we  may  estimate  at  10,000  the  num- 
The  forces  on  ber  of  Grant's  troops  who  had  fought 
Monday.  during  the  previous  day  and  were  now 
again  brought  into  line.  To  oppose  this  force 
Beauregard  had  from  20,000  to  25,000  men,  none 
of  them  fresh.  Some  reorganizing  was  necessary, 
and  in  the  course  of  it  there  was  some  shifting  of 
commands  ;  so  that  Hardee  occupied  the  extreme 
right,  with  Breckinridge  on  his  left,  then  Polk, 
and  finally  on  the  extreme  left,  Bragg. 


SHILOH,   APRIL  7,  1862,    MORNING 


Fort  Donelson  and  ShiloJi  95 

Victory  for  the  Confederates  was  no  longer 
to  be  expected,  save  through  some  extraordinary 
blunder  of  their  antagonists.  The  entire  expe 
rience  of  our  Civil  War  shows  that  in  fighting 
quality  American  soldiers  from  all  parts  of  the 
country  are  so  evenly  matched  that,  under  similar 
conditions,  'even  a  slight  superiority  in  numbers 
ensures  victory.  A  parity  of  conditions  does  not 
exist  when  the  assailing  party  rushes  against  en 
trenchments  and  is  shot  down  faster  than  it  can 
advance ;  nor  can  it  be  said  to  exist  when  the  com 
manders  are  so  unequally  matched  as,  for  example, 
at  Chancellorsville,  where  Lee's  60,000  men  de 
feated  Hooker's  120,000,  because  at  every  point  of 
contact  between  the  two  armies  during  the  battle, 
Lee's  superior  intelligence  opposed  superior  num 
bers  to  those  of  Hooker.  On  the  second  day  of 
Shiloh,  where  the  conditions  were  nearly  equal, 
there  was  nothing  to  interfere  with  the  rule  that 
victory  takes  sides  with  the  heaviest  battalions. 
The  Union  soldiers  were  also  less  fatigued.  Beau- 
regard  was  hardly  entitled  on  Monday  morning  to 
expect  victory,  but  a  battle  was  preferable  to  an 
immediate  retreat  upon  Corinth,  harassed  by  an 
aggressive  foe. 

The  contest  opened  soon  after  daybreak  with 
Nelson's  advance  against  Hardee  along  the  Ham 
burg  road.  By  seven  o'clock  Lew  Wallace's  divi- 


96     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

sion  had  forced  its  way  across  Tillman  creek  and 
occupied  the  heights  to  the  south  of  it.  By  ten 
o'clock  a  fierce  struggle  was  inaugurated  about  the 
road  to  Corinth,  between  the  Purdy  road  and 
Shiloh  church,  and  for  six  hours  here  the  fighting 
Monday's  was  as  severe  as  any  that  Sunday  had 
battle.  witnessed.  To  break  down  Bragg' s 

division,  and  to  gain  a  firm  hold  of  the  Corinth 
road  southwest  of  Shiloh  church,  would  cut  the 
Confederate  connections  with  Corinth.  To  pre 
vent  such  a  catastrophe  Bragg  put  forth  his  utmost 
efforts,  returning  the  offensive  with  magnificent 
pluck  and  resource.  In  this  great  fight  the  de 
cisive  part  was  played  by  McCook's  division  on 
the  spot.  But  scarcely  less  decisive  was  the  pres 
sure  of  Nelson  and  Crittenden  against  the  rebel 
right,  which  obliged  Beauregard  to  reinforce  it  at 
the  expense  of  his  left.  To  prolong  the  fight 
under  such  conditions  would  have  been  to  invite 
destruction,  and  presently  Beauregard  skilfully 
withdrew  his  army,  keeping  up  a  show  of  resist 
ance  as  long  as  possible  in  order  to  cover  his  re 
treat.  By  four  o'clock  he  was  making  all  haste 
toward  Corinth. 

The  Union  army  made  no  attempt  to  pursue  the 
enemy  and  complete  his  discomfiture.  Why  this 
should  not  have  been  done  has  never  been  satis 
factorily  explained.  It  would  seem  that  the  con- 


Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  97 

clitions  were  favourable  for  annihilating  Beaure- 
gard's  army.  Bragg  reported  next  morning  that 
his  troops  were  "  utterly  disorganized  and  demor 
alized,"  while  Breckinridge  declared,  "  My  troops 
are  worn  out,  and  I  don't  think  can 
be  relied  on  after  the  first  volley."  there  no  pur- 
Forage  was  short,  and  the  horses  were  suit  after 

Shiloh? 
so  exhausted  that  artillery  had  to  be 

abandoned  on  the  road.  Buell's  men  must  surely 
have  been  fresh  enough  to  pursue,  and  so  must 
Wallace's ;  and,  moreover,  Buell's  fourth  division, 
under  Wood,  had  begun  arriving  upon  the  battle 
field  in  the  middle  of  the  afternoon,  and  his  fifth 
division,  under  Thomas,  was  coming  up  behind. 
Wood  and  Thomas  brought  12,000  fresh  men.  It 
is  difficult,  therefore,  to  understand  why  Beaure- 
gard  was  not  persistently  followed  up  and  har 
assed  by  from  20,000  to  30,000  pursuers.  The 
responsibility,  of  course,  rests  with  Grant,  who 
never  offered  any  sound  explanation.  He  only 
tells  us  that  he  had  not  the  heart  to  demand  more 
work  from  his  own  jaded  men,  and  he  felt  some 
delicacy  about  giving  orders  to  Buell,  whose  senior 
he  had  been  but  a  short  time.1  Such  delicacy  at 
such  a  moment  shows,  as  Mr.  Ropes  says,  an  entire 
failure  to  rise  to  the  height  of  the  occasion.  Fancy 
such  an  excuse  from  Frederick  or  Napoleon ! 

1  Grant's  Memoirs,  i.  354. 


98     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

The  failure,  be  it  observed,  is  not  a  parallel  case 
with  the  refusal  of  Meade  to  return  the  offensive 
after  the  repulse  of  Pickett's  charge  at  Gettys 
burg  ;  for  in  the  latter  case  there  were  sound  rea 
sons  for  not  putting  in  jeopardy  the  victory  that 
was  ours  as  things  stood.  A  vigorous  pursuit  after 
Shiloh  could  not  have  imperilled  the  Union  army 
in  any  way. 

I  suspect  that  the  true  explanation,  after  all, 
may  be  that  our  peace-loving  people  had  not  yet 
come  to  realize  what  a  terrible  affair  war  is,  when 
truly  effective,  and  especially  when  waged  against 
our  own  kin.  Under  the  compulsion  of  stern 
necessity  we  could  fight  against  our  brethren,  but 
we  could  not  feel  toward  them  the  indifference 
which  Napoleon  at  Austerlitz  felt  toward  the  Kus- 
sian  fugitives  upon  the  Satschan  lake.  We  were 
satisfied  with  thwarting  the  hostile  army,  and  did 
not  appreciate  the  need  for  terminating  its  exist 
ence.  Some  such  state  of  mind,  on  the  part  of  our 
troops  at  Shiloh,  seems  to  be  implied  in  General 
Buell's  remarks  when  he  says,  "  I  make  no  attempt 
to  excuse  myself  or  blame  others  when  I  say  that 
General  Grant's  troops,  the  lowest  individual 
among  them  not  more  than  the  commander  him 
self,  appear  to  have  thought  that  the  object  of  the 
battle  was  sufficiently  accomplished  when  they 
were  reinstated  in  their  camps  ;  and  that  in  some 


Fort  Donelson  and  Skiloh  99 

way  that  idea  obstructed  the  reorganization  of  my 
line  until  a  further  advance  that  day  became  im 
practicable."  1  This  is  not  inconsistent  with  Gen 
eral  Sherman's  humorous  reply  when  I  once  asked 
him  why  the  retreating  rebels  were  not  pursued : 
"  I  assure  you,  my  dear  fellow,  we  had  had  quite 
enough  of  their  society  for  two  whole  days,  and 
were  only  too  glad  to  be  rid  of  them  on  any 
terms ! " 

The  American  people,  unused  to  warfare  upon 
a  great  scale,  were  astounded  at  the  news  of  this 
terrible  battle.  For  the  first  time  in  the  history 
of  the  western  continent  we  were  called  to  witness 
such  slaughter  as  had  marked  the  cam-  Terrible 
paigns  of  Marlborough  or  Napoleon,  slaughter. 
On  each  side  more  than  10,000  men  were  killed 
or  wounded,  while  on  the  first  day  the  Union  army 
lost  some  3000  prisoners.  In  proportion  to  the 
total  numbers  engaged  in  the  battle,  these  losses 
were  enormous.  Reckoning  the  Confederates  (with 
out  their  cavalry)  at  30,000,  Grant's  army  at 
40,000,  and  Buell's  three  divisions  at  20,000,  we 
have  a  total  of  90,000,  with  a  loss  of  more  than 
20,000  ;  more  than  two  ninths,  or  approaching  one 
fourth.  "I  saw  an  open  field,"  says  Grant,  uin 
our  possession  the  second  day,  over  which  the 

1  Battles  and  Leaders,  i.  534. 


100     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Confederates  had  made  repeated  charges  the  day 
before,  so  covered  with  dead  that  it  would  have 
been  possible  to  walk  across  the  clearing,  in  any 
direction,  stepping  on  dead  bodies,  without  a  foot 
touching  the  ground.  .  .  .  On  one  part  bushes 
had  grown  up  to  the  height  of  eight  or  ten  feet. 
There  was  not  one  of  these  left  standing  unpierced 
by  bullets.  The  smaller  ones  were  all  cut  down." 
Considering  the  rawness  of  most  of  the  troops 
engaged,  the  battle  of  Shiloh  was  peculiarly  sig- 
Significance  nificant.  It  tested  American  mettle, 
of  the  battle.  jt  showed  what  formidable  fighters  an 
industrial  people,  hating  warfare,  could  suddenly 
become  under  the  spur  of  necessity.  On  either 
side,  moreover,  it  awakened  such  a  feeling  of  re 
spect  for  the  other  as  had  until  that  day  remained 
dormant.  It  also  dispelled  some  illusions.  It 
showed  the  northern  people  that  a  few  victories 
like  Fort  Donelson  would  not  suffice  to  overthrow 
the  Confederacy,  but  that  the  whole  southern 
country  would  have  to  be  conquered  inch  by  inch. 
It  took  this  tremendous  battle  to  determine  whether 
the  results  of  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson  were  to 
be  permanently  secured.  As  to  this  point  Shiloh 
was  decisive.  The  Federals  were  not  thrown  back 
upon  Kentucky,  but  advanced  into  Mississippi, 
and  laid  siege  to  Corinth,  the  centre  of  the  second 
Confederate  line  of  defence. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS 

THE  defeat  of  the  Confederates  at  Shiloh  put  it 
out  of  their  power  to  regain  what  they  had  lost  at 
Fort  Donelson.  Giving  up  for  the  moment  all 
hope  of  recovering  Kentucky  or  holding  any  part 
of  Tennessee  west  of  the  mountains,  their  task  was 
limited  to  the  maintenance  of  their  second  great 
defensive  line,  extending  from  Memphis  through 
Corinth  and  Huntsville  to  Chattanooga. 

All  but  one  of  the  positions  taken  in  flank  by 
Grant's  advance  up  the  Tennessee  river  had  been 
abandoned.  At  one  point,  however,  the  Confeder 
ates  still  maintained  their  foothold.  This  was  at 
the  great  double  loop  of  the  Mississippi  commanded 
by  New  Madrid  and  Island  Number  Ten,  just  at 
the  corner  of  the  four  states  of  Missouri,  Kentucky, 
Tennessee,  and  Arkansas.  When  Polk  evacuated 
Columbus,  he  took  with  him  130  pieces  of  artillery 
and  planted  them  in  this  position.  Thus  armed, 
Island  Number  Ten  with  its  outposts  isiand  Num- 
hermetically  sealed  the  river  to  ships  ber  Ten- 
descending  from  Cairo.  Vast  swamps  on  the  east 


102     The,  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

side  of  the  river  made  it  difficult  to  approach  the 
island  with  an  army.  There  was  only  one  road  by 
which  an  enemy  could  come,  a  very  good  road  lead 
ing  from  Tiptonville  six  miles  below  in  a  direct 
line  and  on  the  narrow  peninsula  between  the  river 
and  Reelfoot  lake.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
Confederates  should  lose  control  of  the  river  below 
New  Madrid,  this  Tiptonville  road  was  their  only 
possible  line  of  escape.  But  in  order  to  close  this 
road,  it  was  necessary  for  the  Federals  not  only  to 
capture  New  Madrid,  but  also  to  run  their  gun 
boats  and  transports  past  the  island  itself,  and  this 
was  thought  to  be  impossible. 

The  island  was  garrisoned  by  7000  men.  A 
position  so  far  in  advance  of  the  Confederate  line 
was  necessarily  liable  to  be  overwhelmed,  and 
doubtless  it  would  have  been  evacuated  but  for  the 
belief  that  Federal  gunboats  could  not  pass  it.  On 
the  3d  of  March  General  John  Pope  arrived  with 
20,000  men  on  the  western  bank  of  the  river,  and 
erecting  batteries  at  Point  Pleasant,  twelve  miles 
below  New  Madrid,  he  cut  off  the  supplies  of  the 
town  and  in  ten  days  compelled  it  to  surrender. 

The  enemy's  only  line  of  escape  was  now  the 
Tiptonville  road,  and  Pope's  problem  was  how  to 
seize  it,  for  his  transports,  under  convoy  of  Foote's 
fleet,  were  all  above  the  formidable  island.  The 
densely  wooded  peninsula  opposite  the  island,  made 


NEW  MADRID   AND   ISLAND   NUMBER  TEN 
MARCH   s-APRIL   7,    1862 


TJie  Capture  of  New  Orleans  103 

by  the  great  bend  of  the  river,  was  at  that  time 
overflowed,  and  at  some  distance  to  the  north  was 
partially  intersected  by  bayous.  The  whole  penin 
sula  was  under  water,  and  it  was  resolved  to  cut  a 
navigable  channel  through  the  forest  Sawing  out  a 
by  sawing  off  the  trees  near  the  ground.  channel- 
The  army  contained  an  engineer  regiment,  com 
posed  entirely  of  skilled  workmen,  and  this  regi 
ment  with  much  labour  accomplished  the  task. 
First  the  men,  working  in  relays  of  three  hundred, 
stood  upon  small  rafts  and  cut  off  the  trees  about 
eight  feet  above  the  water.  As  fast  as  the  trees 
fell,  another  set  of  men  in  small  boats  tackled 
them  with  ropes  and  they  were  hauled  away  by 
steamboats.  When  room  enough  was  cleared  in 
this  way,  a  large  raft  was  fastened  to  a  stump,  and 
from  this  raft  a  huge  saw,  attached  to  a  pivot, 
was  set  working  below  the  water  so  as  to  cut  away 
the  stumps  close  to  the  ground.  Now  and  then 
in  shallow  places  stumps  were  dragged  up  roots 
and  all,  and  in  some  cases  excavation  was  neces 
sary.  It  was  cold,  wet  work,  but  no  one  flagged  or 
fell  sick,  and  in  nineteen  days  a  channel  six  miles 
in  length,  fifty  feet  wide,  and  four  and  a  half  feet 
deep  had  been  sawed  through  the  submerged  for 
est.  By  this  extraordinary  passageway  the  trans 
ports  for  Pope's  army  were  taken  safely  across 
the  peninsula  and  out  again  into  the  river  at  New 


104     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Madrid,  without  coming  within  a  dozen  miles  of 
the  heavy  guns  of  Island  Number  Ten. 

To  crown  this  triumph  of  ingenuity  a  daring 
exploit  now  became  necessary.  The  place  where 
Pope  intended  to  cross  the  river,  below  Point  Plea 
sant,  was  guarded  by  Confederate  batteries,  which 
must  first  be  silenced.  One  or  two  gunboats  were 
needed  for  this,  but  none  of  the  gunboats  drew  less 
than  six  feet  of  water,  and  consequently  none  of 
them  could  pass  through  the  forest  canal.  The 
gallant  Foote  considered  the  risk  of  running  by  the 
island  so  great  that  he  did  not  like  to  ask  officers 
or  men  to  undertake  it,  but  Commander  Henry 
Exploit  of  the  Walke,  of  the  Carondelet,  was  found 
Carondelet.  eager  to  try  the  experiment.  The 
boilers  and  other  vulnerable  parts  of  the  ship 
were  protected  in  every  possible  way  by  planks  and 
chains  and  coils  of  heavy  rope.  A  barge  laden 
with  hay  was  lashed  in  front  of  the  magazine.  The 
great  guns  were  run  in  under  cover  and  the  port 
holes  shut,  the  sailors,  with  pistol  and  cutlass,  stood 
on  guard  in  case  of  an  attempt  to  board,  and  the 
boatswain  was  ordered  to  be  ready  to  sink  the  ship 
sooner  than  let  her  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands. 
The  escape-steam  was  led  aft  through  the  wheel- 
house  instead  of  puffing  and  sputtering  through 
the  smokestacks.  And  thus  at  ten  o'clock  on  the 
night  of  April  4,  enshrouded  in  the  thick  dark- 


The,  Capture  of  New  Orleans  105 

ness  of  a  gathering  storm,  the  gallant  Carondelet 
cast  off  her  moorings  and  glided  down  the  broad 
river,  unseen  and  unheard.  It  was  not  until  she 
was  close  to  the  island  that  her  presence  was  be 
trayed.  The  soot  in  her  smokestacks,  no  longer 
moistened  by  the  escape-steam,  took  fire,  and  a 
tell-tale  blaze  sprang  forth  from  their  grimy  tops. 
The  enemy  promptly  took  the  alarm  and  began 
firing  his  heavy  guns,  the  roar  of  which  was  soon 
drowned  by  louder  peals  of  thunder,  while  glimpses 
of  the  passing  ship  were  revealed  from  moment 
to  moment  in  vivid  flashes  of  lightning.  But  her 
bold  and  shrewd  commander  ran  her  so  close  to 
the  island  batteries  that  their  ponderous  balls  flew 
harmlessly  overhead,  and  before  the  gunners  could 
lower  their  pieces  and  take  accurate  aim  she  had 
glided  by,  and  the  hour  of  midnight  found  her  safe 
at  New  Madrid. 

On  Sunday  the  6th  and  Monday  the  7th,  while 
the  battle  was  raging  at  distant  Shiloh,  the  Caron 
delet  pounded  to  pieces  the  batteries  on  the  eastern 
shore  as  far  as  Tiptonville,  and  was  presently 
joined  by  the  Pittsburg,  which  followed  her  ex 
ample  and  ran  the  gauntlet  of  Island  Number  Ten 
at  two  o'clock  on  Monday  morning.  The  Confed 
erate  garrison  now  made  haste  to  evacuate  their 
stronghold,  but  it  was  too  late.  During  the  even 
ing  Pope's  army  crossed  the  river  and  occupied  the 


106     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Tiptonville  road,  whereupon  the  garrison  surren- 
Surrender  of  tiered  at  discretion.  Three  generals 
the  garrison.  with  700o  men?  -^3  heavy  guns,  35  field- 

pieces,  7000  stand  of  muskets,  tents  for  12,000  men, 
several  hundred  horses,  and  an  immense  quantity 
of  ammunition,  were  captured  in  this  brilliant 
operation,  without  the  loss  of  a  single  man  on  the 
Federal  side.  The  credit  for  the  achievement  was, 
as  usual,  given  to  the  commanding  officer,1  and 
Pope  for  the  moment  acquired  a  reputation  which 
seemed  to  rival  Grant's,  but  which  he  was  destined 
within  six  months  to  lose  when  confronted  with  a 
problem  which  abler  men  than  he  found  insoluble, 
—  the  problem  of  outgeneralling  Robert  Lee  and 
Stonewall  Jackson. 

By  the  capture  of  Island  Number  Ten  the  Mis 
sissippi  river  was  thrown  open  down  to  Fort  Pil 
low,  against  which  the  army  and  fleets 
immediately  proceeded.     But  Halleck 
now  summoned  Pope  and  his  army  to  Pittsburg 
Landing,  where  all  the  Union  forces  were  concen 
trating  for  the  advance  upon  Corinth.     There  was 
no  use  in  operating  separately  upon  Fort  Pillow, 
for  Corinth  once  taken,  it  would  fall  of  itself. 

1  The  idea  of  sawing  a  channel  through  the  submerged  forest, 
the  operation  upon  which  everything  else  depended,  originated 
with  General  Sehuyler  Hamilton,  of  New  York,  a  grandson  of 
Alexander  Hamilton  and  great-grandson  of  Philip  Sehuyler.  See 
Battles  and  Leaders,  i.  4G2, 


The,  Capture  of  New  Orleans  107 

It  will  be  observed  that  in  the  affair  of  Island 
Number  Ten  the  decisive  blow  was  struck  by  the 
Carondelet.  Without  the  gunboats  the  operation 
could  not  have  succeeded.  The  same  was  true, 
in  the  main,  of  Grant's  movement  against  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson,  the  whole  significance  of 
which,  moreover,  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  opened  a 
vast  stretch  of  country  to  an  invasion  in  which 
the  river  fleet  was  an  indispensable  instrument. 
The  sparse  population  of  the  states  which  were 
the  theatre  of  war,  their  extensive  area,  and  the 
poorness  of  their  roads  made  it  pecul- 

.  .  Importance 

iarly  necessary  for  the  armies  to  con-  of  rivers  and 
trol  the  rivers  and  railways.  To  get  the  river 
sufficient  food  from  the  country  trav 
ersed  was  usually  impossible,  and  all  the  opera 
tions  of  the  war,  especially  in  the  West,  derived 
their  peculiar  character  from  the  necessity  of 
maintaining  long  lines  of  communication,  the  cut 
ting  of  which  would  entail  speedy  famine.  The 
great  rivers  which  flow  in  all  directions  through 
the  heart  of  the  continent,  sustaining  on  their 
broad  waters  the  movements  of  fleets,  thus  early 
impressed  upon  this  American  war  a  novel  and 
interesting  feature,  to  which  there  is  no  parallel  in 
European  history.  The  rivers  afforded  lines  of 
operation  in  many  respects  more  secure  than  the 
railways,  since  they  could  not  be  cut,  and  here  the 


108     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

immense  superiority  of  the  northern  states  in  ships 
and  machinery  came  early  in  the  struggle  to  turn 
the  scale  slowly  but  surely  against  the  Confeder 
acy.  These  formidable  gunboats,  with  their  power 
ful  guns,  were  like  floating  fortresses  which  could 
be  moved  in  two  or  three  hours  to  longer  distances 
than  an  army  could  march  in  a  day  ;  and  while  it 
was  but  seldom  that  they  could  capture  fortified 
places  without  the  aid  of  a  land  force,  at  the  same 
time  this  combination  of  strength  with  speed  made 
them  an  auxiliary  without  which  the  greater  oper 
ations  of  the  war  could  hardly  have  been  under 
taken. 

In  a  still  wider  sense  it  is  true  that  but  for  the 
navy  and  its  gallant  commanders  it  would  have 
been  impossible  to  put  down  the  rebellion.  The 
work  done  by  the  navy  was  truly  Titanic.  There 
was  something  romantic  in  the  boldness  with  which 
President  Lincoln  and  Mr.  Seward,  at  the  out 
break  of  hostilities,  quickly  announced  their  inten 
tion  of  blockading  three  thousand  miles  of  coast, 
all  the  way  from  the  Potomac  to  the  Rio  Grande. 

Europe  laughed  at  the  idea  ;  such  a 
States  navy  thing  had  never  been  done  by  the 
in  the  Civil  greatest  maritime  powers,  and  the 

United  States  had  very  few  warships, 
most  of  them  antiquated  and  all  about  to  become  so. 


The  Capture  of  New  Orleans  109 

Yet  within  a  few  months  this  stupendous  blockade 
was  made  effective.  It  isolated  the  Confederacy 
from  all  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  made  its  over 
throw  possible.  In  those  days  we  had  a  great  and 
growing  merchant  marine,  before  our  abominable 
tariff  and  navigation  laws  killed  it.  The  American 
flag  was  seen  in  nearly  all  the  ports  of  the  world, 
our  hardy  sailors  were  to  be  found  on  every  sea, 
and  we  had  a  small  band  of  brave  and  intelligent 
naval  officers  trained  in  a  school  of  peculiar  excel 
lence.1  With  such  resources,  aided  by  our  Yankee 
versatility  and  our  mechanical  appliances,  a  navy 
especially  adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  occasion, 
and  unlike  anything  ever  seen  before,  was  created 
as  if  by  magic.  The  famous  old  ships-of-the-line 
and  frigates,  a  few  of  which  are  still  lying  in  our 
navy  yards,  were  of  no  more  use  than  the  catapults 
and  cross-bows  of  the  Middle  Ages ;  and  even  such 
steam-frigates  as  the  Roanoke  and  Minnesota, 
which  only  five  years  earlier  had  ranked  among 
the  finest  warships  afloat,  were  now  at  once  ren 
dered  powerless  by  the  invention  of  armoured  rams 
and  gunboats.  Of  its  old  materials  the  govern 
ment  made  such  use  as  it  could,  while  it  called 
upon  inventors  for  new  designs,  and  meanwhile 
bought  up  every  craft  floating  in  American  waters 

1  The  events  of  our  war  of  1898  with  Spain  show  that  there  has 
been  no  falling  off  from  the  lofty  standard  of  achievement  fixed 
by  Hull  and  Perry  and  Farragut. 


110     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

that  could  in  any  wise  be  promptly  adapted  to 
fighting  and  pressed  into  the  service.  Large 
steamers  of  2000  tons  burthen,  swift  little  river 
and  harbour  tugs,  Fulton  ferry-boats  casemated 
in  iron  and  armed  with  formidable  guns,  tall 
Mississippi  steamboats,  squat  mortar-boats,  turtle- 
shaped  rams  with  powerful  engines  and  deadly 
beaks,  went  to  make  up  an  immense  fleet  of  such 
nondescript  appearance  as  would  have  aroused  the 
skeptical  wonder  of  a  Nelson,  but  well-fitted,  in 
the  hands  of  sagacious  and  daring  men,  for  the 
varied  and  difficult  work  which  it  had  to  perform. 
With  such  vessels  as  these,  usually  aided  by  de 
tachments  from  the  army,  the  government  went  on 
seizing  the  enemy's  seaports  and  strengthening  its 
grip  upon  his  coast-line,  until  by  the  end  of  the 
war  every  considerable  maritime  town  in  the  Con 
federacy  had  passed  into  northern  hands. 

In  this  important  warfare  the  South  laboured 
from  the  outset  under  insurmountable  disadvan 
tages.  Of  the  naval  officers  who  followed  their 
states  into  rebellion,  there  were  some,  such  as 
Semmes  and  Buchanan,  of  eminent  ability.  But 
the  South  had  only  two  shipyards,  the 

JN  aval  in  ten-  •*•  J 

ority  of  the       most  important  of  which,  at  Norfolk, 
was  soon  lost.     She  had  no  merchant- 
shipping   or  sea-faring  population,  very  few  ma 
chine-shops  or  skilled  mechanics,  and  her  supply 


The  Capture  of  New   Orleans  111 

of  iron  was  soon  cut  off  by  the  blockade.  Under 
these  circumstances,  though  the  Confederates 
worked  with  the  zeal  and  determination  which 
characterized  all  their  proceedings,  they  necessarily 
effected  but  little.  With  the  aid  of  their  agents 
in  England,  favoured  by  the  culpable  negligence 
of  Lord  Palmerston's  government,  they  succeeded 
in  launching  a  few  formidable  privateers  and  in 
flicting  upon  our  foreign  trade  an  injury  which, 
though  serious  enough,  has  been  greatly  exagger 
ated,  and  was  indeed  a  mere  trifle  compared  to  that 
which  we  have  since  inflicted  upon  ourselves  by 
idiotic  legislation  concocted  in  the  lobbies  of  Con 
gress.  Such  privateering  could  have  no  military 
significance  save  in  so  far  as  it  might  cripple  our 
resources  for  attack ;  and  this  it  did  not  do  to  any 
appreciable  extent.  In  the  defence  of  their  riv 
ers  and  harbours  the  Confederates  showed  their 
unfailing  gallantry  ;  but  their  ships  were  few,  their 
engines  of  inferior  make  and  liable  to  accident, 
and  their  commanders  on  the  whole  unequal  in 
training  to  the  officers  of  the  Federal  navy. 

Early  in  the  war  the  United  States  government 
became  impressed  with  the  necessity  of  capturing 
New  Orleans.  The  place  was  of  the  first  impor 
tance,  both  in  itself  and  in  its  strategic  relations. 
With  a  population  of  170,000  souls,  it  was  by  far 


112     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

the  largest  city  of  the  Confederacy,  and  it  con- 
Militar  im-  tamec^  moreover,  more  machine-shops 
portance  of  and  trained  workmen  than  any  other. 
It  was  important  to  deprive  the  enemy 
of  these  resources.  The  city  was  comparatively 
near  to  Mexico,  which  was  threatened  with  occupa 
tion  by  the  forces  of  France,  a  power  whose  atti 
tude  toward  the  American  Union  was  distinctly 
hostile.  Above  all,  New  Orleans  barred  the  ascent 
of  the  Mississippi  river  to  Union  fleets,  and  if 
the  rebellion  were  ever  to  be  suppressed,  every 
inch  of  the  Mississippi  must  be  conquered  and 
held.  Beyond  it  lay  the  three  revolted  states  of 
Texas,  Arkansas,  and  Louisiana,  which  could  not 
only  put  100,000  men  into  the  field,  but  could  at 
the  same  time  raise  food  enough  to  feed  the  whole 
Confederacy  for  countless  ages.  These  states  must 
be  lopped  off,  and  the  rest  of  the  southern  country 
blockaded  on  its  west  side  as  well  as  on  its  coasts. 
Besides  this,  the  Confederate  hold  upon  the  Mis 
sissippi  seriously  crippled  the  commercial  resources 
and  thus  indirectly  the  military  strength  of  all  the 
northwestern  states.  The  Confederate  leaders 
counted  much  upon  this,  and  some  of  them,  in 
their  first  sanguine  dreams,  hoped  that  the  imper 
ative  need  of  using  this  pathway  for  trade  would 
presently  compel  the  northwestern  people  to  join 
them.  Thus  reinforced  they  might  control  the 


The  Capture  of  New  Orleans  113 

continent,  leaving   the   northeast,  and   especially 
thrice-hated  New  England,  out  in  the  cold. 

However  exaggerated  such  hopes  may  have  been, 
there  could  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  necessity  that 
the  United  States  government  should  ^ee(jfor 
seize  New  Orleans  as  soon  as  possible,  prompt 
Every  month  of  delay  made  the  enter 
prise  more  difficult.  Early  in  the  summer  of  1861 
the  city  was  virtually  defenceless,  and  it  has  been 
said,  on  high  authority,  that  any  three  warships 
could  then  have  entered  the  river  and  ascended 
it  to  Cairo  without  serious  opposition.  That  the 
government  then  made  no  attempt  to  seize  and 
fortify  the  great  defensible  points  on  the  river  is 
one  proof  among  many  of  the  slowness  with  which 
the  people  came  to  realize  that  they  were  entering 
upon  a  desperate  struggle  for  national  existence. 
The  action  of  the  Confederates  was  also  dilatory, 
for  they  found  it  hard  to  believe  that  the  United 
States  government  was  about  to  put  forth  all  its 
energies  to  subdue  them,  and  the  first  effect  of 
their  victory  at  Bull  Run  was  to  create  a  false 
sense  of  security.  Nevertheless  they  worked  faster 
than  the  Federals,  and  after  Fort  Donelson  their 
efforts  were  redoubled.  The  works  on  the  lower 
Mississippi  grew  daily  in  strength,  and  in  a  few 
months  they  might  fairly  hope  to  render  their 
great  city  impregnable. 


114     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Among  the  persons  who  first  discussed  with  the 
Federal  government  a  definite  plan  for  the  capture 
of  New  Orleans  was  Commander  David  Dixon  Por 
ter,  a  man  to  whom  eminent  naval  ability  came 
by  inheritance,  for  he  was  son  of  that  famous  Cap 
tain  Porter  who  had  first  carried  the  American 
David  Dixon  war-flag  on  the  Pacific  ocean,  and  after  a 
Porter.  glorious  cruise  had  at  length  succumbed 

in  an  unequal  struggle  with  two  British  frigates  in 
the  harbour  of  Valparaiso,  in  one  of  the  fiercest 
sea-fights  of  the  War  of  1812.  In  the  spring  of 
1861,  while  watching  the  mouths  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  Commander  Porter  studied  the  situation, 
and  on  arriving  in  Washington  six  months  after 
ward  he  spoke  of  the  importance  of  capturing 
New  Orleans  to  President  Lincoln,  who  did  not 
need  to  be  reminded  of  the  subject  by  Porter  or 
anybody.  His  first  remark  was  that,  of  course, 
such  a  piece  of  work  could  not  be  done  too  soon. 
"The  Mississippi,"  said  Lincoln,  "is  the  backbone 
of  the  Rebellion ;  it  is  the  key  to  the  whole  situa 
tion.  But  we  must  have  troops  enough  not  only  to 
hold  New  Orleans,  but  to  proceed  at  once  toward 
Vicksburg,  which  is  the  key  to  all  that  country 
watered  by  the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries.  If 
the  Confederates  once  fortify  the  neighbouring 
hills,  they  will  be  able  to  hold  that  point  for  an 
indefinite  time,  and  it  will  require  a  large  force  to 


The  Capture  of  New  Orleans  115 

dislodge  them."  With  these  prophetic  words  Mr. 
Lincoln  urged  on  the  preparations  with  all  possible 
despatch.  A  fleet  of  warships  mounting  more 
than  150  guns  was  fitted  out,  and  accompanied  by 
a  strong  squadron  of  mortar-boats.  A  land  force 
of  13,000  men  was  collected  and  placed  under 
command  of  General  Benjamin  Franklin  Butler,  of 
Massachusetts,  concerning  whose  military  qualifica 
tions  one  need  only  say  that  it  was  fortunate,  so  far 
as  the  capture  of  New  Orleans  was  concerned,  that 
the  conditions  of  the  case  were  such  as  to  give  all 
the  serious  work  to  the  fleet. 

For  the  chief  command  of  that  fleet  a  hero 
was  chosen  who  in  the  naval  annals  of  the  Eng 
lish  race  will  take  rank  second  to  none  unless  it 
be  Nelson.  In  that  terrible  fight  at  Valparaiso, 
when  the  Essex  was  forced  to  strike  her  colours 
to  the  Pho3be  and  the  Cherub,  there  was  to  be 
seen  on  the  deck  of  the  hard-pressed  American 
vessel  a  boy  of  fourteen  years,  already  distin 
guished  for  coolness  and  daring,  whose  name  was 
David  Glasgow  Farragut.  A  native  David  Glas- 
of  Tennessee,  descended  from  an  Ara-  £°w  Farragrut. 
gonese  family  once  prominent  in  the  island  of  Mi 
norca,  he  had  in  early  childhood  been  adopted 
into  Captain  Porter's  family,  and  had  entered  the 
navy  in  1810.  During  his  half-century  of  service 
he  had  won  the  highest  reputation  among  his  bro- 


116     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

ther  officers.  In  1833,  when  South  Carolina  un 
dertook  to  put  her  theory  of  nullification  into 
practice,  it  was  Farragut  whom  Andrew  Jackson 
sent  to  Charleston  harbour  to  enforce  his  famous 
decree  that  "  the  Union  must  be  preserved." 
When  the  Civil  War  broke  out,  Farragut's  south 
ern  friends  tried  their  best  to  induce  him  to  join 
them,  but  he  quickly  silenced  them  with  the  un 
compromising  reply  :  "  Mind  what  I  tell  you ! 
You  fellows  are  going  to  catch  hell  before  you  get 
through  with  this  business ! "  In  spite  of  this 
determined  attitude,  the  government  is  said  to 
have  hesitated  about  entrusting  him  with  such 
an  expedition  as  that  against  New  Orleans.  It 
was  feared  that,  however  loyal,  he  might  perhaps 
show  less  zeal  in  such  an  enterprise  than  a  man 
of  northern  birth  and  associations.  But  Gideon 
Welles,  secretary  of  the  navy,  with  his  able  assist 
ant,  Gustavus  Fox,  reinforced  by  Montgomery 
Blair  and  Porter,  who  knew  him  so  well,  over 
came  these  doubts,  and  on  the  20th  of  January, 
1862,  Farragut  was  put  in  command  of  the  great 
expedition. » 

The  capture  of  New  Orleans  is  remarkable  as 
the  last  victory  won  entirely  by  wooden  vessels. 
It  was  the  crowning  exploit  of  the  old-time  navy. 
While  the  expedition  was  fitting  out,  there  oc 
curred  that  memorable  battle  in  Hampton  Roads 


The  Capture  of  New  Orleans  117 

in  which  the  genius  of  Ericsson  suddenly  revolu 
tionized  the  naval  warfare  of  the  world.  None  of 
Farragut's  ships  were  armoured  ;  none  could  have 
stood  against  such  a  foe  as  the  Merrimac.  His 
flagship  the  Hartford,  of  25  guns,  belonged  to  a 
type  already  passing  away,  like  the  still  more  pic 
turesque  and  imposing  seventy-fours  and  frigates 
which  had  preceded  it.  To  the  same  Farragut's 
class  belonged  the  Brooklyn,  Rich-  fleet- 
mond,  and  Pensacola,  and  these  were  followed  by 
one  side-wheel  sloop,  three  screw  corvettes,  and  nine 
screw  gunboats,  each  carrying  two  guns  on  pivots. 
Attached  as  auxiliaries  to  this  squadron  were  nine 
teen  bomb-vessels,  each  armed  with  one  13-inch 
mortar,  and  these  were  accompanied  by  six  gun 
boats,  three  of  which  were  double-ended  ferry-boats 
from  New  York.  This  auxiliary  flotilla  was  placed 
in  charge  of  Commander  Porter,  and  a  distinct  and 
special  part  of  the  work  was  assigned  to  it. 

The  city  of  New  Orleans  is  situated  on  the  east 
bank  of  the  Mississippi,  110  miles  from  its  mouth. 
To  bar  the  approach  of  a  hostile  fleet,  the  Confed 
erates  had  strengthened  and  equipped  the  two  old 
government  fortresses  at  the  Plaquemine  Bend, 
ninety  miles  below  the  city.  The  course  of  the 
winding  river  at  that  point  is  nearly  east  and  west. 
On  the  left  or  north  bank  stood  Fort  St.  Philip, 
and  on  the  right  bank,  some  800  yards  farther 


118     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

downstream,  was  Fort  Jackson.  The  latter  was 
Forts  Jackson  a  casemated  work,  built  in  the  form 
and  St.  Philip.  Of  a  star?  and  armed  with  75  guns. 
Fort  St.  Philip  was  an  open  work,  with  strong- 
brick  walls  covered  with  sod,  and  mounted  53 
guns.  Both  forts  were  well  supplied  with  food  and 
ammunition,  and  each  held  a  garrison  of  700  men. 
The  guns  were  not  so  heavy  as  one  might  suppose, 
for  while  there  were  a  few  that  threw  missiles  of 
80  pounds  weight,  nearly  half  the  number  were 
only  2 4 -pounders.  Even  these,  however,  were 
dangerous  to  wooden  ships,  and  such  was  the  confi 
dence  of  the  rebels  in  the  strength  of  these  for 
tresses  that  they  did  not  believe  a  hostile  fleet 
could  get  past  them.  They  were  much  more  afraid 
of  possible  attacks  from  above,  and  as  the  Confed 
eracy  was  ill-supplied  with  heavy  cannon,  they  pre 
ferred  to  send  as  many  as  possible  to  points  farther 
up  the  river.  Between  the  two  forts  and  the  city  of 
New  Orleans  other  defensive  works  had  been  begun, 
but  were  inadequately  armed,  and  could  do  little  to 
check  the  progress  of  an  enemy  who  had  once  run 
the  gauntlet  between  Jackson  and  St.  Philip. 

For  further  obstruction  the  Confederates 
stretched  across  the  broad  river  between  the  forts 
a  row  of  heavy  schooners  well  anchored  witli  sixty 
fathoms  of  cable  and  held  together  by  stout  iron 
chains.  Their  masts  were  unshipped  and  cast 


TJie  Capture  of  New  Orleans  119 

overboard  without  being  entirely  cut  loose,  so  that 
drifting  hither  and  thither  with  their  tangled  mass 
of  rigging,  they  might  foul  the  screws  of  any 
steamers  that  should  come  too  near.  Above  the 
forts  were  a  dozen  Confederate  warships,  mostly 
wooden  and  of  light  armament.  The  TheConfed- 
cigar-shaped  ironclad  ram  Manassas,  eraterams. 
carrying  one  32-pound  carronade  which  fired 
straight  ahead,  might  have  been  formidable  but 
for  the  weakness  of  her  engines,  which  prevented 
her  acquiring  much  impetus.  The  most  dangerous 
rebel  vessel,  had  she  been  ready  for  action,  was 
the  Louisiana,  an  ironclad  with  sloping  sides  car 
rying  16  very  heavy  guns ;  but  Farragut's  move 
ments  were  so  prompt  that  the  night  of  the  battle 
found  her  still  manned  with  diligent  workmen 
and  unfinished.  This  small  fleet  was  nominally 
controlled  by  Commander  John  Mitchell,  of  the 
Confederate  navy ;  but  six  of  the  ships  belonged 
to  a  force  known  as  the  river  defence  fleet,  and 
were  commanded  by  a  merchant  captain,  whose 
behaviour  was  afterward  deemed  insubordinate. 
The  land  defences  were  in  charge  of  General 
Duncan,  and  under  him  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hig- 
gins  commanded  Fort  Jackson.  The  department- 
commander  was  General  Mansfield  Lovell,  whose 
headquarters  were  at  New  Orleans.  All  three 
were  able  officers,  but  ill-supported.  Lovell's 


120     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

whole  force  in  the  city  consisted  of  3000  raw 
troops  without  arms  enough  to  go  around,  so  thor 
oughly  had  every  corner  been  ransacked  for  forces 
with  which  to  strike  the  heavy  but  unavailing 
blow  at  Pittsburg  Landing. 

In  spite  of  these  disadvantages  the  Confeder 
ates  felt  sure  of  victory,  and  indeed  the  task  set 
for  Farragut  was  so  difficult  that  only  the  highest 
skill  and  daring  could  have  performed  it.  His 
wooden  vessels,  carrying  177  guns,  had  to  contend 
with  128  guns  in  strong  fortresses  and  39  guns 
carried  by  vessels  partly  armoured.  According 
to  Admiral  Porter,  who  thus  concisely  states  the 
case,  "it  is  generally  conceded  by  military  men 
that  one  gun  in  a  fort  is  about  equal  to  five  on 
board  of  a  wooden  ship,  especially  when  .  .  .  the 
forces  afloat  are  obliged  to  contend  against  a  three- 
and-a-half-knot  current  in  a  channel  obstructed 
by  chains  and  fire-rafts."  1  After  making  all  due 
allowances,  therefore,  the  Confederates  might 
easily  feel  that  the  odds  were  in  their  favour. 
They  worked  night  and  day  in  strengthening  their 
defences,  and  another  fortnight  might  have  made 
them  impregnable.  But  Farragut  pushed  on  his 
preparations  with  desperate  energy.  There  was 
great  difficulty  at  first  in  getting  his  larger  vessels 
over  the  bar,  but  by  the  16th  of  April  these  obsta- 

1  Battles  and  Leaders,  ii.  33. 


The  Capture  of  New  Orleans  121 

cles  were  surmounted  and  all  was  in  readiness  for 
the  bombardment.      Commander  Por- 


ter  anchored  his  bomb-  vessels  around  merit  of  Fort 
the  bend  of  the  river,  close  to  the  right 
bank,  from  three  to  four  thousand  yards  below 
Fort  Jackson  and  behind  a  thick  wood.  The 
mastheads  were  dressed  with  bushes,  and  thus 
became  indistinguishable  from  the  treetops.  In 
such  wise  the  bombardment  began  on  the  morning 
of  the  18th,  and  was  kept  up  with  great  fury  for 
five  days  and  nights,  during  which  the  mortar  fleet 
fired  16,800  shells,  or  more  than  one  to  every 
minute.  The  aim  was  excellent.  Nearly  every 
shell  was  lodged  inside  of  the  fort,  which  at  the 
end  of  this  time  was  riddled  like  a  worm-eaten 
log.  Huge  masses  of  sand-bags  still  protected  the 
magazine,  however,  and,  although  several  guns 
were  silenced,  Fort  Jackson  as  yet  gave  no  sign  of 
surrender.  As  for  Fort  St.  Philip,  it  had  suffered 
comparatively  little  damage. 

This  preliminary  bombardment  was  a  pet  scheme 
of  Porter's,  to  which  Farragut  seems  to  have  at 
tached    small    importance,    though    he    Difference 
was  willing  to  give  it  a  trial.     Porter   between 

ill-  u-  i.    Farra^ut's 

was  so  keenly  alive  to  the  danger  which   view  and 

the  fleet  would  incur  in  running  past   Porter's- 
the  forts  that  he  deemed  it  necessary  to  begin  by 
forcing  them  to  surrender,  and  this  he  hoped  to  do 


122     The,  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil    War 

with  his  bomb-shells.  Moreover  he  disapproved  of 
the  policy  of  ascending  the  river  while  leaving  hos 
tile  forts  in  the  rear  unreduced.  On  the  other 
hand,  Farragut  was  ready  to  take  the  risk  of  pass 
ing  the  forts,  and  believed  that  as  soon  as  the  city 
of  New  Orleans  should  be  in  our  possession,  the 
forts,  thus  isolated,  would  have  no  alternative  but 
to  surrender.  The  progress  of  Porter's  bombard 
ment  soon  convinced  Farragut  that  it  was  not 
worth  while  to  wait  for  the  forts  to  be  disabled. 
But  before  he  could  ascend  the  river,  the  line  of 
dismantled  schooners  which  barred  the  passage 
must  be  broken.  On  the  night  of  the  20th,  while 
the  bombardment  was  briskly  going  on,  this  impor 
tant  task  was  undertaken  by  Lieutenant  Caldwell, 
with  the  small  gunboats  Itasca  and  Pinola.  A 
The  Itasca's  torpedo  connected  with  an  electric  bat- 
exploit,  tery  was  lodged  under  the  bows  of  one 
of  the  swaying  hulks,  but  the  wires  broke  prema 
turely  and  no  explosion  took  place.  The  Itasca 
then  tried  to  grapple  the  hulk  and  set  it  on  fire, 
but  mano3uvring  in  the  strong  swift  current  she 
became  entangled  for  a  moment,  and  losing  control 
of  herself  turned  inshore  and  ran  aground  in  a 
very  dangerous  position.  With  much  difficulty  her 
consort  dragged  her  off,  and  now  the  adventurous 
little  craft,  seizing  victory  from  this  untoward  acci 
dent,  steamed  cautiously  upstream  by  the  eastern 


The  Capture  of  New  Orleans  123 

bank  with  just  enough  water  to  float  in,  till  she 
passed  outside  and  above  the  line  of  hulks.  Then 
deftly  turning,  and  crowding  steam,  aided  by  the 
full  momentum  of  the  current,  she  steered  boldly 
down  upon  the  chains  that  stretched  between  the 
third  and  fourth  hulks  and  held  them  together.  As 
she  struck  with  prodigious  force,  her  bows  were 
lifted  quite  clear  of  the  water,  and  when  they  came 
down  again  the  stout  chains  snapped  asunder,  the 
current  pushed  the  great  hulks  far  apart  to  right 
and  left,  the  gallant  Itasca  passed  through  un 
scathed,  and  a  gateway  was  opened  for  the  whole 
fleet  to  pass  up. 

At  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  April  24 
Farragut  hoisted  his  red-light  signal,  and  the  whole 
squadron  steamed  slowly  up  the  river.  The  vital 
parts  of  the  ships  —  their  engines  and  magazines 
—  were  protected  by  chain  cables  and  sand-bags, 
their  light  spars  were  sent  down,  and  The  a^vance 
every  needless  encumbrance  removed,  up  the  Missis- 
Captain  Theodorus  Bailey  led  the  way  sippi  river* 
in  the  gunboat  Cayuga,  closely  followed  by  the 
sloops  Pensacola  and  Mississippi,  the  corvettes 
Oneida  and  Varuna,  and  the  gunboats  Katahdin, 
Kineo,  and  Wissahickon.  As  the  Pensacola  passed 
through  the  breach  in  the  line  of  hulks,  the  batter 
ies  in  both  forts  opened  upon  the  fleet  with  a  tre 
mendous  roar.  Then  Commander  William  Bain- 


124     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

bridge  Kenshaw,  with  the  Westfield  and  four  other 
gunboats,  came  up  within  two  hundred  yards  of 
Fort  Jackson,  and  with  a  hailstorm  of  grape  and 
canister  drove  the  Confederates  from  their  guns ; 
while  the  heavy  broadside  of  the  Pensacola  replied 
effectively  to  the  fire  of  Fort  St.  Philip.  The 
Manassas  attempted  to  ram  the  Pensacola,  but 
missing  her,  kept  on  and  inflicted  a  slight  wound 
upon  the  Mississippi.  In  such  wise  Bailey's  fore 
most  vessels  got  past  the  forts  with  little  injury 
and  engaged  the  enemy's  ships  above,  while  the 
two  swift  corvettes  followed  and  joined  in  the  fight. 
One  of  them,  the  Varuna,  delivered  a  shot  which 
burst  the  boiler  of  a  Confederate  transport  crowded 
with  troops,  and  presently  with  her  shells  set  three 
other  ships  on  fire.  She  was  then  attacked  by  two 
rams,  both  of  which  she  defeated  and  disabled, 
but  not  until  the  enemy's  iron  beak  had  crashed 
through  her  wooden  side.  Running  into  shallow 
water,  her  crew  and  gallant  commander,  Charles 
Stuart  Boggs,  were  rescued  by  her  consort  the 
Oneida,  while  her  two  crippled  opponents  were  set 
on  fire  and  abandoned.  Three  ships  were  wrecked 
or  sunk  by  the  Cayuga,  one  or  two  ran  aground  in 
attempting  to  flee,  and  one  escaped  to  New  Orleans. 
Meanwhile  Farragut  in  the  Hartford,  followed 
by  the  Brooklyn,  poured  his  broadsides  into  Fort 
St.  Philip,  driving  the  gunners  under  cover  while 


The  Capture  of  New  Orleans  125 

the  great  ships  slowly  passed  by.  More  than  two 
hundred  guns  were  now  firing  at  once,  with  noise 
like  an  earthquake,  and  the  dark  sky  was  veiled 
in  darker  clouds  of  smoke,  fitfully  illumined  here 
and  there  by  spasmodic  flashes.  Presently  the 
whole  scene  was  shown  up  in  the  lurid  glare  of  a 
blazing  raft  which  a  brave  little  tugboat  was  push 
ing  straight  down  upon  the  Hartford.  r^e  Hart_ 
After  passing  the  fort  with  thirty-two  ford's  danger, 
shots  in  her  hull  and  rigging,  the  flagship  was  now 
exposed  to  her  greatest  danger.  In  turning  her 
helm  to  avoid  it,  she  grounded  on  a  shoal,  and 
there  received  the  shock  of  the  huge  mass  of  burn 
ing  pine-knots.  The  crackling  flames  instantly 
caught  her  and  danced  half  way  to  her  mastheads, 
while  shells  from  St.  Philip's  water-batteries  still 
kept  dropping  and  bursting  on  her  deck.  At  this 
perilous  moment  the  great  captain  to  whom  the 
battle  had  been  entrusted  showed  all  the  qualities 
of  which  he  had  given  promise  fifty  years  before, 
when  as  midshipman  he  trod  the  blood-stained 
deck  of  the  Essex.  Walking  calmly  up  and  down, 
his  hands  behind  him,  the  old  man  gave  his  orders 
with  a  cheery  voice  that  made  every  one  ashamed 
of  fear.  "  Steady,  boys,  steady,"  he  cried,  with 
his  pleasant  smile,  "  there  's  a  hotter  fire  than  this, 
you  know,  for  those  who  flinch  from  duty !  "  His 
coolness  and  the  admirable  discipline  of  the  crew 


126     Tlie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

quelled  all  the  dangers.  The  fires  were  put  out, 
and  the  staunch  ship,  freed  from  the  shoal,  sailed 
on  up  the  deep  channel,  with  other  good  work 
still  before  her. 

The  flagship's  consort,  the  Brooklyn,  following 
closely  in  her  wake,  was  presently  struck  by  the 
ram  Manassas,  and  an  ugly  gash  was  made  in  her 
side  six  feet  below  the  water-line.  But  nimble 
carpenters  bolted  heavy  planks  over  the  wound, 
and  she  kept  on  her  way.  The  crisis  of  the  battle 
was  now  safely  passed.  All  but  three  of  the  gun 
boats  of  the  rear  division,  under  Captain  Henry 
Bell,  made  a  good  passage  into  the  waters  above 
St.  Philip,  whose  gunners  were  by  this  time  weary 
and  disheartened.  One  of  the  three  unfortunates 
was  the  Itasca,  which  had  so  nobly  played  the  part 
of  pioneer.  Her  boiler  was  pierced  by  a  shot,  and 
she  drifted  downstream,  running  ashore  just  below 
the  mortar  fleet,  and  landing  most  of  her  crew  in 
safety.  In  less  than  an  hour  and  a  half  from  the 
commencement  of  the  action,  Farragut's  squadron 
had  run  the  gauntlet,  the  forts  were  turned,  and 
the  doom  of  the  Confederacy's  proudest  city  was 
sealed.  As  the  ships  glided  up  the  river,  the 
noise  of  battle  hushed,  the  undaunted  Manassas 
Fate  of  the  was  descried  through  the  dull  twilight 
Manassas.  of  the  April  morning,  pushing  after 
them  like  a  grim,  forlorn  hope.  The  Mississippi, 


The  Capture  of  New  Orleans  127 

which  she  had  rammed,  was  ready  to  clear  off  the 
score,  and  turned  quickly  upon  her  to  run  her 
down.  But  the  agile  ram  sheered  away  from  the 
blow  and  gained  the  shore,  where  her  crew  aban 
doned  her.  The  Mississippi  then  pounded  her 
with  shot  till  she  drifted  away  with  the  current, 
wrapped  in  flames,  which  presently  caught  her 
magazine  and  blew  her  into  atoms. 

All  but  three  of  the  rebel  ships  now  lay  at  the 
bottom  of  the  river  or  floated  in  charred  fragments 
on  the  tide.  The  Louisiana  stayed  moored  to  the 
shore  above  St.  Philip,  where  she  had  been  of  little 
use.  Two  others  crouched  under  what  was  left 
of  Fort  Jackson.  The  victorious  fleet  Arrival  at 
kept  on  up  the  river,  silenced  the  bat-  New  Orleans- 
teries  at  Chalmette,  hard  by  the  spot  where  An 
drew  Jackson  had  vanquished  a  British  army  in 
1815,  and  swept  around  the  bend  which  brought 
them  before  the  wharves  of  New  Orleans,  where 
all  was  clamour  and  confusion.  General  Lovell 
had  retreated  northward  with  his  handful  of  troops, 
leaving  the  city  in  the  hands  of  its  mayor.  Amid 
the  clangour  of  church-bells  the  citizens  had  been 
busy  since  daybreak  burning  great  bales  of  cotton, 
and  destroying  the  munitions  of  war  which  they 
had  heaped  together  and  the  half-built  gunboats 
on  which  they  had  been  working  night  and  day. 
Innumerable  fragments  thickly  strewed  the  sur- 


128     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

face  of  the  river  with  a  seething  scum.  Mr.  Cable, 
the  novelist,  then  a  young  lad,  stood  by  and  wit 
nessed  the  scene  as  the  ships  drew  near.  "  TJie 
crowds  on  the  levee,"  he  says,  "howled  and 
screamed  with  rage.  The  swarming  decks  an 
swered  never  a  word  ;  but  one  old  tar  on  the  Hart 
ford,  standing  with  lanyard  in  hand  beside  a  great 
pivot-gun,  so  plain  to  view  that  you  could  see  him 
smile,  silently  patted  its  big  black  breech  and 
blandly  grinned." 

A  plank  was  thrown  from  the  Cayuga,  and  Cap 
tain  Theodorus  Bailey,  with  Lieutenant  George 
Hamilton  Perkins,  regardless  of  the  knives  and 
pistols  of  the  raging  mob,  walked  through  the 
streets  to  the  City  Hall  and  demanded  surrender. 
The  mayor  sought  to  gain  time  by  evasive  answers. 
Until  Butler's  troops  should  arrive,  Farragut  could 
not  occupy  the  city,  though  his  guns  could  destroy 
it,  and  the  mayor,  taking  advantage  of  his  for 
bearance,  kept  the  state  flag  of  Louisiana  flying 
for  five  days  more.  Meanwhile  Porter,  who  had 
stayed  with  his  bomb-vessels  below  the  forts,  sum 
moned  them  to  surrender,  and  on  General  Dun- 
Surrender  of  can's  refusal  he  renewed  the  bombard- 
the  forts.  ment.  This  was  not  relished  by  the 
garrisons,  and  on  the  night  of  the  27th  they  all, 
except  one  company  of  devoted  planters,  rose  in 
mutiny  and  began  spiking  their  own  guns.  Next 


The  Capture  of  New  Orleans  129 

morning  General  Duncan  surrendered.  While 
the  terms  were  arranged  in  the  cabin  of  the 
Harriet  Lane,  with  flags  of  truce  flying  at  her 
masthead  and  on  both  the  forts,  the  Louisiana, 
by  accident  unmoored,  came  blundering  down  with 
the  current,  all  aflame,  her  shotted  guns  dischar 
ging  to  right  and  left,  until  she  suddenly  blew 
up,  rolling  the  Harriet  Lane  over  on  her  beam- 
ends,  and  shaking  all  the  officers  out  of  their  seats. 
A  moment  later  the  explosion  would  have  killed 
friend  and  foe  alike.  It  was  simple  carelessness 
on  the  part  of  the  men  who  were  destroying  the 
useless  hulk. 

The  surrender  of  the  forts  allowed  the  trans 
ports  with  Butler's  troops  to  ascend  the  river. 
On  the  29th,  while  they  were  expected  but  before 
their  arrival,  a  small  detachment  of  marines  from 
Farragut's  fleet  landed  in  the  city  and  hoisted 
the  stars  and  stripes  over  one  of  the  public  build 
ings.  Scarcely  had  they  left  the  spot  when  a  man 
named  Mumford  hauled  down  the  flag  for  the  popu 
lace  to  trample  under  foot  and  drag  through  the 
mud.  The  marines  returned  and  hoisted  another, 
and  guarded  it  till  May  1,  when  Butler  arrived 
and  took  possession  of  the  city,  which  he  ruled 
till  the  middle  of  the  next  December.  The  selec 
tion  of  such  a  man  for  such  a  command  was  a 
needless  though  unintentional  insult  to  the  con- 


130  The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 
quered  city.  Where  a  military  rule,  at  once  stern 
Butler  and  anc*  Just'  *s  re(luired  by  circumstances, 
his  adminis-  it  is  far  better  to  have  a  true  soldier 
than  an  unscrupulous  politician,  bent 
upon  money-making  and  intrigue.  In  fairness  to 
Butler  it  must  be  said  that  his  administration  was 
in  some  respects  intelligent  and  able.  Order  was 
preserved,  and  the  streets  were  so  much  cleaner 
than  ever  before  that  the  demon  of  yellow  fever 
was  banished  for  some  time.  But  there  was  an 
amount  of  confiscation  unparalleled  elsewhere  dur 
ing  the  war ;  and  a  swarm  of  adventurers,  with 
Butler's  connivance,  made  their  fortunes  in  specu 
lating  with  the  property  thus  seized.  The  hang 
ing  of  Mumford,  for  his  insult  to  the  Federal  flag 
before  the  city  had  been  regularly  occupied  by  our 
troops,  was  an  act  of  extreme  severity,  although 
the  victim  appears  to  have  been  a  creature  on 
whom  our  sympathy  would  be  wasted.  As  the 
Count  of  Paris  says,  "  The  death  of  Mumford  is 
the  only  stain  on  the  brightest  page,  perhaps,  in  the 
history  of  the  United  States,  —  the  page  on  which 
it  is  written  that  neither  after  final  victory  nor  dur 
ing  the  course  of  this  terrible  war,  while  the  citi 
zens  were  giving  their  lives  by  thousands  in  defence 
of  the  Union,  has  any  political  offence  (save  in  this 
one  instance)  been  expiated  in  blood." 

This  military  execution,  the  speculating  in  se- 


The  Capture  of  Nvw  Orleans  131 

questrated  property,  and  the  notorious  "  woman 
order  "  were  the  incidents  in  Butler's  rule  which 
attracted  most  attention.  Relying  on  the  forbear 
ance  which  Americans  habitually  exercise  toward 
even  the  meanest  of  the  female  sex,  some  foolish 
women  in  New  Orleans,  well-dressed  and  rating 
themselves  as  ladies,  sought  to  vent  their  spite  by 
making  faces  at  Federal  officers  on  the  street,  call 
ing  them  names,  and  spitting  at  them.  To  stop 
such  behaviour  Butler  issued  an  order  "  that  here 
after,  when  any  female  shall,  by  word,  The  "  woman 
gesture,  or  movement,  insult  or  show  order<" 
contempt  for  any  officer  or  soldier  of  the  United 
States,  she  shall  be  regarded  and  held  liable  to  be 
treated  as  a  woman  of  the  town  plying  her  avoca 
tion."  Never,  perhaps,  was  a  military  order  more 
successful  in  effecting  its  immediate  purpose  ;  but 
the  furious  rage  with  which  it  was  greeted  through 
out  the  South  may  easily  be  imagined.  Had  its 
wretched  author,  however,  understood  in  the  small 
est  degree  the  feelings  of  gentlemen,  had  there 
entered  into  his  constitution  so  much  as  a  single 
fibre  of  true  manhood,  he  would  have  seen  that 
this  vile  edict  insulted  no  one  else  so  grossly  as 
the  officers  and  soldiers  under  his  command.  Such 
an  outrage  ought  to  have  led  to  his  immediate 
recall.  It  was  doubtless  silly  in  Jefferson  Davis, 
after  Butler's  departure  from  New  Orleans,  to 


132     The  Mississijipi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

issue  a  proclamation  denouncing  his  former  politi 
cal  ally  as  a  felon  who  might  be  hanged  without 
ceremony ;  but  after  making  due  allowance  for  the 
extravagant  bitterness  of  war-time,  it  seems  a  not 
unnatural  commentary  on  the  behaviour  which 
earned  for  the  military  governor  of  New  Orleans 
the  familiar  sobriquet  of  "  Beast." 

The  value  of  prompt  action  in  warfare  has  never 
been  better  illustrated  than  in  Farragut's  capture 
of  New  Orleans.  The  blow  was  dealt  before  the 
enemy  had  completed  his  preparations  for  defence, 
and  while  his  energies  were  distracted  by  the  con 
centrated  advance  of  the  Federal  army  upon  Cor 
inth.  Its  political  value  was  great ;  it  nipped  in 
the  bud  one  of  the  many  schemes  of  Napoleon  III. 
for  recognizing  the  independence  of  the  Confed 
eracy.  Its  military  value,  in  opening  the  lower 
Mississippi,  was  equally  great,  and  would  have 
been  still  greater  if  the  army  had  cooperated  with 
like  skill  and  promptness.  The  capture  of  New 
Orleans,  taken  in  connection  with  the  capture  of 
Corinth,  ought  to  have  entailed  the  immediate  fall 
of  Vicksburg  and  the  complete  conquest  of  the 
Mississippi  river;  and  but  for  the  flagrant  imbe 
cility  which  then  directed  the  movements  of  our 
western  armies,  it  would  almost  certainly  have 
done  so.  But  we  have  now  to  enter  upon  a  melan 
choly  tale. 


CHAPTER  IV 

FROM   CORINTH   TO   STONE   RIVER 

ON  the  llth  of  April,  1862,  four  days  after 
the  hard-won  victory  of  Shiloh,  General  Halleck 
arrived  at  Pittsburg  Landing  and  took  command 
in  person  of  the  forces  there  assembled.  On  the 
21st  General  Pope  arrived  with  his  army,  fresh 
from  its  capture  of  Island  Number  Ten.  With 
the  three  armies  of  Pope,  Grant,  and  Buell  thus 
united,  Halleck  had  an  effective  force  of  more 
than  100,000  men.  This  force  was  organized  by 
Halleck  into  right  wing,  centre,  left  wing,  and 
reserve.  All  of  Grant's  army,  except  Halleck>s  ad_ 
the  divisions  of  McClernand  and  Lew  vance  upon 
Wallace,  which  were  taken  out  and 
replaced  by  Thomas's  division  from  Buell's  army, 
formed  the  right  wing,  and  was  commanded  by 
General  Thomas.  The  remainder  of  Buell's  army, 
forming  the  centre,  was  still  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Buell.  General  Pope  with  his  army  formed 
the  left  wing.  The  reserve  was  made  up  of  the 
two  divisions  of  McClernand  and  Wallace,  with 
McClernand  in  command.  In  this  arrangement,  it 


134     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

will  be  observed,  there  was  no  place  for  Grant. 
His  talents  were  got  rid  of  for  the  moment  by  ap 
pointing  him  second  in  command  over  the  whole, 
a  position  more  honourable  than  useful,  since  no 
specific  duties  were  assigned  him.  With  this  grand 
army  Halleck  started  at  the  end  of  April,  creeping 
slowly  forward,  entrenching  at  every  step,  and 
restraining  the  ardour  of  his  generals,  until  after 
nearly  a  month  he  had  safely  accomplished  the 
twenty  miles  from  Pittsburg  Landing  to  Corinth  ! 
His  adversary  Beauregard,  soon  gauging  the  cali 
bre  of  the  Federal  commander,  retired  inch  by 
inch,  keeping  his  skirmishers  well  forward  and 
presenting  as  bold  a  front  as  possible.  His  total 
effective  force,  including  the  troops  of  Van  Dorn, 
who  had  joined  him  just  after  Shiloh,  amounted 
to  scarcely  more  than  50,000  men.  He  was  out 
numbered  two  to  one,  and  ought  to  have  been 
surrounded  and  captured.  He  understood  that 
Corinth  could  not  be  held  ;  all  hope  of  that  had 
really  been  lost  when  he  withdrew  his  beaten  army 


Beauregard      from  tne  field  °f  Shiloh.     The  most  he 
evacuates         could  do  was  to  save  that  army  from 

Corinth.  ,  .,        ,    ,       .  , 

capture,  while  delaying  the  enemy  as 
long  as  possible  ;  and  this  he  did  very  well  indeed. 
He  had  thrown  up  extensive  works  as  if  with  the 
intention  of  withstanding  a  siege  at  Corinth;  but 
before  Halleck  had  fairly  closed  in  upon  him,  he 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  135 

had  evacuated  that  town  and  retreated  upon  Tu 
pelo,  a  station  sixty  miles  south  on  the  railroad 
leading  to  Mobile. 

Pope's  forces  were  sent  in  pursuit,  while  their 
commander  was  confined  to  his  tent  by  illness, 
about  five  miles  from  Halleck's  headquarters. 
Despatches  came  in  to  the  effect  that  the  woods 
were  full  of  Confederate  stragglers,  and  it  was 
hoped  that  at  least  10,000  would  be  captured  within 
a  day  or  two.  This  intelligence  Pope  forwarded 
to  Halleck,  and  it  quite  turned  his  head.  Trans 
lating  hope  into  reality,  Halleck  telegraphed  to 
Washington  that "  General  Pope,  with  40,000  men, 
is  thirty  miles  south  of  Corinth,  pushing  the  enemy 
hard.  He  already  reports  10,000  prisoners  and 
deserters  from  the  enemy,  and  15,000  Much  cry 
stand  of  arms  captured."  Great  were  and  little 
the  rejoicings  throughout  the  North, 
but  they  gave  place  to  indignation  a  few  days  later, 
when  it  appeared  that  this  brave  story  was  but  a 
new  version  of  the  three  black  crows.  No  prisoners 
were  taken  worth  mentioning,  Beauregard's  army 
was  still  intact,  and  Pope  was  generally  blamed 
and  ridiculed  for  a  wild  statement  which  he  had 
in  no  way  authorized.  With  praiseworthy  desire 
not  to  embarrass  his  chief,  Pope  bore  this  popular 
censure  in  silence,  and  it  was  not  until  after  the 
end  of  the  war  that  he  even  asked  Halleck  for  an 


136      The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

explanation,  which  that  general,  with  some  frivolous 
excuses,  declined  to  give.  Pope's  conduct  in  this 
affair  shows  true  generosity,  but  what  shall  be  said 
of  the  superior  officer  who  thus  allowed  a  subordi 
nate  to  become  his  scapegoat  and  uttered  never  a 
word  to  clear  him  ? 

Chagrined  and  disgusted  as  the  northern  people 
were  at  Beauregard's  easy  escape,  nevertheless  the 
occupation  of  Corinth  was  an  event  of  great  im- 
^portance.  It  broke  through  the  second  Confederate 
line  of  defence,  and  gave  the  Federals  possession 
-.J  of  the  only  railroad  which  directly  connected  the 
Mississippi  river  with  the  seaboard  of  Virginia 
and  South  Carolina.  It  also  turned  the  positions 
of  Fort  Pillow  and  Memphis  on  the  great  river, 
just  as  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson  had  turned 
the  position  of  Columbus.  On  the  5th  of  June, 
just  a  week  after  the  fall  of  Corinth,  the  Federal 
fleet  found  Fort  Pillow  abandoned.  This  river 
fleet,  which  had  cooperated  with  Grant  and  Pope, 
was  now  commanded  by  Commodore  Charles  Davis, 
as  the  wound  received  by  Foote  at  Fort  Donelson 
had  grown  worse  and  obliged  him  to  retire.  Foote 
was  a  commander  worthy  of  a  navy  that  boasted 
a  Farragut  and  a  Porter,  and  in  Davis  he  had  a 
worthy  successor.  The  fleet  had  been  strengthened 
by  the  addition  of  four  powerful  rams  constructed 
by  Colonel  Ellet  of  the  army,  a  man  of  venture- 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  137 

some  courage,  under  whose  separate  command  they 
had  been  somewhat  oddly  placed.  From  Fort  Pil 
low  this  strong  armada  hastened  downstream  to 
Memphis,  which  the  fall  of  Corinth  had  already 
made  untenable,  but  which  the  Confederate  Com 
modore  Montgomery  had  too  chivalrously  deter 
mined  not  to  abandon  without  fighting  to  the  death. 
Against  Davis's  five  gunboats  and  Ellet's  four 
rams  he  could  bring  eight  gunboats,  some  of  them 
armed  with  beaks ;  and  on  the  6th  of  Naval  battle 
June,  at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  of  Memphis, 
under  the  high  bluff  crowded  with  anxious  citizens 
gathered  in  the  blazing  sunshine  to  watch  the  scene, 
he  advanced  to  the  trial  of  arms,  which  was  short, 
sharp,  and  final.  At  half  past  seven  the  specta 
tors  dispersed  to  their  homes,  the  men  muttering 
curses,  the  women  in  tears.  Of  their  eight  gun 
boats  three  were  captured,  three  were  sunk,  and 
one  was  blown  up;  only  one  had  escaped.  One 
of  the  Federal  ships  was  seriously  injured,  and  two 
or  three  men  were  wounded,  but  not  a  man  on 
that  side  was  killed.  Memphis  surrendered  that 
day,  and  thus  the  Mississippi  was  opened  as  far 
down  as  Vicksburg. 

After  his  capture  of  New  Orleans,  Farragut  had 
proceeded  up  the  river,  receiving  the  surrender  of 
Baton  Rouge,  the  capital  of  Louisiana,  and  other 
towns ;  but  on  the  18th  of  May  his  progress  had 


138     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

been  stopped  at  Vicksburg,  400  miles  above  New 
Orleans  by  water  and  400  below  Memphis.  The 
position  of  that  town  was  such  that  it  could  not 
Van  Dom  ^e  taken  without  the  cooperation  of  a 
fortifies  larger  land  force  than  Butler  was  able 

Vicksburg.  -,          ..-. 

to  spare,  and  so  it  became  necessary  to 
wait  for  the  fall  of  Corinth.  But  after  that  event, 
as  before  it,  Halleck  dawdled  instead  of  striking. 
On  the  28th  of  June  Farragut's  fleet  ran  past  the 
guns  of  Vicksburg  without  serious  damage  and 
effected  a  junction  with  that  of  Commodore  Davis 
just  above  the  town.  Nothing  could  be  done  with 
out  an  army,  and  Farragut  asked  Halleck  for 
troops,  but  could  not  get  any.  Precious  time  was 
thus  slipping  away,  while  the  enemy  was  putting 
every  minute  to  good  use.  General  Van  Dorn, 
detached  from  the  army  which  Beauregard  had 
withdrawn  to  Tupelo,  made  all  haste  to  Vicksburg, 
taking  Breckinridge  and  his  division  along  with 
him,  and  worked  day  and  night  building  fortifica 
tions  and  collecting  cannon. 

Moreover,  so  far  from  losing  heart  on  account 
of  their  crushing  naval  defeats  at  New  Orleans 
and  Memphis,  the  undaunted  Confederates  were 
making  ready  to  attack  the  victors  upon  their  own 
element.  Fifty  miles  up  the  Yazoo  river,  which 
empties  into  the  Mississippi  just  above  Vicksburg, 
they  were  building  a  formidable  ironclad  ram, 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  139 

which  they  hoped  would  do  as  much  mischief  as 
the  Merrimac  had  done  and  threatened   The  Confed. 
at    Hampton    Roads,    and    Farragut   erate  ram 
had  no  Monitor  at  his  disposal.     This   " 
famous  ram,  the  Arkansas,  was  built  like  the  Mer- 
riinae,  though  smaller  in  size,  and  if  her  engines 
had   been   sufficiently  powerful,   she  might   have 
wrought  fearful  havoc  to  the  Federal  fleet.     At 
her   first   appearance,  on   the  15th  of   July,  she 
attacked  and  put  to  flight  the  Tyler  and  Caron- 
delet,   and,  running  under   the  friendly  guns   of 
Vicksburg,    where   Commander    William    Porter, 
with  the  Essex,  tried  in  vain  to  destroy  her,  she 
became  a  perpetual  menace  to  our  ships. 

By  the  end  of  July,  as  no  troops  could  be  ob 
tained,  and  the  crews  were  suffering  from  fever, 
it  was  decided  to  abandon  offensive  operations, 
and  Davis  withdrew  his  ships  300  miles  up  the 
river  to  Helena,  while  Farragut  returned  to  New 
Orleans.  The  energetic  Van  Dorn  at  once  sent 
Breckinridge  with  6000  men  and  the  Arkansas  to 
recover  Baton  Rouge  and  bring  back  the  state 
government,  besides  securing  the  mouth  of  Red 
river.  The  capital  was  defended  by  a  detachment 
of  4000  of  Butler's  troops,  with  the  ram  Essex 
and  a  couple  of  gunboats.  In  the  fight  which 
occurred  on  the  5th  of  August  at  one  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  the  Confederate  troops  were  repulsed 


140     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

with  a  loss  of  500  men,  the  machinery  of  the  Arkan- 
Destruction  sas  broke  down,  and  when  she  was  at- 
of  theArkan-  tacked  by  the  Essex,  her  commander 
Dorn  fortifies  ran  her  ashore,  landed  his  crew,  set  her 
Port  Hudson.  on  fire?  an(j  turned  her  adrift.  Like 
so  many  other  rebel  vessels  in  these  waters,  her 
career  came  to  an  end  in  a  deafening  explosion. 
Nothing  daunted,  however,  by  this  reverse,  Van 
Dorn  seized  and  fortified  the  village  of  Port  Hud 
son,  a  few  miles  above  Baton  Kouge  but  below  the 
mouth  of  Red  river.  By  thus  holding  Vicksburg 
and  Port  Hudson,  the  Confederates  controlled  the 
250  miles  of  river  between  them,  and  through  the 
Red  river  obtained  their  supplies  from  the  trans- 
Mississippi  region  as  promptly  and  securely  as  ever. 
Until  they  could  be  ousted  from  these  two  strong 
holds,  in  spite  of  the  splendid  naval  victories  above 
and  below,  the  work  of  clearing  the  Mississippi  river 
was  but  half  accomplished  ;  the  "  backbone  of  the 
rebellion  "  was  not  yet  broken.  Many  more  lives 
were  yet  to  be  sacrificed,  many  more  homes  made 
desolate,  before  that  great  object  could  be  attained. 
The  lesson  of  the  summer  of  1862  is  a  mournful 
one.  It  shows  us  how  far  the  self-devotion  of  a 
noble  people  and  the  valour  of  able  commanders 
could  be  neutralized  by  incompetence  at  the  head 
of  affairs.  Corinth  had  fallen  on  the  29th  of  May 
and  Memphis  on  the  6th  of  June.  Halleck  had 


Fvom  Corinth  to  Stone  River  141 

100,000  men  elated  with  success,  while  his  adver 
sary,  Beauregard,  had  50,000  dispirited  by  a  long 
series  of  reverses.  At  any  time  between  the  first 
of  June  and  the  middle  of  July  a  force  of  20,000 
men,  cooperating  with  the  fleets  of  Farragut  and 
Davis,  which  were  ready  and  waiting  for  them, 
might  easily  have  taken  Vicksburg  and  Lost  oppor- 
saved  a  whole  year  of  anxious  and  ar-  tumties- 
duous  work  in  this  quarter.  There  was  nothing  to 
prevent  Halleck  from  sending  such  a  force  by  rail 
to  Memphis  and  thence  down  the  river,  and  their 
landing  at  Vicksburg  would  have  met  with  no  such 
resistance  as  Sherman  encountered  six  months 
later.  But  Halleck's  mind  was  not  large  enough 
to  take  in  the  whole  theatre  of  war  between  the 
Mississippi  and  the  Alleghanies.  Thus  far  the 
advance  of  the  Union  armies  from  Fort  Donelson 
up  the  Tennessee  river  to  Corinth  had  operated 
directly  to  open  the  Mississippi  river  by  taking 
its  fortified  places  in  flank ;  and  with  New  Orleans 
now  in  our  possession,  nothing  but  the  occupation 
of  Vicksburg  was  necessary  to  complete  the  con 
quest. 

But  in  this  vast  theatre  of  war,  there  was  an 
other  region  that  needed  to  be  looked  after ;  there 
was  another  strategic  point  scarcely  less  important 
than  Vicksburg.  This  was  the  mountain  fastness 
of  Chattanooga,  commanding  eastern  Tennessee 


142     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

and  all  the  northward  avenues  by  which  an  army 
starting  from  the  centre  of  the  Confederacy  might 
hope  to  recover  some  of  the  lost  ground  in  Tennes 
see  and  Kentucky.  Halleck  at  Corinth  was  300 
miles  distant  from  Vicksburg  on  the  one  hand, 
and  200  miles  from  Chattanooga  on  the  other. 

Importance  Jt  was  as  important  for  him  to  oc- 
of  Chatta-  cupy  the  latter  as  the  former,  lest  the 
enemy,  despairing  of  direct  success 
against  overwhelming  odds  in  Mississippi,  should 
seek  to  retrieve  the  situation  by  boldly  returning 
the  offensive  and  throwing  his  whole  force  north 
ward  into  eastern  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  For 
two  other  reasons  it  was  desirable  to  possess  Chat 
tanooga  as  the  key  to  eastern  Tennessee.  First, 
it  would  interpose  a  Union  army  between  the 
rebel  forces  in  Virginia  and  in  the  West,  and  thus 
prevent  their  easily  reinforcing  one  another.  Sec 
ondly,  the  people  of  eastern  Tennessee  were  de 
voted  to  the  Union,  they  were  subjected  to  griev 
ous  persecution  on  that  account,  and  ever  since 
the  first  outbreak  of  hostilities,  President  Lincoln 
had  been  impatient  to  relieve  them.  Halleck, 
therefore,  was  imperatively  called  upon  to  reach 
out  his  left  hand  to  Chattanooga  while  seizing 
Vicksburg  with  the  right.  It  was  indeed  a  long 
reach,  but  he  possessed  both  the  stronger  force 
and  the  interior  lines.  With  all  the  difficulties  of 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  143 

the  task,  a  Napoleon  would  have  made  light  work 
of  it.  A  moderately  good  general  would  have 
made  sure  of  one  prize,  even  at  the  risk  of  losing 
the  other.  But  what  shall  be  said  of  the  general 
ship  which  could  throw  away  such  advantages  of 
strength  and  situation,  and  tamely  allow  the  enemy, 
dividing  his  weaker  force  and  moving  upon  exterior 
lines,  to  gain  both  the  coveted  positions !  Let  us 
observe  the  manner  in  which  this  awful  disaster 
was  brought  upon  us. 

Besides  the  army  of  50,000  under  Beauregard, 
the  enemy  had  12,000  men  under  Kirby  Smith  at 
Knoxville  in  east  Tennessee,  watched  by  9000 
Federals  under  George  Morgan  at  Cumberland 
Gap.  He  had  also  a  garrison  of  2000  men  at 
Chattanooga,  and  this  was  watched  from  Hunts- 
ville  in  Alabama  by  7000  Federals  under  an  able 
commander,  the  astronomer  Ormsby  Mitchel.  This 
general  had  just  accomplished  one  of  the  most 
brilliant  raids  that  were  made  on  Mitchel's 
either  side  during  the  war.  At  the  raidt 
beginning  of  June  he  held  a  hundred  miles  of  the 
railroad  between  Corinth  and  Chattanooga,  some 
portions  of  which  were  torn  up,  and  on  the  7th  of 
that  month  one  of  his  -brigades  even  went  so  far  as 
to  erect  batteries  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Tennes 
see,  opposite  Chattanooga,  and  begin  bombarding 
the  town.  But  with  only  7000  men,  Mitchel 


144     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

could  not  hope  to  retain  such  advantages.  If 
Halleck  had  now  promptly  reinforced  him  with 
30,000  or  40,000  men  under  Buell,  Chattanooga 
might  have  been  seized  at  once  and  held  against 
all  comers.  Halleck  would  still  have  retained 
70,000,  or  at  least  60,000,  with  which  to  crush  all 
opposition  in  Mississippi  and  proceed  overland  to 
Vicksburg,  drawing  his  supplies  either  by  boat  or 
by  rail  from  Memphis. 

Now  Halleck  did  despatch  Buell  toward  Chat 
tanooga,  but  in  such  a  fashion  as  to  render  the 
movement  useless.  The  question  arose  by  what 
line  of  railway  should  Buell  obtain  his  supplies 
when  once  he  should  have  occupied  the  mountain 
citadel.  Should  they  come  from  Memphis  through 
Corinth  and  Huntsville,  or  from  Louisville  by 
way  of  Nashville  and  Murfreesboro  ?  The  former 
line  was  parallel  to  the  enemy's  front,  the  latter 
was  perpendicular  to  it,  and  all  sound  military 
considerations  required  that  the  latter  should  be 
Why  Buell  chosen.  So  thought  Buell,  whose 
was  "slow."  judgment  in  such  matters  was  most 
excellent,  but  Halleck  overruled  him,  and  insisted 
upon  his  taking  the  line  from  Memphis  to  Chatta 
nooga  and  putting  the  railroad  in  thorough  repair 
yard  by  yard  as  he  went.  Under  these  imperative 
orders  Buell  started  from  Corinth  on  the  10th  of 
June  with  40,000  men,  and  after  six  weeks  of  rail- 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  145 

road-building  reached  by  the  end  of  July  a  posi 
tion  from  which  he  could  threaten  Chattanooga. 

Meanwhile  Halleck  lay  idle  at  Corinth,  as  if 
on  the  defensive,  with  his  army  of  60,000  men 
still  outnumbering  the  enemy,  who  retreated  from 
before  him.  He  gave  most  stringent  orders  to 
Pope  not  to  press  the  Confederate  army  in  such 
wise  as  to  run  risk  of  a  battle,  and  summed  up  his 
theory  of  the  situation  in  these  memorable  words : 
"  I  think  the  enemy  will  continue  his  Halleck's 
retreat,  which  is  all  I  desire."  The  imbecility. 
enemy  was  indeed  rapidly  moving  the  bulk  of  his 
army  southward  to  Mobile,  but  he  could  not  be 
expected  to  show  such  an  accommodating  disposi 
tion  as  to  throw  himself  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico ! 
It  is  usually  safe  to  suppose  in  warfare  that  your 
enemy  will  not  do  as  you  desire.  General  Beaure- 
gard,  who  was  not  a  favourite  of  Jefferson  Davis, 
was  now  removed  from  command,  and  his  place 
was  taken  by  Braxton  Bragg.  As  soon  as  Bragg 
saw  the  manner  in  which  Buell  had  been  started 
eastward,  he  boldly  divided  his  own  forces.  Leav 
ing  15,000  men  under  Van  Dorn,  as  the  nucleus 
of  a  force  with  which  to  cover  Vicksburg,  he 
retreated  upon  Mobile  with  35,000,  and  thence 
sped  by  rail  straight  to  Chattanooga,  which  he 
reached  and  occupied  in  advance  of  Buell  on  the 
29th  of  July. 


146     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

By  this  masterly  move  Bragg  suddenly  gained 
the  initiative  and  threw  the  Union  armies  upon  the 
defensive,  along  the  whole  line.  Holding  Chat 
tanooga,  he  seriously  threatened  Btiell,  who  with 
Mitchel's  division  now  had  47,000  men,  but  was 
obliged  to  spare  20,000  in  small  detachments  to 
guard  the  long  railroad,  leaving  only  27,000  ready 
for  the  field.  Against  this  force,  by  summoning 
Kirby  Smith  from  Knoxville,  Bragg  could  at  any 
moment  throw  47,000  men.  To  relieve  Buell  from 
this  embarrassment,  20,000  more  men  were  sent 
from  Corinth  to  take  the  place  of  those  who  were 
guarding  the  railroad,  leaving  only  40,000  for  the 
work  in  Mississippi.  Against  these,  by  bringing 
together  Lovell  and  Price,  with  other  troops  from 
Arkansas,  Van  Dorn  was  presently  able  to  oppose 
32,000.  It  was  not  long  before  Bragg's  activity 
How  his  army  awakened  such  alarm  that  the  army 
was  scattered.  at  Corinth  was  still  further  depleted 
to  send  reinforcements  to  Buell,  so  that  it  became 
quite  out  of  the  question  for  it  to  undertake  any 
offensive  operations.  Thus  it  was  that  Halleck 
frittered  away  his  golden  opportunity ;  thus  was 
his  great  army  scattered  to  little  purpose ;  thus 
did  he  allow  the  enemy  to  seize  both  the  strategic 
centres  west  of  the  Alleghanies,  and  to  prolong 
the  Civil  War  at  least  a  twelvemonth.  And  to 
crown  all,  the  ridiculous  line  of  communication  for 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  147 

the  sake  of  which  everything  had  been  thus  indis 
criminately  sacrificed  was  almost  immediately 
rendered  useless  by  the  events  which  forced  Buell 
northward  into  Kentucky 

On  the  16th  of  July,  before  the  nature  or  extent 
of   the   mischief   had   become   apparent,    Halleck 

started   for    Washington.      President   _  „    . 

Halleck  ap- 

Lincoln  felt  the  need  of  a  general-in-  pointed  gen- 
chief  for  all  the  armies  of  the  United  eral-in-chief- 
States,  in  the  hope  of  securing  unity  of  operation. 
4  Comparatively  little  had  been  accomplished  thus 
far  in  the  East,  whereas  much  had  been  accom 
plished  in  the  West;  and  it  seemed  logical  to 
choose  the  western  commander-in-chief  for  the 
supreme  control  of  the  armies.  The  departure  of 
Halleck  left  Grant  in  command  at  Corinth.  Pope 
was  now  called  eastward  to  take  charge  of  the 
forces  hitherto  scattered  about  in  northern  Vir 
ginia,  and  his  place  was  filled  by  one  of  his  divi 
sion-commanders,  William  Stark  Rosecrans,  who 
after  distinguishing  himself  in  the  early  campaigns 
in  West  Virginia  had  taken  part  in  the  recent 
advance  upon  Corinth.  On  arriving  at  Washing 
ton,  Halleck's  supreme  capacity  for  doing  the 
wrong  thing  was  illustrated  by  a  step  which 
threatened  the  Union  cause  with  speedy  and 
irretrievable  wreck.  The  Seven  Days'  battles 
near  Richmond  had  seriously  damaged  McClellan's 


148     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

army,  but  still  left  it  in  a  position  which  must  com 
pel  Lee  to  remain  about  Richmond.  Lee  would 
gladly  have  fought  for  another  week  and  given 
20,000  men  to  get  McClellan's  army  away  from 
the  James  river ;  and  what  he  so  earnestly  desired 
Halleck  now  did  for  him  by  removing  it  by  sea  to 
northern  Virginia,  in  the  hope  of  making  Wash 
ington  more  secure.1  While  this  clumsy  move 
ment  was  going  on,  Lee  was  at  once  let  loose,  with 
all  his  force,  to  overwhelm  Pope,  threaten  the 
Federal  capital,  and  invade  the  loyal  states. 

The  northern  people  did  not  generally  at  the 
time  appreciate  the  relations  of  cause  and  effect  in 
this  tide  of  calamity  which  so  suddenly  rolled  over 
the  country  and  seemed  for  a  moment  to  be  un 
doing  all  that  had  been  done.  But  the  Confederate 
generals  appreciated  it  thoroughly,  and  the  im 
becility  so  manifest  at  the  head  of  our  armies  made 
them  very  bold  indeed.  Now  that  Bragg  had 

1  McClellan's  plans  were  apt  to  be  sound,  although  he  was,  to 
an  astonishing  degree,  inefficient  in  action.  His  intention,  which 
Halleck  overruled,  was  to  seize  Petersburg  as  a  point  from  which 
to  operate  against  Richmond,  just  as  Grant  tried  to  do,  two  years 
later.  Had  McClellan  done  so,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  no  invasion 
of  Maryland  by  Lee  would  ever  have  been  heard  of.  See  Ropes's 
Civil  War,  ii.  235-243,  where  this  point  is  very  clearly  set  forth. 
The  Count  of  Paris  truly  says  that  Halleck's  order,  withdrawing 
McClellan's  army  from  the  James  river,  was  more  disastrous  to 
the  Federal  cause  than  any  of  the  defeats  inflicted  by  the  enemy. 
See  his  Civil  War  in  America,  ii.  249. 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  149 

saved  Chattanooga  and  gained  the  initiative,  he 
meditated  the  recon quest  of  Tennessee  and  Ken 
tucky,  and,  emulous  of  Lee,  he  lost  no  time  in  start 
ing.  During  July  and  August  the  cavalry  raids 
of  Morgan  and  Forrest  spread  terror  Morgan  and 
and  confusion  through  those  two  states.  Forrest- 
They  cut  railroads,  seized  telegraph  offices  and 
sent  misleading  despatches  over  the  wires,  car 
ried  off  horses  and  mules  by  the  thousand,  and 
once  in  a  dash  upon  Murfreesboro  captured  1700 
troops  and  a  battery  of  artillery.  Buell  sent  Nel 
son  to  look  after  them,  but  that  enterprising  com 
mander  was  free  to  confess  that  chasing  cavalry 
with  infantry  was  not  very  inspiriting  work.  Buell 
had  long  since  earnestly  called  the  government's 
attention  to  his  perilous  deficiency  in  cavalry,  but 
could  get  no  assistance. 

At  length  in  the  last  week  of  August,  while  Lee 
was  crushing  Pope  in  Virginia,  the  forward  move 
ment  began.  Kirby  Smith  took  his 

*  .  Kirby  Smith 

12,000  men  over  the  mountains  by  a   defeats 
pass  which  enabled  him  to  turn  Cum-   Nelson- 
berland   Gap   and  compel   the   Federal   force   to 
evacuate  it  and  retreat  upon  the  Ohio.     He  then 
struck  across  Kentucky  to  Richmond,  where  Nel 
son  with  7000   men   undertook  to  check   his  ad 
vance.     In  a  sharp  fight  in  which  about  900  were 
killed   and   wounded   on    each   side,    Nelson   was 


150     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

totally  defeated  and  a  third  of  his  force  was  cap 
tured.  Smith  then  advanced  upon  Cincinnati. 

'  While  this  was  going  on,  Bragg  had  come  out 
of  Chattanooga  and  crossed  the  Tennessee  river. 
The  sagacious  Thomas  saw  that  a  movement  into 
Kentucky  was  intended,  and  advised  Buell  to  check 
it  by  occupying  Sparta.  But  instead  of  doing  so, 
Buell,  who  feared  an  attack  on  his  right,  concen 
trated  his  forces  at  Murfreesboro.  Profiting  by 
this  error,  Bragg  slipped  past  Buell's  left,  crossed 
the  Cumberland  river  at  Gainesville,  and  marched 
straight  toward  Munfordville,  a  station  on  the 
Louisville  and  Nashville  railroad  through  which 
Bra  Buell  obtained  his  supplies.  Munford- 

invades  ville    was    garrisoned    by    4000    men. 

Kentucky.          ^    ^^    ^    ^^    ^    ^    ^^    -^ 

miles  on  the  arc  of  a  circle  through  Nashville  and 
Bowling  Green,  while  Bragg  had  only  to  travel  G8 
miles  on  a  straight  line  forming  the  chord  of  this 
arc.  Determined  in  no  event  to  abandon  Nash 
ville,  Buell  left  Thomas  there  with  three  divisions 
and  hastened  northward  ;  but  Bragg's  shorter 
route  enabled  him  to  reach  Munfordville  and  cap 
ture  its  garrison  before  Buell  had  passed  Bowling 
Green.  Bragg  was  now  three  marches  nearer  than 
Buell  to  Louisville,  and  everybody  supposed  he 
would  instantly  come  up  and  capture  that  city,  so 
important  not  only  for  its  size  and  wealth,  but 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  151 

also  as  the  only  base  of  supply  from  which  Buell's 
40,000  men  could  be  fed. 

In  the  states  north  of  the  Ohio  the  excitement 
was  at  fever  heat,  and  everywhere  the  outlook 
seemed  gloomy  enough.  Within  a  few  weeks  the 
President  had  called  for  600,000  men,  half  of  them 
to  serve  for  three  years  and  a  half  as  nine  months' 
militia ;  in  case  of  necessity  conscription  panic  at  the 
was  to  be  resorted  to.  People  forgot  Norfch- 
Fort  Donelson  and  New  Orleans ;  it  seemed  as  if  all 
the  gains  had  been  cancelled.  Those  who  held  that 
the  South  could  never  be  conquered  now  regarded 
their  opinion  as  borne  out  by  facts ;  and  there  were 
a  few  in  whom  party  prejudice  was  so  strong  as  to 
make  them  rejoice  in  this  conclusion.  While  such 
short-sighted  people  wagged  their  heads,  militia 
turned  out  in  thousands  to  defend  the  threatened 
points,  and  the  streets  of  Louisville  and  Cincinnati 
were  the  scene  of  busy  military  preparation. 

But  the  wave  of  rebel  invasion  had  already  spent 
its  force.  On  the  17th  of  September,  the  day  on 
which  Munfordville  was  captured,  Lee  was  slightly 
defeated  in  the  murderous  battle  of  Antietam  and 
compelled  to  turn  his  back  upon  Maryland.  Per 
haps  the  news  of  this  reverse  may  have  impressed 
upon  Bragg  the  necessity  of  caution.  His  army 
had  not  been  cordially  received  by  the  people  of 
Kentucky.  He  found  himself  in  a  hostile  country. 


152     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

He  was  indeed  on  Buell's  line  of  communications, 
in  a  position  where  defeat  would  be  ruinous  to 
Buell.  But  by  the  same  token,  defeat  at  the  hands 
of  an  army  lying  south  of  him  would  be  ruinous  to 
himself,  and  his  force  did  not  outnumber  Buell's. 
Louisville  was  not  quite  defenceless,  and  to  attack 
it  with  the  chance  of  being  assailed  in  the  rear 
would  be  to  court  destruction.  Accordingly  Bragg 
V  desisted  and  turned  eastward  to  join  Kirby  Smith, 
who  after  threatening  Cincinnati  had  retired  upon 
Frankfort.  Here  was  the  weak  point  in  the  Con 
federate  strategy.  If,  after  his  victory 

Defect  in  the  to  J  >  J 

Confederate  at  Kichmond,  Smith  had  moved  toward 
strategy.  Louisville,  so  as  to  unite  with  Bragg 
upon  Buell's  line  of  communications,  they  might 
have  hoped  to  crush  him  as  thoroughly  as  Pope 
was  crushed  at  Manassas.1  As  it  was,  they  met  at 

1  In  this  connection  Mr.  Ropes  very  properly  comments  on 
"the  folly,  which  both  the  Union  and  the  Confederate  govern 
ments  were  so  constantly  committing1,  of  having  more  than  one 
commanding  officer  in  one  theatre  of  war."  Bragg  might  have 
sent  for  Kirby  Smith  to  come  from  Lexington  (about  100  miles) 
and  join  him  in  giving  battle  to  Buell  at  Munfordville.  Smith, 
"  although  an  independent  department-commander,  had  offered 
to  serve  under  Bragg  in  this  campaign.  Still,  the  fact  that  Bragg 
was  not  the  sole  commander  in  this  region  unquestionably  ham 
pered  his  movements.  .  .  .  Smith  was  not  summoned,  and  Bragg 
did  not  feel  himself  strong  enough  to  attack  Buell  alone." 
Ropes's  Civil  War,  ii.  403.  Thus  the  supreme  opportunity  for 
the  Confederates  in  this  invasion  of  Kentucky  was  lost  by  them. 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  153 

Frankfort,  the  state  capital,  and  amused  themselves 
with  the  inauguration  of  a  rebel  governor,  while 
Buell,  who  had  marched  on  to  his  base  at  Louis 
ville  and  largely  reinforced  his  army,  was  now 
ready  to  turn  and  rend  them.  On  the  30th  of 
September,  just  as  he  was  starting,  there  came  an 
order  from  Halleck,  relieving  him  from  command 
and  appointing  Thomas  in  his  place.  But  mag 
nanimous  Thomas,  who  understood  the  situation 
much  better  than  either  Halleck  or  the  newspapers, 
protested  so  seriously  against  this  injustice  that  the 
order  was  revoked. 

Upon  BuelFs  advance  Bragg  fell  back.  At 
Perry  ville,  on  the  8th  of  October,  por-  Battle  of 
tions  of  the  two  armies  came  into  colli-  Perryville. 
sion.  There  was  a  severe  fight,  in  which  nearly 
5000  men  were  killed  and  wounded  on  each  side, 
but  it  decided  nothing.  Bragg  retreated  south 
easterly  and  escaped  into  east  Tennessee  through 
Cumberland  Gap,  whence  he  made  his  way  back 
to  Chattanooga,  and  presently  advanced  upon 
Murfreesboro.  Instead  of  fruitlessly  chasing  him 
through  the  Gap,  the  Federal  commander,  antici 
pating  his  movements,  proceeded  to  Nashville, 
whence  a  new  campaign  might  best  be  begun. 

While  on  either  side  of  the  Alleghanies  the 
Union  armies  had  thus  been  baulked  of  the  coveted 
prizes  of  Richmond  and  Chattanooga,  and  the 


154     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

loyal  states  were  for  a  moment  invaded  by  the 
enemy,  there  was  one  point  where  the  Union  line 
did  not  fall  back,  but  every  inch  of  ground  once 
conquered  was  firmly  held.  That  point  was 
Corinth,  where  Grant  remained  in  command. 
Grant  had  so  many  miles  of  railroad  to  guard,  and 
his  force  was  so  much  weakened  by  sending  troops 
to  aid  Buell,  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to 
undertake  any  extensive  operations.  His  first 
active  movement  was  to  send  Rosecrans  with  9000 
men  and  Ord  with  8000  to  attack  Sterling  Price, 
who  was  isolated  with  14,000  men  at  the  village  of 
^  Battle  of  luka,  twenty  miles  southeast  of  Cor- 
luka.  iuih.  They  were  to  attack  him  on 

opposite  sides  and  crush  him  between  them,  but  as 
often  happens  with  such  schemes,  there  was  a  lack 
of  coordination  in  the  movements.  The  battle  was 
prematurely  fought  between  Price  and  Rosecrans, 
and  although  Price  retired  from  the  field  with 
heavy  loss,  he  made  good  his  escape  and  succeeded 
in  joining  his  forces  to  those  of  Van  Dorn.  It 
could  hardly  be  called  a  victory  for  the  Federals. 

With  his  army  thus  concentrated,  Van  Dorn 
now  resolved  to  inflict  such  a  blow  upon  Grant  as 
would  compel  him  to  retire  down  the  Tennessee 
river.  His  plan  was  bold  but  well-considered. 
Grant's  forces  were  small  for  the  extent  of  country 
he  was  directed  to  occupy.  He  had  7000  men  at 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  155 

Memphis  under  Sherman,  12,000  at  Bolivar  under 
Ord,  23,000  at  Corinth  under  Rosecrans,  and  a 
reserve  of  6000  at  Jackson,  where  —  as  the  most 
convenient  point  for  communicating  with  these 
different  forces  —  he  had  his  headquarters.  Van 
Dorn's  total  force  was  22,000  men,  and  with  it  he 
boldly  undertook  to  defeat  Rosecrans  and  capture 
the  works  at  Corinth.  This  would  Battle  of 
oblige  Grant  to  retreat,  and  it  was  Corinth- 
hoped  it  would  throw  him  back  as  far  as  Fort 
Donelson.  Accordingly,  on  the  3d  of  October  Van 
Dorn  attacked  Rosecrans,  and  a  very  obstinate 
battle  ensued,  in  which  fortune  seemed  at  first 
to  favour  the  Confederates,  but  after  two  days  of 
fighting  they  were  defeated  with  a  loss  of  5000  in 
killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.  The  total  Union 
loss  was  about  2500.  After  this  serious  defeat 
the  Confederates  could  no  longer  hope  to  take  the 
offensive  against  Grant.  On  the  contrary,  it  left 
him  free  to  assume  the  aggressive  and  begin  upon 
his  first  movement  against  Vicksburg.  For  this 
ill-fortune  Van  Dorn  was  unreasonably  blamed  by 
Jefferson  Davis,  who  at  once  superseded  him  by 
John  Clifford  Pemberton,  a  general  in 

Van  Dorn 

every  way  his  inferior.     On  the  other   superseded 
hand,    Rosecrans    won   great   increase   ty  Pember- 

ton. 

of  fame,  and  three  weeks  after  his  vic 
tory  he  was  appointed  to  an  independent  command. 


156     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

It  was  inevitable  that  some  of  our  generals 
should  be  made  to  serve  as  scapegoats  for  the  dis 
asters  and  panic  of  the  summer.  Popular  indig 
nation  demanded  victims,  and  at  such  times  the 
blows  are  very  apt  to  fall  in  the  wrong  places.  If 
Halleck  could  only  have  been  removed  from  the 
Buellmadea  chief  command  and  comfortably  im- 
scapegoat.  mured  in  some  Old  Woman's  Home, 
what  a  relief  it  would  have  been  to  a  long-suffer 
ing  people  !  But  the  fates  showed  little  discrimi 
nation  in  their  awards.  One  of  the  most  shameful 
pages  in  American  history  is  that  which  records 
the  unrighteous  condemnation  of  the  able  and 
faithful  Fitz  John  Porter,  a  wrong  which  has  been 
tardily  and  partially  rectified.  As  for  Pope,  who 
had  shown  himself  totally  unfit  to  command  an 
army,  his  removal  came  none  too  soon.  Of 
McClellan's  incapacity,  both  in  strategy  and  in 
tactics,  the  Maryland  campaign  had  furnished  the 
crowning  proof,  and  the  only  reason  for  regretting 
him  was  the  amazing  selection  of  Burnside  as  his 
successor.  The  case  of  Buell  was  entirely  different. 
It  is  true  that  the  public  had  in  great  measure  lost 
confidence  in  him ;  it  was  vaguely  felt  that  some 
how  or  other  he  ought  to  have  prevented  Bragg 
from  invading  Kentucky,  or  else  that  he  ought  not 
to  have  allowed  him  to  get  away  from  Kentucky 
without  a  crushing  defeat.  While  a  war  is  going 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  157 

on,  it  is  difficult  to  see  below  the  surface  of  events. 
We  now  know,  however,  that  it  was  Halleck  who 
was  responsible  for  BuelTs  failure  to  anticipate 
the  rebels  in  seizing  Chattanooga.  With  the 
enemy  in  possession  of  this  place  and  holding  east 
ern  Tennessee,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  any  gen 
eral,  without  a  decided  superiority  in  numbers, 
without  a  suitable  force  of  cavalry,  and  with  a 
line  of  communications  300  miles  long,  could  en 
sure  himself  against  such  mischief  as  that  which 
for  a  moment  overtook  Buell.  His  retreat  upon 
Louisville  and  his  subsequent  pursuit  of  the  enemy 
were  admirably  managed,  and  the  state  of  his  army 
during  the  whole  campaign  bore  testimony  to  his 
rare  ability. 

Unfortunately  for  Buell,  however,  he  had  made 
two    powerful   enemies,    in    Oliver   Morton,   gov 
ernor  of  Indiana,  and  Andrew  Johnson,   Buell»s  ene_ 
whom  President  Lincoln  had  appointed   mies,  Morton 

•I.,  p  rr\  -m/r  and  Johnson. 

military  governor  of  Tennessee.  Mor 
ton's  services  to  the  Union  cause  were  so  great  that 
he  stood  high  (and  deservedly  so)  in  the  favour  of 
President  Lincoln.  At  the  same  time  he  was  a 
man  of  relentless  and  domineering  temper,  and 
could  never  be  made  to  understand  that  the  In 
diana  troops  in  Buell's  army  owed  obedience  pri 
marily  to  their  general  and  not  to  the  governor  at 
Indianapolis.  He  would  send  his  staff-officers 


158      The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

into  the  army  to  look  after  the  interests  of  the 
Indiana  men,  exchange  their  arms  without  the 
knowledge  of  their  commanders,  and  keep  up  a 
communication  concerning  various  matters  which 
were  none  of  their  business.1  Buell  was  not  the 
man  to  endure  such  infringements  of  discipline, 
and  when  he  suppressed  them  he  incurred  the 
deadly  hostility  of  the  passionate  Morton.  As  for 
Andrew  Johnson,  he  wished  to  have  all  the  other 
objects  of  the  war  postponed  or  sacrificed  to  the 
occupation  of  eastern  Tennessee,  and  he  hated 
Buell  for  entertaining  broader  views.  Moreover, 
Buell  was  a  strict  disciplinarian,  and  insisted  that 
war  should  be  conducted  upon  civilized  principles, 
and  not  upon  those  of  Vandals  and  Bashi-bazouks. 
So  when  one  of  MitcheFs  brigades,  in  the  summer 
of  1862,  wantonly  sacked  the  town  of  Athens,  in 
Alabama,  Buell  visited  the  offence  with  wholesome 
severity ;  by  sentence  of  a  court-martial  the  brig 
ade  was  broken  up  and  distributed,  its  command 
ing  colonel  was  dismissed,  and  other  officers  were 
variously  punished.  For  these  praiseworthy  mea 
sures  Buell  was  loudly  abused  in  public  meetings 
and  by  many  of  the  newspapers.  He  was  accused 
of  sympathizing  with  rebels,  and  foul  imputa 
tions  upon  his  loyalty  were  caught  up  and  used 
against  him  by  Morton  and  Johnson.  In  Octo- 
1  See  Fry,  The  Army  under  Buell,  p.  86. 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  Elver  159 

ber  the  pressure  in  various  ways  brought  to  bear 
upon  President  Lincoln  had  come  to  be  such 
that  he  yielded  to  it  and  consented  to  Buell's  re 
moval. 

So  industriously  had  Buell  been  maligned  that 
it  was  said  that  everybody  had  lost  confidence  in 
him  except  Thomas  !  But  Thomas's  opinion  on 
such  a  matter  was  probably  worth  more  than  that 
of  any  other  man  in  the  United  States.  He  could 
feel  keenly  what  a  pity  it  was  for  the  country  to 
lose  the  services  of  such  an  accomplished  and  high- 
minded  soldier.1  The  immediate  occa-  ~  ,, 

JLJuell  super- 

sion  of  Buell's  dismissal  furnishes  a   sededby 
striking  commentary  upon  the  military 
obtuseness   which   then   reigned    at   Washington. 
When  Bragg  retreated  through  Cumberland  Gap, 
Halleck   insisted   that    Buell   should   follow  and 

1  I  am  glad  to  be  able,  in  support  of  my  opinion  of  Buell,  to 
cite  the  words  of  Mr.  Ropes,  one  of  the  most  acute  and  learned 
military  critics  of  the  nineteenth  century  :  "  It  cannot  be  doubted 
that  the  cause  of  the  Union  was  seriously  injured  by  withdrawing 
Buell  from  the  command  of  this  army.  Buell  was  as  able  a  gen 
eral  as  any  in  the  service.  Had  he  at  the  first  —  that  is,  on  Nov. 
1,  1861  —  been  placed  in  chief  command  in  the  West,  it  is  not 
too  much  to  say  that  the  Confederate  army  of  the  West  would 
have  ceased  to  exist  before  June  1,  1862,  and  that  thereafter  a 
regiment  of  Union  troops  could  have  marched  without  opposition 
from  Nashville  to  Chattanooga  and  Knoxville."  Civil  War,  ii. 
414.  The  reference  to  Nov.  1,  1861,  is  to  the  date  of  Halleck's 
appointment  to  the  chief  command  in  the  West. 


160     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the,  Civil  War 

chase  him  around  the  circle,  instead  of  moving  to 
Nashville  to  head  him  off ;  and  because  Buell 
refused  to  lend  himself  to  such  a  silly  scheme, 
he  was  removed,  and  Rosecrans,  fresh  from  the 
victory  at  Corinth,  was  put  in  his  place.1 

When  Rosecrans  took  command  at  Nashville, 
October  30,  this  pretext  for  Buell's  removal  was 
ignored,  and  the  new  general  was  allowed  to  con 
tinue  in  the  course  begun  by  his  predecessor.  An 
immediate  offensive  was  demanded  by  the  circum 
stances.  People  were  angry  because  Bragg  had 
got  off  so  easily.  On  the  other  hand  the  southern 
people  were  abusing  Bragg  for  failing  to  conquer 
Kentucky.  It  is  so  easy  in  war-time  for  people  at 
their  cosy  firesides  to  blame  sorely  tried  soldiers 
for  not  doing  the  impossible  !  A  battle  was  there 
fore  necessary  both  for  Bragg  and  for  Rosecrans. 
The  long  campaign  begun  in  July  must  be  brought 
to  a  decisive  issue.  After  all  their  marches  and 
countermarches  the  two  armies  were  face  to  face 
in  middle  Tennessee,  and  it  was  now  to  be  seen 
which  could  annihilate  the  other. 

1  There  is  little  direct  evidence  to  show  why  Rosecrans 
received  the  appointment  instead  of  Thomas,  who  had  been 
appointed  a  month  before.  But  Thomas  had  declined  that  ap 
pointment,  and  may  have  been  supposed  to  be  too  much  in 
sympathy  with  Buell.  Moreover,  since  the  important  victory  at 
Corinth,  there  was  a  visible  disposition  to  look  upon  Rosecrans 
as  "  the  coming1  man." 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  161 

Rosecrans  was  at  Nashville,  where  his  first  care 
was  to  repair  the  railway  connecting  him  with  his 
base  of  supplies  at  Louisville.  Bragg  had  con 
centrated  his  forces  at  Murfreesboro,  whence  he 
sent  the  indefatigable  Morgan  on  flying  excursions 
to  tear  up  rails  and  break  down  bridges  in  Rose- 
crans's  rear ;  and  for  want  of  a  sufficient  cavalry, 
Rosecrans,  like  Buell,  found  it  hard  to  check 
these  performances.  The  longer  he  stayed  quiet, 
the  worse  the  nuisance  was  sure  to  become ;  and 
after  due  preparation  he  marched  out  of  Nash 
ville,  on  the  day  after  Christmas,  to  attack  and 
overwhelm  the  enemy. 

The  town  of  Murfreesboro  is  a  station  on  the 
Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad,  thirty  miles 
southeast  from   Nashville.     A  mile  to   westward 
of  the  town  the  road  to   Franklin  crosses  Stone 
river,    a   sluggish   tributary   of   the  Cumberland. 
The  sinuous  river,  and  the  railroad  and  turnpike 
straight  as  arrows,  all  run  northwesterly  and  near 
together,  through  dense  cedar-brakes  interspersed 
with  occasional  clearings.     It  was  this   -j^  Battle- 
triple  line  of   turnpike,  railroad,  and   field  of  Stone 
stream  that  was  now  to  be  made  the   Murfrees- 
scene  of  some  of   the  most  obstinate   boro- 
fighting   of   modern    times.      Bragg's   army  was 
drawn  up  in  line  of  battle  at  an  acute  angle  with 
the  river  and  mostly  to  the  west  of  it.     The  left 


162     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

wing  under  Hardee  and  the  centre  under  Polk 
were  west  of  the  river,  and  on  the  further  side, 
to  ward  off  any  flank  movement  upon  the  town 
of  Murfreesboro,  was  the  right  wing,  composed 
of  Breckinridge's  division  of  Hardee's  corps  sepa 
rated  from  its  fellows.  The  general  direction  of 
the  line  west  of  the  river  was  nearly  north  and 
south,  with  the  left  wing  advanced  south  westward. 
On  the  east  side  Breckinridge's  division  was  con 
siderably  refused  to  the  northeast.  Such  was  the 
Confederate  line  of  battle,  —  an  arrangement  ap 
parently  faultless  and  fully  adequate  to  the  work 
which  Bragg  had  planned. 

The  Union  army  was  drawn  up  to  westward  of 

the  river  in  a  line  somewhat  zigzag,  but  for  the 

most  part  parallel  to  the  enemy's  front. 

The  arrange-     m          .  .  i       T\  T   n      i 

ment  of  our  -Lhe  right  wing  under  McL/ook  stretched 
troops  at  from  the  Franklin  road  to  the  Wilkin 
son  turnpike.  It  consisted  of  three  di 
visions,  —  first  Johnson's,  resting  on  the  Franklin 
road  with  its  right  refused  in  a  crotchet,  and  then 
Davis's  ;  the  third,  which  connected  with  the  centre 
at  the  Wilkinson  pike,  was  commanded  by  a  young 
officer  named  Philip  Sheridan,  who  had  lately  won 
his  first  laurels  at  Perryville.  The  centre,  com 
manded  by  Thomas,  consisted  of  two  divisions, 
Negley's  and  Rousseau's,  but  in  the  plan  of  battle 
Palmer's  division  of  the  left  wing  practically  formed 


STONE   RIVER,   DECEMBER   3r,   1862,    MORNING 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  163 

part  of  the  centre.  Negley  and  Palmer  were  drawn 
up  in  line  between  the  Wilkinson  and  Nashville 
pikes,  with  Rousseau  stationed  in  the  rear  as  a 
reserve.  The  remainder  of  the  left  wing  under 
Crittenden,  consisting  of  Wood's  and  Van  Cleve's 
divisions,  reached  from  the  Nashville  pike  across 
the  railroad  and  rested  its  left  on  a  bend  in  the 
river.  Each  line  of  battle,  Union  and  Confederate, 
was  about  three  miles  in  length,  and  each  contained 
in  infantry  and  artillery  about  40,000  men. 

It  was  well  said  by  Frederick  of  Prussia  that 
more  than  half  the  secret  of  winning  battles  lies 
in  knowing  how  to  take  position.  Rosecrans's 
arrangement  was  well  adapted  to  his  purpose  save 
in  one  quarter  of  the  field,  but  the  defect  in  that 
quarter  was  a  grave  one.  His  plan  of  R  , 

attack  was  brilliant  and  bold.  It  was  plan  of 
to  throw  the  two  divisions  of  Wood  £ 
and  Van  Cleve  across  the  easily  fordable  river  and 
crush  the  single  division  of  Breckinridge.  At  that 
point  is  a  commanding  ridge  upon  which  Union 
artillery,  once  posted,  would  enfilade  the  whole 
Confederate  line.  With  the  aid  of  this  galling 
fire  it  seemed  certain  that  Thomas,  with  his  two 
divisions  and  Palmer's,  would  defeat  the  Confeder 
ate  centre ;  while  the  Union  left,  continuing  its 
turning  movement,  would  pass  through  Murfrees- 
boro  and  occupy  the  Franklin  road,  thus  cutting 


164     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

off  the  enemy's  retreat.  In  other  words,  the  Union 
army,  pivoting  upon  its  right,  was  to  be  swung 
around  in  a  semicircle,  enveloping  and  destroying 
the  enemy.  It  was  for  this  purpose  that  Rosecrans 
massed  his  troops  so  heavily  upon  his  left.  In 
space  the  Wilkinson  turnpike  divided  his  line  in 
the  middle,  but  nearly  two  thirds  of  his  weight 
was  to  the  left  of  this.  This  was  well,  provided 
the  right  wing  were  strong  enough  and  so  advan 
tageously  placed  as  to  be  able  to  hold  its  ground. 
If  the  pivot  were  to  be  shaken  out  of  place,  the 
whole  turning  movement  would  be  spoiled  and 
the  army  thrown  upon  the  defensive. 

It  was  all  the  more  essential  that  the  right  wing 
should  be  made  secure,  since  the  arrangement  of 
Bragg's  plan  Bragg's  troops  was  such  as  to  indicate 
of  attack.  tnat  an  attack  would  be  made  in  that 
quarter.  In  fact,  Bragg's  plan  of  battle  was  almost 
precisely  the  same  as  that  of  Rosecrans.  With  his 
left  somewhat  heavily  massed  and  thrown  forward, 
he  intended  to  overlap  and  crush  the  Federal  right. 
Swinging  around  his  whole  force  west  of  the  river 
with  Folk's  right  as  its  pivot,  he  would  come  in 
upon  the  Federal  rear,  fold  the  army  back  against 
the  river,  and,  seizing  the  Nashville  turnpike,  cut 
off  their  retreat.  The  two  plans  being  thus  sub 
stantially  identical,  each  general  having  a  heavy 
force  opposed  to  the  weaker  wing  of  the  other,  it 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  165 

followed  that  he  who  could  soonest  deliver  his  blow 
would  be  likely  to  achieve  success.  In  this  respect 
the  position  favoured  the  Confederate  general. 
Rosecrans,  in  delivering  his  blow,  must  throw  two 
divisions  across  the  river,  which,  though  not  a  seri 
ous  obstacle,  would  still  occasion  some  slight  delay. 
In  front  of  Bragg's  left  there  was  not  only  no 
obstacle,  but  the  forest  formed  an  impenetrable 
curtain,  under  cover  of  which  his  men  could  ap 
proach  the  Federal  right  without  being  observed. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  was  imperatively 
necessary  for  Rosecrans  to  use  extraordinary  dili 
gence  in  placing  his  right  wing.     This 
he  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  done,  and   tio^  Of  J^e* 
the  error  which  he   failed   to  rectify   Union  right 
spoiled  his  plan  of   battle  and  came 
within  an  ace  of  destroying  the  Union  army.     The 
error  was  that  McCook's  line  was  too  long  and  thin 
and  faced  too  much  to  the  east,  thus  coming  too 
near  the  enemy.     If  it  had  been  refused  half  way 
back  to  the  Wilkinson  road,  so  as  to  face  nearly 
south,  it  might  at  the  same  time  have  been  more 
heavily  massed.     The  enemy  would  have  had  to 
move  farther  to  reach  it,  and  could  not  have  struck 
it  in  flank  without  stretching  out  his  own  line  so 
far  as  to  weaken  himself.     It  could  also  have  been 
more  easily   reinforced,   in  case  of   necessity,  by 
Rousseau's  division  in  reserve.     Rosecrans  under- 


166     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

stood  all  this,  and  told  McCook  that  he  did  not  like 
his  facing  so  much  to  the  east.  At  the  same  time 
he  did  not  press  the  matter,  but  left  too  much  to 
the  discretion  of  the  corps-commander,  who  was 
over-confident,  and  assured  him  that  in  the  event 
of  an  attack  he  could  hold  his  ground  just  as 
he  was  for  three  hours.  Herein  was  Rosecrans's 
one  terrible  mistake.  Absorbed  in  preparing  the 
offensive  movement  with  his  left,  he  did  not  give 
sufficient  attention  to  his  right.  He  ought  to  have 
visited  the  spot  in  person  and  insisted  upon  Mc- 
Cook's  rectifying  his  position.  One  reason  why 
Napoleon  almost  invariably  won  his  battles  was 
that  he  did  not  leave  such  important  matters  to 
subordinates,  but  overlooked  all  manner  of  details 
with  his  own  eyes  and  made  sure  they  were  right. 
If  he  seemed  sometimes  to  take  fearful  risks,  it  was 
generally  after  he  had  very  thoroughly  verified  his 
premises.  If  Rosecrans  had  been  a  really  great 
general,  he  never  would  have  staked  so  much  upon 
another  man's  judgment. 

Other  officers  beside  the  commander-in-chief  re 
marked  upon  the  faulty  arrangement  of  the  right 
wing.  On  the  eve  of  the  battle  General  Sheridan, 
accompanied  by  one  of  his  brigade-commanders, 
General  Sill,  visited  McCook's  headquarters  and 
earnestly  assured  him  that  the  arrangement  was 
liable  to  invite  disaster.  But  McCook  did  not 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  167 

profit  by  the  warning.     His  line  was  not  only  not 
withdrawn,  but  it  was  not  even  pro-   McCook's 
perly  guarded.    When  the  storm  of  bat-   want  of 
tie  burst  upon  it  at  daybreak  next  morn 
ing,  the  31st  of  December,  it  found  Johnson,  the 
first  division-commander  on  the  right,  a  mile  and  a 
half  in  the  rear  at  his  headquarters ;  and  with  him 
was  Willich,  the  commander  of  the  right  brigade  of 
his  division,  so  that  there  was  literally  nobody  in 
front  to  give  orders  to  the  troops.     Baldwin's  re 
serve  brigade  was  too  far  in  the  rear  to  be  of  any 
use.     The  guns  were  ill-guarded,  and  some  of  their 
horses  had  been  led  to  a  distance  to  be  watered. 

Upon  this  scene  of  gross  negligence  fell  the 
sudden  shock  of  two  Confederate  divisions,  one 
of  which  was  led  by  Patrick  Cleburne,  the  ablest 
division-commander  in  all  the  Confederate  army 
west  of  the  Alleghanies.  The  Confederate  attack 
was  superb  and  irresistible.  Their  men  rushed 
forward  like  an  overwhelming  torrent,  and  in  a 
few  minutes  Johnson's  whole  division  was  swept 
from  the  field  with  the  loss  of  eleven  guns,  and 
fled  in  wild  disorder  toward  the  Wilkinson  road.1 
This  catastrophe  uncovered  the  right  Rout  Of  two 
of  Davis's  division,  and  upon  this  the  divisions. 
victorious  Confederates  charged  in  heavy  masses, 

1  The  crotchet  upon  which  McCook  placed  so  much  reliance  was 
of  course  too  thin  and  frail  to  withstand  such  an  attack  in  mass. 


168     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

striking  it  at  once  in  front  and  flank.  The  resist 
ance  here  was  much  more  effectual.  The  redoubt 
able  Cleburne  was  twice  driven  back  by  a  murder 
ous  fire,  but  no  bravery  could  compensate  for  the 
advantage  of  position  which  the  rebels  had  gained, 
and  after  an  obstinate  struggle  Davis's  division 
was  routed  and  driven  across  the  Wilkinson  turn 
pike,  leaving  Sheridan  uncovered  to  receive  the 
next  furious  onset  of  the  enemy. 

While  the  battle  was  begun  thus  inauspiciously 
on  the  right,  Rosecrans  had  been  carrying  forward 
his  plan  of  attack  with  the  left.  Part  of  Van 
Cleve's  division  had  already  crossed  the  river,  and 
Wood  with  his  men  was  preparing  to  follow,  when 
the  terrific  roar  of  battle  from  the  other  end  of  the 
line  made  every  one  start  with  surprise,  not  un- 
mingled  with  dismay.  It  indicated  a  much  more 
sudden  and  violent  attack  than  they  had  reckoned 
on.  Presently  word  came  that  McCook  was  hard 
pressed,  but  it  did  not  reveal  the  extent  of  the 
calamity ;  and  Rosecrans,  loath  to  admit  the  neces- 
Union  army  sity  for  changing  his  plans,  sent  word 
thrown  upon  to  McCook  to  dispute  every  inch  of 

the  defensive.  -•        T  /.  •  -,  • 

ground.     In  a  tew  minutes    his   own 

O 

attack  would  set  everything  right.  But  the  enemy 
had  secured  the  initiative,  and  held  the  game  in 
his  hands.  The  surging  volume  of  sound  moved 
steadily  northward,  and  drew  nearer  and  nearer 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  Rive*  169 

with  alarming  rapidity.  The  first  of  McCook's 
three  hours  had  hardly  elapsed  when  a  message 
came  announcing  the  rout  of  two  divisions  and  the 
loss  of  nearly  all  the  field  south  of  the  Wilkinson 
road.  The  bold  plan  of  attack  must  now  be  aban 
doned,  or  the  enemy  would  gain  the  Nashville 
turnpike  before  the  morning's  disaster  could  be 
remedied,  and  thus  our  line  of  retreat  would  be  cut 
off.  The  Union  army  was  thrown  upon  the  defen 
sive,  and  the  question  for  the  moment  was  how  to 
ward  off  impending  ruin.  The  army  must  change 
front,  and  a  new  line  of  battle  must  be  formed 
facing  southwest.  Crittenden  was  accordingly 
ordered  to  withdraw  Van  Cleve  from  beyond  the 
river  and  send  him  westward  to  the  railroad,  while 
Wood  was  to  follow  and  take  place  on  his  right 
so  as  to  defend  the  Nashville  road.  Rousseau's 
reserve  division  was  moved  southward  to  support 
Sheridan. 

It  was  a  terrible  moment.  The  cedar  thickets 
in  Sheridan's  rear,  between  the  Wilkinson  and 
the  Nashville  roads,  were  swarming  with  fugitives, 
the  shattered  remnants  of  Johnson's  and  Davis's 
divisions.  The  Confederate  centre,  hitherto  silent, 
opened  a  heavy  fire  upon  Sheridan  and  Negley, 
while  their  victorious  left  was  hurled  upon  Sheri 
dan,  whose  defeat  would  now  complete  the  de 
struction  of  the  Union  right.  But  in  young  Philip 


170     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Sheridan  the  advancing  rebels  encountered  an 
officer  of  very  different  mettle  from  those  they  had 
disposed  of  that  morning.  When  he  found  his 
Sheridan's  flank  uncovered  by  Davis's  retreat,  he 
magnificent  withdrew  his  right  and  ordered  his  left 
to  push  back  the  enemy  at  point  of  bay 
onet  ;  and  while  this  charge,  superbly  conducted 
by  Colonel  Roberts,  drove  off  the  enemy  in  dis 
order,  he  used  the  precious  moments  in  forming  a 
new  front  at  right  angles  to  his  old  one  and  facing 
southward.  In  this  new  position  he  met  the  re 
turning  shock  of  the  rebel  infantry,  and  held  them 
at  bay  for  two  hours.  Then  finding  them  again 
outflanking  him,  he  faced  his  two  right  brigades  to 
westward,  so  that  his  division  and  Negley's  together 
formed  something  like  a  semicircle  convex  toward 
the  south,  and  for  another  two  hours  the  enemy's 
efforts  to  break  this  line  were  fruitless.  The  fight 
ing  was  now  terrific.  Maddened  by  this  obstinate 
resistance,  Bragg  massed  the  entire  left  and  centre 
of  his  army  against  these  two  divisions,  but  was 
thrice  driven  back  with  frightful  slaughter.  At 
length,  with  his  cartridge-boxes  empty,  his  brigade- 
commanders  all  killed,  and  1800  men  laid  low,  the 
noble  Sheridan  saw  that  he  must  retreat.  One 
more  desperate  charge  with  cold  steel,  and  before 
the  enemy  had  recovered  he  withdrew  his  men  to 
the  rolling  plain  west  of  the  Nashville  road  where 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  171 

the  new  line  of  battle  was  forming.  "  Here  we 
are,"  he  cried,  as  he  met  Rosecrans  galloping  up, 
—  "here  we  are,  all  that  are  left  of  us."  His 
magnificent  resistance  had  saved  the  day. 

The  crisis,  however,   was  not  yet   passed.     To 
form  a  whole  army  in  new  line  of  battle   under 
the  fire  of  an  advancing  enemy  flushed  with  suc 
cess  is  an  operation  calculated  to  tax  the  highest 
powers  of  a  general.     The  enemy's  repeated  and 
determined  assaults  left  no   respite.     The   whole 
right   wing  was  now  gone,  and  the  brunt  of  the 
fight   was   taken   by   the   centre    under   Thomas. 
With    Sheridan's    retirement,    Negley   Thomas 
was   next   outflanked   and   obliged  to   stands  invin- 
retreat.      Rousseau's    division,    which 
had  been   sent   to   Sheridan's    support,  was   also 
driven   back.     But   Thomas  was   not  to  be   con 
quered.     On  rising  ground  just  west  of  the  Nash 
ville   turnpike  and  commanding  the   field,  Rose 
crans   was  already  forming  his  new  line   facing 
southwestward.     The  divisions  of  Johnson,  Davis, 
and  Sheridan  were  again  set  in  order,  with  those 
of   Van   Cleve  and  Wood,  12,000  fresh  men,  to 
sustain  them  ;  and  on  the  crest  of  the 
knoll  Rosecrans  gathered  his  artillery   crans  forma 
in  heavy  masses.      To  gain  time   for   a  new  battle- 
this    formation,   and    to    preserve    its 
continuity  with  Palmer's  division,  which  was  now 


172     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

the  extreme  left,  between  railroad  and  river,  it 
was  essential  that  Thomas  should  stand  immov 
able  as  a  rock.  He  rallied  the  divisions  of  Negley 
and  Kousseau,  and  called  Van  Cleve  to  bring  up 
one  brigade  to  his  support.  Van  Cleve  came  on 
the  double  quick,  just  in  time  to  meet  the  rebel 
onset.  The  righting  at  this  critical  point  was  per 
haps  the  hottest  of  the  day.  One  of  Rousseau's 
brigades  lost  26  officers  and  611  men  out  of  a 
total  of  1566.  Four  times  the  Confederates  with 
marvellous  gallantry  returned  to  the  assault,  and 
four  times  their  ranks  were  so  woefully  torn  with 
grape  and  canister  that  they  fell  back  baffled  and 
at  last  somewhat  disheartened.  Their  hopes  of 
victory  were  beginning  to  be  dashed.  The  stub 
born  resistance  of  Thomas,  added  to  that  of  Sheri 
dan,  had  gained  so  much  time  that  the  new  line 
of  battle  was  approaching  completion,  and  occupy 
ing  so  strong  a  defensive  position  that  the  work  of 
Bragg' s  army  must  virtually  be  begun  over  again. 
The  division  of  Palmer,  however,  had  become 
more  and  more  enveloped  in  battle  since  the  first 
withdrawal  of  Rousseau  and  Negley.  By  a  con 
centrated  assault  upon  Palmer,  the  enemy,  whose 
original  plan  was  now  manifestly  failing,  might 
break  through  the  Union  left  and  take  the  new 
line  in  flank.  But  Palmer  handled  his  men  very 
finely,  and  the  fighting  was  here  as  stubborn  as 


STONE   RIVER,    DECEMBER   31,   1862,    EVENING 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY   ' 

OF 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River 


173 


anywhere   in   Thomas's    part   of   the   field.     The 
most  furious  struggle  was  for  the  possession  of  a 
grove    known   as    the   Round   Forest,   Terrific 
which   was    regarded    as    the    key   to   ^"sgle; 

0  Palmer  holds 

the  Federal  left.  The  Confederates,  the  Round 
urged  on  by  their  bishop-general,  Polk,  Forest- 
performed  prodigies  of  valour.  One  of  their  regi 
ments  returned  to  the  charge  till  it  had  lost  207 
men  out  of  402 ;  another,  surpassing  even  this  won 
derful  record  of  heroism,  kept  on  till  it  had  lost 
306  out  of  425.  But  all  in  vain.  Palmer's  grip 
on  the  Round  Forest  could  not  be  shaken,  and  at 
length  Polk  sent  across  the  river  to  Breckinridge 
for  reinforcements.  Up  to  this  time  Breckin- 
ridge's  men  had  not  been  engaged.  Crittenden 
had  withdrawn  his  divisions  cautiously,  keeping 
up  some  show  of  menace,  and  Bragg  had  not 
yet  deemed  it  prudent  to  weaken  his  right  wing. 
Rosecrans's  first  movement,  therefore,  though 
nipped  at  the  start,  had  played  a  useful  secondary 
part  in  neutralizing  a  large  force  of  the  enemy. 
At  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  Breckinrid<re 

O 

sent  over  four  brigades  to  Polk's  assistance,  and 
the  attack  on  the  Round  Forest  was  renewed.  It 
was  unsuccessful,  and  the  Confederates  were  so 
roughly  handled  that  they  did  little  more  here  till 
four  o'clock.  Then  summoning  all  their  energies, 
they  rushed  forward  in  one  last  determined  effort. 


174     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Here,  as  Rosecrans  hurried  to  the  spot,  a  cannon- 
ball  grazed  him  and  carried  away  the  head  of 
Colonel  Garesche,  his  chief  of  staff,  who  was  rid 
ing  at  his  side.  Making  his  way  to  the  front,  the 
commander  ordered  a  bayonet  charge,  which  broke 
TheConfed-  *^e  Confederate  line  and  ended  the 
erates  battle  in  this  quarter.  During  the 

[milled.  c    ,1   •  •  c     i        11 

progress  ot  this  series  ot  deadly  strug 
gles  at  the  Round  Forest,  the  remainder  of  the 
Confederate  army  attempted  to  break  down  the 
new  Federal  line  of  battle  by  an  attack  in  front. 
Unless  this  could  be  accomplished,  all  the  successes 
of  the  morning  went  for  nothing.  But  the  new 
line  was  too  strong  to  be  carried.  As  the  Con 
federates  approached,  their  ranks  were  beaten 
down  by  a  hurricane  of  grape  and  shrapnel  and 
musket-balls,  against  which  nothing  human  could 
stand.  So  great  was  the  destruction  that  the  as 
sault  which  was  just  beginning  was  never  made, 
but  the  baffled  foe  sought  shelter  in  the  woods, 
and  the  noise  of  battle  ceased. 

Thus  ended  the  first  day  of  the  great  fight  at 
Stone  river.  It  decided  nothing  except  that  both 
commanders  had  failed  to  carry  out  their  plans. 
Rosecrans's  plan  had  been  foiled  at  the  outset 
by  the  vigour  and  promptness  with  which  Bragg 
struck  the  vulnerable  point  in  his  line.  Bragg's 
plan  had  come  very  near  succeeding,  but  was  at 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  175 

length  ruined  by  the  stubbornness  and  resource  of 
Sheridan,  Thomas,  and  Palmer,  and  the  skill  with 
which  Rosecrans  reconstructed  his  order  of  battle. 
The  two  armies  were  still  on  a  par  in  strength, 
being  about  equally  exhausted.  If  Results  of  the 
either  was  to  be  crushed,  the  work  must  first  day- 
be  begun  anew,  and  Rosecrans  now  held  such  a 
position  that  little  could  be  hoped  from  a  direct 
attack  upon  him.  The  enemy's  superior  cavalry, 
indeed,  had  already  begun  to  operate  against  our 
line  of  communications,  to  which  our  army  was 
now  parallel ;  and  there  was  some  fear  lest  he 
might  follow  up  the  movement  in  force  and  cut  us 
off  from  our  base.  Rosecrans,  however,  rightly 
judged  that  the  Confederate  army  was  in  no  condi 
tion  to  attempt  this.  During  the  cold,  clear  night 
a  council  of  war  was  held,  and  some  of  the  gener 
als  earnestly  advised  him  to  retreat  to  Nashville. 
But  Rosecrans  would  not  hear  of  such  a  thing. 

This  determination  proved  very  disconcerting  to 
Bragg  next  morning.  He  had  misinterpreted  the 
bloody  repulse  of  the  afternoon,  supposing  it  to  be, 
like  Sheridan's  last  bayonet  charge,  a  device  for 
facilitating  retreat ;  and  accordingly  he  imagined 
that  he  had  won  the  battle.  When  he  got  up  on 
New  Year's  Day  and  found  the  Union  army  still 
in  position,  it  was  a  great  disappointment.  Little 
was  done  that  day.  Bragg  spent  it  in  reconnoi- 


1 76     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

tring  to  ascertain  if  his  adversary  was  still  pre 
sent  in  full  force.  Rosecrans  prepared  to  resume 
the  offensive,  and  accordingly  sent  Van  Cleve's 
division  with  one  of  Palmer's  brigades  to  seize  the 
heights  upon  the  east  side  of  the  river  and  plant 
batteries  there,  according  to  his  original  plan.  This 
movement,  which  threatened  the  town  of  Mur- 
freesboro  and  Bragg's  communications,  was  unop 
posed  and  apparently  not  discovered  until  the  next 
day.  The  batteries  enfiladed  the  whole  of  Folk's 
Renewal  of  ^ne>  an^  ^  was  necessary  for  Bragg 
the  battle.  either  to  storm  the  position  or  take 
his  army  away.  On  the  afternoon  of  January  2, 
Breckinridge  was  sent  back  to  the  east  side  of  the 
river  and  entrusted  with  the  attack.  At  first 
Breckinridge  was  successful  against  Van  Cleve  ; 
but  Negley's  division  coming  to  the  rescue,  led 
by  Colonel  John  Miller,  its  senior  brigade-com 
mander,  the  Confederates  were  presently  over 
powered.  Their  line  was  exposed  to  the  raking 
fire  of  58  guns  from  the  Union  batteries  west  of 
the  river,  and  after  half  an  hour  Breckinridge 
retreated,  leaving  1700  men  of  his  division  killed 
and  wounded.  During  the  night  both  armies 
Retreat  of  began  massing  forces  east  of  the  river, 
the  Confeder-  Bragg  sent  over  Cleburne's  division, 
while  Rosecrans  sent  the  whole  of 
Crittenden's  corps,  together  with  Davis's  division, 


From  Corinth  to  Stone  River  177 

and  occupied  the  heights  so  firmly  that  it  was  idle 
to  think  of  dislodging  him.  Nothing  was  done 
next  day  till  toward  midnight,  when  Bragg  began 
his  retreat  to  Shelbyville  and  Tullahoma.  The 
retreat  was  unmolested. 

The  losses  at  the  battle  of  Stone  river  were 
nearly  the  same  as  at  Shiloh,  —  about  10,000  men 
on  each  side,  or  one  fourth  of  the  total  infantry 
and  artillery  force  engaged.  Such  a  proportion  of 
loss  ranks  it  among  the  most  stubborn  battles  of 
modern  times.  In  point  of  bravery  it  is  impossi 
ble  to  award  the  palm  to  one  side  more  than  to  the 
other.  It  was  simply  Greek  against  Greek.  As 
at  Shiloh,  the  Confederates  seemed  at  first  to  be 
bearing  down  all  opposition ;  and  as  at  Shiloh, 
they  were  at  last  compelled  to  retire  from  the  field. 
Of  the  two  battles  Stone  river  seems  in  some 
respects  the  more  interesting,  as  it  was  much  the 
less  simple  in  its  conditions.  There 

Comments. 

was  more  opportunity  for  the  display 
of  something  like  grand  tactics,  and  here,  except 
for  the  great  initial  mistake,  Rosecrans  showed 
signal  ability.  Pity  that  the  mistake  should  have 
been  so  grave  as  to  cause  all  this  fertility  of  re 
source  to  be  expended  in  the  work  of  retrieving 
disaster !  But  for  that  well-nigh  fatal  error,  Rose 
crans  might  probably  have  gone  forthwith  to  Chat 
tanooga.  As  it  is,  the  battle  of  Stone  river  seems 


178     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the,  Civil  War 

less  clearly  a  Federal  victory  than  the  battle  of 
Shiloh.  The  latter  decided  the  fall  of  Corinth; 
the  former  did  not  decide  the  fall  of  Chattanooga. 
Offensively  it  was  a  drawn  battle,  as  looked  at 
from  either  side.  As  a  defensive  battle,  however, 
it  was  clearly  a  Union  victory.  It  saved  Nashville 
and  tightened  the  Federal  grasp  upon  Tennessee, 
and  from  this  time  forward,  except  for  a  brief 
period  in  the  following  autumn,  the  initiative  in 
the  great  western  theatre  of  war  remained  with 
the  Union  armies. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  VICKSBURG   PROBLEM 

OF  all  the  great  rivers  in  the  world,  the  Missis 
sippi  is  perhaps   the  crookedest.     A  ship  sailing 
over  its  waters  will  often  travel  a  dis-  physical 
tance  of  thirty  miles  to  reach  a  point   clmracteris- 

tics  of  the 

eight  or  ten  miles  distant  from  its  start-  Mississippi 
ing-place.  This  crookedness  is  not  like  nver- 
that  of  the  New  England  stream  that  flows  in 
graceful  curves  through  deep  valleys  worn  down 
into  the  granite  by  long  ages  of  rubbing  and  grind 
ing  under  the  pressure  of  glaciers.  The  Missis 
sippi  flows  through  a  soft  alluvial  soil,  in  which  it 
cuts  fresh  channels  to  right  or  left  at  the  occurrence 
of  the  slightest  obstacle  to  its  direct  progress.  It 
is  thus  continually  leaving  its  old  bed  for  a  new 
one,  so  that  its  long  course  is  marked  by  countless 
swampy  islands  and  peninsulas,  while  on  either 
side  may  be  seen  stagnant  crescent-shaped  lakes, 
the  remnants  of  its  abandoned  channels.  The  Mis 
sissippi  water  is  so  crowded  with  fine  particles  of 
reddish-brown  alluvial  mud  that  when  dipped  up 
in  a  tumbler  it  looks  like  diluted  chocolate,  and 


180     T/ie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

when  poured  out  again  leaves  a  thick  slimy  sedi 
ment  in  the  tumbler.  Of  this  alluvium  great  quan 
tities  are  caught  on  its  loop-like  banks,  until  they 
gradually  grow  higher  than  the  country  beyond 
them,  forming  frail  natural  dikes,  through  which 
the  contained  water  frequently  bursts  in  devastat 
ing  floods.  Against  such  calamities  the  inhabitants 
of  lowland  towns  on  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi 
seek  to  protect  themselves  by  erecting  artificial 
dikes,  known  in  the  parlance  of  that  once  French 
region  as  "levees;"  and  when  the  imprisoned  river 
sometimes  asserts  itself  and  washes  away  a  part 
of  the  levee,  the  "crevasse"  is  as  terrible  to  the 
dwellers  on  those  flats  as  the  avalanche  or  the 
landslide  to  people  who  live  on  the  sides  of  steep 
mountains. 

As  a  result  of  such  freshets,  the  land  on  either 
side  of  the  Mississippi  is  intersected  by  a  network 
of  bayous  or  sluggish  streams  as  crooked  as  the 
river  itself,  and  sometimes  so  long  and  deep  as  to 
be  navigable  for  miles  by  vessels  of  considerable 
size.  The  strip  of  country  thus  creased  and  chan 
nelled  in  every  direction,  which  forms 

The  bayous.          ^        -\        •          PI  • 

the  basin  ot  the  mighty  stream,  aver 
ages  some  forty  miles  in  width.  It  is  filled  with 
cypress  swamps,  interspersed  with  dense  forests  of 
cottonwood,  sweet  gum,  magnolia,  sycamore,  and 
tulip,  beneath  which  the  ground  is  thickly  covered 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  181 

with  impenetrable  masses  of  creeping  vines.  In 
such  a  country  operations  with  an  army  are  quite 
impracticable;  at  no  season  is  it  possible  for  a 
large  body  of  men  to  secure  a  foothold,  f  At  the 
same  time  it  is  impossible  to  erect  upon  these  low, 
flat  shores  fortifications  fit  to  resist  a  naval  force 
like  that  which  captured  New  Orleans.  Through 
the  devious  windings  of  the  river  the  Federal 
gunboats  could  plough  their  way  unmolested  from 
point  to  point,  controlling  its  navigation  and  pos 
sessing  it  as  a  military  highway. 

But  to  this  peculiar  state  of  things,  which  was 
general  throughout  the  lower  Mississippi  basin, 
there  were  a  few  notable  exceptions.  On  its  eastern 
side,  for  hundreds  of  miles,  the  valley  is  bounded 
by  the  lofty  plains  of  Tennessee  and  Mississippi, 
which  terminate  in  precipitous  bluffs ;  and  here  and 
there,  though  at  long  intervals,  the  river  sweeps  up 
close  to  the  bluffs  and  washes  their  base  for  several 
miles.  Such  is  the  case  at  Columbus, 
Fort  Pillow,  Memphis,  Vicksburg, 
Grand  Gulf,  and  Port  Hudson.  All  these  places 
stand  on  the  summit  of  bluffs  rising  from  80  to  200 
feet  sheer  above  the  turbid  water.  ?They  afford 
foothold  for  an  army  approaching  from  the  rear, 
but  on  the  other  hand  they  are  unassailable  by 
fleets  on  the  river.  I  A  ship's  guns  cannot  be  ele 
vated  sufficiently  to  inflict  fatal  damage  on  such 


182     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

places,  which  on  their  part  can  return  such  a  plun 
ging  fire  as  is  difficult  for  the  strongest  ship  to  en 
dure.  /It  was  therefore  only  by  fortifying  these 
places  that  the  Confederates  could  hope  to  retain 
their  hold  upon  the  Mississippi  river./  As  soon  as 
they  lost  one  of  them,  they  lost  the  river  down 
to  the  next  similar  point,  except  in  the  single  case 
of  Island  Number  Ten,  where  the  conditions  were 
peculiar.  When  they  lost  Columbus  and  Island 
Number  Ten,  there  was  no  other  foothold  for  them 
above  Fort  Pillow  ;  and  when  this  and  Memphis 
were  taken  away  from  them,  there  was  no  place 
where  they  could  make  a  stand  against  the  fleet 
until  Vicksburg  was  reached. 

But  of  all  points  on  the  great  river  this  was  the 
strongest  to  resist  either  fleet  or  army.  To  the 
fleet  it  was  practically  inaccessible,  to  the  army 
it  was  nearly  so.  A  little  below  the  mouth  of  the 
Yazoo  river  the  Mississippi  makes  one  of  its  great 
bends,  turning  abruptly  to  the  northeast,  and  after 
flowing  five  miles  in  that  direction  it  turns  with 
equal  abruptness  to  the  southwest,  enclosing  a  pen 
insula  less  than  two  miles  in  width.  Opposite  the 
northern  portion  of  this  low  peninsula  stands  the 
Vicksburg  city  of  Vicksburg,  crowning  the  bluff 
and  Port  at  a  height  of  200  feet  above  the  water. 
For  eleven  miles  below  Vicksburg  the 
river  washes  the  foot  of  the  cliffs.  Then  it  sweeps 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  183 

away  from  them  westward,  and  after  three  gigantic 
double  bends  again  strikes  the  line  of  bluffs  at 
Grand  Gulf,  which  is  only  twenty-five  miles  below 
Vicksburg  as  the  crow  flies,  but  sixty  miles  by  the 
river.  Immediately  below  Grand  Gulf  the  river 
once  more  leaves  the  bluffs,  not  to  touch  them 
again  till  it  reaches  the  village  of  Port  Hudson,  two 
hundred  and  fifty  miles  farther  down.  (Grand 
Gulf  and  Port  Hudson,  both  of  which  were  strongly 
fortified,  might  be  regarded  as  outworks  of  Vicks 
burg,!  but  of  these  Port  Hudson  was  far  the  more 
important.  For  between  it  and  Vicksburg  the 
great  Red  river  empties  into  the  Mississippi,  and 
the  Red  river  was  the  highway  by  which  the  states 
of  Texas,  Louisiana,  and  Arkansas  were  connected 
with  the  central  and  eastern  portions  of  the  Con 
federacy.  As  a  recruiting-ground  for  the  rebel 
armies,  these  three  states  were  able  to  supply 
100,000  men ;  but  still  more  than  this,  they  were 
an  inexhaustible  granary  from  which  the  Confed 
eracy  was  furnished  with  food,  and  while  all  its 
coasts  were  rigorously  blockaded,  its  only  communi 
cation  with  the  outer  world  was  through  Texas  and 
Mexico.  To  sever  from  the  Confederacy  its  three 
trans-Mississippi  states,  and  to  blockade  it  on  this 
side  as  closely  as  on  its  sea-coast,  was  an  object  of 
paramount  importance.  It  would  destroy  nearly 
half  its  resisting  power.  I  To  do  this,  it  was  not 


184     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

enough  for  Union  fleets  and  armies  to  possess  the 
mouth  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  whole  of  its  course 
above  Vicksburg.  It  was  necessary  to  control 
every  part  of  it,  and  especially  this  region  about 
the  mouth  of  the  Red  river.  This  stream  was  the 
great  avenue  between  east  and  west,  jealously 
guarded  on  either  side  by  Vicksburg  and  Port 
Hudson,  which  were  like  two  powerful  bastions 
reciprocally  flanking  and  protecting  each  other. 

Between  these  two  points  the  Mississippi  river 
was  entirely  in  rebel  hands.  Farragut's  fleet  at 
Unapproach-  New  Orleans  could  not  pass  above  Port 
ablenessof  Hudson,  nor  could  Davis's  fleet  at 
from  the  Helena  pass  below  Vicksburg,  without 
south  incurring  great  danger  in  running  by 

the  batteries.  Nor  was  there  any  use  in  taking 
such  risk  unless  to  cooperate  with  an  army  acting 
between  the  two  places.  But  no  Union  army  could 
land  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  river  at  any  point 
between  Port  Hudson  and  Vicksburg  without  sev 
ering  itself  from  every  source  whence  supplies 
could  reach  it.  As  long  as  Port  Hudson  was  in 
rebel  hands,  a  Union  army  could  not  operate  upon 
Vicksburg  from  below  without  risk  of  speedy  star 
vation  ;  for  the  guns  of  Port  Hudson  closed  the 
way  to  all  supplies  coming  up  the  river,  and  the 
guns  of  Vicksburg  itself  frowned  off  all  supplies 
attempting  to  come  down. 


TJie  Vicksburg  Problem  185 

While  thus  quite  inaccessible  from  the  south, 
Vicksburg  was,  for  other  reasons,  no  less  inacces 
sible  on  the  north  to  an  army  approaching  from 
the  river.  Above  the  city  the  hilly  and  from  the 
range  on  which  it  stands  swerves  north-  north- 
easterly  and  quite  away  from  the  Mississippi,  but 
near  to  its  tributary,  the  Yazoo.  Twelve  miles 
above  Yicksburg  the  waves  of  the  Yazoo  break 
upon  the  base  of  Haines  Bluff,  which  commands 
all  the  river  approaches  at  long  cannon-range.  As 
long  as  the  Confederates  held  Haines  Bluff,  no 
army  could  land  north  of  Vicksburg  without  being 
torn  to  pieces  by  a  fire  to  which  it  could  not  effec 
tively  reply. 

Thus  the  "  Queen  City  of  the  Bluff,"  as  southern 
people  were  fond  of  calling  it,  might  indeed  smile, 
in  its  royal  sense  of  security,  on  all  the  difficult 
country  around  it.  Unapproachable  by  its  steep 
front  on  the  Mississippi,  by  its  left  which  Port 
Hudson  covered,  or  by  its  right  which  was  guarded 
by  Haines  Bluff,  it  could  be  assailed  only  in  the 
rear ;  and  here  too  the  country,  extremely  rugged 
and  broken  by  deep  ravines,  presented  formidable 
obstacles  to  an  enemy.  While  thus  from  its  situ 
ation  Vicksburg  had  come  to  be  the  mainstay  of 
the  Southern  Confederacy,  its  strength  was  such 
that  it  was  likened  to  Gibraltar.  The  task  of  tak 
ing  it  was  as  arduous  as  had  ever  been  set  before 
a  general. 


186     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

That  the  obstacles  had  been  allowed  to  accumu 
late  to  such  an  extent  was  due,  as  we  have  seen, 
to  the  imbecility  with  which  the  Union  armies  were 
managed  in  the  summer  of  1862.  When  Farragut 
Alostoppor-  and  Davis  were  patrolling  the  river 
tunity.  on  either  side  of  Vicksburg  in  June,  a 

force  of  20,000  men,  coming  down  from  Memphis 
and  landing  north  of  the  city,  could  not  have  failed 
to  take  it,  for  the  approaches  were  not  yet  fortified 
and  the  Confederates  had  but  a  handful  of  men 
there.  But  although  Farragut  persistently  begged, 
he  could  get  no  help  from  Halleck,  who  was  trifling 
away  the  precious  moments  at  Corinth,  and  scatter 
ing  his  100,000  men  in  such  wise  as  to  accomplish 
nothing  in  any  direction.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
we  had  had  a  few  more  troops  at  New  Orleans,  it 
would  have  been  easy  to  send  a  small  force  up  the 
river  and  take  Vicksburg  from  the  south,  for  the 
Confederates  did  not  seize  Port  Hudson  till  August. 
The  energetic  and  quick-witted  Van  Dorn  was  not 
slow  to  catch  the  golden  opportunities  which  we 
thus  wantonly  threw  away.  His  men  worked  with 
exemplary  vigour,  and  every  day  that  saw  Vicks 
burg  and  Port  Hudson  unmolested  by  Federal 
troops  saw  also  their  fortifications  and  outworks 
grow  more  and  more  impregnable. 

It  was  toward  the  end  of  October,  1862,  that 
General  Grant  began  to  feel  his  hands  free  for  a 


The  VicJcsburg  Problem  187 

clutch  at  Vicksburg.  His  headquarters  were  then 
at  Jackson  in  Tennessee ;  the  centre  of  his  army 
was  a  little  south  of  Jackson  at  Boli- 

.  -\r          ^  •        Grant's  posi- 

var,  his  right  wing  was  at  Memphis,  tion  and 
his  left  wing  at  Corinth,  and  his  base  f°rces  at  Cor- 
of  supplies  far  up  the  Mississippi  river 
at  Columbus.  His  army  consisted  of  7000  men 
at  Memphis  under  General  Sherman,  19,200  at 
.  Bolivar  under  General  Hurlbut,  17,500  at  Cor 
inth  under  General  Schuyler  Hamilton,  who  had 
there  succeeded  Rosecraus,  and  4800  at  Columbus 
under  General  Dodge,  —  in  all  48,500  men.  Heavy 
reinforcement  was  soon  to  be  expected  from  the 
new  levies  which  were  collecting  in  response  to  the 
President's  call  in  July  for  300,000  men.  Since 
Halleck's  departure  for  Washington  in  July  had 
left  Grant  in  command  of  this  army,  he  had  so 
many  points  to  occupy,  in  pursuance  of  Halleck's 
orders,  that  it  was  impossible  to  undertake  any  of 
fensive  operation.  Under  these  circumstances  Van 
Dorn  had  aimed  a  bold  and  skilful  blow  at  Grant's 
left  wing  at  Corinth,  hoping  to  destroy  it  and  force 
him  to  retreat  down  the  Tennessee  river ;  but  the 
scheme,  as  we  have  seen,  had  ended  in  a  bloody 
defeat  at  the  hands  of  Rosecrans.  But  the  losses 
of  that  battle  had  been  more  than  made  good  by 
new  levies  and  exchanged  prisoners,  so  that  Van 
Dorn  now  had  24,000  men.  Besides  these  there 


188     The,  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

were  6000  at  Vicksburg,  5500  at  Port  Hudson,  and 
about  2000  at  Jackson  in  Mississippi,  making  for 
the  total  Confederate  force  about  37,500  men, 
under  General  Pemberton,  by  whom  Jefferson 
Davis,  after  the  defeat  at  Corinth,  had  unwisely 
superseded  Van  Dorn. 

With  his  army  properly  concentrated,  Grant 
felt  ready  to  advance  against  this  inferior  force, 
and  on  the  26th  of  October  he  wrote  to  Halleck, 
proposing  to  abandon  Corinth  after  destroying  the 
railroads  all  around  it,  and  then  to  concentrate  his 
force  at  Grand  Junction  and  move  upon  Yicks- 
burg  by  way  of  the  Mississippi  Central 

Grant's  first  . 

movement  railroad.  JLnis  was  the  correct  thing 
against  to  do,  but  the  suggestion  did  not  find 

favour  with  Halleck,  who  was  apt  un 
duly  to  exaggerate  the  value  of  places  as  such,  and 
to  forget  that  after  all  it  is  the  destruction  of  the 
enemy's  army  that  is  the  primary  object  in  war 
fare.  Before  the  victory  at  Shiloh  had  decided  that 
Corinth  was  to  be  ours,  that  little  town  was  a  point 
of  intense  strategic  interest.  But  now  that  it  had 
been  definitely  gained  with  all  its  fruits,  including 
the  fall  of  Memphis  and  the  opening  of  the  Missis 
sippi  down  to  Yicksburg,  there  was  no  good  reason 
for  continuing  to  occupy  it  in  force.  Strategic 
points  can  be  held  by  covering  them  as  well  as  by 
leaving  men  to  defend  them,  and  a  movement  of 


GRANT'S   FIRST    MOVEMENT   AGAINST   VICKSBURG 
NOVEMBER   24,   i862-JANUARY   10,  1863 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  189 

Grant's  whole  army  upon  Pemberton,  pressing  him 
down  through  the  state  of  Mississippi,  would  have 
effectually  covered  Corinth.  Halleck  seems  never 
to  have  answered  Grant's  letter  or  taken  any 
notice  of  his  suggestion ;  so  that  being  left  without 
instructions,  and  unauthorized  to  abandon  Corinth 
or  any  other  point  held  by  his  army,  Grant  tried 
to  see  what  could  be  done  under  these  embarrass 
ing  circumstances.  By  weakening  his  forces  at 
Corinth  and  Bolivar,  he  got  together  about  30,000 
men  near  Grand  Junction,  and  prepared  to  advance 
against  Pemberton.  But  he  was  so  puzzled  and 
delayed  by  incomprehensible  telegrams  from  Wash 
ington  that  he  did  not  get  started  until  the  24th 
of  November.  By  this  time  reinforcements  had 
arrived  at  Memphis,  and  Sherman  was  ready  to 
move  thence  toward  Grant  and  join  him  on  the 
Tallahatchie  river.  As  the  Union  army  advanced, 
the  Confederates  fell  back,  continually  skirmish 
ing,  until  they  reached  the  town  of  Grenada,  be 
hind  the  Yallabusha  river.  Grant  with  his  forces 
united  advanced  as  far  as  Oxford,  forty  miles  north 
of  Grenada. 

This  first  movement  of  Grant  was  an  attempt 
to  approach  Vicksburg  in  the  rear,  and  either 
compel  its  evacuation,  as  had  hap-  Theoutflank- 
pened  in  the  case  of  Columbus  and  ins  strategy. 
Memphis,  or  attack  it  in  the  quarter  where  it  was 


190     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

least  invulnerable.  Be  it  observed  that  this  was 
a  continuation  of  the  same  strategy  which  he 
had  employed  with  such  success  from  the  moment 
he  set  out  to  attack  Fort  Donelson.  Without 
approaching  the  Mississippi  river,  but  simply  by 
a  victorious  advance  along  a  line  parallel  to  it, 
he  had  effectually  conquered  it  all  the  way  from 
Cairo  to  Vicksburg.  One  after  another  the  great 
bluffs  which  the  Confederates  had  been  at  such 
pains  to  fortify  had  fallen  of  themselves  in  conse 
quence  of  blows  dealt  not  on  the  Mississippi  river, 
but  on  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumber 
land.  The  victories  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson 
necessitated  the  fall  of  Columbus.  The  victory  at 
Sliiloh,  involving  the  fall  of  Corinth,  necessitated 
also  the  fall  of  Island  Number  Ten,  Fort  Pillow, 
and  Memphis.  Island  Number  Ten,  indeed,  was 
taken  with  all  its  garrison  by  General  Pope  ;  but 
had  Pope  never  attacked  it,  the  fall  of  Corinth 
made  it  untenable,  and  it  would  have  been  evacu 
ated  ;  the  fortress  would  have  fallen,  though  the 
garrison  would  have  escaped.  This  series  of  con 
quests  of  fortified  places,  simply  through  victories 
at  distant  points  which  outflanked  them,  was  a 
beautiful  though  perfectly  obvious  piece  of  strat 
egy.  Grant's  further  advance  toward  the  capital 
of  Mississippi,  along  a  line  parallel  to  the  river, 
was  in  illustration  of  the  same  principle.  The 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  191 

presence  of  his  army  at  Jackson  would  seriously 
threaten  the  Confederate  hold  upon  Yicksburg. 
But  the  conditions  of  the  case  were  now  very  dif 
ferent,  and  the  progress  of  the  army,  which  had 
heretofore  been  comparatively  easy,  was  soon  ren 
dered  extremely  difficult  by  reason  of  the  increas 
ing  length  of  its  line  of  communications.  In  order 
fully  to  appreciate  this  point,  let  us  consider  for  a 
moment  how  enormous  was  the  task  of  supplying 
our  armies  in  the  Civil  War,  and  how  narrowly 
their  movements  were  thereby  restricted. 

In  the  densely  populated  countries  of  Europe 
an  army  can  often  subsist  upon  the  country 
through  which  it  marches,  but  this  was  seldom  the 
case  with  our  armies  in  the  southern  states.  Their 
food  and  ammunition  had  to  be  brought  m 

The  task  of 

to  them,  and  it  was  seldom  possible  for  supplying  an 
them  to  move  more  than  a  few  miles  £ 
from  the  line  by  which  these  supplies  were  brought. 
As  Wellington  once  said,  every  army  moves,  like 
a  serpent,  upon  its  belly  ;  and  the  clumsiness  of 
such  kind  of  movement,  under  the  conditions  which 
obtained  in  our  Civil  War,  may  best  be  illus 
trated  by  a  little  arithmetic.  The  weight  of  food, 
ammunition,  and  other  supplies  required  by  each 
soldier  averaged  4  pounds  daily.  A  single  wagon, 
therefore,  carrying  a  load  of  2000  pounds  and 
dragged  over  bad  roads  by  six  mules  or  draught 


192     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

horses,  would  supply  500  men,  provided  it  could 
make  the  trip  both  ways  between  the  army  and  its 
base  on  the  same  day.  If  the  army  were  one  day's 
march  from  its  base,  so  that  the  wagon  must  come 
one  day  and  return  empty  the  next,  it  could  only 
supply  500  men  every  alternate  day,  or  250  daily. 
If  the  army  were  two  days'  march  from  its  base, 
the  wagon  could  only  furnish  supplies  at  the  rate 
of  125  men  daily,  or  4  wagons  to  500  men.  To 
supply  an  army  of  50,000  men,  therefore,  at  two 
days'  march  from  its  base,  required  400  wagons. 
Such  an  army  ordinarily  had  at  least  8000  horses 
for  its  cavalry  and  artillery,  and  each  of  these  ani 
mals  consumed  25  pounds  of  forage  daily,  which 
made  a  load  for  just  another  400  wagons.  These 
800  wagons  were  drawn  by  4800  mules  or  draught 
horses,  which  in  turn  required  180  wagons  to  carry 
their  forage.  These  180  wagons  were  drawn  by 
1080  animals,  which  were  fed  by  48  additional 
wagons,  and  so  on.  Adding  the  figures,  we  find 
that  for  such  an  army  as  Grant  had  in  Mississippi 
in  December,  1862,  nearly  1100  wagons,  drawn 
by  6600  animals,  were  needed  to  keep  it  sup 
plied  at  two  days'  march  from  its  base  ;  while  at 
three  days'  march,  nearly  1900  wagons,  drawn  by 
11,000  animals,  were  requisite.  Such  an  army 
could  not  travel  more  than  two  or  three  days 
without  shifting  its  base  along  the  line  of  some 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  193 

railroad  or  river;  and  obviously  this  movable  base 
must  be  securely  connected  by  river  or  rail  with 
some  permanent  base  established  in  a  region  en 
tirely  under  Federal  control.  We  thus  get  a 
realizing  sense  of  the  prodigious  importance  of 
railroads  in  our  Civil  War.  Had  the  rebellion 
occurred  a  few  years  earlier,  before  our  long  lines 
of  railway  had  been  built,  its  suppression  by  mili 
tary  means  would  have  been  physically  impossible. 
Indispensable  as  railways  were,  however,  in  sup 
plying  our  armies  in  their  long  expeditions,  they 
were  far  inferior  to  rivers  in  respect  of  security. 
Aided  by  the  formidable  gunboats,  the  Federal 
armies  could  advance  to  any  distance  along  the 
banks  of  a  navigable  river,  obtaining  Riverg  re_ 
their  supplies  with  promptness  and  ferable  to 
regularity  from  flat-bottomed  trans 
ports,  which  could  almost  anywhere  be  pushed  up 
to  the  shore  and  quickly  unloaded.  Owing  to  the 
naval  superiority  of  the  Federals,  these  river  lines 
of  communication  could  not  be  cut  by  the  enemy. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  railroads  afforded  lines  of 
communication,  the  insecurity  of  which  rapidly 
increased  with  their  length ;  as  it  was  easy  for  the 
enemy's  cavalry,  in  which  he  was  usually  superior 
to  the  Federals,  to  make  bold  incursions  in  the 
rear  of  our  armies  and  tear  up  the  track  for  miles. 
The  effect  of  such  a  sudden  stoppage  of  supplies 


194     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

was  enough  to  paralyze  all  military  operations. 
Imagine  the  food  supply  cut  off  for  several  days 
in  time  of  peace  from  cities  of  the  size  of  Hartford 
or  Worcester,  and  you  get  an  inadequate  illustra 
tion  of  the  peril  of  a  great  army  severed  from  its 
base  and  isolated  in  the  midst  of  lonely  and  hostile 
forests.  To  guard  against  such  dangers  was  one 
of  the  most  difficult  tasks  allotted  to  the  Federal 
commanders,  especially  in  the  western  theatre  of 
war,  where  such  immense  distances  had  to  be  trav 
ersed.  Accordingly  we  find  that,  while  the  Fed 
eral  advance  was  always  sure  and  decisive  when 
supported  by  a  river,  it  was  apt  to  be  precarious 
when  the  sole  reliance  was  a  long  line  of  railway. 
J  We  can  now  fully  understand  why  it  was  not  easy 
for  Grant  in  the  state  of  Mississippi  to  continue 
the  series  of  brilliant  movements  by  which  he  had 
heretofore  caused  so  many  rebel  river-fortresses  to 
fall  without  taking  the  trouble  to  go  and  assault 
them.  Hitherto  his  own  forward  progress  had 
been  secure,  for  it  had  rested  upon  the  Tennessee 
river.  Now  it  had  become  insecure, 

(jrrant  s  inse 
cure  position     for  it  depended  upon  the  integrity  of 

every  mile  of  a  long  line  of  railway. 
When  Grant  reached  Oxford,  on  the  5th  of  De 
cember,  he  had  his  immediate  base  of  supplies  at 
Holly  Springs,  and  his  permanent  base  at  Colum 
bus,  180  miles  distant.  It  was  impossible  to 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  195 

guard  so  long  a  line,  and  in  order  to  advance 
upon  Grenada  and  beyond,  it  was  necessary  to 
make  some  different  arrangement.  Memphis  was 
admirably  situated  for  a  permanent  base,  and  a 
railroad  ran  directly  from  that  point  to  Grenada, 
where  it  joined  the  Mississippi  Central.  Unfor 
tunately  it  had  sustained  serious  damage,  and 
Halleck  had  instructed  Grant  not  to  have  it  re 
paired.  His  movement  was  evidently  regarded 
with  disfavour  at  Washington,  and  the  telegrams 
sent  by  Halleck  were  so  bewildering  that  at  this 
stage  of  the  proceedings  Grant  felt  it  necessary  to 
ask  the  question,  "  How  far  south  would  you  like 
me  to  go  ? "  After  more  or  less  discussion  by 
telegraph,  he  at  length  received  permission  to 
plan  his  own  campaign. 

Thus  armed  with  discretionary  power,  Grant 
held  a  conference  with  Sherman,  in  which  two 
plans  were  thoroughly  discussed.  The  one  alter 
native  was  to  keep  on  in  full  force  to  Jackson  and 
threaten  Vicksburg  in  the  rear ;  the  other  was  to 
divide  the  army,  sending  Sherman  back  to  Mem 
phis,  and  thence  down  the  river  to  effect  a  landing 
just  north  of  Vicksburg,  while  Grant  should  so 
manoeuvre  as  to  detain  Pemberton  upon  the  Yalla- 
busha.  There  were  sound  objections  to  such  a 
division  of  force,  inasmuch  as  the  enemy  would 
possess  the  interior  line  whereby  to  mass  his 


196     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

strength  against  either  Grant  or  Sherman.     In  this 
instance,  however,  no  serious  risk  was 

Sherman's 

movement        apprehended,    since    Grant    felt   able, 
against  even  w^h  his  force  diminished,  to  meet 

Vicksburg. 

the  enemy  in  battle ;  while  Sherman, 
on  the  other  hand,  in  case  of  ill-fortune,  could 
retreat  upon  his  ships.  To  move  on  in  full  force 
to  Jackson  would  necessitate  the  adoption  of 
Memphis  as  a  base,  and  the  thorough  repair  of 
the  railroad  between  that  city  and  Grenada ;  and 
this  would  consume  precious  time,  during  which 
the  Confederates  might  be  reinforced  and  Vicks 
burg  was  sure  to  grow  stronger.  For  this  reason 
mainly  it  was  decided  to  adopt  the  other  alterna 
tive  and  divide  the  army.  Sherman  accordingly 
returned  to  Memphis,  organized  his  expedition, 
and  on  the  20th  of  December  started  down  the 
river  under  convoy  of  the  gunboat  fleet,  in  the 
command  of  which  Davis  had  lately  been  suc 
ceeded  by  Admiral  Porter. 

The  fear  that  the  Confederates  in  Mississippi 
might  soon  be  reinforced  was  well  founded.  On 
the  24th  of  November  the  Confederate  President 
had  appointed  Joseph  Johnston  to  the  chief  com 
mand  of  all  the  forces  between  the  Alleghanies  and 
the  Mississippi,  with  his  headquarters  at  Chatta 
nooga.  A  week  later  Mr.  Davis  himself  visited 
Vicksburg  and  Jackson,  and  saw  that  reinforce- 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  197 

ments  were  sorely  needed ;  and  here  it  is  interest 
ing  to  observe  that  the  Confederate  Mr.  Davis's 
authorities  could  meddle  and  bungle  mistake- 
as  effectively  as  the  government  at  Washington. 
They  had  not  yet  given  up  all  hope  of  retrieving 
the  disaster  at  Pea  Ridge  and  invading  the  state 
of  Missouri ;  and  to  this  end  a  considerable  force 
had  been  assembled  in  northern  Arkansas,  which 
on  the  7th  of  December  was  thoroughly  defeated 
by  the  Union  generals  Blunt  and  Herron  at  Prairie 
Grove.  Offensive  movements  in  that  quarter  being 
thus  decisively  checked,  Johnston  thought  that  the 
reinforcements  needed  in  Mississippi  might  best  be 
taken  from  the  Confederate  army  in  Arkansas, 
thus  sacrificing  a  comparatively  small  and  remote 
interest  in  behalf  of  one  that  was  great  and  im 
mediate.  But  Davis  was  unwilling  to  do  this  for 
fear  of  political  disaffection  in  Arkansas.  He 
preferred  to  take  the  reinforcements  from  Bragg's 
army  at  Murfreesboro,  and  did  so  in  spite  of 
Johnston's  solemn  warnings.  On  the  20th  of  De 
cember  Bragg  accordingly  sent  10,000  men  to 
reinforce  Pemberton  in  Mississippi.  The  great 
battle  at  Stone  river  was  fought  eleven  days  later ; 
and  when  we  consider  how  closely  that  battle  was 
contested  and  how  narrowly  the  Federal  army  was 
saved  from  destruction,  it  seems  probable  that  if 
those  10,000  men  had  been  at  hand,  Bragg  would 


198     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

have  won  a  decisive  victory,  and  the  whole  course 
of  the  war  in  the  West  would  have  been  changed 
most  disastrously  for  the  Union  cause.  So  much 
good  was  already  achieved  for  the  Federals  in  con 
sequence  of  Grant's  assuming  the  offensive,  slow 
and  hampered  as  his  movements  had  been. 

But  Bragg  did  more  for  Pemberton  than  merely 
to  send  him  reinforcements.  On  the  llth  of  De 
cember  he  sent  the  brilliant  trooper,  General 
Nathan  Forrest,  with  2500  cavalry,  across  the 
state  of  Tennessee  to  cut  Grant's  communications 
with  Columbus.  Grant  was  warned  of  this  move 
ment  by  a  telegram  from  Rosecrans,  but  Forrest's 
Forrest's  blows  were  difficult  to  parry,  and  Grant 
raid<  had  then  no  cavalry  commanders  equal 

to  such  a  task.  In  one  of  the  most  effective  raids 
of  the  war,  Forrest  destroyed  sixty  miles  of  rail 
road,  besides  cutting  the  telegraph  lines  so  effec 
tually  that  from  the  19th  to  the  30th  of  December 
Grant  was  quite  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the 
world. 

At  the  same  time  Pemberton  ordered  a  raid  on 
his  own  account.  Van  Dorn,  with  all  the  cavalry 
in  the  army,  some  3500  in  number,  rode  around 
into  Grant's  rear  and  made  a  dash  at  Holly 
Springs,  where  a  great  mass  of  supplies,  valued  at 
$  1,500,000,  had  been  accumulated  for  the  use  of 
the  Union  army.  The  place  was  commanded  by  a 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  199 

Colonel  Murphy,  whom  Grant  had  duly  warned  of 
the  danger  and  instructed  to  defend  his  post  to  the 
last  extremity.     But   at   daybreak  of 
the  20th,  the  very  day  after  receiving   captures 
this  order,  Murphy  allowed  himself  to 
be  taken  by  surprise,  and  surrendered 
the  town,  with  his  whole  force  of  1500  men,  with 
scarcely  a  show  of  resistance.     For  this  shameful 
conduct  he  was  dismissed  the  service,  but  the  dam 
age  was  done.     Van  Dorn  burned  all  the  stores, 
and  making  a  long  detour  returned  safely  to  his 
army. 

Grant  was  now  in  a  very  uncomfortable  situa 
tion.  That  which  he  most  dreaded  had  come  to 
pass.  Van  Dorn  had  destroyed  his  accumulated 
stores,  and  Forrest  had  destroyed  the  only  road  by 
which  other  stores  could  come  to  replace  them. 
There  was  nothing  to  be  done  but  retreat,  and  the 
cutting  of  the  telegraph  made  it  impossible  to 
notify  Sherman  of  this  movement.  To  support 
the  army  on  its  retreat,  it  was  neces- 

Grant 

sary  to   try   the   experiment  of  living   retreats  to 
upon  the  country.    When  some  women    Grand 

Junction. 

of  the  neighbourhood  came  to  Grant's 
headquarters  and  tauntingly  asked  him  where  he 
expected   to  get  food  for  his  soldiers,  he  quietly 
reminded    them    that    their   barns    and   granaries 
seemed  to  be  well  stocked.     "  What !  "  they  ex- 


200     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

claimed,  frightened  and  crestfallen,  "you  surely 
would  not  lay  hands  on  private  property !  "  The 
general  regretted  the  necessity,  but  assured  them 
that  they  must  not  expect  him  to  starve  his  army 
on  their  account.  Fortunately,  the  mishap  occurred 
while  the  army  was  in  a  region  of  abundance.  It 
ate  up  everything  animal  or  vegetable  that  could 
serve  as  food  on  its  retreat  of  eighty  miles  to 
Grand  Junction,  stripping  the  country  for  fifteen 
miles  to  right  and  left.  Before  the  8th  of  January 
communication  had  been  opened  with  Memphis, 
and  on  that  day  Grant  received  a  despatch  from 
Halleck,  informing  him  that  Sherman  had  been 
defeated  before  Vicksburg,  and  directing  him  to 
go  at  once  to  the  rescue  with  all  the  available  force 
at  his  command.  Accordingly  on  the  10th  Grant 
went  to  Memphis,  and  began  his  preparations  for 
moving  his  army  down  the  river  to  Vicksburg. 

Meanwhile  Sherman  steadily  pursued  his  course, 

in  total  ignorance  of  what  was  happening  to  his 

chief.     He  started  from  Memphis  on  the  20th  of 

December,  with  32,000   men  and    60 

Sherman's  ,T.     .     . 

defeat  at  guns,  steamed  down  the  Mississippi  to 
Chickasaw  t}ie  mouth  of  the  Yazoo  and  thirteen 
miles  up  the  Yazoo,  and  landed  his 
troops  near  Chickasaw  bayou,  on  the  low  flats  in 
front  of  the  range  of  bluffs  just  north  of  Vicks 
burg.  This  lowland,  regularly  submerged  at  cer- 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  201 

tain  seasons,  was  intersected  by  a  labyrinth  of 
bayous  and  stagnant  lakes  in  such  wise  that  there 
were  only  five  paths  along  which  an  army  could 
advance  toward  the  bluffs,  and  these  paths  were  so 
completely  commanded  by  the  Confederate  guns 
as  to  be  impassable.  The  outlook  was  not  promis 
ing,  but  it  was  the  only  point  north  of  Vicksburg 
where  a  landing  could  be  made  at  all,  and  accord 
ingly  it  must  be  tried.  Sherman's  theory  of  the 
campaign  was  based  on  the  expectation  of  surpris 
ing  the  enemy  and  securing  a  foothold  upon  the 
bluffs,  where  he  might  maintain  himself  until 
Grant  could  join  him.  There  were  no  topogra 
phical  maps  upon  which  he  could  rely,  and  he  did 
not  know  how  completely  the  Confederates  had 
crowned  the  bluffs  with  batteries.  The  enemy, 
moreover,  having  watchful  scouts  all  up  and  down 
the  banks  of  the  river,  had  observed  him  every 
moment  since  his  departure  from  Memphis ;  and 
the  bluffs  were  guarded  by  12,000  men,  who  in 
that  position  were  more  than  a  match  for  100,000 
assailants  on  the  swampy  ground  below.  The 
ground,  indeed,  was  so  bad  that  Sherman's  32,000 
men  were  twice  as  many  as  he  could  use  to  good 
effect.  Under  these  circumstances  he  ordered  an 
assault,  and  was  right  in  doing  so,  inasmuch  as 
the  facts  here  stated  were  not  fully  known  to  him, 
and  could  not  be  ascertained  save  by  trial.  On 


202     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

the  29th  of  December  the  assault  was  made.  It 
was  as  ably  and  gallantly  conducted  as  any  oper 
ation  of  the  war,  but  was  doomed  to  failure  from 
the  outset.  Two  brigades,  one  of  which  was  com 
manded  by  Francis  Blair  (our  old  friend  of  the 
Camp  Jackson  days),  made  their  way  up  to  the 
enemy's  works,  but  recoiled  for  want  of  support ; 
and  presently  the  attack  was  abandoned.  It  cost 
Sherman  nearly  2000  men  killed  and  wounded, 
while  the  Confederates  lost  187.  It  was  not  safe 
to  stay  upon  the  lowland,  for  a  very  slight  rise  in 
the  river  might  at  any  time  flood  it  and  drown  the 
whole  army.  On  the  2d  of  January,  therefore, 
convinced  that  the  enterprise  was  hopeless,  Sher 
man  moved  his  troops  down  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Yazoo,  where  he  met  General  McClernand,  who 
had  been  sent  to  take  command  of  the  expedition 
in  his  stead. 

The  mention  of  this  general's  name  brings  up 
a  dismal  story  of  political  intrigue  by  which  this 
whole  series  of  military  operations  had  been  unfa 
vourably  affected.  The  part  which  he  sustained 
toward  Grant  at  this  time  reminds  one  of  the 
part  sustained  by  Gates  toward  Schuyler  in  the 
Revolutionary  War.  But  McClernand  was  an 
McClemand's  abler  man  than  Gates.  Without  any 
military  training,  he  had  nevertheless 
acquitted  himself  very  creditably  at  Belmont,  Fort 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  203 

Donelson,  and  Shiloh,  showing  marked  personal 
gallantry  and  some  skill  in  handling  troops.  But 
his  vanity  was  prodigious,  while  he  had  a  very 
inadequate  idea  of  military  subordination,  and 
seems  to  have  regarded  a  military  career  chiefly 
as  a  means  of  political  advancement.  He  was 
tired,  he  said,  of  furnishing  brains  for  Grant's 
army,  and  he  thought  the  time  had  come  when 
his  services  entitled  him  to  an  independent  com 
mand.  In  August  preceding  the  operations  above 
described  he  had  obtained  leave  of  absence  and 
gone  to  Washington  to  give  personal  attention 
to  his  claims.  As  an  Illinois  politician  he  had 
long  been  known  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  whom  he  sought 
to  persuade  that  the  best  method  of  capturing 
Vicksburg  was  by  an  independent  expedition  down 
the  river.  After  much  discussion  he  won  over 
both  Lincoln  and  Stanton  to  his  views.  Late  in 
October  Stanton  gave  to  McClernand  a  paper 
secretly  authorizing  him  to  raise  a  volunteer  force 
in  the  states  of  Indiana,  Illinois,  and  Iowa,  and 
when  properly  equipped  and  organized,  to  proceed 
with  it  against  Vicksburg  ;  and  on  the  back  of 
this  paper,  which  McClernand  was  to  show  in 
confidence  to  the  governors  of  the  states  in  ques 
tion,  Mr.  Lincoln  endorsed  his  approval  of  the 
enterprise.  The  scheme,  however,  was  not  viewed 
with  favour  by  Halleck.  Though  not  endowed 


204     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

with  great  discernment,  Halleck  cherished  a  whole 
some  professional  prejudice  against  amateur  gen 
eralship,  and  he  understood  the  viciousness  of  a 
plan  which  contemplated  an  advance  by  two  mutu 
ally  independent  commanders  against  the  same 
objective  point.  Such  a  plan  was  contrary  to 
military  principles,  ruinous  to  discipline,  and  full 
of  the  seeds  of  disaster.  With  all  his  sagacity, 
Mr.  Lincoln  had  not  yet  come  to  realize  the  force 
of  such  considerations.  In  the  preceding  spring 
much  mischief  had  been  wrought  by  thus  carving 
out  independent  commands  in  Virginia  ;  and  it 
was  now  proposed  to  repeat  this  unwise  policy  in 
the  case  of  Vicksburg.  To  crown  all,  Grant  was 
not  informed  of  it ;  and  accordingly,  not  possess 
ing  the  key  to  the  brief  enigmatical  telegrams 
which  kept  coming  from  Washington  during  the 
month  of  November,  he  was  so  puzzled  by  them 
that  his  own  movements  were  embarrassed.  It 
was  not  until  the  18th  of  December,  two  days 
before  Sherman  started  from  Memphis  on  the 
expedition  against  Vicksburg,  that  Grant  was 
directed  from  Washington  to  put  McClernand 
in  charge  of  the  expedition.  It  appears  that  Hal- 
leek's  well-founded  objections  had  been  to  some 
extent  heeded  by  the  President,  for  there  was  no 
intimation  that  McClernand  was  to  be  made  inde 
pendent  of  Grant ;  on  the  contrary,  he  was  ex- 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  205 

pressly  placed  under  his  direction.  The  order  was 
at  once  sent  by  Grant  to  Sherman  at  Memphis  and 
to  McClernand,  who  was  at  Springfield  in  Illinois. 
Both  telegrams  had  to  go  through  Columbus,  and 
as  Forrest  had  just  cut  the  wires,  neither  was  ever 
received.  Thus  it  was  not  until  after  the  repulse 
at  Vicksburg  that  Sherman  learned  that  he  was 
superseded,  and  that  Grant  had  been  obliged  to 
abandon  his  advance  through  the  interior  of  Mis 
sissippi. 

On  turning  over  his  command  to  McClernand, 
Sherman  proposed  that,  instead  of  lying  idle  until 
a  new  campaign  could  be  planned,  they  should 
utilize  their  time  by  capturing  a  fortress  known  as 
Arkansas  Post,  which  the  Confederates  capture  of 
had  established  on  the  Arkansas  river  Arkansas 
about  fifty  miles  from  its  mouth. 
This  stronghold  threatened  the  communications  of 
a  Union  army  operating  against  Vicksburg  from 
the  river,  and  it  was  highly  desirable  to  get  rid 
of  it.  The  expedition  was  well-conducted  and 
promptly  successful,  as  might  have  been  expected 
from  the  overwhelming  force  of  the  assailants, 
—  30,000  men,  with  45  field-pieces,  7  gunboats 
mounting  66  heavy  guns,  and  a  powerful  ram. 
The  fort  was  defended  by  3  heavy  and  14  light 
guns,  with  a  garrison  of  5000  men.  In  spite  of 
its  strong  position  and  the  gallantry  of  its  defend- 


206     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

ers,  it  could  not  hope  to  stand  against  such  odds. 
On  the  llth  of  January  it  was  battered  to  pieces 
and  its  garrison  captured,  yet  not  until  it  had 
cost  the  Federals  1000  men  killed  and  wounded, 
—  a  striking  illustration  of  the  difficulty  of  storm 
ing  fortifications  even  under  the  most  favourable 
circumstances.  Elated  beyond  measure  with  this 
success,  McClernand  began  talking  about  his 

McClemand  "  star  "  wnich  was  ever  "  in  the  ascend- 
and  his  ant,"  and  announced  to  Sherman  and 

Porter  that  he  should  now  keep  on  to 
Little  Rock  and  clear  Arkansas  of  rebel  troops. 
But  in  a  letter  to  Grant  a  day  or  two  before,  ex 
plaining  his  reasons  for  moving  against  the  Arkan 
sas  Post,  he  had  mysteriously  hinted  at  a  campaign 
in  the  interior  of  the  state  ;  and  Grant,  aghast  at 
the  thought  of  thus  wantonly  diverting  30,000  men 
from  the  all-important  work  at  Vicksburg,  promptly 
signified  to  McClernand  his  disapproval  of  the 
whole  movement.  At  the  same  time  he  informed 
Halleck  by  telegraph  that  McClernand  had  "  gone 
on  a  wild-goose  chase  to  the  Post  of  Arkansas." 
In  reply,  Halleck  authorized  him  to  relieve 
McClernand  from  the  command  of  the  Vicksburg 
expedition,  and  either  give  it  to  the  next  in  rank, 
or  take  command  in  person.  Grant  did  not  im 
mediately  act  upon  this  permission,  but  perempto 
rily  ordered  McClernand  back  to  the  Mississippi. 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  207 

That  ambitious  general  sullenly  obeyed,  but  took 
the  occasion  to  empty  the  vials  of  his  wrath  in  a 
confidential  letter  to  Mr.  Lincoln.  "  My  success 
here,"  said  he,  "  is  gall  and  wormwood  to  the 
clique  of  West  Pointers  who  have  been  persecut 
ing  me  for  months." 

It  was  fortunate  for  the  country  that  the  "  clique 
of  West  Pointers  "  were  allowed  to  have  their  way. 
McClernand's  case  was  only  one  among  many 
which  in  the  course  of  our  Civil  War  illustrated 
the  evils  of  amateur  generalship.  The  Amateur 
old-fashioned  American  notion  that  a  senerals- 
man  who  succeeds  in  one  kind  of  work  can  succeed 
in  any  other  by  dint  of  native  ability  and  without 
special  training  is  not  so  commonly  entertained 
now  as  it  once  was.  It  was  a  notion  which,  on  the 
whole,  did  us  credit ;  for  it  bore  unconscious  testi 
mony  to  the  quick  wit  and  rare  versatility  of  the 
American  people.  But  the  complicated  conditions 
of  modern  life  are  beginning  to  show  its  fallacious 
ness,  and  the  Civil  War  taught  us  some  lessons 
in  this  regard.  Of  all  the  occupations  of  life, 
there  is  none  in  which  the  imperative  need  of  pro 
fessional  training  is  so  forcibly  demonstrated  as 
in  warfare,  where  errors  of  judgment  are  visited 
with  such  prompt  and  terrible  penalties.  Among 
the  commanders  in  our  Civil  War  on  either  side, 
nearly  all  who  achieved  success  on  a  large  scale 


208     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

were  graduates  of  West  Point,  and  most  had  served 
their  apprenticeship  in  Mexico.  On  the  other 
hand,  our  volunteer  commanders  who  had  had  no 
special  training  seldom  prospered  in  any  higher 
position  than  that  of  general  of  division.  There 
were  one  or  two  exceptions,  but  this  was  the  rule, 
and  McClernand  was  a  conspicuous  instance  of  it. 
Fortunately  his  power  for  mischief  was  short-lived. 
In  superseding  him,  Grant  waited  only  to  make  up 
his  mind  as  to  the  best  way  of  doing  it.  He  seems 
to  have  been  governed  purely  by  unselfish  motives. 
He  would  have  been  glad  to  restore  Sherman  to 
the  command,  and  thus  give  him  a  chance  to  re 
trieve  himself,  for  people  at  the  North  were  clam 
orous  with  indignation  over  the  failure  at  the 
Chickasaw  bayou.  But  on  mature  reflection  he 
concluded  that  he  could  best  harmonize  the  jarring 
elements  by  assuming  the  immediate  command  in 
person,  and  on  the  30th  of  January  he  did  so. 
He  prepared  to  withdraw  the  forces 

Grant  moves       .,  A/r.      .     .       .          , 

to  the  west       from  northern  Mississippi  and  concen- 
bank  of  the      trate  his  whole  army  at  Young's  Point, 

Mississippi.  .         ,r.   ,     .  ^, 

opposite  Vicksburg.  Ine  army  was 
reorganized  in  four  corps,  respectively  commanded 
by  McClernand,  Sherman,  Hurlbut,  and  McPher- 
son  ;  and  thus  McClernand' s  dream  of  glory  was 
abruptly  ended.  He  protested  bitterly,  alleging 
that  he  had  been  the  originator  of  the  Vicksburg 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  209 

expedition,  and  had  been  entrusted  with  it  by  the 
President's  express  desire.  Grant  simply  referred 
the  protest  to  Lincoln  and  Halleck,  and  that  was 
the  last  of  it. 

By  this  movement  to  the  west  bank  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  Grant's  first  plan  for  the  capture  of  Vicks 
burg  was  definitely  abandoned.  It  had  His  first  plan, 

resulted    in    complete    failure,    owing   thus  aban 
doned,  was 
partly  to  the  misconduct  of  the  officer   the  correct 

who  surrendered  Holly  Springs,  and  one< 
partly  to  the  unforeseen  obstacles  encountered  by 
Sherman  at  the  Chickasaw  bayou.  But  behind 
these  causes  lay  the  McClernand  affair,  which 
diverted  the  attention  of  the  authorities  at  Wash 
ington  from  Grant's  requirements  in  November. 
Had  he  then  been  properly  supported  by  the  gov 
ernment,  he  might  have  established  his  base  at 
Memphis,  and,  receiving  his  supplies  by  the  rail 
road  running  thence  through  Grenada,  might  have 
moved  upon  Vicksburg  from  the  rear,  pursuing 
the  same  strategy  which  he  had  employed  with 
such  brilliant  success  in  former  campaigns.  The 
occasion  for  dividing  his  army  would  not  have 
come  up,  and  united  it  was  far  more  than  a  match 
for  any  force  that  Pemberton  could  oppose  to  it. 
This  first  plan  of  Grant's  was  no  doubt  the  correct 
one,  and  could  he  have  managed  it  in  his  own  way, 
Vicksburg  would  probably  have  fallen  before  New 


210     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Year's  Day.  The  difficulties,  though  consider 
able,  were  nothing  to  those  which  Grant  finally 
surmounted. 

In  order  to  understand  the  complicated  opera 
tions  to  which  Grant  now  devoted  two  weary  months 
Various  alter-  of  fruitless  and  thankless  labour,  we 
natives.  must  remember  that  Vicksburg  was 

assailable  only  in  the  rear.  Grant's  first  plan, 
which  was  now  given  up,  had  contemplated  an 
approach  upon  the  rear  through  the  interior  of 
Mississippi.  When  he  captured  the  city,  some 
months  later,  it  was  because  he  at  last  succeeded 
in  approaching  it  from  the  rear.  Now,  with  his 
army  concentrated  on  the  western  side  of  the  river, 
the  difficult  problem  before  him  was  how  to  take 
it  across,  and  get  into  the  rear  of  the  city  without 
sacrificing  his  line  of  communications.  He  could 
not  do  so  by  crossing  below  the  city,  for  his  supply 
ships  came  down  the  river  from  Memphis  and 
could  not  be  depended  upon  to  pass  by  the  guns  of 
Vicksburg ;  while  Port  Hudson  equally  blocked 
the  ascent  of  the  river  250  miles  below,  so  that 
supplies  could  not  be  sent  up  from  New  Orleans. 
On  the  other  hand,  Sherman's  unsuccessful  experi 
ment  had  proved  that  he  could  not  cross  above  the 
city  unless  he  could  get  so  far  away  to  the  north  as 
to  turn  the  extremity  of  the  works  at  Haines  Bluff, 
and  this  was  impossible  from  the  nature  of  the 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  211 

ground.  Grant's  work  during  February  and  March 
consisted  of  a  series  of  attempts  to  grasp  first  the 
one  and  then  the  other  of  the  horns  of  this  dilemma. 
His  work  may  all  be  summed  up  under  two  plans, 
which  we  may  call  his  second  and  third  plans  for 
capturing  Yicksburg.  The  second  plan  was  to 
find  a  passage,  by  canal  or  otherwise,  whereby  his 
supply  ships  might  pass  below  Vicksburg  without 
coming  within  range  of  its  guns ;  it  was  like  the 
problem  which  Pope  had  solved  at  Island  Number 
Ten  by  cutting  a  channel  through  the  submerged 
forest.  Could  this  be  accomplished,  the  army 
might  cross  below  Vicksburg,  and  good  hard  fight 
ing  would  do  the  rest.  The  third  plan  was  to  find 
a  passage  available  for  gunboats  through  the  laby 
rinth  of  bayous  to  the  north,  so  that  with  the  aid 
of  the  fleet  he  might  secure  a  foothold  for  the  army 
beyond  Haines  Bluff,  and  thence  come  down  upon 
the  rear  of  the  city.  Both  plans  were  Titan-like  in 
their  audacity;  both  contended  with  insuperable 
difficulties ;  and  both  were  foredoomed  to  failure. 

For  the  sake  of  convenience  we  may  designate 
these  plans  as  second  and  third,  but  they  were 
prosecuted  more  or  less  simultaneously.  Each  of 
the  plans  comprised  two  experiments.  The  first 
was  an  attempt  to  dig  a  canal  through  the  neck 
of  the  peninsula  formed  by  the  great  bend  of  the 
river  opposite  Vicksburg.  The  distance  was  but 


212     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

little  over  a  mile,  but  as  the  canal  was  designed  to 
admit  vessels  of  sixty  feet  beam  and  nine  feet 
41  Grant's  big  draught,  the  amount  of  excavation  re- 
ditch."  quired  was  very  considerable,  and  as 

much  labour  was  necessary  to  keep  the  canal  free 
from  water  while  the  digging  was  going  on,  the 
progress  was  very  slow.  A  dam  was  built  across 
the  upper  end,  and  dredging-machines  were  set  to 
work,  and  at  length,  after  six  tedious  weeks,  success 
seemed  near  at  hand,  when  all  at  once,  on  the  8th 
of  March,  a  sudden  rise  in  the  river  burst  open 
the  dam.  If  the  torrent  could  have  been  confined 
between  the  levees  of  the  canal,  it  might  perhaps 
have  helped  the  work  by  scouring  the  bottom,  but 
its  force  was  so  great  that  it  broke  down  these 
levees  and  submerged  the  surrounding  country, 
sweeping  away  tents  and  tools,  drowning  horses, 
and  driving  off  the  men,  who  had  to  flee  for  their 
lives.  The  catastrophe  was  a  godsend  to  the 
northern  croakers,  who  all  these  weeks  had  been 
wagging  their  heads  in  scorn  of  "  Grant's  big 
ditch."  The  rebels  saw  in  it  the  judgment  of 
Heaven  upon  an  impious  attempt  to  disturb  the 
order  of  nature.  Many  enthusiastic  friends  of  the 
government,  who  had  built  great  hopes  upon  the 
undertaking,  were  sadly  disappointed.  Not  so 
Grant,  who  from  the  first  had  expected  very  little 
from  it.  He  had  observed  that  the  lower  end  of 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  213 

the  canal  entered  the  river  just  opposite  the  bluffs 
at  Warrenton,  where  the  Confederates  could  easily 
plant  batteries  commanding  it,  and  early  in  Febru 
ary  he  informed  Halleck  that  he  had  lost  all  faith 
in  the  scheme.  Indeed,  before  the  catastrophe 
occurred,  the  enemy  had  already  erected  batteries 
at  Warrenton  which  enfiladed  the  mouth  of  the 
canal,  so  that  even  if  finished  it  would  have  been 
useless.  Nevertheless,  in  deference  to  the  public 
sentiment,  which  was  shared  by  the  government  at 
Washington,  Grant  had  given  the  project  a  fair 
trial,  while  looking  out  for  some  more  feasible  plan. 
His  other  experiment  for  crossing  below  Vicks- 
burg  was  begun  the  next  day  after  his  arrival 
upon  the  scene,  and  was  carried  on  simultaneously 
with  the  canal  experiment.  About  r 

r  The  Lake 

seventy  miles  above  Vicksburg,  on  the  Providence 
opposite  side  of  the  river,  is  the  cres-  exPenment- 
cent-shaped  Lake  Providence,  a  remnant  of  the 
old  deserted  bed  of  the  stream.  A  muddy  chan 
nel,  more  swamp  than  river,  known  as  Bayou 
Baxter,  imperfectly  connected  this  lake  with 
Bayou  Macon,  which  flows  into  the  Macon  river, 
a  tributary  of  the  Tensas.  The  Tensas,  in  turn, 
flows  into  the  Washita,  which  flows  into  the  great 
Red  river.  This  tortuous  system  of  waters  is 
navigable  throughout  its  length,  except  in  Bayou 
Baxter,  which  about  midway  between  Lake  Provi- 


214     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

dence  and  Bayou  Macon  spreads  out  into  a  huge 
cypress  swamp,  in  which  for  some  distance  the 
stream  is  quite  lost.  To  clear  a  passage  through 
this  labyrinth*,  it  was  necessary  to  cut  a  channel 
through  the  swamp,  dig  up  the  stumps,  and  then 
break  down  the  levees  east  of  Lake  Providence 
and  let  in  the  Mississippi  river.  It  would  thus 
be  possible  for  ships  coming  down  from  Memphis 
to  sail  through  this  long  detour  without  ever  get 
ting  within  forty  miles  of  the  guns  of  Vicksburg, 
and  thus  at  length  reentering  the  Mississippi  from 
the  Red  river,  to  ascend  to  the  scene  of  operations. 
The  supplies  for  the  army  would  thus  make  a 
roundabout  journey  of  400  miles,  but  the  route 
was  quite  safe  from  the  enemy.  McPherson's 
corps  was  at  work  upon  Bayou  Baxter  through 
February  and  March,  but  the  obstacles  had  not 
been  all  surmounted  when  Grant  resolved  upon 
the  very  different  plan  which  finally  proved  suc 
cessful. 

While  these  experiments  were  going  on,  Grant 
was  also  endeavouring,  with  much  more  hope  of 
success,  to  find  a  method  of  crossing  his  army 
to  the  north  of  Haines  Bluff,  so  as  to  turn  the 
The  Yazoo  right  flank  of  the  rebel  line  of  works. 
Passexperi-  The  Yazoo  Pass  seemed  to  afford  a 
promising  opportunity  for  this.  The 
line  of  steep  bluffs  which  leaves  the  Mississippi 


Ka.tch.ez 


fcs, 


Port  Hudson 


THE   LAKE   PROVIDENCE   EXPERIMENT 
FEBRUARY   AND   MARCH,    1863 


TJie  Vicksburg  Problem  215 

at  Memphis  to  meet  it  again  at  Vicksburg  en 
closes  with  the  river  an  elliptical  area  200  miles 
long  as  the  crow  flies  by  60  miles  wide  at  its  widest. 
Along  the  eastern  portion  of  this  ellipse,  and  near 
the  base  of  the  bluffs,  run  a  series  of  rivers  drain 
ing  the  elevated  plains  of  the  state  of  Mississippi. 
First  the  Coldwater  at  the  north  comes  down  to 
join  the  Tallahatchie,  and  presently  their  united 
volume,  swelled  by  that  of  the  Yallabusha,  forms 
the  Yazoo  river,  which  empties  into  the  Missis 
sippi  just  above  Vicksburg.  All  these  streams 
were  navigable  for  vessels  of  light  draught.  In 
the  upper  part  of  the  ellipse,  150  miles  due  north 
from  Vicksburg,  the  distance  between  the  Cold- 
water  and  the  Mississippi  is  only  ten  miles,  and 
this  is  traversed  by  a  winding  bayou,  some  80 
feet  wide  by  30  feet  deep,  known  as  the  Yazoo 
Pass.  In  former  times  this  route,  through  the 
Yazoo  Pass  and  along  the  rivers  that  flow  under 
the  bluffs,  had  been  commonly  taken  by  vessels 
plying  between  Vicksburg  and  Memphis.  But 
the  waters  of  the  Mississippi,  pouring  into  these 
narrow  channels,  had  overflowed  so  much  land 
that  in  order  to  abate  the  nuisance  a  powerful 
levee  had  been  built,  100  feet  thick  and  18  feet 
in  height,  shutting  up  the  Yazoo  Pass  and  sever 
ing  it  from  the  great  river.  To  break  down  this 
levee  and  restore  the  old  state  of  things  was  easy ; 


216     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

and  then  it  seemed  as  if  the  army  might  be  con 
veyed  in  steamers  all  around  the  ellipse,  from 
Milliken's  Bend  up  to  the  Yazoo  Pass,  and  then 
down  the  Coldwater,  Tallahatchie,  and  Yazoo 
rivers  to  a  point  where  it  could  land  in  the  rear 
of  Haines  Bluff.  It  was  perhaps  the  most  gigan 
tic  flanking  movement  ever  attempted  in  military 
history.  The  distance  to  be  traversed  along  these 
serpentine  streams  was  full  700  miles,  —  as  far 
as  from  New  York  to  Cincinnati,  or  from  London 
to  Marseilles,  and  as  striking  an  illustration  as 
one  could  wish  of  the  inaccessibleness  of  this 
wonderful  stronghold  of  Vicksburg. 

This  experiment,  like  the  others,  was  begun 
immediately  upon  Grant's  arrival.  On  the  2d  of 
February  a  mine  was  exploded  in  the  levee,  and 
the  waters  rushing  in  completed  its  destruction. 
The  Yazoo  Pass  was  thus  opened  so  that  vessels 
could  enter,  but  the  enemy  had  been  beforehand. 
Both  the  bayou  and  the  system  of  rivers  to  which 
it  gives  access  wind  their  way  through  dense  for 
ests  of  pecan-wood,  sycamore,  oak,  and  other  hard 
woods,  and  it  was  easy  by  felling  trees  across  the 
stream  to  make  a  formidable  barricade.  Several 
miles  of  the  Yazoo  Pass  were  thus  obstructed.  In 
one  place  eighty  prostrate  trees,  reaching  from 
bank  to  bank,  and  intertwining  their  huge  branches 
with  the  dense  and  tangled  growth  on  either  side, 


THE   YAZOO   PASS   AND   BIG   SUNFLOWER    EXPERIMENTS 
FEBRUARY   AND   MARCH,   1863 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  217 

formed  a  barrier  more  than  a  mile  in  length.  It 
was  necessary  to  chop  the  boughs  and  haul  the 
great  trunks,  often  weighing  from  twenty  to  thirty 
tons,  quite  out  of  the  stream.  The  men,  in  parties 
of  500,  worked  like  beavers,  and  in  two  weeks  had 
cleared  the  way  to  the  Tallahatchie  river.  Success 
now  seemed  assured  in  this  direction.  General 
Ross,  with  4500  men,  embarked  on  22  steamers, 
and  convoyed  by  a  couple  of  ironclads,  made 
his  way  250  miles  through  the  wilderness  without 
losing  a  man,  for  there  was  so  much  of  a  freshet 
that  the  rebel  sharpshooters  could  not  reach  the 
banks.  By  the  10th  of  March  Ross  was  sailing 
upon  the  lower  waters  of  the  Tallahatchie,  Quim- 
by's  division  had  been  sent  to  support  him,  and 
General  McPherson,  with  his  whole  corps,  was 
preparing  to  follow  as  soon  as  steamers  enough 
could  be  got  together.  But  the  Confederates  had 
made  good  use  of  the  time  which  their  barricades 
had  gained  for  them.  Where  the  Tallahatchie 
and  the  Yallabusha  unite  to  form  the  Yazoo  river, 
there  is  a  great  looplike  bend  enclosing  a  penin 
sula,  upon  the  neck  of  which  the  Confederates  had 
now  extemporized  an  earthwork  and  planted  heavy 
guns.  This  work,  which  they  called  FortPember- 
Fort  Pemberton,  completely  barred  ton- 
the  descent  of  the  river,  and  as  the  peninsula  was 
overflowed  it  could  not  be  approached  by  infantry. 


218     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

It  remained  to  be  seen  whether  the  gunboats  could 
silence  its  batteries.  On  the  llth  and  13th  of 
March  attacks  were  made  from  a  distance  of  800 
yards,  but  nothing  was  accomplished.  The  vessels 
suffered  more  damage  than  the  fort.  Another 
levee  of  the  Mississippi,  300  miles  distant,  was  by 
and  by  cut,  in  the  hope  that  the  increased  volume 
of  water  flowing  into  the  Tallahatchie  might  suf 
fice  to  drown  the  fort ;  but  the  rise  turned  out  to 
be  insufficient  for  this.  The  Yazoo  Pass  experi 
ment,  therefore,  auspiciously  as  it  had  begun,  was 
now  totally  defeated.  There  was  nothing  for  Koss 
to  do  but  make  his  way  back  to  the  Mississippi 
river,  and  Grant  had  already  begun  to  feel  anxious 
lest  the  enemy  might  in  some  way  contrive  to  sur 
round  and  cut  him  off. 

While  reconnoitring  to  find  some  method  of 
relieving  Ross,  another  labyrinthine  passage  was 
discovered,  through  which  it  was  hoped  the  army 
might  cross  far  below  Fort  Pemberton  to  the  rear 
of  Haines  Bluff.  Through  the  middle  of  the  long 
ellipse  for  nearly  200  miles  flows  a  considerable 
stream  known  as  the  Big  Sunflower  river,  empty 
ing  into  the  Yazoo  100  miles  below  Fort  Pemberton 
and  20  miles  above  Haines  Bluff.  Were  it  only 
possible  to  get  from  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo  into 
the  Big  Sunflower  without  passing  the  batteries  at 
Haines  Bluff,  such  a  route  would  be  preferable  to 


The  Vicksburg  Problem  219 

any  as  yet  devised  ;  and  it  seemed  as  if  a  way  had 
at  length  been  discovered  through  a  The  Big 
network  of  narrow  streams  known  as  Sunflower 
Steele's  and  Black  bayous,  Deer  creek, 
and  Rolling  Fork.  The  chief  obstacles  here  were 
the  narrowness  and  sudden  bends  of  the  shallow 
streams,  the  cypress  and  willow  trees  growing  in 
their  very  beds,  and  the  dense  mass  of  tangled 
branches  and  vines  overhanging  and  blocking  the 
way.  On  the  16th  of  March  Sherman  took  one  of 
his  divisions  up  Steele's  bayou  in  small  steamers, 
preceded  by  Admiral  Porter  with  five  ironclads  and 
four  mortar-boats.  The  powerful  ironclads  slowly 
pushed  their  way  through  the  bushes,  and  the 
transports  followed  still  more  slowly,  while  now 
and  then  a  smokestack  or  a  pilot-house  was  brushed 
away  by  the  wild  tangle  overhead.  Sharpshooters 
lurked  in  the  thickets,  and  on  the  fifth  day  the 
admiral,  having  advanced  thirty  miles  farther  than 
Sherman  and  approached  within  a  few  hundred 
yards  of  the  clear  navigation  of  the  Rolling  Fork, 
found  himself  attacked  by  a  considerable  force. 
His  position  soon  became  perilous.  The  rebels 
brought  squads  of  negroes,  and  compelled  them 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet  to  fell  great  trees 
across  the  creek  both  in  front  and  in  rear  of  the 
ships.  Presently  Sherman,  hearing  of  the  danger, 
and  finding  a  narrow  path  through  the  cane-brake, 


220     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

disembarked  his  troops  by  night  and  marched  at 
their  head  to  the  rescue,  lighting  the  way  with 
candles.  The  skirmishers  were  dispersed,  but  it 
was  found  that  the  enemy  had  blockaded  the 
entrance  to  the  Rolling  Fork,  and  occupied  it  in 
such  force  that  he  could  not  be  dislodged.  It 
was  therefore  necessary  to  retreat.  There  was  not 
room  enough  to  turn  the  ironclads  around,  and 
so  their  rudders  were  unshipped  and  they  slowly 
backed  out,  bumping  from  side  to  side  of  the 
wretched  creek,  till  on  the  27th  of  March,  after 
eleven  days  of  toil  and  peril,  the  whole  expedition 
floated  again  on  the  broad  bosom  of  the  Missis 
sippi. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE   FALL   OF  VICKSBURG 

WHILE  army  and  navy  were  using  up  the 
months  of  February  and  March  in  these  combined 
experiments,  the  navy  was  also  endeavouring  to 
disturb  the  Confederate  control  over  the  river 
below  Vicksburg.  To  this  end,  on  the  2d  of  Feb 
ruary  before  daybreak  Porter  sent  the  ram  Queen 
of  the  West  down  past  the  dreaded  batteries.  She 
succeeded  in  running  safely  by,  and  Naval  opera- 
immediately  attacked  and  disabled  the  tlons< 
Confederate  steamer  Vicksburg,  after  which  she 
cruised  up  and  down  the  river  for  a  fortnight, 
capturing  and  destroying  Confederate  vessels 
wherever  found.  At  midnight  of  the  12th  the 
powerful  armoured  gunboat  Indianola  ran  swiftly 
past  the  batteries  and  escaped  without  a  scratch, 
though  under  fire  for  twenty  minutes.  The  ad 
miral,  in  high  spirits,  now  looked  forward  to  the 
speedy  conquest  of  the  river  between  Vicksburg 
and  Port  Hudson,  but  events  soon  maliciously 
mocked  him.  On  the  14th  the  Queen  of  the  West, 
while  running  past  a  battery  on  the  Red  river, 


222     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

had  her  steam-pipe  cut  by  a  shot  and  became  un 
manageable.  The  crew  escaped  upon  one  of  her 
prizes,  but  did  not  set  fire  to  her,  as  there  was  a 
wounded  officer  on  board  whom  it  was  impossi 
ble  to  remove.  Thus  she  passed  almost  unharmed 
into  the  hands  of  the  Confederates,  and  presently 
was  ready  to  attack  the  Indianola,  so  lately  her 
consort.  In  company  with  another  rebel  ram  and 
a  couple  of  light  steamers,  she  chased  the  Indian 
ola  nearly  up  to  Vicksburg,  and  on  the  night  of 
the  24th,  after  a  sharp  fight,  compelled  her  to 
surrender.  The  Indianola  was  much  damaged, 
and  while  the  Confederates  a  few  days  afterward 
were  at  work  upon  her,  the  astounding  news  was 
brought  that  a  monitor  was  coming  down  upon 
them.  Sure  enough :  there  was  the  black  and 
terrible  little  creature,  already  below  the  Vicks 
burg  batteries,  out  of  harm's  way  and  coming 
swiftly  down  with  the  current.  The  Confederate 
ships  did  not  stay  to  fight,  but  fled  in  a  panic,  and 
never  slackened  speed  until  they  had  reached  the 
Red  river.  The  men  upon  the  Indianola  set  her 
on  fire  and  hastened  away.  Yet  the  guns  of  the 
dreaded  monitor  sent  forth  neither  sound  nor 
flame.  She  was  a  dummy,  a  malicious  ruse,  a 
grim  joke  of  Admiral  Porter's.  On  the  deck  of 
an  old  coal  barge  he  had  built  a  wooden  turret 
and  painted  it  black.  For  a  smokestack  he  had 


The  Fall  of  Vicksburg  223 

piled  up  some  pork  barrels  emitting  clouds  of 
smoke  from  a  mud  furnace  underneath,  and  this 
truly  formidable  craft  was  let  loose  with  the  cur 
rent  to  scatter  the  Confederate  vessels  by  the  mere 
terror  of  her  coming,  —  an  excellent  instance  of  the 
moral  power  of  Ericsson's  memorable  invention! 

So  far  as  concerned  the  control  of  the  water, 
however,  the  Confederates  still  had  the  laugh  on 
their  side.  Porter  saw  that  it  was  useless  to  dis 
pute  the  case  without  bringing  a  great  part  of  his 
fleet  down,  which  was  out  of  the  question  so  long 
as  the  army  entertained  the  thought  of  crossing 
the  river  above  Vicksburg.  When  the  news  of 
these  events  reached  New  Orleans,  it  seemed  to 
Admiral  Farragut  that  the  time  had  come  to  take 
his  fleet  upstream  and  pass  Port  Hudson.  Gen 
eral  Banks  had  reached  New  Orleans  in  December 
with  a  force  intended  to  cooperate  with  the  fleet 
in  reducing  this  stronghold  ;  but  he  had  found  it 
necessary  first  to  make  a  campaign  in  the  interior 
of  Louisiana  against  a  troublesome  Confederate 
force  under  Kichard  Taylor,  and  it  was  long  be 
fore  he  was  ready  to  undertake  his  principal  work. 
But  Farragut  felt  that  his  ships  were  needed  above 
Port  Hudson,  and  on  the  night  of  March  14,  with 
seven  stout  vessels,  he  set  out  to  pass  the  batteries. 
This  time  it  was  a  fierce  fight  for  an  hour  and  a 
half.  Four  ships  retreated  downstream  disabled, 


224     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

and  one  was  destroyed,  but  the  gallant  admiral 
in  his  flagship,  the  Hartford,  with  one  consort, 
succeeded  in  passing.  From  this  time  forth  the 
Federal  ships  were  able  to  patrol  the  Mississippi 
below  Vicksburg,  and  to  close  the  mouth  of  the 
Ked  river,  which  was  a  serious  blow  to  the  Con 
federates.  But  so  long  as  Port  Hudson  remained 
defiant,  the  problem  of  sending  supplies  by  water 
to  a  Union  army  below  Vicksburg  remained  un 
solved. 

In  these  various  enterprises  two  weary  months 
had  been  consumed,  and  Grant  seemed  as  far  as 
ever  from  taking  Vicksburg.  He  had  not  yet  been 
able  to  secure  a  foothold  on  dry  land  whereby  to 
A  gloomy  get  near  it.  He  had  apparently  tried 
outlook.  every  available  method  of  approach, 

he  had  shown  great  boldness  and  ingenuity  of 
conception  and  rare  perseverance,  yet  now,  at  the 
end  of  March,  he  had  accomplished  absolutely  no 
thing.  Loud  complaints  were  heard  at  the  North. 
People  were  getting  impatient.  It  was  long  since 
a  Federal  army  had  tasted  the  sweets  of  a  deci 
sive  victory.  Burnside  had  been  terribly  defeated 
at  Fredericksburg.  Kosecrans's  great  struggle  at 
Stone  river  had  apparently  been  fruitless,  and 
Grant  seemed  to  be  wasting  the  precious  moments 
in  digging  ditches.  There  were  but  few  who  as 
yet  cordially  recognized  his  ability.  His  victory 


The  Fall  of  Vicksburg  225 

at  Fort  Donelson  was  indeed  the  most  brilliant 
success  yet  achieved  by  a  northern  general,  but  it 
was  thought  that  he  might  have  blundered  into 
one  great  success,  and  in  proof  of  this  theory, 
it  was  asked,  had  he  not  soon  after  been  nearly 
defeated  at  Shiloh?  People  were  clamorous  for 
his  removal.  The  President's  office  at  the  White 
House  was  beset  with  politicians  urging  Mr.  Lin 
coln  to  supersede  him.  As  generals  capable  of 
doing  what  Grant  could  not,  one  frequently  heard 
mentioned  the  names  (Heaven  save  the  mark  !  ) 
of  Fremont,  or  Hunter,  or  McClernand.  The 
intrigues  of  the  last-named  general  seemed  at 
one  time  almost  likely  to  succeed.  But  Lincoln 
showed  himself  wiser  than  those  who  were  se 
ready  with  their  advice.  He  said,  "  I  rather  like 
the  man  ;  I  think  we  '11  try  him  a  little  longer." 

Lincoln's  patience  was  well  rewarded.  It  was  this 
"  trying  him  a  little  longer  "  that  saved  the  country. 
Grant  seemed  to  have  exhausted  all  Grant's  de- 
possible  schemes,  but  his  lexicon  con-  termination, 
tained  no  such  word  as  "fail,"  and  he  was  getting 
ready  to  attempt  the  impossible,  —  to  defy  Fortune 
and  subdue  her.  It  was  proved  that  he  could  not 
cross  with  his  army  to  the  north  of  Haines  Bluff, 
nor  could  he  preserve  a  secure  line  of  communica 
tions  if  he  were  to  cross  to  the  south  of  Vicksburg. 
To  put  such  a  fortress  as  Vicksburg  between  him- 


226     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

self  and  his  base  of  supplies  was  not  to  be  thought 
of ;  it  would  be  putting  himself  just  where  the 
enemy  wanted  him.  Nevertheless,  Grant  did  think 
of  it. 

There  were  just  three  new  alternatives  before 
him.  First,  he  might  cross  in  front  of  Ilaines 
Fresh  Bluff  and  try  to  carry  it  by  storm  ; 

alternatives.  fcut  that  meant  almost  inevitable  de 
feat.  Secondly,  he  might  take  his  whole  army 
back  to  Memphis  and  resume  his  first  plan  of  ap 
proach  through  the  interior  of  Mississippi.  That 
was  a  perfectly  sound  course,  and  was  earnestly 
recommended  by  General  Sherman  ;  but  it  would 
look  so  much  like  retreat  that  the  moral  effect 
upon  the  country  would  be  disheartening.  Thirdly, 
he  might  descend  below  Vicksburg,  detach  a  force 
to  cooperate  with  Banks  at  Port  Hudson,  and 
after  the  fall  of  that  fortress  move  upon  Vicks 
burg,  with  a  sure  base  of  supplies  at  New  Orleans. 

This  was  not  yet  defying  Fortune,  but  Grant 
was  rising  to  the  occasion.  Every  one  of  his  gen 
erals  thought  it  sheer  madness  to  put  the  army 
south  of  the  city.  Grant,  however,  was  not  wont 
to  hamper  himself  with  councils  of  war.  He  used 
to  listen  in  silence  to  the  opinions  of  his  generals, 
and  then  do  as  he  thought  best.  He  had  now 

O 

made  up  his  mind  what  to  do,  and  accordingly  on 
the  29th  of  March,  having  concentrated  his  army 


The  Fall  of  Vicksburg  227 

at  Milliken's  Bend,  McClernand's  corps  was  or 
dered  to  lead  the  way  to  New  Carthage,  twenty- 
seven  miles  below.  To  this  point  Grant  still 
thought  it  possible  to  bring  supplies  by  cutting 
little  canals  to  connect  a  network  of  bayous,  and 
work  of  this  sort  was  still  kept  up  until  the 
advancing  season,  which  dried  the  channels  so 
as  to  make  them  useless,  dried  also  the  roads  in 
that  wilderness  of  swamps,  and  began  to  afford 
ground  upon  which  corduroy  roads  could  be  built 
fit  for  men  and  wagons.  As  the  movement  to  the 
north  of  Vicksburg  had  been  finally  abandoned,  it 
was  desirable  to  bring  the  greater  part  of  Porter's 
fleet  below  the  city ;  and  Grant  seized  the  occasion 
to  risk  the  passage  of  ten  shiploads  of  rations 
and  forage  under  cover  of  the  gunboats.  This 
enterprise  was  completely  successful.  Themove. 
Eight  gunboats  were  left  at  the  mouth  mentsouth- 
of  the  Yazoo,  and  on  the  night  of  April 
16  all  the  rest  of  the  fleet  passed  down.  The 
Confederates  set  a  few  houses  on  fire  to  light  up 
the  scene,  and  rained  heavy  shot  upon  the  river, 
while  Porter's  ships  in  reply  sent  shell  after  shell 
into  the  streets  of  Vicksburg.  Every  ship  was 
struck  and  many  were  damaged,  but  only  two  were 
disabled,  and  after  three  hours  the  whole  fleet,  in 
cluding  the  supply  ships,  was  safe  below  the  city. 
Ten  days  later  another  squadron,  consisting  of 


228     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  tlie  Civil  War 

transports  and  barges  laden  with  rations,  succeeded 
in  running  the  gauntlet ;  and  now  at  last  Grant 
was  ready  to  cross  the  Mississippi.  The  labour  of 
moving  the  army  through  the  Louisiana  swamps 
had  been  enormous,  and  it  was  only  on  the  29th 
of  April,  one  month  from  the  beginning  of  the 
movement,  that  the  advance  corps  had  reached  the 
hamlet  of  Hard  Times,  opposite  the  fortress  of 
Grand  Gulf,  the  extreme  left  or  southernmost  of 
the  defences  of  Vicksburg,  on  a  bluff  twenty-five 
miles  south  of  the  city  and  just  below  the  mouth 
of  Big  Black  river. 

The  next  thing  in  order  was  to  cross  the  river 
and  take  Grand  Gulf.  On  the  29th  of  April  the 
works  were  briskly  bombarded  for  more  than  five 
hours  by  Porter's  fleet,  but  they  were  too  high 
overhead  to  be  seriously  damaged.  Not  a  single 
rebel  gun  was  dismounted,  and  accordingly  the 
army  could  not  cross  here.  During  the  night 
the  fleet  ran  down  past  the  batteries,  convoying 
the  transports  and  supply  ships,  while  the  army 
marched  still  farther  down  upon  the  west  bank.  A 
negro  brought  word  that  there  was  a  good  road 
from  Bruinsburg,  six  miles  below  Grand  Gulf,  to 
Grant  crosses  Port  Gibson  on  the  high  ground  twelve 
the  Missis-  miles  inland.  Nothing  better  could 
be  desired.  Next  morning  McCler- 
nand's  corps  embarked,  and  before  sunset  they 


The  Fall  of  Vicksburg  229 

had  reached  the  summit  of  the  bluffs  on  the 
east  side  of  the  river,  while  McPherson's  corps 
pushed  on  behind  them.  During  the  whole  of 
these  two  days  Sherman,  assisted  by  the  eight 
gunboats  which  had  been  left  above  Vicksburg, 
completely  absorbed  the  enemy's  attention  by 
moving  his  forces  up  the  Yazoo  and  landing  them 
as  if  to  attack  Haines  Bluff.  On  the  1st  of  May 
he  received  orders  from  Grant  to  move  down  the 
west  side  of  the  Mississippi,  cross  to  Bruinsburg, 
and  follow  McPherson  as  rapidly  as  possible. 
Grant  had  immediately  sent  McClernand  forward 
to  Port  Gibson,  as  a  place  which  it  was  important 
to  seize  at  once.  Port  Gibson  stands  'at  the  junc 
tion  of  roads  from  Bruinsburg  and  Grand  Gulf, 
with  roads  leading  directly  to  Vicksburg  and  to 
Jackson,  the  state  capital.  By  seizing  it,  Grant 
would  compel  the  enemy  to  evacuate  Grand  Gulf. 
On  the  evening  of  April  80  General  Bowen,  the 
Confederate  commander  at  Grand  Gulf,  discover 
ing  McClernand's  presence  on  the  road  to  Port 
Gibson,  marched  out  to  attack  him;  Firgt ^ciory . 
and  early  next  morning  the  two  forces  at  Port  Gib- 
encountered  each  other  about  four 
miles  from  that  town,  and  a  battle  began  which 
lasted  all  day.  The  enemy,  with  his  reinforce 
ments  arriving  from  Vicksburg,  numbered  8500 
men.  Grant  came  upon  the  scene  early  in  the 


230     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

battle,  and  with  a  portion  of  McPherson's  corps 
which  arrived  at  noon,  he  had  over  20,000  men. 
The  Confederates  fought  with  their  usual  gallan 
try,  but  by  nightfall  their  right  flank  had  been 
turned,  and  they  were  swept  from  the  field  with  a 
loss  of  1000  killed  and  wounded  and  650  captured. 
The  Union  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  850. 
Next  morning  our  army  entered  Port  Gibson  in 
triumph,  and  spent  the  day  pursuing  the  routed 
enemy  for  fifteen  miles,  as  far  as  Hankinson's 
ferry,  on  the  Big  Black  river,  and  capturing  1000 
Confederates  Prisoners.  That  evening  the  Confed- 
evacuate  crates  hastily  evacuated  Grand  Gulf, 

Grand  Gulf.       ^    retreated    acrosg    the    Big    Black  . 

so  hurried  were  their  movements  that  they  left 
five  heavy  guns  as  spoils  for  the  victors.  Next 
day,  the  3d  of  May,  Grant  occupied  this  strong 
hold  and  established  his  base  of  supplies  there, 
while  the  troops  remained  three  days  in  bivouac 
at  Willow  Springs  and  Hankinson's  ferry,  await 
ing  the  arrival  of  Sherman's  corps  and  fresh 
ammunition  and  rations. 

The  critical  moment  in  Grant's  career  had  now 
come.  During  the  long  weary  weeks  of  struggle 
with  creeks  and  swamps,  his  mind  had  been  grad 
ually  rising  to  a  great  resolve,  which  the  turn  of 
events  was  now  about  to  make  perfectly  definite 
and  clear.  He  had  at  last  secured  a  footing  on 


The  Fall  of  Vicksburg  231 

the  high  ground  east  of  the  river,  and  was  in 
possession  of  one  of  the  strongest  of  the  rebel  for 
tresses.  At  this  season  supplies  could  be  brought, 
though  liable  to  tedious  delays,  over  the  rough 
roads  on  the  west  side.  In  case  of  emergency  it 
had  been  shown  that  they  could  do  such  a  thing  as 
run  down  the  river  under  the  Vicksburg  batteries. 
Yet  his  situation  was  not  a  desirable  The  critical 
one  to  remain  in.  It  was  precarious  moment' 
at  best,  and  delay  would  increase  the  danger. 
His  first  intention  had  been  to  establish  himself 
here,  and  detach  a  corps  to  cooperate  with  Banks 
in  reducing  Port  Hudson.  After  the  removal  of 
that  formidable  obstacle,  supplies  could  be  regu 
larly  and  safely  brought  up  from  New  Orleans. 
If  it  were  not  for  this  vexed  question  of  supply, 
there  was  everything  to  tempt  him  to  an  immedi 
ate  movement  upon  Vicksburg.  The  enemy  had 
been  surprised,  defeated,  and  somewhat  demoral 
ized  ;  now  was  the  time  to  follow  up  this  initial 
success  with  blow  after  blow.  At  this  crisis  there 
came  a  letter  from  Banks  in  the  interior  of  Louisi 
ana,  stating  that  he  could  not  reach  Port  Hudson 
before  the  10th  of  May.  This  was  all  that  Grant 
needed  to  decide  his  movements.  It  was  still  a 
week  to  the  10th  of  May,  and  after  that  it  might 
very  well  take  a  month  to  reduce  Port  Hudson. 
Meanwhile  the  enemy,  realizing  the  danger  of 


232     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Vicksburg,  would  send  troops  from  every  quarter 
to  reinforce  it.  Delay  would  be  ruinous,  and 
Grant  instantly  made  up  his  mind  to  move  upon 
the  rear  of  Vicksburg. 

To  face  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  such  a 
movement  required  the  stoutest  of  hearts  and  the 
coolest  of  heads.  Grant's  force,  consisting  of  the 
three  corps  of  Sherman,  McPherson,  and  McCler- 
nand,  numbered  45,000  men.  In  Vicksburg  and  its 
neighbourhood  Pemberton  had  an  army  of  about 
50,000 ;  but  Grant,  unlike  many  Union  command 
ers,  was  apt  to  underrate  the  enemy's  strength, 
A  difficult  and  ne  supposed  it  to  be  only  30,000. 
situation.  Another  Confederate  army  was  gather 
ing  to  the  east  and  north  of  Jackson.  Its  strength 
was  unknown,  but  likely  to  be  considerable,  for  the 
rebels  were  weakening  their  garrisons  at  Charles 
ton  and  Mobile  and  every  point  from  which  troops 
could  be  spared  to  reinforce  it ;  and  Grant  knew 
that  Joseph  Johnston  was  on  his  way  from  Chat 
tanooga  to  take  the  command  in  person.  It  was 
necessary  for  Grant  to  interpose  his  forces  be 
tween  these  two  armies  and  beat  them  in  detail, 
first  driving  Johnston  eastward,  then  turning  upon 
Pemberton,  crushing  him  in  battle  and  pushing  him 
back  upon  Vicksburg.  In  order  to  do  this,  it  was 
necessary  to  keep  his  army  together ;  if  he  should 
detach  forces  to  guard  his  line  of  communication 


The  Fall  of  Vicksburg  233 

with  Grand  Gulf,  he  could  not  bring  men  enough 
into  battle  to  ensure  him  the  victory.  But  nothing 
could  be  more  certain  than  that  Pemberton  would 
fall  upon  his  line  of  communications  the  moment 
he  should  move  eastward  against  Johnston. 
Grant  therefore  came  to  the  startling  decision  to 
cut  loose  from  his  base  altogether,  to  feed  his 
troops  on  what  they  could  carry  in  their  haver 
sacks  and  what  they  could  pick  up  on  the  way, 
and  moving  with  all  possible  speed,  unencumbered 
by  heavy  wagons,  to  vanquish  the  enemy  and  gain 
a  new  base  of  supplies  on  the  Mississippi  north 
of  Vicksburg  before  famine  should  have  time  to 
overtake  him.  This  was  defying  Fortune  out 
right.  No  general  ever  conceived  a  more  daring 
scheme.  There  was  no  precedent  for  it  in  the 
history  of  modern  warfare.  Napoleon  and  other 
European  generals  who  had  "  lived  upon  the 
country  "  had  done  so  through  a  regularly  organ 
ized  system  of  requisitions.  No  one  had  ever 
undertaken  an  elaborate  campaign  in  an  enemy's 
country  with  no  more  provisions  than  could  be 
carried  in  haversacks  or  got  by  foraging.  Doubt 
less  all  would  go  well  if  everything  should  turn 
out  as  Grant  had  planned,  but  cam-  Grant>ssuk_ 
paigns  are  seldom  carried  out  pre-  limeauda- 
cisely  as  they  are  conceived,  and  in  Clty> 
the  event  of  defeat  the  total  destruction  of  the 


234     The  Mississippi   Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

army  could  scarcely  be  averted.  Accordingly 
none  of  Grant's  generals  approved  of  the  move 
ment  ;  even  the  daring  Sherman  had  little  faith 
in  its  success.  As  for  Halleck,  he  was  not  in 
formed  of  the  scheme  until  too  late  to  prevent  it. 
As  soon  as  the  news  of  it  reached  Washington, 
on  the  llth  of  May,  Halleck  ordered  Grant  to 
retrace  his  steps  and  move  toward  Port  Hudson 
to  cooperate  with  Banks.  But  by  that  time  Grant 
was  fortunately  beyond  the  reach  of  the  telegraph, 
and  the  order  did  not  find  him  until  victory  had 
been  achieved.  With  sublime  self-reliance  he 
took  the  destinies  of  the  army  and  the  nation 
upon  his  shoulders,  and  wrought  out  a  triumph 
that  could  have  been  obtained  in  no  other  way. 

In  making  this  bold  decision,  Grant  knew  that 
Johnston  laboured  under  difficulties.  Pie  knew 
that  a  concentration  of  rebel  troops  near  the  state 
capital  could  not  be  speedily  effected.  Some 
weeks  ago  Van  Dorn,  with  his  great  force  of  cav 
alry,  had  been  imprudently  taken  from  Mississippi 
and  sent  to  assist  Bragg  at  Tullahoma ;  and  soon 
afterward  Grant  had  despatched  Colonel  Grierson 
on  a  cavalry  raid  which  turned  out  to  be  one  of 
the  most  brilliant  and  useful  of  the  war.  From 
Grierson's  the  17th  of  April  to  the  2d  of  May, 

cavalry  raid.      wjt}1    a   force    Qf    \\^\Q   n'ore   t}ian  1QOO 

men,    Grierson   had   made   a   tour   of   600   miles 


The  Fall  of  Vicksburg  235 

through  the  state  of  Mississippi,  effectually  cutting 
three  different  lines  of  railroad,  destroying  60 
miles  of  telegraph,  and  isolating  the  city  of  Jack 
son  on  the  north,  south,  and  east,  besides  thor 
oughly  confusing  the  enemy  and  distracting  his 
attention.  Nothing,  however,  could  so  completely 
bewilder  the  enemy  and  throw  him  off  upon  a 
false  scent  as  the  unprecedented  move  which 
Grant  was  about  to  make. 

With  these  elements  of  success  duly  considered, 
Grant  started  on  the  7th  of  May,  as  soon  as  Sher 
man  had  crossed  the  river.  The  men  were  fur 
nished  with  rations  for  five  days,  and  foraging 
parties  were  sent  out  each  night  to  scour  the 
country  and  bring  in  everything  eatable  they 
could  lay  hands  on.  Grant's  march  was  admira 
bly  adapted  to  mask  his  purpose.  He  sent  small 
detachments  west  of  the  Big  Black  to  threaten 
Vicksburg  and  keep  Pemberton  in  the  neighbour 
hood  of  the  city.  The  left  wing  under  McCler- 
n and  marched  up  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Big 
Black  toward  Edwards's  station  on  the  Vicksburg 
and  Jackson  railroad,  about  midway  between  the 
two  cities.  The  centre  under  Sherman  was  headed 
for  Bolton  station,  a  few  miles  farther  east  on  the 
same  road.  The  right  wing  under  McPherson 
was  directed  toward  Jackson  by  way  of  Raymond. 
On  the  12th  McPherson's  advance  encountered 


236     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

5000  Confederates  in  a  strong  position  at  Ray- 
Second  vie-  rciond  and  routed  them  in  a  sharp 
tory;  at*  fight  of  two  hours,  each  side  losing 

about  400  in  killed  and  wounded.  The 
enemy  also  lost  400  in  prisoners,  and  thus  discom 
fited  withdrew  to  Jackson. 

Meanwhile  Pemberton,  supposing  Grant's  imme 
diate  goal  to  be  Edwards's  station,  advanced  in 
that  direction,  intending  to  offer  battle ;  but  Grant 
was  not  quite  ready  to  dispose  of  him.  He  rightly 
interpreted  the  affair  at  Raymond  as  indicating  a 
concentration  of  rebel  forces  about  Jackson,  and 
his  first  business  was  to  nip  it  in  the  bud.  Ac 
cordingly  he  turned  McClernand  and  Sherman 
eastward  upon  Clinton  to  support  McPherson  in 
his  advance  upon  Jackson.  On  the  evening  of 
the  13th  General  Johnston  arrived  at  Jackson  and 
took  command,  but  could  muster  only  6000  men, 
mostly  consisting  of  those  who  had  been  defeated 
Third  vie-  ^ie  ^a^  before  at  Raymond.  Rein- 
tory;  at  forcements  were  on  the  way,  however, 

and  in  a  few  days  Johnston  would 
have  had  over  20,000  men ;  but  Grant's  celerity 
spoiled  all  this.  On  the  14th,  while  the  other  two 
corps  were  within  supporting  distance,  McPherson 
came  up  and  overwhelmed  Johnston,  capturing 
800  prisoners  and  all  his  artillery.  McPherson's 
loss  was  about  250.  The  stars  and  stripes  were 


The  Fall  of  Vicksburg  237 

hoisted  over  the  capitol,  and  Grant  slept  in  the 
house  where  Johnston  had  slept  the  night  before. 
The  one  useful  thing  that  Pemberton  might  have 
done  on  this  day  would  have  been  to  come  up  to 
Clinton  and  attack  Grant  in  the  rear,  and  indeed 
Johnston  had  sent  word  to  him  to  do  so ;  but 
Pemberton  thought  he  knew  better.  Seeing  Grant 
carelessly  moving  so  far  away  from  his  base  at 
Grand  Gulf,  Pemberton  naturally  thought  that 
sound  strategy  required  him  to  lay  hold  of  Grant's 
line  of  communications ;  and  accordingly  he  wasted 
the  day  in  marching  down  toward  Raymond.  Of 
course  it  never  entered  his  head  that  Grant  had 
divested  himself  of  all  such  encumbrances  as  lines 
of  communication ! 

Thus  did  Grant's  very  audacity,  by  fooling  the 
enemy,  contribute  to  its  own  success.  Had  Pem 
berton  pressed  him  in  the  rear,  it  might  have 
detained  him  till  Johnston  could  be  reinforced. 
But  that  chance  was  lost,  and  Grant  now  took 
care  that  Johnston  should  not  speedily  gather  his 
forces.  Leaving  Sherman  to  burn  the  bridges, 
factories,  and  arsenals  at  Jackson,  and  Grant  turns 
tear  up  the  railroads  in  every  direction  westward, 
for  twenty  miles,  he  now  faced  his  army  to  west 
ward  and  started  for  Vicksburg.  Johnston  had 
retreated  to  Canton,  thirty  miles  north  of  the  capi 
tal,  and  had  now  no  means  of  getting  back  save 


238     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

by  marching.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  16th 
Pemberton  received  a  peremptory  order  to  march 
to  Clinton,  it  being  Johnston's  intention  to  join 
him  there,  and  with  their  united  masses  head  Grant 
off  and  prevent  his  ever  getting  back  to  the  Mis 
sissippi.  But  when  this  despatch  reached  Pember 
ton,  two  thirds  of  Grant's  army  were  already  pass 
ing  Bolton,  ten  miles  west  of  Clinton,  and  out  of 
Johnston's  reach  by  quite  two  days'  march. 

Hearing  of  Pemberton's  approach,  Grant  has 
tened  to  the  front,  sending  word  to  Sherman  to 
bring  up  his  corps.  Pemberton  was  found  strongly 
posted  a  little  south  of  the  railroad  about  three 
miles  west  of  Bolton.  His  left  wing  occupied  the 
bald  crest  of  a  wooded  hill  some  seventy  feet  in 
height,  known  as  Champion's  Hill,  and  this  crest 
was  well-crowned  with  artillery.  His  whole  line, 
stretching  a  couple  of  miles  south  from  the  hill, 
consisted  of  about  18,000  men.  It  took  eight 
hours  of  severe  fighting  to  dislodge  this  force.  On 

the  Union  side  the  work  was  almost 
tory  •  at  entirely  done  by  McPher son's  corps 

Champion's      an(j  Hovey's  division  of  McClernand's, 

directed  by  Grant  in  person,  and  con 
stituting  the  right  wing.  The  Confederates  were 
defeated,  losing  1400  in  killed  and  wounded,  2500 
prisoners,  and  all  their  artillery;  while  one  divi 
sion  of  4000  men,  cut  asunder  from  the  rest  of  the 


The  Fall  of  Vicksburg  239 

array  and  unable  to  rejoin  it,  fled  southeasterly 
many  miles  beyond  Jackson. 

Half  of  Pemberton's  force  had  thus  crumbled 
away ;  the  rest  retreated  in  disorder  toward  Yicks- 
burg.  To  deal  this  shattering  blow  cost  Grant 
2500  men.  It  was  the  decisive  stroke  of  the  cam 
paign.  The  Confederates  were  now  scattered  to 
all  points  of  the  compass  ;  there  was  no  more  chance 
of  uniting  under  Johnston  ;  while  the  Federals,  in 
solid  column  and  elated  with  victory,  were  fast 
nearing  the  goal  of  all  their  labours.  That  even 
ing  Grant  received  Halleck's  order,  dated  five 
days  before,  telling  him  on  no  account  whatever  to 
undertake  such  a  campaign  as  this,  but  to  go  down 
and  unite  with  Banks.  He  could  read  this  order 
now  with  equanimity.  He  had  staked  everything, 
but  he  had  won.  Unless  something  extraordinary 
should  happen,  Vicksburg  was  doomed. 

The  march  thither  next  morning  was  attended 
by  a  brief  but  notable  passage  at  arms.  At  eight 
o'clock  McClernand's  corps  had  reached  the  bridge 
over  the  Big  Black  river.  Pemberton  had  placed 
5000  men  there  in  a  position  precarious  unless  re 
inforced,  and  yesterday's  defeat  had  Fifth  victory- 
prevented  this.  In  less  than  an  hour  at  Big  Black 
one  third  of  this  force  was  captured, 
with  18  pieces  of  artillery  and  1400  stand  of  arms ; 
the  rest  had  fled  in  a  panic,  not  forgetting,  how 


240      Tlie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

ever,  to  set  fire  to  the  bridge,  which  had  been 
smeared  with  turpentine  and  was  soon  in  a  blaze. 
This  delayed  the  Federals  for  a  whole  day  while 
they  were  building  a  rude  bridge,  and  it  may  per 
haps  have  prevented  their  entering  Vicksburg  with 
the  fleeing  enemy.  During  that  day  Johnston 
advanced  fifteen  miles  from  Canton  in  search  of 
Pemberton,  who  now,  twice  beaten,  was  taking 
refuge  behind  the  stout  works  of  Vicksburg.  Next 
day,  the  18th,  while  McClernand  and  McPherson 
marched  straight  toward  the  city,  Sherman  moved 
northwesterly  and  occupied  the  Beriton  road  about 
half  way  between  Vicksburg  and  Haines  Bluff, 
thus  rendering  the  latter  stronghold  untenable. 
The  garrison  abandoned  it  in  too  much  haste  to 
destroy  anything ;  and  so  the  great  fortress,  with 
all  its  guns  and  stores,  and  with  its  command  of 
the  Yazoo  river  and  all  the  northern  approaches 
to  Vicksburg,  fell  into  Union  hands  in  good  con 
dition  and  ready  to  be  used  against  the  enemy. 
The  right  wing  of  the  Union  army  now  rested  on 
the  long-coveted  bluffs  above  the  city,  and  looked 
Fall  of  down  upon  the  Mississippi  with  feelings 

Haines  Bluff,  like  those  which  surged  in  the  bosoms 
of  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  when  from  a  peak  in 
Asia  Minor  they  caught  sight  of  the  friendly  sea. 
Grant  was  with  Sherman  this  morning,  and  the  two 
rode  out  together  upon  the  very  bluff  which  five 


The  Fall  of  Viclcsburg  241 

months  before  the  latter  had  vainly  tried  to  storm. 
"  Until  this  moment,"  exclaimed  Sherman,  "  I 
never  thought  your  movement  a  success.  But  this 
is  a  campaign !  this  is  a  success,  if  we  never  take 
the  town."  Grant  took  out  a  fresh  cigar  and 
lighted  it,  smiled,  and  said  never  a  word. 

Vicksburg  was  no  longer  the  unapproachable 
Gibraltar  of  America.  This  wonderful  campaign 
had  made  her  like  any  other  fortress.  Grant's 
lines  were  drawn  about  her,  and  the  bluffs  which 
so  long  had  baffled  him  now  guarded  his  new  base 
of  supplies.  The  soldiers  had  contrived  to  live 
fairly  well  off  the  country  and  had  not  suffered 
from  hunger,  though  they  had  eaten  so  much  poul 
try  with  so  little  bread  that  the  sight  of  a  chicken 
disgusted  them.  Never,  perhaps,  was  a  campaign 
carried  out  so  precisely  in  accordance  with  its 
plan.  It  was  just  eighteen  days  since  Grant  had 
crossed  the  Mississippi,  eleven  since  he  An  amazing 
had  cut  loose  from  his  base  at  Grand  campaign. 
Gulf.  In  those  eighteen  days  he  had  marched  200 
miles,  and  by  the  novelty  of  his  movements  dis 
concerted  and  separated  forces  much  larger  than 
his  own.  With  a  loss  of  not  more  than  5000  men 
he  had  defeated  two  armies  in  five  battles,  taking 
nearly  100  cannon,  and  destroying  or  capturing 
more  than  12,000  of  the  enemy.  And  to  crown 
all,  he  had  solved  the  apparently  insoluble  problem 


242     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

of  investing  Vicksburg.  To  find  a  parallel  in 
military  history  to  the  deeds  of  those  eighteen  days, 
we  must  go  back  to  the  first  Italian  campaign  of 
Napoleon  in  1796. 

When  Johnston,  on  the  night  of  the  17th,  heard 
of  the  decisive  overthrow  at  Champion's  Hill,  he 
instantly  sent  word  to  Pemberton  to  abandon  Vicks 
burg  if  not  too  late,  and  march  northeastward  to 
join  him  at  Vernon.  He  saw  that  Haines  Bluff 
must  fall,  that  Vicksburg  would  then  become 
untenable,  and  that  Pemberton's  only  remaining 
chance  was  to  save  his  army.  It  was  noon  of  the 
Vicksburg  18th  when  Pemberton  received  this  mes- 
invested.  sage,  and  it  nearly  drove  him  frantic. 
He  had  not  realized  the  full  significance  of  his 
defeat,  and  could  not  bring  himself  to  admit  that 
the  case  was  as  bad  as  the  sagacious  Johnston  saw 
it  to  be.  While  he  was  discussing  the  matter  with 
his  generals,  Sherman  had  occupied  the  road  lead 
ing  northeast  in  such  force  that  it  was  decided  the 
order  could  not  be  carried  put.  So  Pemberton 
waited  his  doom.  The  city  was  well  provided  with 
food,  but  in  course  of  time  it  must  succumb  to 
starvation,  unless  relieved. 

Grant,  however,  did  not  at  first  contemplate 
a  siege.  The  Confederates  were  so  disheartened 
by  their  defeats  that  he  doubted  their  ability  to 
resist  an  assault.  On  the  19th  an  attempt  was 


The  Fall  of  Vicksburg  243 

made  to  storm  their  works,  but  it  was  unsuccess 
ful,  though  it  secured  more  advanced  Two  unguc 
and  sheltered  positions  for  the  Federal  cessful  as- 
troops.  The  failure  was  disappoint 
ing,  for  time  was  precious.  Reinforcements  were 
on  the  way  to  Johnston,  and  it  was  feared  that  he 
might  approach  in  sufficient  strength  to  relieve  the 
city.  Accordingly  on  the  22d  another  and  desper 
ate  assault  was  made.  The  Federals  pressed  up 
close  to  the  works  under  a  murderous  fire.  In 
several  places  brave  men  succeeded  in  climbing 
the  parapets  and  planting  their  flags,  where  they 
waved  several  hours,  while  the  rebels  were  shot 
down  as  fast  as  they  stepped  up  to  remove  them ; 
but  the  works  were  not  carried.  Two  of  these 
cases  occurred  in  McClernand's  corps,  just  as  Grant 
was  about  to  give  orders  to  stop  the  assault.  In 
an  altogether  too  sanguine  and  heated  mood  Mc- 
Clernand  sent  word  that  he  was  "  partly  in  posses 
sion  of  two  forts  "  and  with  a  vigorous  push  hoped 
to  carry  everything  in  front  of  him.  This  natu 
rally  led  Grant  to  renew  the  fruitless  assault. 
Similar  incidents  occurred  in  Sherman's  and  Mc- 
Pherson's  commands,  but  their  military  eyes  read 
the  situation  more  correctly.  If  McClernand  had 
sent  word  that  his  men  had  reached  the  ditch  but 
could  not  get  into  the  forts,  he  would  have  described 
just  what  he  saw  before  him,  and  much  useless 


244     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

bloodshed  would  have  been  avoided.  In  these  two 
assaults  of  the  19th  and  22d  the  Union  army  lost 
4000  men,  and  made  up  its  mind  to  settle  down  to 
a  regular  siege.  Shortly  after  this  McClernand 
issued  a  congratulatory  address  to  his  corps,  full 
of  insinuations  against  the  other  troops  and  their 
commanders.  The  address  was  evidently  intended 
McClernand  for  a  political  constituency  in  Illinois. 
It  was  published  in  the  newspapers, 
but,  in  flat  defiance  of  army  regulations,  no  copy 
of  it  had  been  sent  to  headquarters.  This  was  a 
plain  act  of  insubordination.  During  all  these 
months  Grant  had  been  extremely  patient  with 
McClernand,  for,  as  he  said,  "  he  could  not  afford 
to  quarrel  with  a  man  whom  he  had  to  command." 
Now,  however,  he  sent  him  home  to  Illinois,  and 
gave  the  command  of  his  corps  to  a  trained  and 
well-tried  soldier,  General  Edward  Ord.  This 
was  virtually  the  end  of  McClernaiid's  military 
career,  though  he  afterward  held  some  obscure 
position  in  Texas. 

As  soon  as  a  siege  was  decided  on,  provision 
had  to  be  made  against  the  contingency  of  John 
ston's  arrival.  Grant's  army  was  reinforced  from 
various  quarters  till  it  numbered  70,000  men,  so 
that  he  was  enabled  to  detach  a  strong  force  under 
Sherman  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Big  Black  river 
in  his  rear.  Defensive  works  were  raised  along 


The  Fall  of  Vicksburg  245 

this  line  and  as  far  as  Haines  Bluff,  so  strong 
that  when  Johnston,  after  collecting  Vicksburg 
with  much  difficulty  30,000  men,  ar-  ^sieged, 
rived  in  the  neighbourhood,  he  prudently  refrained 
from  making  an  attack.  Under  such  circum 
stances  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  was  only  a  question 
of  time.  There  was  no  more  fighting  worthy  of 
mention.  Mining,  countermining,  and  sapping 
went  on  as  usual  in  sieges.  Shells  were  thrown 
into  the  city  as  they  had  been  for  months,  only 
now  more  constantly,  the  army's  siege  guns  aiding 
the  mortars  of  the  fleet.  To  escape  this  perpetual 
storm  of  deadly  missiles,  the  inhabitants  had  re 
verted  to  the  custom  of  earlier  ages  and  learned  to 
dwell  in  caves.  The  bluff  on  which  the  city  stood 
was  honeycombed  with  subterranean  vaults  and 
passages,  like  the  Roman  catacombs,  and  caves 
favourably  situated  brought  high  rents.  Food 
grew  scarcer  and  scarcer.  Flour  sold  at  ten  dol 
lars  a  pound  and  bacon  at  five  dollars  a  pound. 
Mule  meat  *  was  in  demand.  "  Mule  tongue  cold, 
a  la  Bray,"  it  was  jocosely  said,  was  a  favourite 
side  dish.  On  the  28th  of  June  Pemberton  re 
ceived  a  curious  letter  from  an  unknown  number 
of  soldiers,  which  said,  among  other  things,  "  If 
you  can't  feed  us  you  had  better  surrender  us,  hor- 

1  Which  if  well  fatted  is  a  great  delicacy,  as   French  cooks 
know ;  but  doubtless  the  mule  meat  of  sieges  is  lean  and  tough. 


246     The,  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

rible  as  the  idea  is.  ...  I  tell  you  plainly,  men 
are  not  going  to  lie  here  and  perish  ;  if  they  do 
love  their  country,  self-preservation  is  the  first 
law  of  nature,  and  hunger  will  compel  a  man  to 
do  almost  anything.  You  had  better  heed  a  warn 
ing  voice,  though  it  is  the  voice  of  a  private  sol 
dier.  This  army  is  now  ripe  for  mutiny  unless  it 
can  be  fed."  The  newspapers  —  which  are  not 
given  to  looking  facts  in  the  face  —  tried  to  take 
a  more  hopeful  view.  On  July  2  one  of  them 
said :  "  The  great  Ulysses  has  expressed  his  inten 
tion  of  celebrating  the  Fourth  of  July  in  Vicks- 
burg  by  a  grand  dinner.  .  .  .  Ulysses  must  get 
into  the  city  before  he  dines  in  it.  The  way  to 
cook  a  rabbit  is  first  catch  the  rabbit,"  etc. 

But  Ulysses  had  caught  his  rabbit.  On  that 
same  day  Pemberton  had  abandoned  all  hope,  and 
next  morning  he  sent  out  a  flag  of  truce.  The 
day  was  spent  in  arranging  terms.  Grant  did  not 
give  up  his  principle  of  "  unconditional  surrender," 
but  allowed  some  merely  formal  privileges,  such 
as  marching  out  with  colours  flying  to  stack  arms. 
Surrender  of  The  prisoners  were  all  paroled,  thus 
Vicksburg.  saving  the  time  and  expense  of  trans 
porting  and  feeding  so  great  a  number  of  men. 
At  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  Fourth  of 
July  the  Union  army  occupied  the  city,  and  before 
evening  Sherman  had  started  with  50,000  men 


The  Fall  of  Vicksburg  247 

in  pursuit  of  Johnston,  whom  he  chased  beyond 
the  state  capital,  and  left  too  hopelessly  demoral 
ized  to  threaten  any  more  mischief  in  that  tpart 
of  the  world. 

The  capture  of  Pemberton's  army  was  the  lar 
gest  that  up  to  that  time  had  been  made  in  modern 
warfare.  The  nearest  approach  to  it  had  been 
Napoleon's  capture  of  the  Austrian  army  at  Ulm 
in  1805,  when  he  took  30,000  men  and  60  cannon. 
At  Vicksburg  Grant  took  37,000  men  and  172 
cannon.  Sedan  and  Metz  were  still  in  the  future. 
There  was  no  longer  any  question  as  to  Grant's 
military  capacity.  The  northern  people  were  wild 
with  delight,  while  the  first  chills  of  The^  turnin  - 
despair  began  to  creep  over  the  South-  point  of  the 
ern  Confederacy.  The  capture  of 
Vicksburg,  with  the  victory  just  won  at  Gettys 
burg,  marked  the  turning-point  of  the  Civil  War. 
Five  days  later  Port  Hudson,  which  had  withstood 
a  six  weeks'  siege  and  two  assaults,  surrendered 
to  General  Banks  on  hearing  of  the  fall  of  Vicks 
burg.  On  the  16th  of  July  the  merchant  steamer 
Imperial,  which  had  started  from  St.  Louis  on 
the  8th,  drew  up  to  the  wharf  at  New  Orleans,  and 
in  President  Lincoln's  vigorous  language,  "the 
Father  of  Waters  rolled  unvexed  to  the  sea." 


CHAPTER  VII 

CHICKAMAUGA 

NEXT  after  Kichmond  and  Vicksburg,  the 
mountain  fastness  of  Chattanooga  was  the  most 
Importance  important  strategic  point  in  the  South- 
of  Chatta-  ern  Confederacy.  It  was  the  centre  of 
great  lines  of  railroad  radiating  in 
every  direction  to  the  Mississippi,  the  Ohio,  the 
Atlantic  Ocean,  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Situ 
ated  at  the  lower  end  of  that  huge  mountain 
defile  known  as  East  Tennessee,  in  the  heart  of  a 
region  which  some  have  called  an  American  Swit 
zerland,  it  guards  the  only  avenue  by  which  Vir 
ginia  can  be  approached  directly  from  the  south 
western  states.  Its  possession  by  a  Federal  army 
would  practically  isolate  Virginia  and  North 
Carolina  on  the  one  hand,  and  lop  off  Mississippi 
and  Alabama  on  the  other  ;  and  by  opening  the 
way  into  the  interior  of  Georgia  would  throw  what 
was  left  of  the  war  entirely  into  the  Atlantic 
region.  Its  possession  by  the  Confederates  gave 
them  control  of  eastern  Tennessee,  enabled  them 
easily  to  move  reinforcements  between  Virginia 


Chickamauga  249 

and   the  West,  and  was  a  perpetual  menace   to 
middle  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. 

Besides  this  great  strategic  importance,  Chatta 
nooga  had  its  peculiar  political  value.  It  was  sit 
uated  in  the  midst  of  a  population  which  from  the 
beginning  of  the  war  had  suffered  persecution  for 
their  enthusiastic  and  uncompromising  love  of  the 
Union.  Still  nearer  to  the  heart  of  the  Confed 
eracy,  indeed,  there  was  a  considerable  area  where 
sentiments  of  loyalty  to  the  Union  were  strong,  but 
ineffective  because  of  their  isolation.  The  hardy 
mountaineers  of  western  North  Caro-  „ 

The  loyal 

lina   and   northern  Georgia  and  Ala-   mountaineers 
bama    were    not    associated    by    any   0*tneAlle- 

J  J     ghames. 

bonds  of  interest  with  the  slavehold 
ers  of  the  lowlands,  and  had  no  sympathy  with 
their  scheme  of  secession.  When  two  of  Footers 
gunboats,  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  ascended 
the  Tennessee  river  into  northern  Alabama,  they 
found,  in  some  places,  the  shores  crowded  with 
people  loudly  cheering  their  arrival  and  throwing 
up  their  hats  with  glee  at  sight  of  the  Union  flag. 
Even  in  South  Carolina,  in  the  upland  region 
which  in  the  Revolutionary  War  had  witnessed 
the  victories  of  King's  Mountain  and  the  Cowpens, 
it  is  said  that  not  one  person  in  ten  was  a  seces 
sionist.  This  whole  area  of  the  Alleghanies  was  a 
loyal  area,  and  to  clear  it  of  Confederate  armies, 


250     The  Mississipin  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

as  had  already  been  done  in  West  Virginia,  was  to 
set  it  free. 

Thus  political  and  military  reasons  combined  to 
make  Chattanooga  the  great  objective  point  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  as  Vicksburg  was  the 
goal  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  as  Kich- 
mond  was  the  goal  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
But  the  progress  of  the  Federals  toward  Chatta 
nooga  was  slower  and  less  steady  than  their  pro 
gress  toward  Vicksburg,  and  this  was  due  mainly 
to  their  different  relations  to  the  great  rivers.  In 
advancing  from  Cairo  toward  Vicksburg,  we  have 
seen  how  the  Federals  were  powerfully  assisted 
Theu  er  as  ^ar  as  Corinth  by  their  control  of 
Tennessee  the  Tennessee  river  as  a  highway  for 
suPplies.  Proceeding  up  the  Tennes- 


communica-  see,  which  in  that  part  of  its  course 
runs  parallel  to  the  Mississippi,  the 
Federals  were  at  the  same  time  conquering  the 
latter  river  downward,  simply  by  taking  its  great 
fortresses  one  after  another  in  flank.  When  they 
left  the  Tennessee  and  had  to  support  themselves 
by  railroads,  their  progress  became  much  more 
difficult,  as  was  illustrated  by  the  failure  of  Grant's 
first  movement  against  Vicksburg.  Now  the  Ten 
nessee  river  is  not  navigable  for  ships  of  war  above 
the  Muscle  Shoals  near  Florence  in  Alabama, 
some  400  miles  from  its  mouth  and  more  than  200 


CMckamauga  251 

miles  below  Chattanooga.  Even  if  it  were  naviga 
ble  in  that  part  of  its  course,  its  value  as  a  line  of 
communication  was  greatly  diminished  by  the  fact 
of  its  running  parallel  instead  of  perpendicular  to 
the  enemy's  front.  In  approaching  Chattanooga, 
therefore,  the  Federals  were  obliged  to  depend  for 
their  supplies  on  the  long  line  of  railway  running 
from  Louisville  through  Nashville ;  and  at  least 
half  their  energies  were  consumed  in  watching  this 
line. 

We  have  seen  that  there  was  a  moment  in  the 
summer  of  1862  when  Chattanooga  might  have 
been  seized  and  held.  As  the  Federals  A  lost  oppor- 
had  that  spring  concentrated  all  their  tunity- 
forces  west  of  the  Alleghanies  for  the  great  move 
ment  upon  Corinth,  so  the  Confederates  had  gath 
ered  together  all  their  strength  to  oppose  them, 
and  Chattanooga  was  left  well-nigh  defenceless,  so 
that  a  single  Federal  brigade  was  able  to  begin 
bombarding  it.  After  the  fall  of  Corinth,  the 
prize  of  Chattanooga  was  for  him  that  should  move 
quickest.  Buell  might  have  taken  it,  had  not 
Halleck  insisted  upon  his  employing  the  precious 
hours  in  mending  a  railroad  that  was  of  no  use 
to  any  one  but  the  rebels  when  mended.  This 
lamentable  delay  allowed  Bragg  to  get  there  first, 
and  within  six  weeks  he  had  illustrated  its  use  as  a 
sally-port  from  which  to  invade  Kentucky,  throw 


252     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Cincinnati  into  a  panic,  and  threaten  the  destruc 
tion  of  Buell's  fine  army. 

The  most  that  was  accomplished  by  the  tremen 
dous  battle  at  Stone  river  was  to  keep  Bragg  upon 
the  defensive.  Had  Rosecrans's  plan  of  attack 
succeeded  that  day,  the  total  defeat  of  Bragg 
would  have  uncovered  Chattanooga.  As  it  was, 
Rosecrans  just  got  off  with  a  whole  skin,  and  the 
two  armies  lay  sullenly  facing  each  other,  their 
fronts  about  thirty  miles  apart,  Rosecrans  at  Mur- 
freesboro,  Bragg  at  Shelbyville  and  Tullahoma, 
for  nearly  six  months.  Things  were  not  so  quiet, 
however,  as  would  seem  from  this  immobility  of 
the  armies.  It  was  a  busy  half  year.  Each  gen- 
Cavalry  eral  was  trying  with  his  cavalry  to 
raids-  reach  out  a  long  arm  behind  the  other 
and  cut  his  communications.  They  had  tried  hard 
pounding  at  Stone  river  without  much  profit  to 
either ;  now  it  remained  to  be  seen  which  could 
trip  the  other  up.  The  cavalry  expeditions  on 
either  side  came  almost  to  assume  the  proportions 
of  campaigns.  At  the  end  of  January  Bragg  sent 
a  cavalry  force  to  surprise  and  capture  Fort  Donel- 
son,  but  it  was  repulsed,  and  came  back  after  losing 
1000  men.  In  April  Rosecrans  sent  out  a  troop 
which  penetrated  far  into  Georgia,  cutting  rail 
roads,  defeating  the  brilliant  raider  Forrest,  and 
burning  the  Round  Mountain  ironworks,  one  of 


Chickamauga  253 

the  principal  manufactories  of  war  material  in  the 
South ;  until  at  length  Forrest  attacked  again  and 
captured  the  whole  troop,  1500  in  number. 

In  warfare  of  this  kind  the  Confederates  had  the 
advantage,  as  their  cavalry  was  more  numerous 
and  better  trained ;  and  when  Rosecrans  at  length 
began  to  rival  them  in  this  arm  of  the  service,  the 
inequality  was  restored  by  the  arrival  of  Van  Dorn 
from  Mississippi.  In  May,  1863,  Van  Dorn  was 
murdered  in  a  private  quarrel,  and  the  loss  was  a 
grievous  one  to  Bragg,  as  he  had  set  his  heart 
upon  starving  his  antagonist  into  retreating.  How 
diligently  the  Confederates  worked  may  Diligence  in 
be  seen  from  the  report  of  the  superin-  destruction, 
tendent  of  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  railroad 
for  the  year  ending  July  1,  1863.  During  that 
year  there  were  but  seven  months  and  twelve  days 
when  trains  could  run  over  the  whole  length  of  the 
road.  Every  bridge  and  trestle  work  of  any  conse 
quence,  on  the  main  road  and  all  its  branches,  had 
been  destroyed  and  rebuilt  within  the  year  ;  many 
had  been  destroyed  and  rebuilt  three  or  four  times. 
Stations  and  cars  were  burned  and  engines  demol 
ished  ;  and  in  one  place  a  tunnel  had  been  choked 
with  rubbish  to  a  distance  of  800  feet.  Under 
such  circumstances  it  was  not  strange  that  Rose- 
crans's  army  should  often  have  had  to  subsist  on 
half  rations.  The  country  was  scoured  for  forage 


254     TJie  Mississi%)pi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

till  it  was  stripped  bare.  Vegetables  could  not  be 
had  in  quantity  sufficient  to  keep  off  scurvy.  In 
early  summer  a  regiment  passing  over  a  field  newly 
planted  with  potatoes  would  pull  them  up  and 
eagerly  devour  them  raw  without  waiting  to  wipe 
off  the  dirt. 

In  contending  with  such  difficulties,  and  with 
the  horrible  spring  roads,  the  months  wore  away, 
while  people  at  home  censured  Rosecrans  as  they 
censured  Grant,  and  wondered  whether  anything 
was  ever  going  to  be  done,  and  what  the  govern 
ment  was  spending  three  million  dollars  a  day  for. 
The  government  responded  to  these  expressions  of 
feeling,  and  early  in  the  spring  Halleck  hit  upon  a 
curious  device  for  hastening  matters.  He  wrote 
letters  to  Rosecrans  and  Grant,  offering  the  rank 
of  major-general  in  the  regular  army  to  the  gen 
eral  who  should  soonest  win  an  important  victory. 
Grant  never  took  any  notice  of  the  letter,  but 
Rosecrans  treated  it  as  an  insult,  and 

Rosecrans 

snubs  Hal-  replied  to  Halleck  that  he  felt  "de 
graded  at  such  an  auctioneering  of 
honours,"  and  that  if  we  had  a  general  who  would 
fight  for  his  own  personal  benefit  when  he  would 
not  for  the  sake  of  his  country,  he  ought  to  be 
despised  by  all  honourable  men.  The  incident  is 
interesting,  and  strongly  characteristic  of  the  men 
concerned.  Rosecrans's  feelings  were  those  of  a 


Chickamauga  255 

high-spirited  gentleman,  but  it  was  impolitic  thus 
to  show  his  contempt  for  his  superior  officer;  it 
set  not  only  Halleck,  but  the  despotic  and  passion 
ate  Stan  ton  against  him.1  Perhaps  Grant's  cold 
silence  was  not  less  eloquent,  but  he  presently 
won  such  a  triumph  at  Vicksburg  as  made  it  of 
little  account  how  Halleck  felt. 

In  May,  when  Johnston  was  straining  every 
nerve  to  raise  a  force  to  relieve  Vicksburg,  the 
question  arose  whether  Eosecrans  ought  not  at 
once  to  move  against  Bragg,  to  keep  him  from 
sparing  any  of  his  men  for  such  a  purpose.  Hal- 

1  If  Stanton  and  Halleck  had  expected  to  find  in  Rosecrans  a 
more  docile  and  submissive  general  than  Buell,  they  were  greatly 
mistaken.  Of  course  I  am  not  here  speaking1  of  military  subordi 
nation,  but  of  the  abdication  of  individual  judgment,  which  is  a 
very  different  thing.  Perhaps  they  may  now  have  been  able,  by 
the  comparative  method,  to  get  some  light  on  the  subject  of 
Buell's  alleged  "slowness."  During  the  first  eight  months  under 
Rosecrans,  from  October,  1862,  to  June,  1863,  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  marched  about  32  miles  and  fought  the  battle  of 
Stone  river.  In  the  preceding  eight  months  under  Buell  the  same 
army  had  marched 

from  Louisville  to  Nashville  185  miles 

from  Nashville  to  Corinth  217     " 

from  Corinth  to  Battle  Creek  217     " 

thence  via  Nashville  to  Louisville     336     " 
thence  circuitously  in  pursuit   of 

Bragg,  and  back  to  Nashville       485     " 

In  all,  1440  miles,  besides  fighting  the  battles  of  Shiloh  and  Perry- 
ville.  See  Fry,  The  Army  under  Buell,  p.  76. 


256     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

leek  urged  such  a  movement,  and  Grant  took  the 
same  view,  but  Rosecrans  ingeniously  argued  that 
if  Bragg  were  to  be  defeated  so  as  to  lose  Chatta 
nooga,  his  troops  would  be  all  the  more  likely  to  be 
sent  to  Mississippi,  just  as  after  the  fall  of  Corinth 
they  had  hastened  from  Mississippi  to  Chattanooga. 
However,  as  the  siege  of  Vieksburg  progressed 
Rosecrans  de-  toward  its  close,  Rosecrans  decided 

cidestomove.    to  move    ;n   f^  force?  an(j  Qn  the  24th 

of  June  his  army  started  from  Murfreesboro. 
About  the  same  time  Burnside,  who  had  been  in 
command  at  Cincinnati,  moved  into  eastern  Ten 
nessee  with  25,000  men,  to  take  Knoxville  and  put 
an  end  to  the  distresses  there. 

Rosecrans's  advance  was  well-planned  and  skil 
fully  executed.     He    hoped   to  manoeuvre  Bragg 
back  upon  Chattanooga  and  out  of  it 

A  prelimi- 

nary  cam-        without  a  battle,  and  his  first  steps  to- 
of  ward  this  end  were  well  taken.     Mak- 


manceuvres. 


ing  a  false  movement  upon  Bragg's 
advanced  position  at  Shelbyville,  and  thus  absorb 
ing  the  enemy's  attention,  he  rapidly  concentrated 
his  forces  at  Manchester,  threatening  Bragg's  line 
of  retreat.  The  Confederate  general  then  fell 
back  behind  his  fortifications  at  Tnllahoma.  But 
now,  by  a  second  turning  movement,  Rosecrans 
obliged  him  to  abandon  this  strong  position  and 
fall  back  across  the  mountains  and  the  river  into 


Chickamauga  257 

Chattanooga.  This  preliminary  campaign  ended 
on  the  3d  of  July,  the  same  day  which  witnessed 
Meade's  victory  at  Gettysburg  and  the  hoisting  o£ 
the  white  flag  by  the  rebel  commander  at  Vicks- 
burg.  In  nine  days  Rosecrans  had  driven  the 
enemy  from  middle  Tennessee  without  a  battle. 
He  had  one  great  advantage  in  a  superiority  of 
numbers  which  enabled  him  to  extend  his  left  wing 
toward  the  enemy's  rear,  while  still  retaining  force 
enough  on  his  right  to  make  serious  demonstrations 
there.  He  had  now  nearly  70,000  men,  while 
Bragg  had  but  43,000.  Accordingly  on  reaching 
Chattanooga,  Bragg  felt  it  necessary  to  call  in 
Buckner's  force  from  eastern  Tennessee,  thus  giv 
ing  up  Knoxville,  which  Burnside  immediately 
occupied.  Much  good  had  thus  been  accomplished 
by  Rosecrans  at  small  cost.  The  people,  elated 
with  the  recent  victories  as  much  as  they  had  be 
fore  been  depressed,  looked  on  with  eager  expecta 
tion.  Grant,  Rosecrans,  and  Meade  were  at  that 
moment  the  three  conspicuous  figures  whose  every 
movement  occupied  the  attention  of  the  whole 
country. 

The  second  stage  of  the  campaign  so  well  begun 
was  devoted  to  driving  the  enemy  out  of  Chatta 
nooga.  The  place  was  excessively  difficult  to  ap 
proach  from  the  north  side  of  the  Tennessee  river 
in  any  direction.  The  Union  army  lay  in  a  north- 


258     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

east  and  southwest  line  from  McMinnville  to  Win- 
The  ap-  chester.     The  most  direct  approach  to 

proachesto  Chattanooga  was  by  the  left  through 
Therman  and  over  Waldron's  Ridge,  a 
spur  of  the  Cumberland  Mountains  named  after 
a  hardy  pioneer  of  a  century  ago.  But  Rosecrans 
had  two  good  objections  to  that  road.  One  was 
that  it  would  carry  him  far  from  the  railway,  with 
a  long  wagon-haul  over  steep  and  dangerous  roads  ; 
the  other  was  that  Bragg  fully  expected  him  to 
come  that  way  in  spite  of  its  difficulty.  The  alter 
native  route  was  by  the  right  through  Bridgeport 
and  Stevenson  and  over  the  mountains  of  northern 
Alabama  and  Georgia.  This  would  keep  Rose 
crans  near  to  the  railway  and  to  his  depot  of  sup 
plies  which  he  was  just  establishing  at  Stevenson, 
but  it  necessitated  his  moving  through  a  country 
so  difficult  that  Bragg  did  not  believe  he  would 
dare  to  attempt  it.  A  series  of  parallel  mountain 
ranges,  hard  to  climb  and  penetrable  only  through 
narrow  defiles,  stood  in  his  way. 

The  first  of  these  steep  ranges,  parallel  to  the 
Tennessee  river  and  very  near  its  bank,  was  known 
as  Raccoon  Mountain.  Next  came  Lookout  Moun 
tain,  a  name  destined  to  be  famous  in  song  and 
story,  and  more  descriptive  than  such  names  some 
times  are.  The  mountain,  100  miles  in  length, 
rears  its  bold  crest  at  its  northern  end  nearly  3000 


Chickamauga  259 

feet  above  sea  level  and  more  than  1400  over  the 
great  river  whose  strong  swift  current  rushes  along 
below  on  its  journey  of  600  miles  to  its  junction 
with  the  Ohio.  It  is  here  crowned  with  steep  pali 
sades,  from  the  summit  of  which  parts  of  seven 
states  may  be  seen,  spread  out  in  a  A  difficult 
magnificent  panorama.  Toward  the  country- 
lofty  peaks  of  North  Carolina  —  the  highest  this 
side  of  the  Eocky  Mountains  —  it  bears  a  similar 
relation  to  that  held  by  the  Rigi-Kulm  in  presence 
of  its  neighbour  Alps.  Between  Raccoon  and 
Lookout  lies  the  wild  valley  drained  of  its  waters 
by  Lookout  creek.  Eastward  from  Lookout  comes 
Missionary  Ridge,  some  forty  miles  in  length  and 
running  also  up  to  the  river.  It  encloses  with 
Lookout  Mountain  the  Chattanooga  valley,  through 
which  flows  Chattanooga  creek ;  and  near  the 
mouth  of  the  creek  stands  the  town  of  Chatta 
nooga,  superbly  situated  in  the  midst  of  a  great 
amphitheatre  of  hills.  Its  position  may  well  sug 
gest  the  name  of  "  Hawk's  Nest,"  which  the  Indian 
word  has  been  supposed  to  mean  ;  but,  heartless 
as  it  seems  to  disturb  so  pretty  a  fancy,  we  have 
the  testimony  of  the  famous  chief,  John  Ross,  that 
in  his  native  Cherokee  the  name  "  Chattanooga  " 
means  "  a  good  fishing-place." 

Eastward  again  from  Missionary  Ridge  we  come 
upon    Pigeon    Mountain,    a   sickle-shaped    range 


260     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

enclosing  the  Cliickamauga  valley,  drained  by 
West  Cliickamauga  creek.  In  the  lower  part  of 
Mountains  ^is  valley  the  wide  space  contained 
after  within  the  curved  blade  of  the  sickle 

mountains.  ,11  ,1  p 

was  presently  to  become  the  scene  of 
the  most  dreadful  act  of  the  tragic  drama  now 
unfolding.  At  their  southern  or  upper  ends  the 
Chattanooga  and  Chickamauga  valleys  unite  in  a 
single  valley  known  as  McLemore's  Cove.  Still 
eastward  of  Pigeon  Mountain  we  find  Chick 
amauga  Hill  and  Taylor's  Ridge,  drained  by  the 
middle  and  eastern  branches  of  Chickamauga 
creek.  Crossing  these  ranges  we  come  to  Chatta 
nooga  Mountain,  the  last  of  the  series,  beyond 
which  the  streams  all  flow  in  the  opposite  direction 
toward  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  East  of  the  whole 
series,  and  on  the  southern  watershed,  stand  the 
towns  of  Dalton  and  Resaca,  stations  on  the  rail 
road  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta,  where  Bragg 
had  his  base  of  supplies. 

Now,  obviously  by  moving  his  army  directly 
across  these  formidable  mountain  barriers  and  aim 
ing  straight  at  Dalton,  Rosecrans  would  keep  his 
own  base  at  Stevenson  well-covered,  while  he  would 
threaten  the  enemy's  line  of  communications  and 
compel  him  to  evacuate  Chattanooga.  In  spite  of 
its  natural  difficulties,  therefore,  Rosecrans  chose 
this  route,  more  especially  as  he  perceived  that 


Chickamauga  261 

Bragg' s  attention  was  absorbed  in  the  opposite 
direction.  Accordingly,  as  soon  as  the 

In  moving 

railroad  to  Stevenson  was  in  thorough    over  the 
repair,  and  a  sufficiency  of  supplies  ac-   mountains 
cumulated  there,  Rosecrans  crossed  the   greatiy  ex- 
Cumberland  Mountains  and  descended    tends  his 
into  the  valley  of  the  Tennessee  river. 
The  more  effectually  to  hoodwink  Bragg,  he  kept 
his  left  wins:  thrown  out  so  as  to  menace  Chatta- 

O 

nooga  from  the  north  ;  and  on  the  20th  of  August 
he  began  shelling  the  town  from  across  the  river. 
His  front  extended  from  opposite  Harrison,  ten 
miles  above  Chattanooga,  to  Bellefonte,  fifty  miles 
below,  too  great  a  distance  for  his  numbers  to 
cover.  Between  the  29th  of  August  and  the  4th 
of  September,  still  keeping  up  his  demonstrations 
on  the  left,  Rosecrans  moved  the  great  bulk  of  his 
army  across  the  river  and  began  his  march  over 
Raccoon  Mountain.  The  left  wing,  under  Critten- 
den,  took  position  at  Wauhatchie,  a  railway  station 
in  Lookout  valley ;  the  centre,  under  Thomas, 
crossed  to  Trenton  ;  the  right  wing,  under  McCook, 
crossed  from  Stevenson  and  Bellefonte  to  Valley 
Head,  whence  cavalry  demonstrations  were  made 
as  far  as  Alpine.  These  movements  were  com 
pleted  by  the  8th  of  September.  When  Bragg  first 
began  to  hear  of  them  he  was  incredulous,  but  at 
length,  on  the  7th  and  8th  of  September,  taking 


262     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

in  the  situation  and  seeing  his  communications 
Bra  threatened,  he  evacuated  Chattanooga 

evacuates         and    moved    twenty-five    miles    south 

Chattanooga.     ^    Lafayette?     where     he    covered    the 

railroad  and  hoped  to  fall  heavily  upon  the  Fed 
eral  columns  as  they  debouched  from  the  mountain 
passes.  On  the  9th  Crittenden's  corps  marched 
from  Wauhatchie  into  Chattanooga  and  took  pos 
session  of  that  long-coveted  town. 

This  capture  (as  it  seemed)  of  the  prize  by  sheer 
manoeuvring,  without  a  battle,  was  hailed  by  the 
northern  people  with  an  outburst  of  joy.  It 
seemed  as  if  everything  were  going  right  at  last. 
But  dire  disaster  was  soon  to  follow  on  the  heels 
of  this  premature  rejoicing.  The  seeds  of  calam- 
Seeds  of  ity  were  sown  in  the  enormous  exten- 

disaster.  sjon  of  the  Federal  lines.     Two  alter 

natives  were  open  to  Rosecrans.  On  the  one  hand 
he  might  draw  the  forces  of  Thomas  and  McCook 

O 

down  Lookout  valley  behind  the  friendly  shelter 
of  the  great  mountain,  and,  passing  around  its 
northern  point  in  Crittenden's  footsteps,  concen 
trate  his  army  upon  Chattanooga.  The  north 
ern  crests  of  Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary 
Ridge,  which  command  the  amphitheatre  in  which 
the  town  is  situated,  would  require  to  be  held  in 
force.  Then  Chattanooga  could  be  held  against 
all  comers  and  made  the  starting-point  for  a  new 


Chickamauga  263 

movement  for  the  overthrow  of  Bragg  and  his 
army.  This  would  have  been  practi-  TWO  alter- 
cable  and  prudent,  whereas  in  that  dif-  natlves- 
ficult  and  dangerous  country,  any  other  course 
was  needlessly  venturesome.  In  one  of  those 
wild  glens  it  was  not  always  easy  to  learn  what 
mischief  might  be  brewing  in  another,  and  in  issu 
ing  from  the  steep  and  narrow  passes  one  might 
come  upon  ruin  unawares.  But  Rosecrans  in  an 
evil  hour  chose  the  alternative  of  pushing  through 
the  mountains,  in  the  hope  of  cutting  off  Bragg's 
southward  retreat  and  annihilating  his  army  on 
the  spot. 

In  adopting  this  hazardous  course  Rosecrans  was 
duped  by  appearances   and  by  treacherous  infor 
mation.    Bragg  in  evacuating  Chattanooga  had  not 
the  slightest  intention  of  retreating.    He  had  come 
out  full  of  the  spirit  of  fight,  to  cover  his  commu 
nications  and  to  find  his  antagonist.     But  he  sent 
scores  of  pretended  deserters  through  the  moun 
tains  and  into  Chattanooga,  telling  sad    Rosecrans 
stories  of  the  headlong  flight  and  utter   chooses  the 
demoralization     of     the      Confederate 
army.     This  notion  was  even,  in   some  unknown 
way,  disseminated  in  Washing-ton,  and  Rosecrans 
received  telegrams  from  that  city  which  confirmed 
him    in    his    false    impressions.      Accordingly   he 
ordered  Crittenden  to  leave  one  brigade  in  Chat- 


264     Tlie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

tanooga,  and  with  all  the  rest  of  his  corps  pursue 
the  enemy  along  the  railroad  to  Ringgold  and 
Dalton.  He  sent  Thomas's  corps  through  two 
rugged  gaps  in  Lookout  Mountain  into  McLe- 
more's  Cove ;  and  he  pushed  forward  McCook 
from  Valley  Head  to  Alpine  and  Summerville. 
Such  movements  were  hardly  justifiable  except 
against  a  beaten  and  demoralized  enemy.  The 
orders  were  issued  on  the  9th  of  September,  and  it 
was  not  until  the  12th  that  Rosecrans  discovered 
his  frightful  mistake.  No  wonder  if  the  suddenness 
of  the  discovery  somewhat  shook  his  nerves.  The 
situation  was  appalling.  The  Union  army  was 
separated  into  three  parts  over  a  distance  of  fifty- 
seven  miles  from  Ringgold  to  Alpine,  for  McCook 
had  luckily  taken  the  alarm  and  gone  no  farther. 
These  three  corps  numbered  each  scarcely  20,000 
men ;  and  between  them  at  Lafayette,  close  in 
front  of  the  Union  centre,  was  Bragg's  whole  army 
in  excellent  condition  and  reinforced  by  troops 
from  Mississippi,  so  that  it  numbered  full  55,000 ! 
It  looked  as  if  Rosecrans  were  going  to  end  his 
brilliant  campaign  by  seeing  his  army  annihilated 
corps  by  corps,  for  he  could  not  possibly  draw  it 
together  in  less  than  three  or  four  days. 

Tilings,  however,  did  not  come  to  such  a  pass 
as  that.  If  Lee  or  Stonewall  Jackson  had  been 
in  Bragg's  place,  the  worst  might  have  happened, 


CMckamauga  265 

but  Bragg  was  too  slow  in  making  up  his  mind.1 
Crittenclen    moved   from    Ringgold    into    Chicka- 
mauga  valley,  near  Lee  and  Gordon's   Bra^g  loses 
Mill,  and  Thomas,  skilfully  withdraw-   the  golden 

,.  ,1  ,     c  -,  .          opportunity. 

ing  from  the  enemy  s  rroiit  and  moving 
along  the  west  side  of  Missionary  Ridge,  passed 
through  Cooper's  Gap  and  joined  him.  But  there 
was  woeful  delay  in  making  this  junction,  and  the 
delay  was  due  to  the  necessity  which  Thomas  was 
under  of  waiting  for  McCook.  The  latter  general 
was  ordered  by  Rosecrans  to  march  from  Alpine 
through  Dougherty's  Gap,  straight  into  McLe- 
more's  Cove,  but  being  assured  by  people  in  the 
neighbourhood  that  there  was  no  practicable  road 
that  way,  he  retraced  his  steps  over  Lookout 
Mountain  to  Valley  Head,  and  marched  through 
Johnson's  Crook  and  Stevens's  and  Cooper's  Gaps 

1  A  few  days  before,  in  a  conversation  with  General  Daniel 
Hill,  Bragg  had  petulantly  exclaimed  :  "  It  is  said  to  be  easy  to 
defend  a  mountainous  country,  but  mountains  hide  your  foe  from 
you,  while  they  are  full  of  gaps  through  which  he  can  pounce 
upon  you  at  any  time.  A  mountain  is  like  the  wall  of  a  house 
full  of  rat-holes.  The  rat  lies  hidden  in  his  hole,  ready  to  pop 
out  when  no  one  is  watching.  Who  can  tell  what  lies  behind 
yonder  wall  ?  "  The  truth  is,  says  General  Hill,  that  Bragg  "  was 
bewildered  by  the  popping  out  of  the  rats  from  so  many  holes. 
The  wide  dispersion  of  the  Federal  forces,  and  their  confrontal  of 
him  at  so  many  points,  perplexed  him,  instead  of  being  a  source 
of  congratulation  that  such  grand  opportunities  were  offered  for 
crushing  them  one  by  one."  Battles  and  Leaders,  iii.  641,  644. 


266     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

into  Chickamauga  valley.  This  roundabout  route 
took  him  five  days  to  traverse,  and  it  was  not 
until  the  night  of  the  18th  that  his  corps  was 
entirely  closed  up  on  Thomas's  right. 

Meanwhile  the  anxiety  of  Rosecrans  had  scarcely 
allowed  him  to  sleep,  —  and  with  good  reason. 
Even  as  it  was,  with  all  the  enemy's  slowness 
in  seizing  his  advantage,  this  delay  in  McCook's 
movements  came  near  destroying  the  army.  But 
for  this  delay  no  battle  need  have  been  fought 
in  Chickamauga  valley.  If  McCook  could  have 
Evil  results  come  UP  two  days  sooner,  the  army 
of  McCook's  would  probably  have  been  concentrated 
at  Chattanooga,  holding  the  crests  of 
Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary  Kidge.  Then 
Rosecrans's  mistake  would  have  been  retrieved, 
and  Bragg  could  not  have  attacked  him  save  at 
great  disadvantage.  The  delay  worked  mischief 
to  Rosecrans  in  two  ways.  It  detained  him  in 
Chickamauga  valley  at  least  two  days  longer  than 
there  would  otherwise  have  been  any  need  for,  and 
it  also  allowed  time  for  Bragg  to  receive  a  heavy 
reinforcement  from  Virginia.  Kosecrans  was  thus 
not  only  obliged  to  fight  in  the  wrong  place,  but  he 
was  obliged  to  fight  against  heavy  odds.  No  sooner 
had  the  news  of  the  evacuation  of  Chattanooga 
reached  Richmond  than  the  Confederate  govern 
ment  put  forth  its  utmost  energies  in  support  of 


CHICKAMAUGA,   SEPTEMBER   19,  1863 


ChicJcamauga  267 

Jefferson  Da  vis's  favourite  commander.  General 
James  Longstreet  —  a  host  in  himself  —  was  de 
tached  from  Lee's  army,  with  the  two  fine  divisions 
of  Hood  and  McLaws,  and  sent  in  all  possible 
haste  to  reinforce  General  Bragg.  Under  ordi 
nary  circumstances  this  reinforcement  would  have 
come  directly  by  rail  through  eastern  Tennessee, 
but  the  free  use  of  that  road  was  a  privilege 
which  the  rebels  were  never  again  to  enjoy.  The 
Federal  occupation  of  Knoxville  and  Chattanooga 
already  blocked  the  way,  so  that  Longstreet  was 
obliged  to  go  around  by  rail  through  the  Carolinas 
and  Georgia,  and  come  up  from  At-  Arrival  of 
lanta  to  Bragg's  assistance.  This  delay  Longstreet. 
was  probably  our  salvation.  If  Longstreet  had 
been  present  two  or  three  days  earlier,  it  is  not 
likely  that  Rosecrans  would  have  been  allowed  to 
concentrate  his  forces  without  preliminary  fight 
ing.  Three  brigades  of  Longstreet' s  corps  under 
General  Hood  arrived  on  the  18th,  —  the  same 
day  on  which  the  Federal  concentration  was  com 
pleted,  —  and  Bragg,  knowing  that  the  rest  would 
soon  arrive,  made  his  arrangements  for  an  attack 
on  the  following  day. 

The  details  of  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  are 
somewhat  complicated,  but  its  salient  points  are 
easy  to  understand.  Both  armies  were  in  Chicka 
mauga  valley,  Rosecrans  on  the  west  side  of  the 


268     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

creek,  Bragg  on  the  east  side.  It  would  have  been 
The  problem  Desirable  for  Rosecrans,  if  he  could 
atChicka-  have  done  so,  to  reach  Chattanooga 
without  a  battle,  and  then  choose  his 
own  time  and  place  for  fighting.  His  roads 
thither  lay  through  Mc.Farland  and  Rossville  Gaps 
in  Missionary  Ridge.  If  attacked  now,  he  must 
hold  these  roads  at  whatever  cost,  and  accordingly 
he  placed  Thomas  on  the  left,  opposite  Reed's  and 
Alexander's  bridges,  with  McCook  on  the  right 
and  Crittenden  in  reserve.  He  told  Thomas  that 
he  should  be  properly  reinforced  if  it  took  all  the 
rest  of  the  army  to  do  it.  On  the  other  hand, 
Bragg's  object  was  to  attack  the  Federal  left  in 
flank,  drive  it  back  in  confusion  on  the  centre,  and 
seize  the  roads  through  Rossville  and  McFarland 
Gaps,  thus  interposing  his  victorious  army  between 
Chattanooga  and  the  defeated  Federals.  His  plan 
of  battle  was  much  the  same  as  at  Stone  river, 
except  that  now  he  was  to  pivot  on  his  left  wing 
and  press  forward  with  his  right.  But  its  issue 
was  very  different  from  what  it  had  been  at  Stone 
river.  The  attack  which  he  had  planned  was  a 
failure  from  the  outset,  but  a  sudden  catastrophe 
in  a  different  part  of  the  field  —  an  accident  which 
was  not  down  on  anybody's  programme  —  threw 
victory  into  his  hands.  He  did  not  open  the  battle 
clearly  and  vigorously,  as  at  Stone  river.  Before 


CHICKAMAUGA,   SEPTEMBER  20,  1863,   MORNING 


Ckickamauga  269 

his  preparations  were  completed,  he  discovered 
that  the  Federal  lines  extended  much  farther  to 
the  north  than  he  had  supposed,  so  that  he  was 
himself  obliged  to  draw  northward.  While  he 
was  accomplishing  this  movement,  on  the  morning 
of  the  19th,  one  of  his  brigades  got  entangled  with 
one  of  Thomas's  brigades,  and  rein-  First  day  of 
forcements  coming  up  first  from  one  the  battle- 
side  and  then  from  the  other,  the  skirmish  quickly 
grew  into  a  battle,  which  raged  till  nightfall.  It 
was  a  series  of  desperate  charges  and  counter 
charges,  the  prelude  to  a  still  more  deadly  fight 
on  the  morrow.  At  the  close  of  the  day  Thomas's 
grasp  upon  the  Rossville  road  was  even  firmer  than 
at  the  beginning,  so  that  the  advantage  was,  on 
the  whole,  with  the  Federals. 

During  the  night  Longstreet  arrived  with  the 
remainder  of  his  corps,  and  Bragg  somewhat  im 
proved  the  arrangement  of  his  troops,  bringing  all 
his  infantry  across  the  creek,  and  placing  Polk  in 
command  on  his  right  and  Longstreet  on  his  left. 
His  plan  was  the  same  as  the  day  before  —  to 
wheel  on  his  left  as  a  pivot  and  turn  the  Federal 
left.  Polk  attacked  vigorously  between  nine  and 
ten  o'clock.  Thomas  held  his  own  as  sturdily  as 
before,  but  was  obliged  to  call  for  reinforcements, 
and  Rosecrans  began  weakening  his  right  in  order 
to  support  him.  While  this  was  going  on,  the 


270     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

catastrophe  occurred  which  gave  away  the  battle 
to  the  enemy.  /  Near  the  centre  of  the  Federal 
The  fatal  line,  where  the  shock  of  battle  had 
order.  not  ye^  arrivec^  three  divisions  were 

posted  in  zigzag  fashion.  The  first  of  these  was 
Reynolds's  division  ;  next  on  the  right  was  Bran- 
nan's,  considerably  refused  to  the  right  and  hidden 
among  trees  ;  next  was  Wood's  division,  nearly 
at  right  angles  to  Brannan's.  About  noon  an 
aide  of  General  Thomas,  riding  along  the  line 
and  not  seeing  Brannan's  men  in  their  screened 
position,  too  hastily  translated  his  first  crude 
impression  into  a  fact  and,  on  reaching  Thomas, 
informed  him  that  there  was  an  empty  space 
between  Eeynolds  and  Wood.  Thomas  instantly 
transmitted  the  false  information  to  Rosecrans. 
Now  Rosecrans  would  have  known  better,  had  it 
not  been  for  one  thing.  Some  time  before,  the 
place  now  occupied  by  Wood  had  been  occupied 
by  Negley ;  but  Negley  had  been  sent  to  the  left 
to  reinforce  Thomas,  and  Rosecrans  had  ordered 
Wood  to  take  his  place.  This  had  all  been  done, 
and  the  line  was  all  as  it  should  be.  But  when 
Rosecrans  heard  that  there  was  a  gap  in  the  line, 
he  naturally  supposed  that  Wood  had  not  yet  quite 
got  into  position,  and  he  sent  an  aide  to  hasten  his 
movements.  The  aide  thus  gave  the  order  in 
writing  :  "  The  General  Commanding  directs  that 


"  The  General  com 
manding  directs  that 
you  close  up  on  Rey 
nolds  as  fast  as  possi 
ble  and  support  him  " 


\ 


\ 


'.% 


\ 


I 

I* 
1° 


I 
I 


*  * 

^Reynolds 
Brannan 
Wood 


/ 

X/ 


t* 

/A 


CHICKAMAUGA:   THE   FATAL  ORDER  TO  WOOD 


Chickamaiiga  271 

you  close  up  on  Reynolds  as  fast  as  possible,  and 
support  him."  He  should  have  said  "  close  up  on 
Brannan."  General  Wood  was  naturally  bewil 
dered  by  such  a  mysterious  order.  How  could  he 
close  up  on  Reynolds,  when  there  was  Brannan's 
whole  division  in  line  between  them  ?  He  could 
not  close  up  on  him,  but  he  might  support  him  by 
passing  around  Brannan's  rear.  This,  thought 
Wood,  must  be  what  Rosecrans  meant,  and  so 
with  all  promptness  he  moved  his  division  accord 
ingly,  leaving  a  great  empty  space  in  the  very 
middle  of  the  battle-front.  Thus  in  the  endeavour 
to  fill  up  an  imaginary  gap  there  was  created  a 
real  gap.  It  was  just  such  a  sort  of  misunder 
standing  as  is  perpetually  happening  in  the  little 
ordinary  affairs  of  life.  How  often  do  we  witness 
innocent  but  awkward  blunders  arising  from  hasty 
observation  and  lack  of  precision  in  the  use  of  lan 
guage  !  But  war  has  no  pity  for  innocent  blun 
ders.  General  Longstreet  would  have  willingly 
sacrificed  ten  thousand  men  to  make  such  a  hole 
in  the  Federal  line  as  General  Wood  had  just  left 
there.  For  some  little  time  the  battle  had  been 
surging  along  down  the  line  toward  The  dire 
the  centre,  and  just  at  this  moment  catastrophe. 
Longstreet  received  Bragg's  order  to  attack.  Into 
the  dreadful  opening  which  Wood's  movement  had 
left,  Longstreet  poured  eight  brigades,  one  after 


272     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

another,  in  an  overwhelming  mass.  The  Federal 
divisions  on  either  side  were  slammed  out  of  place 
"  like  doors  swung  back  on  their  hinges  and  shat 
tered  by  the  blow."  The  whole  right  wing  was 
taken  on  its  left  flank,  completely  torn  away  from 
the  rest  of  the  army,  and  swept  off  the  field  in 
utter  and  hopeless  rout.  The  heroic  exertions  of 
division  and  brigade  commanders  were  all  in  vain. 
Nothing  human  could  stand  when  struck  in  such  a 
fashion.  Rallying  was  out  of  the  question  ;  there 
was  nothing  to  be  done  but  get  out  of  the  way. 
Rosecrans  was  caught  in  the  throng  and  whirled 
off  the  field,  and  so  were  McCook  and  Crittenden. 
The  cannon  were  all  in  the  enemy's  hands.  The 
road  to  McFarland  Gap  was  crowded  with  fugi 
tives.  More  than  half  the  Federal  army  was  in 
full  flight.  Not  an  officer  above  a  division-com 
mander  was  left  on  this  part  of  the  field. 

Happily,  however,  it  was  not  the  Federal  right 
wing  that  held  the  key  of  the  position.  That  key 
was  the  Rossville  road,  which  Thomas  had  been 
holding  like  a  vise  ever  since  yesterday  morning. 
If  the  enemy  were  to  gain  that  road  and  interpose 
between  Thomas  and  Missionary  Ridge,  they  could 
force  him  to  surrender  on  the  spot.  The  Army 
A  critical  °^  tne  Cumberland  would  be  annilii- 
moment.  lated.  Chattanooga  would  be  lost, 
and  the  rebel  army,  flushed  with  a  victory  far 


Chickamauga  273 

greater  than  any  they  had  yet  won,  a.  victory  com 
pared  to  which  even  Chancellorsville  was  nothing, 
would  in  a  few  weeks  plant  their  batteries  before 
Nashville,  perhaps  before  Cincinnati.  Such  mighty 
issues  rested  that  afternoon  upon  the  shoulders  of 
one  great  man.  It  was  a  crisis  scarcely  less  ter 
rible  than  that  of  Gettysburg.  But  the  occasion 
was  never  found  to  which  Thomas  proved  unequal. 
The  more  disasters  thickened  about  him,  the  more 
grandly  did  that  noble  Virginian  defy  them.  Calm 
and  imperturbable  at  all  times,  his  clear  head  was 
never  at  a  loss  for  resources.  The  extent  of  the 
disaster  upon  the  right  was  first  revealed  to  him 
by  the  appalling  sight  of  huge  masses  of  the 
enemy  coming  toward  his  flank  instead  of  the 
reinforcements  for  which  he  was  so  earnestly  look 
ing,  —  a  sight  fit  to  shake  the  stoutest  nerves ! 
Retreat  was  inevitable,  but  nothing  was  allowed 
to  loosen  his  hold  upon  the  position  he  had  under 
taken  to  defend.  Less  than  a  mile  in  his  rear 
there  was  a  curved  ridge  known  as  the  Horseshoe, 
convex  toward  the  enemy's  front,  and  over  this 
horseshoe  ran  the  Rossville  road,  that  goal  of  the 
enemy's  efforts.  To  this  ridge  Thomas  retreated, 
and  on  its  most  favourable  points  skilfully  planted 
his  artillery ;  and  gathering  there  some  25,000 
men,  stood  like  a  rock,  which  the  angry  waves  of 
war  might  buffet  in  vain.  Long  afterward  men 


274     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

spoke  of  him  as  the  "  Rock  of  Chickamauga." 
For  six  weary  hours  those  25,000  men  —  their 
Terrific  numbers  lessening  moment  by  moment 

fighting.  till  nearly  10,000  were  stretched  upon 

the  ground  —  stood  at  bay  and  hurled  back  again 
and  again  the  furious  onset  of  60,000  rebels  mad 
with  desire  to  clutch  the  prize  they  had  so  nearly 
won.  Riding  to  and  fro  among  his  men  as  quietly 
as  if  on  parade,  infusing  them  all  with  his  own 
great  spirit,  quick  to  see  each  emergency  as  it 
came  and  to  meet  it  with  some  fresh  device,  the 
hero  held  his  ground.  At  one  moment  early  in 
the  afternoon,  the  rebel  lines  were  extended  so 
far  beyond  our  left  as  to  threaten  the  Rossville 
road,  when  their  advance  was  suddenly  checked 
by  the  arrival  of  that  superb  soldier,  the  rough 
and  ready  Gordon  Granger,  with  4000  men.  He 
had  marched  without  orders  to  the  sound  of  the 
cannon,  and  the  tremendous  energy  with  which  he 
supported  Thomas  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  nearly 
half  his  men  were  killed  or  wounded  before  dusk. 
As  evening  approached  it  was  discovered  that  the 
last  cartridge  had  been  fired.  In  the  wild  turmoil 
which  attended  the  rout  of  the  right  wing  some 
body  had  ordered  the  removal  of  all  the  ammuni 
tion  trains,  and  powder  and  ball  were  no  more  to 
be  had  save  by  searching  among  the  dead  bodies 
of  friend  and  foe.  Then  with  grim  determination 


CHICKAMAUGA,   SEPTEMBER   20,  1863,   EVENING 


Chickamauga  275 

bayonets  were  fixed.  Longstreet,  loath  to  own  him 
self  baffled,  had  sent  to  Bragg  for  reinforcements, 
but  none  were  forthcoming.  "  He  told  me,"  says 
Longstreet,  "  that  the  men  had  been  beaten  back 
so  badly  that  they  could  be  of  no  service  to  me." 
With  such  portions  of  his  corps  as  still  retained 
some  freshness,  Longstreet  attempted  a  last  as 
sault,  but  his  men  were  driven  down  the  hillside 
with  cold  steel  and  with  muskets  used  r 


Of 

as  clubs.  Their  strength  was  ex-  Chicka- 
hausted  ;  they  were  baulked  of  their 
prey  ;  and  night  found  Thomas  still  master  of  the 
Kossville  road,  and  the  Union  army  saved  from 
destruction.  The  annals  of  warfare  may  be 
searched  in  vain  for  a  grander  spectacle;  and  in 
the  years  to  come,  so  long  as  American  children 
are  born  to  love  and  serve  their  country,  rescued 
at  such  dreadful  cost  from  anarchy  and  dishonour, 
may  they  be  taught  to  revere  the  glorious  name 
of  Thomas,  the  Rock  of  Chickamauga  ! 

When  Rosecrans  was  swept  away  in  the  tide 
of  fugitives,  he  at  first  made  every  effort  to  turn 
down  a  road  which  led  through  the  valley  straight 
to  Thomas's  position.  But  learning  that  this  road 
was  occupied  by  the  enemy,  he  kept  on  through 
McFarland  Gap,  attended  by  General  Garfield,  his 
chief  of  staff,  hoping  to  return  by  the  Rossville 
road  and  thus  make  his  way  to  Thomas.  They 


276     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

found  Rossville  Gap  choked  with  stragglers  and 
teamsters  fleeing  toward  Chattanooga,  and  were 
Rosecrans  told  that  Thomas  was  killed,  and  the 
and  Garfield.  whole  army  knocked  to  pieces.  Some 
soldiers  from  Negley's  division  told  Rosecrans 
that  their  comrades  were  all  coming  close  upon 
their  heels  in  disorderly  flight.  Now  as  Negley's 
was  one  of  the  last  fresh  divisions  he  had  sent  to 
the  left  in  support  of  Thomas,  Rosecrans  was  con 
vinced  that  the  worst  must  be  true.  While  they 
were  talking  there  came  one  of  those  lulls  which 
every  now  and  then  interrupt  the  din  of  battle. 
Leaping  from  their  horses,  Rosecrans  and  Gar- 
field  laid  their  ears  to  the  ground  to  detect,  if 
possible,  the  meaning  of  the  distant  murmur. 
There  was  no  boom  of  cannon,  only  a  faint  and 
fitful  crackle  of  musketry  from  different  quarters 
of  the  field.  It  was  one  of  the  moments  when 
Thomas  had  hurled  back  the  rebel  masses  in  dis 
order,  and  they  were  waiting  to  reform  their  lines 
for  a  fresh  onset.  But  to  the  anxious  listeners 
the  scattered  sounds  seemed  only  to  confirm  the 
stories,  but  too  probable,  which  had  just  been  told 
them.  If  these  stories  were  true,  the  fragments 
of  the  army  —  all  save  such  as  must  have  sur 
rendered —  would  soon  be  pouring  through  the 
passes  to  Chattanooga,  and  the  best  thing  to  be 
done  was  to  get  there  as  soon  as  possible  and 


Chickamauga  277 

begin  preparations  for  withstanding  a  siege.  So 
Garfield  advised,  and  so  Rosecrans  did,  while  Gar- 
field  rode  to  the  front  to  learn  how  things  were 
faring. 

About  four  o'clock  Rosecrans  rode  up  to  the 
door  of  the  adjutant-general's  office  in  Chatta 
nooga,  faint  and  ill.  During  this  week  that  he 
had  been  drawing  together  his  scattered  forces, 
he  had  slept  but  little  ;  and  on  this  second  day 
of  battle  he  had  been  in  the  saddle  since  early 
dawn,  with  nothing  to  eat.  The  officers  who 
helped  him  into  the  house  did  not  soon  forget  the 
terrible  look  of  the  brave  man  stunned  by  sudden 
calamity.1  Presently  McCook  and  Crittenden 
came  in,  and  not  long  after  a  despatch  from  Gar- 
field  telling  how  he  had  found  Thomas.  Rose 
crans  read  it  aloud,  and  waving  it  in  the  air 
shouted,  "  Thank  God !  the  day  is  not  lost ;  gen 
tlemen,  go  at  once  to  the  front."  But  it  was  too 

1  In  later  years  I  used  occasionally  to  meet  Rosecrans,  and  al 
ways  felt  that  I  could  see  the  shadow  of  Chickamauga  upon  his 
noble  face.  The  first  time  that  I  was  introduced  to  him  I  was 
reminded  of  the  strange  look  that  haunted  the  face  of  the  mother 
of  Barnaby  Rudge  ;  a  look  that  remained  amid  all  changes  of 
expression,  the  dim  but  abiding  shadow  of  a  look  to  which  an 
instant  of  terrible  and  overwhelming  experience  only  could  have 
given  birth.  Afterward  I  always  noticed  this  look,  and  am  sure 
that  it  was  not  merely  in  my  fancy.  (See  Barnaby  Budge, 
chap,  v.) 


278     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

late  now  to  turn  defeat  into  victory.  It  was  Gar- 
The  battle  field  that  should  have  gone  to  Chatta- 
was  lost.  nooga,  and  Rosecrans  that  should  have 
gone  to  the  front.  On  the  roads  about  Missionary 
Ridge  there  were  brigades  and  divisions  moving 
aimlessly  for  want  of  a  chief,  and  Thomas  had  so 
drawn  upon  himself  the  whole  fury  of  the  rebel 
attack  that  these  scattered  fragments  of  the  army 
were  but  feebly  molested.  Could  Rosecrans  have 
stayed  on  the  field  and  exerted  himself,  as  he  had 
done  so  gallantly  at  Stone  river,  in  forming  a 
new  line  of  battle,  perhaps  the  issue  might  have 
been  similar  to  the  issue  of  that  memorable  con 
test.  For  there  was  a  moment  when  the  three 
divisions  of  Negley,  Sheridan,  and  Davis,  thrown 
against  the  left  of  the  enemy  assailing  Thomas, 
might  perhaps  have  restored  the  battle ;  but  each 
general,  following  his  own  judgment,  chose  a  dif 
ferent  route,  and  neither  arrived  at  a  position 
But  Thomas  wnere  ne  could  effect  the  result.  The 
saved  the  only  commander  who  succeeded  in  ren 
dering  valuable  assistance  to  Thomas 
was  Gordon  Granger,  as  we  have  seen,  who  was 
guided  simply  by  the  din  of  battle  and  his  com 
mon  sense.  At  night,  in  pursuance  of  an  order 
from  Rosecrans,  Thomas  moved  quietly  away 
from  Horseshoe  Ridge,  and  the  whole  army  was 
drawn  up  at  Rossville  Gap  and  on  the  heights 


Chickamauga  279 

adjoining,  where  it  remained  all  the  next  day 
unmolested.  On  the  morning  of  the  22d  it  had 
all  been  retired  to  Chattanooga. 

The  name  "  Chickamauga "  has  been  said  to 
mean  "Valley  of  Death,"  in  allusion,  perhaps, 
to  some  wholesale  Indian  slaughter  of  long  ago. 
However  that  may  have  been,  the  place  had  now 
fairly  earned  such  a  sombre  epithet.  In  its  di 
mensions  and  in  its  murderousness  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga  was  the  greatest  battle  fought  by 
our  western  armies,  and  one  of  the  greatest  of 
modern  times.  In  our  Civil  War  it  was  exceeded 
only  by  Gettysburg  and  the  Wilderness ;  in  Euro 
pean  history  one  may  compare  with  it  such  battles 
as  Neerwinden,  or  Malplaquet,  or  Waterloo.  At 
Shiloh  and  Stone  river  there  were  about  80,000 
men  engaged,  and  in  each  the  total  losses  in  killed 
and  wounded  were  about  20,000,  the  opposing 
armies  and  their  losses  being  in  each  Awful 
case  nearly  equal.  At  Chickamauga  slaughter, 
there  were  not  less  than  130,000  men  engaged, 
and  the  total  losses  in  killed,  wounded,  and  miss 
ing  amounted  to  nearly  37,000  ;  but  the  figures 
on  the  two  sides  were  not  evenly  matched.  Rose- 
crans  had  begun  the  campaign  with  about  70,000 
men,  but  had  to  leave  detachments  to  guard  his 
stores  at  Stevenson  and  to  occupy  other  impor 
tant  points,  so  that  he  brought  about  62,000  men 


280     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

into  the  field.  Bragg,  after  his  reinforcements 
from  Virginia  arrived,  must  have  had  about  70,000 
men.  The  Union  loss  was  nearly  17,000,  while 
that  of  the  Confederates  was  not  far  from  20,000, 
a  large  proportion  of  which  was  incurred  in  the 
furious  and  futile  assaults  at  Horseshoe  Ridge. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
CHATTANOOGA 

IN  retiring  into  Chattanooga,  Rosecrans  felt 
obliged  to  take  a  step  which  soon  threatened  to  im 
peril  the  army  even  more  than  the  ordeal  through 
which  it  had  passed.  He  withdrew  a  small  force 
which  had  been  stationed  on  the  point  of  Lookout 
Mountain.  With  the  forces  then  at  his  disposal 
this  step  was  doubtless  necessary,  but  its  conse 
quences  were  lamentable.  The  railroad  from  Ste 
venson,  crossing  the  Tennessee  river  at 

-r,   .  ,  Rosecrans  in 

Bridgeport,  passes  over  a  depression  in   Chattanooga 
Eaccoon  Mountain  into  Lookout  val-   is  besieged 

i  j  J/L  by  Bragg. 

ley  and  runs  thence  over  a  narrow 
ledge,  with  the  river  on  one  hand  and  the  pre 
cipitous  end  of  Lookout  Mountain  on  the  other, 
into  Chattanooga.  This  was  the  only  line  of  rail 
road  by  which  supplies  could  be  brought  to  the 
beleaguered  army,  and  the  only  way  to  hold  it  was 
to  hold  Lookout  Mountain.  But  Rosecrans  did 
not  think  it  practicable  to  keep  up  communication 
between  his  army  in  and  about  the  town  and  the 
detachment  on  the  mountain,  and  accordingly  he 


282     The,  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

withdrew  the  latter.  In  doing  this,  of  course,  he 
did  not  abandon  his  only  method  of  getting  sup 
plies.  He  retained  one  avenue  for  that  purpose, 
but  it  was  a  very  poor  one,  and  the  immediate 
consequences  of  loosening  his  hold  upon  the  rail 
road  were  alarming.  Bragg  instantly  occupied  the 
mountain,  and  placed  batteries  there  commanding 
railroad  and  river.  On  the  east  his  forces  occu 
pied  the  crest  of  Missionary  Ridge,  about  400  feet 
above  the  level  of  the  town,  and  patrolled  the  bank 
of  the  river  for  some  miles.  From  water  to  water 
he  held  the  Union  army  invested  in  a  semicircle. 
The  only  route  by  which  food  could  come  was  a 
narrow  and  crooked  wagon-road  over  Waldron's 
Ridge  from  Bridgeport  through  Jasper,  a  distance 
of  sixty  miles.  Such  a  line  of  supply  was  a  sorry 
dependence  for  40,000  men  with  their  animals, 
added  to  the  population  of  the  little  town  ;  and 
Bragg,  well  knowing  how  precarious  it  was,  sat 
down  to  compass  the  starvation  of  the  Federal 
army. 

Longstreet  advocated  a  bolder  method.  He 
recommended  crossing  the  river  in  full  force 
above  Chattanooga  and  threatening  the  Nashville 
railroad  so  as  to  cut  off  Rosecrans's  retreat  and 
compel  him  to  come  out  and  fight  at  a  disadvan 
tage  ;  after  which  the  Confederates  might  move 
up  through  eastern  Tennessee,  crush  Burnside, 


Chattanooga  283 

and  invade  Kentucky.     But  Bragg' s    mood  was 
not  sufficiently  sanguine  for  such  an   ^h^^  at 
enterprise,  and  he  felt  that  he  made   tacks  the 
much  surer  of  his  prey  by  simply  wait 
ing.     For  some  days  the  wagons,  wearily  jolting 
over  the  rough  mountain  road,  brought  food  and 
blankets   and   ammunition  with   some   degree    of 
promptness.    Then  came  General  Joseph  Wheeler, 
on  the  1st  of  October,  with  four  or  five  brigades  of 
rebel  cavalry,  and  burned  300  well-stocked  wagons 
and  slew  their  1800  mules.     To  stop  this  danger 
ous  work  a  strong  force  of  Union   cavalry  from 
Bridgeport  spent  a  week  in  fighting  Wheeler  and 
driving  him  back  across  the  river. 

Then  heavy  rains  came  on,  and  proved  a  worse 
foe  than  the  rebel  troopers.  The  poor  mules  could 
scarcely  tug  their  wagons  through  the  deep  mud, 
and  as  the  delay  shortened  their  forage,  they  grew 
weak  from  hunger  and  dropped  by  the  way  till  all 
passing  was  blocked.  The  trips  to  Bridgeport  took 
longer  and  longer,  each  new  trip  brought  back 
fewer  wagons,  and  every  day  the  rations  for  man 
and  beast  grew  smaller.  The  artillery  The  peril 
horses,  being  least  needed  at  the  mo-  from  rains- 
ment,  fared  worse  in  the  scanty  allotment  of  forage, 
and  died  by  hundreds.  On  the  road  and  within 
the  Union  lines  more  than  10,000  mules  and  horses 
perished.  Thus  the  army,  unable  to  haul  its  artil- 


284     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

lery,  soon  became  practically  immovable.  It  could 
not  retreat  without  inviting  destruction,  and  re 
maining  where  it  was,  gaunt  famine  stared  it  in 
the  face.  Bragg  might  well  believe  that  all  he 
had  to  do  was  to  wait. 

But  the  United  States  government  was  awaken 
ing  to  the  needs  of  the  occasion.  If  Lee's  army 
could  be  temporarily  weakened  in  behalf  of  Bragg, 
it  was  safe  to  take  from  Meade  in  order  to  give  to 
Rosecrans.  It  had  not  at  first  been  thought  neces 
sary  to  do  this,  because  Burnside  was  in  eastern 
Tennessee  with  25,000  men,  only  100  miles  from 
Chattanooga,  and  almost  daily  since  the  llth  of 
September  Lincoln  and  Halleck  had  been  telegraph 
ing  him  to  go  to  Rosecrans  without  a  moment's 
delay.  If  he  had  moved  when  first  notified,  his 
corps  would  have  been  present  at  Chickamauga, 
and  the  story  of  that  battle  might  have  been  differ 
ent.  But  there  were  difficulties  in  the  way  which 
to  a  man  of  Burnside's  make-up  seemed  insuper 
able  ;  and  he  never  got  quite  ready  to  start.  As 
the  dangers  thickened,  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth 
corps,  numbering  23,000  men,  were  detached  from 
Arrival  of  ^e  ^Lrmv  °^  ^6  Potomac,  and  sent, 
Hooker  with  under  command  of  General  Hooker,  to 
the  rescue.  They  went  by  rail  around 
through  Ohio  and  thence  southward,  with  all  their 
baggage  and  artillery,  making  the  circuit  of  1200 


Chattanooga  285 

miles  from  the  Rapidan  to  Stevenson  in  about 
a  week.  On  October  3  Hooker  established  his 
headquarters  at  Stevenson.  Once  arrived  on  the 
scene,  his  first  business  was  to  assist  in  opening 
communications  with  the  beleaguered  army. 

On  the  19th  of  October,  before  this  work  had 
begun,  Rosecrans  was  removed  from  command. 
President  Lincoln  had  made  up  his  mind  that  at 
this  critical  juncture  of  affairs  the  presence  of  the 
conqueror  of  Vicksburg  was  needed.  Grant  was 
called  north  from  Mississippi,  and  met  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  at  Indianapolis.  He  then  learned 
that  he  was  placed  in  command  of  all  the  forces 
between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Alleghanies,  and 
two  orders  were  shown  him,  the  one  retaining 
Rosecrans  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland,  the  other  removing  Rosecrans  and  put 
ting  Thomas  in  his  place.  It  was  left  for  Grant 
to  choose  which  he  would  have,  and  without  a 
moment's  hesitation  he  selected  Thomas.  Sher 
man  succeeded  Grant  in  command  of  „ 

Rosecrans 

the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.    Rosecrans   superseded 
was  sent  to  command  the  department     y 
of  Missouri.     McCook  and  Crittenden  went  home 
to  await  an  investigation  of  the  disaster  at  Chick- 
amauga ; l  and  their  two  depleted  corps,  consoli 
dated  into  one,  were  given  to  Gordon  Granger. 
1  "  McCook  .  .  .  seemed  at  Perryville,  Stone  river,  and  Chick- 


286     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Grant's  first  telegram  to  Thomas  was,  "  Hold 
Chattanooga  at  all  hazards ;  I  will  be  there  as 
soon  as  possible."  Thomas  replied,  "  We  will 
hold  the  town  till  we  starve."  To  some  that  time 
seemed  not  far  off.  There  were  officers  who  had 
nothing  to  eat  but  rancid  pork  and  mouldy  bread, 
and  kernels  of  parched  corn  had  come  to  be  reck 
oned  a  luxury.  A  week  ago  Jefferson  Davis  had 
visited  Bragg  at  his  headquarters.  Ascending 
Lookout  Mountain  and  climbing  to  the  top  of  a 
jagged  rock  on  its  summit,  known  as  Pulpit  Rock, 
the  President  of  the  Confederacy  surveyed  the 

amauga,  pursued  by  a  strange  fatality.  He  assumed  a  kind  of 
boastful  over-confidence  that  in  war  always  presages  failure,  be 
cause  it  takes  the  place  of  the  careful  preparation  that  secures 
success.  .  .  .  He  possessed  a  peculiar  open  frankness  of  manner 
and  bonhomie  that  made  him  many  friends,  and  he  had  many  ad 
mirable  traits  of  character.  .  .  .  Crittenden  was  greatly  beloved 
by  his  men.  He  was  always  genial,  kind,  just,  and  brave  to  a 
fault ;  and  as  he  came  to  my  brigade,  which  was  drawn  up  to  bid 
him  farewell,  mounted  on  his  beautiful  gray  horse,  .  .  .  and 
made  us  an  admirable,  almost  electrical,  little  speech,  if  it  had 
been  in  my  power  I  would  have  made  him  commander-in-chief 
of  the  armies.  .  .  .  Now  came  the  new  regime.  But  already, 
before  their  arrival,  and  with  the  assumption  of  command  by 
Thomas,  our  hopes  went  up  with  a  great  bound.  .  .  .  Grant  and 
Sherman  were  different  from  the  commanders  we  had  known  be 
fore.  They  wore  vests  and  coats  unbuttoned  ;  and  as  to  military 
bearing,  old  Frederick  would  not  have  had  them  in  his  camp. 
...  But  they  had  from  the  start,  and  always  retained,  the  per 
fect  confidence  of  the  army ;  and  that  faith  was  not  misplaced." 
Hazen's  Narrative  of  Military  Service,  pp.  152,  153,  104. 


Chattanooga  287 

scene  before  him  with  exultation,  and  prophesied 
the  speedy  surrender  of  the  Federal  army.     But 
the  tables  were  soon  and  most  unexpectedly  to 
be  turned.      When  Grant  arrived  at   Grant  arriveg 
Chattanooga,  on   the   evening  of   the   at  Chatta- 
23d,  he  found  that  Thomas  had   al-  n°°ga' 
ready  ordered  Hooker  to  concentrate  his  forces  at 
Bridgeport  with  a  view  to  opening  a  new  line  of 
communications. 

An  admirable  plan  had  been  conceived  by  Gen 
eral  William  Farrar  Smith,  —  familiarly  known  to 
the  soldiers  as  "  Baldy  "  Smith,  —  chief  engineer 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  On  the  19th  of 
October,  the  day  on  which  Rosecrans  was  super 
seded,  General  Smith  was  reconnoi-  ~ 

General 

tring  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee  river  "Baldy" 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Brown's  Ferry,  Smith- 
when  this  beautiful  scheme  occurred  to  him.  Next 
day,  on  his  return  to  Chattanooga,  finding  General 
Thomas  in  command  of  the  army,  Smith  imparted 
to  him  his  plan.  On  the  22d  Thomas  issued  the 
needful  orders  for  putting  it  into  operation ;  and 
when  Grant  arrived,  a  day  later,  he  gave  it  his 
hearty  approval.  It  was  an  indispensable  prelim 
inary  to  the  brilliant  operations  which  followed, 
and  some  writers  have  shown  a  disposition  to 
claim  the  credit  of  it  for  Grant.  It  was  certainly 
creditable  to  Grant's  military  judgment  that  he 


288     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

instantly  recognized  the  merit  of  the  plan,  as 
Thomas  had  already  done.  But  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  plan  originated  with  Smith,  and 
would  have  been  carried  out  exactly  as  it  was, 
even  if  Grant  had  remained  in  Mississippi.  Let 
us  now  observe  the  features  of  this  famous  scheme. 
Opposite  the  point  of  Lookout  Mountain  the 
river  makes  a  great  bend,  enclosing  a  peninsula 
some  three  miles  in  length  by  less  than  a  mile  in 
width,  known  as  Moccasin  Point.  Opposite  the 
lower  side  of  this  peninsula  a  narrow  range  of 
hills  runs  along  close  by  the  water's  edge,  with  a 
The  Brown's  £aP  a*  Brown's  Ferry.  A  road  from 
Ferry  opposite  Chattanooga  runs  across  the 

neck  of  the  peninsula  to  Brown's  Ferry, 
and  thence  continues  nearly  southward  along  a 
deep  gorge  between  the  narrow  range  of  hills  and 
the  base  of  Raccoon  Mountain  until,  as  it  enters 
Lookout  valley,  it  curves  westward  and  passes 
over  a  depression  in  Raccoon  Mountain  to  Kelly's 
Ferry.  Over  this  same  depression  runs  the  wa 
gon-road  from  Bridgeport  to  Wauhatchie  in  Look 
out  valley,  and  also  the  railroad  from  Bridgeport 
to  Chattanooga.  Now  the  railroad,  passing  close 
under  the  point  of  Lookout  Mountain  and  through 
the  rebel  lines,  could  not  of  course  be  wrested 
from  the  enemy  without  storming  the  mountain. 
But  the  banks  of  the  river  below  Kelly's  Ferry  to 


Chattanooga  289 

Bridgeport  were  entirely  free  from  rebels,  and 
obviously,  if  the  wagon-road  through  the  gorge 
could  be  secured,  it  would  make  an  excellent  line 
of  communications.  Supplies  to  any  amount  could 
be  brought  up  the  river  in  steamboats  to  Kelly's 
Ferry,  and  from  that  point  hauled  in  wagons 
through  the  gorge  to  Brown's  Ferry,  and  thence 
across  the  neck  of  the  peninsula  to  Chattanooga, 
twice  crossing  the  river  by  pontoon  bridges.  By 
this  route  the  distance  to  be  traversed  by  wagons 
was  only  eight  miles.  In  order  to  get  possession 
of  this  route  it  was  necessary  to  secure  the  narrow 
range  of  hills  and  place  a  strong  force  in  Lookout 
valley.  Such  a  scheme  needed  such  an  auxiliary 
force  as  Hooker's  to  carry  it  into  operation.  Now 
under  General  Smith's  personal  supervision  it 
was  executed  with  complete  success.  Although  a 
staff-officer,  he  was  entrusted  with  the  requisite 
command  over  troops  to  make  the  enterprise  com 
pletely  his  own ;  a  point  in  which  Thomas  and 
Grant  showed  true  wisdom. 

In  order  to  secure  the  narrow  range  of  hills 
profound  secrecy  was  required,  for  if  the  Confed 
erates  were  to  divine  the  scheme  and  occupy  the 
hills  in  force,  they  could  not  be  dislodged  without 
a  desperate  and  doubtful  fight.  The  north  end  of 
Lookout  valley  was  occupied  by  a  Confederate 
brigade,  which  could  be  reinforced  to  any  extent 


290     The  Mississi2)pi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

by  the  short  road  around  the  point  of  Lookout 
Mountain.  The  problem  was  to  seize  the  narrow 
range  of  hills  by  stealth,  lodge  Hooker  with  a 
strong  force  in  Lookout  valley,  and  establish  a 
route  by  which  he  could  be  reinforced  at  pleasure 
from  Chattanooga.  At  the  end  of  three  days  the 
pontoon  bridges  were  ready,  the  ground  had  been 
duly  reconnoitred,  and  everybody  had  his  instruc 
tions.  At  three  o'clock  on  the  foggy  morning  of 
the  27th  fifty-two  pontoon  boats,  each  containing' 
twenty-five  picked  men,  1300  in  all,  commanded 
by  General  William  Hazen,1  were  started  from 
Chattanooga  and  glided  noiselessly  down  with  the 
Its  complete  swift  current,  with  no  tell-tale  plash 
success.  Of  oarg>  jn  {-wo  nours'  time  they  had 

landed  at  Brown's  Ferry,  driven  away  a  rebel 
picket  force,  and  taken  possession  of  the  narrow 
range  of  hills.  While  this  was  going  on,  General 
Smith,  with  a  force  of  2700  men,  and  three  bat 
teries,  marched  across  the  neck  of  Moccasin  Point 
to  Brown's  Ferry,  where  they  crossed  in  the  pon 
toon  boats  and  ascended  the  hills,  The  range  was 
thus  held  throughout  its  whole  length  by  4000 
men,  who  speedily  felled  trees  and  made  a  formid 
able  abattis,  while  they  planted  their  three  batter 
ies  on  the  end  toward  Lookout  valley  in  such  wise 
as  to  sweep  the  narrow  road  around  the  point  of 

1  For  the  numbers,  see  Hazen's  Narrative,  pp.  154,  161. 


Chattanooga  291 

Lookout  Mountain,  by  which  alone  the  Confed 
erates  could  send  troops  into  the  valley  without 
climbing  over  the  mountain.  These  4000  men 
could  defend  such  a  position  against  three  or  four 
times  their  own  number.  As  soon  as  they  had 
crossed  the  river  the  work  on  the  pontoon  bridge 
was  vigorously  begun,  so  that  by  ten  o'clock  in  the 
forenoon  an  excellent  and  secure  road  was  in 
Grant's  possession,  direct  from  Chattanooga  to  the 
mouth  of  Lookout  valley,  and  over  this  road  he 
could  send  troops  into  the  valley  much  faster  than 
the  Confederates  could  send  them  around  the  point 
of  the  mountain. 

The  next  morning  Hooker  started  from  Bridge 
port,  with  part  of  the  Eleventh  corps,  under 
Howard,  and  one  division  of  the  Twelfth,  under 
Geary,  something  over  10,000  men  in  all,  and 
marched  along  the  railroad  to  Wauhatchie,  where 
he  arrived  late  in  the  afternoon  and  took  posses 
sion  of  all  the  roads  in  the  valley.  The  single 
Confederate  brigade  there  could  do  nothing  but  get 
out  of  his  way,  and  a  few  shells  from  the  batteries 
at  the  top  of  Lookout  Mountain  did  Hooker  occu- 
little  harm.  But  by  midnight  Long-  pies  Lookout 
street  had  brought  the  greater  part  of 
his  corps  into  the  valley  and  assaulted  Hooker  in 
force.  It  was  a  wild  scene  under  the  uncertain 
light  of  the  moon,  with  the  cannon  reverberating 


292     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

among  the  mountains.  By  four  in  the  morning 
Hooker  was  master  of  the  field,  and  Longstreet  had 
retreated  into  his  camp  in  Chattanooga  valley.  To 
complete  the  whole  scheme,  Palmer's  division  had 
been  sent  some  days  before  around  by  the  road 
over  Waldron's  Kidge  and  through  Jasper,  to  hold 
the  road  by  which  Hooker  had  advanced,  and  this 
movement  was  duly  executed. 

The  enemy  made  no  further  attempt  to  dislodge 
Hooker,  and  by  the  bridge  at  Brown's  Ferry  Grant 
could  quickly  reinforce  him  to  any  extent  required. 
The  new  line  of  communications,  through  Brown's 
and  Kelly's  ferries,  was  now  completely  secured, 
The  siege  of  wagons  loaded  with  rations  came  rum- 
Chattanooga  bling  into  Chattanooga  every  few 
hours,  and  all  danger  of  famine  was  at 
an  end.  Still  more,  by  Hooker's  new  position  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  joined  to  its  rein 
forcements  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
its  effective  strength  thus  became  equal  to  the 
enemy's.  The  siege  of  Chattanooga  was  virtually 
raised,  and  the  situation  in  Lookout  valley  boded 
no  good  to  Braxton  Bragg.  It  is  such  beautiful 
operations  as  this  that  make  military  history  a 
fascinating  study.  In  all  its  details  we  perceive 
the  touch  of  a  master  hand.  Grant  showed  his 
appreciation  by  recommending  Smith  for  promo 
tion  to  the  rank  of  major-general,  saying,  "  No 


Chattanooga  293 

man  in  the  service  is  better  qualified  than  he  for 
our  largest  commands."  1 

Bragg  was  sorely  chagrined  at  this  collapse  of 
his  hopes  of  starving  the  Union  army,  but  he  did 
not  begin  to  imagine  what  his  adversary  had  in 
store  for  him.  He  did  not  see  what  the  Brown's 
Ferry  affair  foreboded.  So  little  did  he  dream 
that  the  Federals  would  soon  be  ready  to  resume 
the  offensive,  that  on  the  3d  of  Novem- 

Bragg  sends 

ber  he    sent  Longstreet   with  20,000   away  Long- 
men  and  80  guns  to  annihilate  Burn-   street' 
side,   or   chase   him   out    of    eastern    Tennessee. 
After  having  accomplished   this  task,  Longstreet 
was  to  return. 

Bragg  has  been  severely  criticised  for  thus 
weakening  his  army  at  such  a  crisis.  It  was  a 
grave  mistake  and  hardly  excusable.  Bragg  must 
have  known  that  the  fate  of  Chattanooga  would 
have  to  be  settled  by  a  battle  ;  and  it  ought  to 
have  been  clear  to  him  that  if  he  won  that  battle, 
Knoxville  would  be  at  his  mercy,  while  if  he  lost 
it,  Knoxville  would  be  relieved.  To  risk  the  loss 
of  the  battle  at  Chattanooga,  in  order  to  pick  from 

1  It  was  also  appreciated  by  the  enemy,  as  witness  the  follow 
ing1,  from  the  Richmond  Press :  "  The  admirably  conceived  and 
perfectly  executed  coup  at  Brown's  Ferry  .  .  .  has  robbed  the 
Confederacy  of  all  its  dearly  earned  advantages  gained  at  Chicka- 
mauga."  Hazen's  Narrative,  p.  164. 


294     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

the  bough  an  apple  that  was  sure  to  drop  into  his 
lap  if  he  won  it,  would  seem  the  height  of  imbecil 
ity.  Yet  Bragg  was  110  fool.  Though  he  had 
Why  did  he  not  the  divine  spark  of  genius,  he  was 
do  so?  an  adversary  whom  it  was  creditable 

to  beat.  It  was  reported  and  believed  by  some 
people  that  Jefferson  Davis,  on  his  visit  to  Bragg, 
devised  the  Knoxville  expedition  for  Longstreet 
because  he  and  Bragg  did  not  get  on  well  together. 
General  Grant,  while  mentioning  this  report,  hu 
morously  suggests  an  alternative  explanation  :  "  It 
may  be  that  Longstreet  was  not  sent  to  Knoxville 
for  the  reason  stated,  but  because  Mr.  Davis  had 
an  exalted  opinion  of  his  own  military  genius,  and 
thought  he  saw  a  chance  of  '  killing  two  birds 
with  one  stone.'  On  several  occasions  during  the 
war  he  came  to  the  relief  of  the  Union  army  by 
means  of  his  superior  military  genius"  1 

But  supposing  that  Bragg  himself  originated  or 
approved  the  sending  away  of  Longstreet,  although 
the  blunder  does  not  admit  of  excuse,  we  can  nev 
ertheless  perhaps  understand  how  it  may  have 
happened.  Bragg  knew  that  the  Federal  army 
was  at  that  moment  in  no  fit  condition  to  attack 
him  in  his  strong  positions.  The  best  illustration 
of  this  was  what  happened  immediately  upon 
Longstreet's  departure.  No  sooner  had  Grant 

1  Grant's  Memoirs,  ii.  87.     The  italicizing  is  Grant's. 


Chattanooga  295 

observed  this  weakening  of  the  enemy's  force  than 
he  proposed  to  Thomas  an  assault  A  possible 
upon  Missionary  Ridge,  in  the  hope  explanation, 
of  recalling  Longstreet  and  relieving  Bumside,  in 
accordance  with  the  frantic  telegrams  which  kept 
coming  from  Washington.  From  the  tone  of 
some  of  the  despatches  one  would  gather  that 
neither  Lincoln,  Stanton,  nor  Halleck  had  a  par 
ticle  of  confidence  in  Burnside's  ability  to  take 
care  of  himself,  and  the  question  is  forcibly  sug 
gested,  why  was  he  kept  so  persistently  in  impor 
tant  commands?  To  return  to  Grant,  when  he 
proposed  the  assault  upon  Missionary  Ridge, 
Thomas  reminded  him  that  the  artillery  horses 
were  all  dead,  and  so  long  as  cannon  could  not  be 
hauled,  the  mobility  of  the  army  was  like  that  of 
a  man  with  his  legs  cut  off. 

Bragg  knew,  indeed,  that  the  Union  army  was 
expecting  further  reinforcements.  He  knew  that 
Sherman  was  coming  from  Mississippi  with  part  of 
the  army  which  had  captured  Vicksburg.  Halleck 
had  ordered  this  movement  soon  after  the  defeat  at 
Chickamauga.  Sherman  had  started  from  Vicks 
burg  on  September  27,  and  in  steamboats  accom 
plished  the  400  miles  to  Memphis  by  October  2. 
He  had  then  before  him  400  miles  of  marching 
in  order  to  get  within  reach  of  Chattanooga; 
and  Halleck,  true  to  his  snail-like  traditions,  had 


296     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

ordered  him  to  repair  the  railroad  yard  by  yard 
Halleck's  as  ne  advanced  ;  that  same  blessed  old 
railroad  railroad,  for  the  sake  of  which  Hal- 

leek  had  once  sacrificed  Buell's  hopes 
of  success,  and  God  knows  how  many  thousand 
lives  !  Thus  hampered,  Sherman  plodded  along 
at  such  a  rate  that  the  27th  of  October  —  a 
whole  month  from  the  time  of  his  leaving  Vicks- 
burg — found  him  only  at  luka,  still  200  miles 
distant  from  Chattanooga.  Thus  Sherman,  when 
weighted  with  Halleck,  could  move  as  slowly 
as  Buell,  under  like  circumstances.  At  this  rate 
Bragg  might  well  reckon  that  Longstreet  could 
proceed  100  miles  to  Knoxville,  crush  the  feeble 
Burnside,  and  get  back  in  time  to  counteract  any 
movements  that  might  be  awaiting  the  arrival  of 
Sherman.  At  all  events,  he  knew  that  a  mere 
demonstration  against  Burnside  would  throw  Mr. 
Lincoln  and  the  northern  states  into  a  wild  panic, 
and  be  likely  to  divert  to  Knoxville  any  Union 
reinforcements  that  might  otherwise  be  sent  to 
Chattanooga.  From  this  point  of  view  there  may 
have  been  a  grain  of  sense  in  Bragg's  plan.  What 
ruined  it  was  the  unforeseen  appointment  of  Grant 
to  the  command  of  all  the  western  armies.  It  in 
stantly  wrought  a  combination  of  energies  quite 
new  to  Bragg's  experience.  Since  the  fall  of 
Vicksburg,  Halleck  no  longer  overruled  and  ham- 


Chattanooga  297 

pered  Grant,  but  deferred  to  his  judgment.  Ac 
cordingly  the  movements  in  the  western  theatre 
of  war  began  to  keep  time  to  Grant's  ideas  and 
not  to  Halleck's,  and  there  was  an  end  of  that 
slowness  upon  which  Bragg  had  counted.  On  the 
24th  of  October,  the  morning  after  his  Arrival  of 
arrival  at  Chattanooga,  Grant  sent  Sherman  at  . 

,  01  ,,   1  Chattanooga. 

word  to  Sherman  to  "  drop  every 
thing"  and  hurry  to  Stevenson  with  his  entire 
force.  The  result  was  that,  in  spite  of  broken 
bridges  and  long  detours  thereby  necessitated, 
Sherman  got  his  army  up  to  Stevenson  and  Bridge 
port  by  the  14th  of  November,  and  next  day  re 
ported  in  person  to  Grant  at  Chattanooga.  At 
this  moment  Longstreet,  who  had  encountered 
unforeseen  obstacles  to  a  rapid  progress,  had  got 
scarcely  half  way  on  his  march  to  Knoxville. 
Throughout  the  northern  states,  the  anxiety  for 
Burnside  was  intense,  but  Sherman's  arrival  at 
Chattanooga  put  a  new  face  upon  things,  and 
enabled  Grant  to  strike  a  blow  so  tremendous  that 
among  its  far-reaching  consequences  the  rescue 
of  Burnside  and  the  relief  of  eastern  Tennessee 
appear  but  as  minor  incidents. 

The  wagon-road  from  Bridgeport  through  Look 
out  valley  and  the  narrow  gorge  to  Brown's 
Ferry  was  now  to  become  a  channel  for  reinforce 
ments  as  well  as  supplies.  Sherman's  whole  army 


298     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

was  to  be  moved  through  it  to  the  north  of  the 
river,  with  a  view  to  crossing  again  far  above,  and 
seizing  the  extremity  of  Missionary  Ridge.  Less 
than  a  mile  behind  Missionary  Ridge,  at  the  junc 
tion  of  the  railroads  to  Cleveland  in  eastern  Ten- 
Chickamauga  nessee  and  to  Dalton  in  Georgia,  was 
station.  Chickamauga  station,  where  Bragg  had 

his  depot  of  supplies.  To  get  possession  of  this 
station,  and  of  the  road  between  Cleveland  and 
Dalton,  would  by  a  happy  coincidence  cut  off  all 
supplies  not  only  for  Bragg,  but  also  for  Long- 
street.  A  point  of  such  vital  importance  could 
not  be  gained  without  a  battle,  and  it  was  possi 
ble  to  plan  the  battle  so  that  in  the  effort  to  save 
this  position  the  enemy  should  incur  shattering 
defeat.  While  Hooker  was  to  divert  the  attention 
of  the  Confederates  by  a  vigorous  demonstration 
against  Lookout  Mountain,  Sherman  was  to  attack 
their  right  wing  near  the  north  end  of  Missionary 
Ridge  and  cut  them  off  from  Chickamauga  station. 
But  the  task  of  getting  Sherman's  force  into  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Confederate  right  wing  was 
one  that  called  for  very  delicate  management.  It 
Sherman's  was  beautifully  done.  The  enemy, 
stealthy  ad-  looking  down  from  his  lofty  eminences 

vance  toward 

Chickamauga  upon  the  whole  vast  field,  and  seeing 
station.  the  Union  army  gathered  for  so  long 

a  time   before   his   left    and    centre,   in  Lookout 


Chattanooga  299 

valley  and  the  plain  before  Chattanooga,  felt  little 
fear  for  his  right,  and  so  the  northern  end  of  Mis 
sionary  Ridge  was  inadequately  guarded.  It  was 
of  the  first  importance  that  Sherman's  movement 
to  this  point  should  be  hidden.  One  of  his  divi 
sions  was  therefore  first  moved  from  Bridgeport 
into  Lookout  valley  near  Trenton,  to  draw  Bragg's 
attention  thither.  The  remaining  divisions  were 
taken  along  the  wagon-road  to  Brown's  Ferry, 
where  they  crossed  on  the  pontoon  bridge,  and  then 
diverged  into  a  road  leading  due  northward  quite 
away  from  Chattanooga,  and  losing  itself  to  sight 
among  densely  wooded  hills.  Here,  a  couple  of 
miles  north  of  the  river,  Sherman  had  a  concealed 
camp.  The  enemy,  seeing  the  troops  cross  at 
Brown's  Ferry,  but  observing  no  further  indica 
tions  of  their  presence  north  of  the  river,  very 
naturally  concluded  that  they  were  going  to  Knox- 
ville  to  relieve  Burnside.  So  completely  was  Bragg 
hoodwinked  that  on  the  very  eve  of  battle  he 
sent  away  two  divisions  to  reinforce  Longstreet, 
and  was  able  to  get  only  one  of  them  back  again  in 
time  to  be  of  service.  At  the  same  time  he  seems 
to  have  thought  it  possible  to  scare  Grant  by  de 
claring  his  intention  of  attacking  him,  and  thus 
prevent  his  sending  any  more  forces  in  the  same 
direction.  This  was  perhaps  the  weakest  thing 
Bragg  ever  did.  He  sent  Grant  a  letter,  saying, 


300     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

"  As  there  may  still  be  some  non-combatants  in 
Chattanooga,  I  deem  it  proper  to  notify  you  that 
prudence  would  dictate  their  early  withdrawal." 

Grant  was  not  the  bird  to  be  caught  with  such 
chaff.  He  was  inclined  to  regard  the  letter  as 
designed  to  cover  an  intention  of  retreat,  and  was 
confirmed  in  this  impression  by  the  story  of  a  de 
serter.  He  did  not  wish  Bragg  to  get  away  un 
punished,  and  accordingly  on  the  23d  of  November 
Thomas  was  ordered  to  make  a  demonstration  in 
force.  Thomas's  line  was  in  front  of  Chattanooga, 
facing  Missionary  Kidge.  It  consisted  of  the  three 
corps  of  Granger,  Palmer,  and  Howard,  the  latter 
having  been  detached  from  Hooker.  In  all  Thomas 
had  about  30,000  men.  At  two  in  the  afternoon 
Capture  of  they  advanced  with  such  deliberate 
Orchard  precision  that  for  a  while  the  rebels 

Knob  and 

adjacent  line  supposed  them  to  be  on  parade,  but 
ofhilb.  presently  they  made  a  sudden  rush 

forward  and  captured  a  mound  known  as  Orchard 
Knob  and  a  low  range  of  hills  forming  the  enemy's 
front  line  of  entrenchments.  This  demonstration 
showed  the  Confederates  in  full  force  on  Mission 
ary  Ridge,  but  it  accomplished  much  more.  Dur 
ing  the  night  this  advanced  line  was  fortified  and 
crowned  with  artillery,  for  dragging  which  horses 
were  borrowed  from  Sherman.  Two  days  later,  in 
the  closing  scene  of  the  battle,  this  artillery  played 


Chattanooga  301 

an  important  part  in  protecting  the  assault  upon 
the  Confederate  centre.  Still  another  effect  was 
produced.  This  preliminary  attack  in  front  caused 
Bragg  that  night  to  weaken  his  left  wing  on  Look 
out  Mountain  by  withdrawing  one  strong  division 
in  order  to  transfer  it  to  his  extreme  right.  The 
observed  presence  of  Howard's  corps  on  Thomas's 
left,  near  Citico  creek,  made  him  think  it  wise  to 
guard  that  all-important  quarter  somewhat  more 
strongly. 

This  strengthening  of  the  Confederate  right  was 
destined  to  work  an  important  change  in  Grant's 
plan  of  battle.  Sherman's  march  on  the  24th  was 
delayed  by  many  obstacles,  and  at  last  he  was 
separated  from  his  rear  division  by  a  sudden  rise 
of  the  river,  which  broke  down  the  Breaking  of 
pontoon  bridge  at  Brown's  Ferry.  To  a  bridge- 
replace  this  loss,  Thomas  sent  him  Davis's  division, 
and  thus  he  went  on  in  full  strength.  Following 
the  route  through  his  concealed  camp,  Sherman 
threw  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the  river,  a  little 
below  the  mouth  of  the  South  Chickainauga  creek, 
and  above  the  extreme  right  of  the  Confederate 
army.  Having  completed  his  crossing  about  noon, 
he  moved  on  three  divisions  en  echelon,  his  left 
leading  up  the  left  bank  of  the  creek,  until  all 
arrived  at  the  terminal  slopes  of  Missionary  Ridge, 
where  the  Dalton  railroad  runs  along  their  base. 


302     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

By  four  o'clock  Sherman  had  secured  the  adjacent 
summits,  and  began  massing  the  three  divisions 
there,  while  Davis's  division  was  left  to  guard  the 
rear  as  far  back  as  the  pontoon  bridge. 

But  now  this  brilliant  general  was  rudely  re 
minded  that  there  is  many  a  slip  betwixt  the 
cup  and  the  lip.  Up  to  this  moment  the  crest 
of  Missionary  Ridge,  as  viewed  from  below  and 
from  a  distance,  had  appeared  to  be  continuous, 
Sherman's  so  tna*  Sherman  had  expected,  after 
disappoint-  ascending  it,  to  march  without  hin- 

ment. 

drance  southward  past  the  tunnel  of 
the  Cleveland  railroad,  and  thus  to  reach  a  point 
where  he  could  cut  off  the  Confederate  army  from 
Chickamauga  station.  Grant  had  not  only  looked 
for  this,  but  he  had  expected  Sherman  to  get  into 
position  on  the  ridge  at  such  an  early  hour  on  the 
24th  that  the  great  battle  might  take  place  on  that 
day.  But  now  it  was  near  sunset  when  Sherman, 
looking  southward  from  his  new  vantage  ground, 
saw  before  him  not  a  continuous  crest,  but  a  yawn 
ing  valley,  with  another  frowning  crest  beyond. 
He  had  no  good  topographical  map,  and  hitherto 
his  eye  had  been  deceived  because  of  a  crest  which 
lies  just  to  the  east  of  that  depression,  and  viewed 
from  a  distance  looks  continuous  with  the  crests  to 
the  north  and  south  of  it.  Sherman,  therefore, 
had  not  reached  his  goal.  Neither  had  he  taken 


Chattanooga  303 

the  enemy  by  surprise.  For  on  that  frowning 
crest  northward  of  the  tunnel  he  sees  the  rebels 
in  force.  There  were  two  divisions  of  them,  one 
of  which  Bragg  had  taken  from  Lookout  Moun 
tain  the  night  before.  They  had  hastily  fortified 
themselves  upon  the  knob  north  of  the  tunnel,  and 
upon  the  two  tines  of  the  fork  to  the  south  of 
it ;  and  with  them  were  those  fine  old  war-dogs, 
Hardee  and  Cleburne !  These  positions  must  be 
carried  by  storm,  and  the  hour  of  sunset  is  too 
late  for  such  an  experiment.  So  Sherman  forti 
fies  himself  on  his  isolated  heights  and  waits  for 
morning.  A  message  from  Grant  orders  him  to 
make  his  attack  at  daybreak,  and  tells  him  that 
Thomas  will  soon  support  him  by  an  attack  on  the 
rebel  centre. 

Meanwhile,  during  all  this  short  winter  day, 
most  picturesque  and  stirring  events  were  going 
on  at  the  extreme  right  of  the  Union  position. 
The  rear  division  of  Sherman's  army,  which 
had  been  prevented  from  crossing  at  An  effect  of 
Brown's  Ferry,  remained  at  Hooker's  the  breaking 

-,.  i  -ill-  •  ,  .       of  a  bridge ; 

disposal,    considerably   increasing    his   new  orders 
strength.    This  circumstance  led  Grant   to  Hooker, 
to   convert    the    intended    demonstration    against 
Lookout  Mountain  into  an  assault  sufficiently  vig 
orous  to  detain  the  rebel  force  upon  the  mountain 
and  prevent  Bragg  from  withdrawing  it  in  order 


304     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

to  strengthen  his  right  wing  against  Sherman. 
Hooker  was  evidently  inspired  that  morning  with 
the  ardour  of  battle  that  had  won  for  him  the  so 
briquet  of  "  Fighting  Joe  ;  "  he  sought  permission 
to  interpret  his  orders  with  sufficient  liberality  to 
allow  him  to  storm  the  summit  of  the  mountain  if 
he  should  find  it  feasible,  and  he  received  from 
Thomas  instructions  to  go  ahead  and  do  his  best. 
So  Hooker  began  his  adventurous  movement  be 
fore  daybreak  of  the  24th.  He  had  three  divisions, 
one  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  one  from  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  one  from  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  in  all  about  10,000  men.  These 
divisions  had  never  fought  side  by  side  before. 
The  ascent  of  the  mountain  was  difficult,  even  if 
there  had  been  no  foe  there.  On  the  west  side 
there  was  no  way  of  getting  up  save  by  narrow 
paths  which  could  be  traversed  only  in  single  file. 
An  ascent  here  was  impracticable,  as  the  men  could 
be  shot  down  faster  than  they  could  advance.  But 
on  the  other  side,  near  the  point  of  the  mountain, 
there  was  a  good  wagon-road  winding  zigzag  to  the 
very  top.  This  road  connected  the  rebels  on  the 
mountain  with  the  centre  of  their  army,  and  to  take 
it  would  turn  their  position  and  put  them  to  flight. 
Hooker's  troops  were  in  the  valley  west  of 
Lookout  creek  which  was  swollen  so  that  it  could 
not  be  forded.  With  two  of  his  divisions  he  set 


Chattanooga  305 

about  building  a  rude  bridge  near  the  mouth  of 
the  creek,  while  the  other  division,  under  the 
dauntless  John  Geary,  marched  up  to  Wauhat- 
chie  and,  crossing  there,  began  to  move  diagonally 
up  the  steep  side  of  the  mountain,  al- 

Geary's  as- 

ways  bearing  northward  so  as  to  reach  cent  of  Look- 
and  round  the  point,  and  ultimately  outMoun- 
gain  the  wagon-road.  The  movement 
was  favoured  by  the  absence  of  the  division  which 
Bragg  had  felt  obliged  to  withdraw  in  the  night ; 
there  were  still,  however,  7000  Confederates  in 
position  on  the  mountain,  —  quite  enough  to  give 
them  odds  against  Hooker  with  his  10,000  lower 
down.  Every  available  point  was  entrenched  and 
commanded  by  artillery,  but  the  Confederate  force 
was  not  quite  sufficient  to  enable  them  to  make 
the  best  use  of  all  these  advantages.  In  many 
places  their  guns  could  not  be  depressed  so  as  to 
bear  upon  Geary's  column,  which  pertinaciously 
crept  along  under  their  muzzles,  climbing  over 
boulders,  bursting  through  the  tangled  underbrush, 
keeping  up  a  skirmishing  fire,  and  always  mak 
ing  progress,  while  its  route  was  marked  by  the 
prostrate  bodies  of  men  dying  and  dead.  By  noon 
Geary  had  reached  the  point  of  the  mountain,  and 
come  out  upon  the  smoother  ascent  which  was 
traversed  by  the  wagon-road. 

Meanwhile  Hooker,  with  his  other  two  divisions, 


306     The,  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

had  finished  their  bridge  and  crossed  it ;  and  then, 
pushing  straight  up  toward  the  peak,  connected 
with  Geary's  left.  As  the  whole  solid  force  ap 
proached  the  wagon-road,  the  fight  became  fiercer. 
Up  and  up  they  went  into  the  clouds,  which  were 
The  "  battle  settling  down  upon  the  lofty  summit, 
above  the  until  they  were  lost  from  sight,  and 
their  comrades  anxiously  watching  in 
Chattanooga  valley  could  hear  only  the  booming 
of  cannon  and  rattle  of  musketry  far  overhead, 
and  catch  glimpses  of  fire  flashing  from  moment 
to  moment  through  the  dark  clouds,  as  if  the  old 
mythmaker's  notion  of  the  thunderstorm  were 
realized,  and  elemental  spirits  were  engaged  in  a 
deadly  struggle  for  the  dominion  of  the  upper  air. 
At  four  o'clock  a  messenger  came  to  Thomas  with 
the  news  that  the  summit  was  carried.  Well  done, 
"  Fighting  Joe  !  "  In  days  to  come,  whensoever 
Chancellorsville  is  mentioned,  something  will  also 
have  to  be  said  of  the  "  battle  above  the  clouds." 

Next  morning,  the  25th  of  November,  the  air 
was  clear  and  frosty.  The  clouds  had  vanished, 
and  the  sun  rose  bright  and  dazzling,  while  thou 
sands  of  eager  eyes  were  turned  towards  the  top 
Presage  of  of  Lookout  Mountain.  And  over  its 
victory.  sharp  outline,  visible  for  miles  and 

miles,  on  the  very  summit  of  Pulpit  Rock,  where 
Jefferson  Davis  had  stood  a  few  weeks  ago  and 


Chattanooga  307 

uttered  his  audacious  prophecy,  there  floated  on 
the  morning  breeze  the  lordly  stars  and  stripes. 
Loud  shouts  of  victory,  cheer  after  cheer,  rose 
up  melodiously  together  from  the  army  below,1  in 
earnest  of  the  crowning  triumph  whereof  the  air 
was  full  of  presage. 

Victory  came,  but  not  in  the  way  that  Grant 
had  expected.  According  to  his  plan,  Hooker  was 
to  keep  the  enemy  occupied  on  Lookout  Mountain, 
while  Sherman  was  to  turn  his  right  flank  and 
sever  his  communications  with  Chickamauga  sta 
tion,  and  all  this  was  to  be  accomplished  on  the 
24th.  Now  Hooker  had  done  more 

An  unex- 

and   Sherman   less   than  was   on   the   pectedsitua- 
programme.     Sherman   had  met  with   tlon' 
unforeseen  obstacles,  while  Hooker  had  captured 
the   mountain,    so   that   the   Confederates   driven 
thence  were  at  liberty  to  be  transferred  to  Bragg's 
right,  there  to  strengthen  the  resistance  to  Sher 
man.     At  daybreak  the  movement  of  troops  north 
ward   along   Missionary  Ridge   could   plainly  be 
detected  from  the  Union  lines. 

I  am  particular  in  emphasizing  these  points, 
because  a  few  years  ago  there  was  a  visible  tend 
ency  toward  the  growth  of  a  "  Grant  legend," 
in  which  that  general's  reputation  was  made  to 

1  Cist,  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  p.  251 ;  Hazen,  Narrative 
of  Military  Service,  p.  172. 


308     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

suffer  from  misplaced  and  undiscriminating  praise. 

Among  other  things  it  was  asserted  by  Grant's 

injudicious  admirers  that  among  the  world's  great 

fights,  the  battle  of  Chattanooga  was 

Need  for  fur-       & 

ther  changes  well-nigh  unique  in  having  been  fought 
of  plan.  from  beginning  to  end  exactly  as  it 

was  first  planned  in  the  superb  brain  of  the  Union 
commander.  Now  if  anything  in  this  world  can 
be  said  to  be  clear,  it  is  that  the  battle  of  Chatta 
nooga  was  not  fought  as  Grant  had  planned  it ; 
while  at  the  same  time  a  correct  history  of  it 
shows  us  that  one  mark  of  a  great  general  is  the 
ability  to  modify  his  plans  on  the  spur  of  the 
moment,  and  to  turn  the  unexpected  incidents  to 
his  own  advantage. 

We  have  seen  how  the  breaking  of  a  bridge 
turned  the  demonstration  against  Lookout  Moun 
tain  into  a  movement  which  resulted  in  its  capture. 
Since  a  small  garrison  would  now  suffice  to  hold 
it,  Grant  ordered  Hooker  to  bring  down  the  bulk 
of  his  force  into  Chattanooga  valley  and  connect 
with  the  right  wing  of  Thomas's  army,  which  oc 
cupied  the  low  range  of  hills  in  front 

Sherman's 

attack  upon  °f  Missionary  Kidge.  Larly  in  the 
Bragg's  morning  Sherman  began  his  assault 

upon  the  north  end  of  the  ridge,  but 
he  encountered  desperate  resistance  and  made  but 
little  progress ;  insomuch  that  as  Grant  scrutinized 


Chattanooga  309 

the  situation  from  Orchard  Knob,  the  thought 
crossed  his  mind  that  if  the  Confederate  right  wing 
could  maintain  its  ground  against  Sherman  till 
nightfall,  what  was  to  hinder  Bragg  from  evacuat 
ing  his  positions  during  the  night  and  retreating 
upon  Cleveland  to  effect  a  junction  with  Long- 
street  ? l  Matters  must  be  pressed  more  vigor 
ously,  and  to  this  end  Grant  sent  a  new  order  to 
Hooker,  telling  him  to  advance  to  Rossville  Gap, 
and  then,  turning  northward  along  Hooker 
Missionary  Ridge,  to  assail  Bragg's  moves  against 
left  flank.  A  front  attack  by  Thomas  Bragg's  left< 
had  been  in  Grant's  mind  since  yesterday,  and  had 
been  mentioned  in  his  evening  order  to  Sherman, 
but  the  difficulties  attending  such  a  movement  so 
impressed  Grant  that  he  was  inclined  to  withhold 
it  until  Bragg's  line  should  be  more  or  less  shaken 
by  one  or  both  of  the  flank  attacks.  The  crest  of 
Missionary  Ridge  rose  400  feet  above  its  foot-hills, 
and  the  irregularities  in  the  ground  made  the  as 
cent  so  difficult  that  Bragg  declared  that  a  single 
cordon  of  skirmishers  ought  to  hold  it  against  the 
whole  Federal  army.  Confident  in  this  view  of 
the  case,  Bragg  sent  brigade  after  brigade  to  his 
right  to  withstand  Sherman,  until  his  centre  grew 
so  thin  as  to  invite  attack,  even  in  its  strong 
position.  From  Orchard  Knob,  where  Grant  and 

1  Comte  de  Paris,  The  Civil  War  in  America,  iv.  289. 


310     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Thomas  were  standing  side  by  side,  every  feature 
of  these  movements  could  be  plainly 

Bragg  weak-  * 

ens  his  centre  seen,  and  as  the  day  wore  on  Grant  s 
to  strengthen  anxiety  for  Sherman  increased.  Ine 
qualities  of  ground  prevented  his  seeing 
what  was  happening  on  the  extreme  Union  right, 
and  he  looked  long  in  vain  for  the  appearance  of 
Hooker's  men  on  Missionary  Ridge  north  of  Ross- 
ville  Gap.  The  Confederates,  in  their  retreat  from 
Lookout  Mountain,  had  destroyed  the  bridge  over 
Chattanooga  creek,  so  that  Hooker's  progress  was 
seriously  delayed. 

At  last  Grant  decided  to  make  a  demonstration 

with  his  centre,  hoping  thus  to  alarm  Bragg  into 

recalling  some  of  the  troops  that  were 

Grant  decides 

to  threaten       contending  against  Sherman.     Should 
Bragg's  cen-     Hooker  appear  at  a  favourable  moment 

tre. 

above  Rossville  Gap,  this  demonstra 
tion  could  easily  be  converted  into  an  assault  upon 
the  rebel  centre.  It  was  for  Thomas's  army  to 
make  this  important  movement.  At  Stone  river 
and  at  Chickamauga  Bragg  had  tried  Thomas  as 
anvil ;  he  was  now  to  feel  him  as  hammer. 

Baird's  division  occupied  the  left  of  Thomas's 
line,  as  Howard  had  been  sent,  with  the  Eleventh 
corps,  to  the  aid  of  Sherman.  To  the  right  of 
Baird  came  Wood,  then  Sheridan,  then  Johnson ; 
four  divisions,  numbering  20,000  men.  The  en- 


Chattanooga  311 

emy's  force  in  front  was  now  much  smaller  than 
this,  probably  13,000  infantry,  with  2000  artiller 
ists  ;  but  it  was  strongly  entrenched  near  the  base 
of  the  ridge,  and  again  near  the  summit.  The 
instructions  to  the  division-commanders  The  orders  to 
were  to  carry  the  first  line  of  works,  the  storming 
and  then  halt  in  the  rifle-pits  to  reform 
their  lines.  Further  instructions  were  withheld 
until  the  effect  of  this  first  charge  could  be  seen, 
and  also  in  the  hope  of  Hooker's  timely  appear 
ance  on  the  scene. 

At  half  past  three  o'clock  the  signal  was  given 
by  six  guns  fired  in  quick  succession  from  Orchard 
Knob,  and  two  strong  lines  of  skir-  Amagnifi- 
mishers  moved  forward,  soon  followed  cent  charse- 
by  20,000  men  with  levelled  bayonets,  and  all  on 
the  double  quick.  A  heavy  fire  was  opened  on 
them  from  sixty  rebel  guns,  which  were  vigorously 
answered  by  the  Union  batteries.  The  long  lines 
of  bayonets  gleaming  in  the  wintry  sunshine  were 
a  magnificent  and  formidable  sight.  The  four 
divisions  reached  the  first  line  of  entrenchments 
almost  at  the  same  moment  and  instantly  poured 
over  them,  scattering  their  defenders,  of  whom  at 
least  1000  were  captured.  Then  came  a  marvel 
lous  moment.  These  brave  assailants  were  thrill 
ing  in  every  nerve  with  victory,  but  the  position 
into  which  they  had  rushed  was  scarcely  tenable. 


312     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  ilia  Civil  War 

Swept  by  a  fierce  artillery  fire,  exacerbated  by  the 
rifles  of  hidden  skirmishers,  it  was  a  veritable 
hornet's  nest,  from  which  escape  must  quickly  be 
sought  in  retreat  or  advance.  But  the  exultant 
mood  of  these  men  was  not  the  mood  for  retreat ; 
an  uncontrollable  impulse  carried  them  straight 
onward  up  the  slope,  without  tarrying  a  moment 
for  orders.  To  adopt  a  happy  phrase  of  the  Count 
of  Paris,  they  "fled  forward"  in. a  contagious  fury 
of  aggressiveness  which  nothing  could  quell. 

It  was  with  grave  concern  that  Grant  and 
Thomas  saw  this  magnificent  charge  continue  be- 
An  anxious  yond  its  prescribed  goal.  If  success- 
moment.  fuj9  jt  meant  speedy  victory,  but  if 
repulsed,  it  would  leave  the  victorious  enemy  be 
tween  the  isolated  forces  of  Sherman  on  the  one 
hand  and  Hooker  on  the  other ;  and  the  probable 
result  would  be,  —  Sherman  driven  across  the  Ten 
nessee,  Thomas  pushed  back  into  Chattanooga,  and 
Hooker  badly  mauled.  Grant  exclaimed,  "  Thomas, 
who  ordered  those  men  up  the  ridge  ?  "  "I  don't 
know,"  replied  Thomas,  "  I  did  not :  Granger,  did 
you?"  "No,"  said  Gordon  Granger,  "they  are 
going  without  orders ;  when  those  fellows  get 
started,  all  hell  can't  stop  them! "  Grant  muttered 
that  somebody  would  suffer  if  the  movement  failed.1 

1  See  the  account  of  General  Fullerton,  Granger's  chief  of  staff, 
in  Battles  and  Leaders,  iii.  725. 


Chattanooga  313 

No  such  calamity,  however,  was  forthcoming. 
The  20,000  bayonets  pushed  their  way  up  the  hill 
under  a  storm  of  shells  and  musketry.  Sheridan 
lost  1300  men  out  of  his  division  of  6000 ;  in  other 
quarters  the  loss  was  not  so  heavy.  In  some  places, 
to  avoid  the  fire,  men  went  on  all  fours,  Bragg's  centre 
but  nothing  stopped  their  advance.  In  crushed- 
less  than  an  hour  from  the  signal  to  start,  the 
crest  was  carried  almost  simultaneously  at  six  dif 
ferent  places.  Wood's  and  Sheridan's  divisions 
were  the  first  to  clear  the  summit,  and  among  these 
General  Hazen  contends  that  his  brigade,  of 
Wood's  division,  was  foremost.1  The  gunners  were 
slain  at  their  posts,  and  the  cannon  turned  upon 
the  enemy.  The  whole  Confederate  centre  was 
routed.  Men  threw  down  their  arms  and  fled,  or 
were  captured  in  crowds.  Bragg  himself  narrowly 
escaped  capture. 

While  this  was  going  on,  Hooker  arrived  at 
Rossville  Gap,  pushed  up  the  ridge,  and  routing 
the  rebel  left  sent  it  tumbling  in  upon  the  routed 
centre.  One  division,  fleeing  before  Hooker,  was 
thus  thrown  directly  in  front  of  John-  Total  defeat 
son's  division,  by  which  it  was  captured,  of  theCon- 

m,  .,  !  -IT         federates. 

The  pursuit  was  kept   up,  mainly  by 

Sheridan,  as  far  as  Chickamauga  creek,  and  many 

prisoners  were  taken.     At  Baird's  end  of  the  as- 

1  See  his  Narrative,  pp.  173-235. 


314     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

sailing  line,  where  the  enemy  had  been  massing  to 
move  against  Sherman,  a  sturdy  resistance  was 
encountered.  The  rebel  right  wing  held  its  ground 
till  toward  nightfall,  when  seeing  the  rest  of  the 
army  crumbled  to  fragments  it  gave  way  and  aban 
doned  the  field.  The  pursuit  was  continued  for 
two  days,  while  Sherman,  with  25,000  men,  started 
for  Knoxville  to  relieve  Burnside ;  but  the  defeat 
of  Bragg  cut  Longstreet's  line  of  supply,  and  on 
learning  of  Sherman's  approach  he  got  out  of  the 
way  as  speedily  as  possible.  Thus  the  siege  of 
Knoxville  was  raised  by  the  same  stroke  that  freed 
Chattanooga  from  the  presence  of  the  foe.  It  was 
a  double  victory. 

The  next  day  after  the  storming  of  Missionary 
Ridge  was  Thanksgiving  Day  ;  the  completeness 
of  the  victory  had  begun  to  be  realized  throughout 
the  country  by  the  time  people  sat  down  to  dinner  ; 
and,  as  Halleck  said  in  his  congratulatory  tele 
gram,  Grant  had  made  it  indeed  a  day  of  thanks- 
Greatness  of  giving-  It  was  in  some  respects  the 
the  victory.  mOst  brilliant  victory  of  the  war.  For 
a  battle  of  such  dimensions,  the  losses  in  killed 
and  wounded  were  remarkably  small,  —  some  GOOO 
on  the  Federal  side,  something  less  on  the  side 
of  the  Confederates,  who  fought  mostly  behind 
entrenchments.  Grant  captured  more  than  6000 
prisoners,  40  pieces  of  artillery,  and  7000  stand  of 


Chattanooga  315 

arms.  That  the  destruction  of  life  was  so  much 
less  than  at  Shiloh,  or  Stone  river,  or  Chicka- 
mauga,  was  largely  due  to  the  adroit  manoeuvring 
which  made  the  enemy's  almost  impregnable  posi 
tions  avail  him  so  little.  In  this  respect  the  battle 
of  Chattanooga  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  in 
modern  history. 

It  is  also  one  of  the  most  picturesque.  The  im 
mense  length  of  battle-front,  thirteen  miles  from 
Sherman's  left  to  Hooker's  right,  the  extraordinary 
difficulty  of  the  ground,  the  dizzy  heights  scaled, 
the  grandeur  of  the  scenery,  all  com-  Grandeur  of 
bined  to  make  it  a  wonderful  spectacle,  the  battle- 
Unlike  most  of  our  battles,  in  which 
the  movements  were  mostly  hidden  from  sight  in 
the  forest,  here  the  fighting  went  on  to  a  great  ex 
tent  in  the  full  view  of  both  armies.  "  Many  a 
time,"  General  Sherman  tells  us,  "  in  the  midst  of 
the  carnage  and  noise,"  he  "  could  not  help  stop 
ping  to  look  across  that  vast  field  of  battle,  to  ad 
mire  its  sublimity." 1  On  that  field  were  arrayed 
portions  of  our  three  great  armies  of  the  Potomac, 
the  Cumberland,  and  the  Tennessee,  thus  for  the 
first  time  brought  together  under  one  leader  ;  and 
of  all  the  battles  of  the  war,  this  was  the  only  one 
in  which  our  four  most  famous  Union  generals  — 
Grant,  Sherman,  Thomas,  and  Sheridan  —  hap- 

1  Sherman's  Memoirs,  i.  362. 


316     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

pened  all  to  be  engaged.     No  wonder  there  was  so 
little  left  of  Braxton  Bragg ! 

But  it  was  not  only  for  its  picturesque  features 
or  its  interesting  tactics,  but  still  more  for  its 
strategic  importance,  that  tlie  battle  of  Chatta 
nooga  was  so  brilliant.  The  victory  gave  us  hence 
forth  undisputed  possession  of  Chattanooga,  with 
all  that  this  implied.  As  the  capture  of  Vicks- 
burg  cut  the  Confederacy  in  two  on  the  line  of  the 
Mississippi,  so  the  victory  at  Chattanooga  cut  in 
two  the  remainder  of  it  on  the  line  of  the  Alle- 
ghanies.  The  great  campaigns  of  the  following 
spring  and  summer  were  conducted  entirely  upon 
soil  which  formed  part  of  the  original  thirteen 
The  Missis-  Atlantic  states.  The  Mississippi  val- 
sippi  valley  ley  was  now  recovered  for  the  Union. 
Once  again,  indeed,  toward  the  end  of 
the  following  year,  the  Confederacy  ventured  to 
invade  this  region,  and  threw  a  great  army  as  far 
north  as  Nashville,  where  dire  catastrophe  awaited 
it.  Our  next  chapter  will  give  some  account  of 
this  important  episode  in  the  conclusion  of  the 
Civil  War. 


CHAPTER  IX 

NASHVILLE 

IT  is  worth  while  to  note  that  each  of  the  four 
cardinal  victories  which  restored  the  supremacy  of 
the  United  States  government  in  the  West  was  won 
under  the  leadership  of  Grant.  Fort  Donelson, 
Shiloh,  Vicksburg,  Chattanooga, — these  names  are 
the  landmarks  in  that  mighty  story.  If  we  may 
liken  the  whole  war  to  one  stupendous  battle  of 
four  years'  duration,  it  is  evident  that  the  United 
States  was  gradually  defeating  the  Confederacy  by 
turning  its  left  flank.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
year  1864  the  Confederate  right  in  Virginia  still 
held  its  ground.  There  three  years  of  warfare  had 
apparently  accomplished  nothing.  Lee  was  still 
midway  between  Richmond  and  Washington,  defi 
ant  and  apparently  unconquerable.  It  was  not 
strange  that  to  the  general  who  had  done  so  much 
this  last  and  most  difficult  problem  should  be 
entrusted.  It  was  fitting  that  to  Grant  should 
be  assigned  the  task  of  overthrowing  Lee.  It  was 
also  right  that  in  undertaking  this  task  Grant 
should  have  unlimited  control  of  the  whole  field  of 


318     Tlie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

operations.  Thus  only  could  unity  of  purpose  in 
Need  for  ^ie  movenients  of  the  different  armies 
unity  of  oper-  be  ensured.  For  want  of  such  well-de 
fined  unity  of  purpose  the  conduct  of 
the  war  had  hitherto  languished.  A  good  instance 
was  furnished  by  the  series  of  campaigns  just 
passed  in  review  for  the  possession  of  Chattanooga. 
Immediately  after  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  Grant  had 
wished  to  ta,ke  his  army  to  Mobile,  and  in  con 
cert  with  the  fleet  under  Farragut  capture  that 
important  city.  He  understood  the  peril  to  which 
Rosecrans's  army  must  necessarily  be  exposed  in 
advancing  into  the  difficult  mountain  region  of 
northern  Georgia.  He  knew  that  Mobile,  threat 
ened  at  once  by  land  and  by  sea,  must  fall  unless 
troops  should  speedily  be  sent  to  its  defence ;  and 
he  knew  that  those  troops  were  most  likely  to  be 
taken  from  Bragg.  His  advice  was  not  heeded. 
If  it  had  been  followed,  the  disaster  of  Chicka- 
mauga  might  have  been  averted.  The  glorious 
victory  at  Chattanooga,  which  had  ensued  upon 
giving  him  unhampered  command  in  the  West, 
pointed  clearly  to  the  next  step  which  ought  to  be 
taken.  In  March,  1864,  a  bill  was  passed  through 
Congress  reviving  the  grade  of  Lieutenant-General, 
which  heretofore  had  been  held  only  by  Washing 
ton  and  Scott.1  Grant  was  promoted  to  this  rank, 

1  Scott's,  which  was  conferred  in  1855,  was  only  a  brevet  rank. 


Nashville  319 

and  made  general-in-chief  of  all  the  armies  of  the 
United   States.     Thus  he  was  enabled   Grant  made 
not  only  to  begin  operation  in  Virginia   general-in- 
with  hands  untrammelled,  but  also  to 
control  the  whole  field  of  war,  so  that  a  victory  in 
Tennessee  or  Georgia  should  exert  its  full  effect 
upon  the  situation  in  Virginia.    In  another  twelve 
month  the  fruits  of  this  sound  policy  were  gathered, 
and  the  conqueror  of  Vicksburg  and  Chattanooga 
became  also  the  conqueror  of  Richmond. 

The  true  character  of  this  final  epoch  of  the 
war,  however,  cannot  be  understood  without  keep 
ing  clearly  before  our  minds  the  mutual  relations 
between  the  grand  operations  in  the  eastern  and 
western  theatres  of  war.  The  work  of  overthrow 
ing  Lee  called  into  play  other  agencies  besides  the 
campaigns  in  Virginia  which  Grant  superintended 
in  person.  Moreover,  with  regard  to  that  frightful 
tale  of  bloodshed,  from  the  Wilderness  to  Peters 
burg,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  it  really  added 
anything  to  Grant's  just  reputation  as  a  soldier. 

After  the  end  of  the  war  the  full  grade  of  General  was  created  by 
Congress,  and  conferred  successively  upon  Grant,  Sherman,  and 
Sheridan.  At  a  much  later  date  Schofield,  on  becoming  general- 
in-chief,  was  made  Lieutenant-General.  During  the  Civil  War 
the  Confederate  government  usually  gave  the  full  rank  of  Gen 
eral  to  the  commanders  of  armies,  and  that  of  Lieutenant-General 
to  the  commanders  of  corps,  which  would  limit  the  grade  of 
Major-General  to  the  commanders  of  divisions. 


320     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

To  start  with  an  army  twice  as  large  as  the  en 
emy's,  and  then  to  throw  away  60,000  men  in  killed 
and  wounded  without  either  inflicting  a  propor 
tionate  loss  or  advancing   perceptibly 

Grant's  first 

Virginia  cam-  toward  the  goal  of  the  campaign,  is 
paign.  hardly  a  record  of  great  generalship, 

and  it  is  not  the  kind  of  record  which  Grant  had 
made  for  himself  at  Vicksburg  and  Chattanooga.1 
When  Grant,  after  three  weeks  of  slaughter,  ar 
rived  at  the  North  Anna  river,  there  could  be  no 
doubt  that  he  had  been  outgene railed,  or  —  to  use 
Colonel  Dodge's  happy  expression  —  had  received 
a  complete  stalemate.2  Then  came  the  horror  of 
Cold  Harbor,  which  Grant  himself,  with  manly 
candour,  afterward  deplored  ;  3  and  then  the  change 
of  base  to  James  river,  a  point  which  might  have 
been  directly  reached  with  small  loss ! 

In  truth,  when  Grant  first  came  to  Virginia  he 
evidently  underrated  his  antagonist,  and  was  pos- 

1  General  Sherman  once  told  me  that  that  fearful  amount  of 
slaughter  was  after  all  necessary,  because  the  South  would  never 
give  up  so  long  as  it  had  an  army  of  any  size  worth  mentioning ; 
it  was  therefore  a  melancholy  necessity  to  pound  the  life  out  of 
Lee's  army,  even  at  the  cost  of  half  a  dozen  lives  for  one,  a  price 
which  the  more  populous  North  could  afford.     But  to  admit  that 
Grant  could  not  avoid  paying  such  a  price  is  to  concede  the  supe 
rior  generalship  of  Lee. 

2  Dodge,  A  Bird's-Eye  View  of  our  Civil  War,  new  ed.,  1897} 
p.  2 14. 

3  Grant's  Memoirs,  ii.  276. 


Nashville  321 

sessed  with  the  notion  that  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  had  never  had  its  full  fighting  power  drawn 
out.  Perhaps  he  may  have  shared  to  some  extent 
in  the  feeling  to  which  another  western  general, 
of  much  smaller  calibre,  John  Pope,  gave  such  ob 
jectionable  expression  two  years  before,  when  he 
declared  his  contempt  for  "  certain  expressions  he 
found  much  in  vogue,  such  as  bases  of 

Manoeuvring 

supplies  and  lines  of  retreat."  In  some-  vs.  hammer- 
what  similar  mood  Grant  is  said  to  ing> 
have  spoken  slightingly  of  grand  tactics.  We  are 
told  that  shortly  before  the  battle  of  the  Wilder 
ness,  when  Meade  was  saying  that  he  proposed  to 
mano3iivre  thus  and  so,  Grant  interrupted  him  with 
the  exclamation,  "  Oh,  I  never  manoauvre ! " 1  This 
anecdote  harmonizes  with  the  popular  conception 
of  Grant  as  a  general  who  achieved  success  by 
"  continuous  hammering  "  rather  than  by  strategi 
cal  or  tactical  devices. 

Yet  if  Grant  really  said  that  he  never  manoeu 
vred,  he  must  have  been  speaking  very  carelessly, 
for  he  certainly  did  manoeuvre  a  great  deal,  and 
to  very  good  purpose.  His  campaign  in  the  rear 
of  Vicksburg  was  a  series  of  splendid  strategic 
mano3uvres,  and  it  showed  how  military  skill  can 
achieve  a  vast  result  without  great  loss  of  life.  So, 
too,  with  the  Chattanooga  campaign,  it  abounded 

1  Svvinton's  Army  of  the  Potomac,  p.  440. 


322     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

in  beautiful  manoeuvres,  helped  by  the  skill  which 
Grant's  ma-  took  advantage  of  accidents  and  thus 
noeuvres.  made  them  "  lucky  accidents."  Smith's 
operation  at  Brown's  Ferry,  which  Grant  adopted, 
was  a  masterpiece  of  manoeuvring ;  the  moving  of 
Sherman's  forces  to  the  northern  end  of  Mission 
ary  Ridge  was  another ;  the  storming  of  Lookout 
Mountain  was  developed  from  a  manoeuvre  in 
tended  to  assist  Sherman.  The  sending  of  Hooker 
to  Rossville  Gap,  and  the  order  to  Thomas's  four 
divisions  to  advance  upon  Missionary  Ridge,  were 
both  manoeuvres  designed  to  make  Bragg  weaken 
his  right  wing ;  and  as  for  the  sublime  spontaneous 
rush  of  Thomas's  men,  which  crushed  the  enemy's 
centre,  its  success  was  prepared  by  the  previous 
manoeuvres.  Again,  in  Virginia,  after  the  experi 
ments  at  the  Wilderness  and  Spottsylvania  had 
shown  that  "  continuous  hammering  "  was  exhaust 
ing  our  own  strength  much  quicker  than  the  ene 
my's,  Grant's  movements  by  the  left  flank  were 
manoeuvres,  and  very  skilful  ones. 

In  truth,  a  thorough  trial  of  the  pounding  policy 
made  it  clear  that  the  obstacle  to  Federal  success 
in  Virginia  did  not  consist  in  the  fancy  that  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  had  not  had  its  full  fighting 
capacity  drawn  out,  but  in  the  fact  that  its  antago 
nist's  movements  were  guided  by  superior  genius. 
At  the  west  Grant  had  been  opposed  by  generals 


Nashville  323 

of  varying  degrees  of  ability,  —  Buckner,  Sidney 
Johnston,  Beauregard,  Van  Dora,  Pemberton, 
Bragg,  —  for  the  most  part  good  soldiers,  but  none 
of  them  a  demonstrated  genius.  In  The  only  way 
Virginia  he  found  himself  opposed  by  to  dispose  of 
a  general  of  the  calibre  of  Turenne  or 
Marlborough,  and  his  eyes  were  gradually  opened 
to  the  difference.  By  the  end  of  July,  1864,  after 
three  months  of  alternate  manoauvring  and  ham 
mering  against  an  army  scarcely  half  the  size  of 
his  own,  his  policy  was  practically  reduced  to  de 
taining  Lee  at  Petersburg  until  the  whole  of  the 
Confederacy  should  be  knocked  away  from  behind 
him,  leaving  him  in  the  air  without  a  prop. 

This  business  of  knocking  away  the  Confederacy 
from  Lee  was  performed  by  the  splendid  army 
with  which  Sherman,  in  May,  1864,  started  from 
Chattanooga  toward  Atlanta.  It  was  work  which 
would  never  have  been  performed  under  the  old 
regime,  with  the  marplot  Halleck  at  the  head  of 
things  ;  for  we  know  that  some  of  Sherman's  most 
important  movements  were  strongly  disapproved 
by  that  personage.  What  was  needed  , 

Unity  of 

was    the  unity  of   design    secured  by   operations 
having  all  great  operations  controlled    secured- 
by  a  master  intelligence,  like  Grant's,  which  could 
appreciate  and  assist  the  brilliant  conceptions  of 
Sherman.     We  must  devote  a  very  few  words  to 


324     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

the  operations  of  the  latter,  before  we  go  on  to  the 
decisive  part  that  was  finally  played  within  the 
limits  of  the  Mississippi  valley. 

When  Grant  was  made  general-in-chief  of  the 
armies  of  the  United  States,  Sherman  succeeded 
him  in  the  chief  command  at  the  West,  and  under 
Sherman  were  three  armies  with  three  superb  com 
manders  :  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  under  Mc- 
Pherson  ;  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  under 
Thomas  ;  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  formerly 
under  Burnside,  but  now  commanded  by  Schofield. 
At  the  beginning  of  May,  1864,  this  triple  army 
.  covered  a  line  about  twenty  miles  in 

The  armies  of  f  "* 

Sherman  and  length,  a  little  south  of  Chattanooga  : 
Johnston.  McPherson  on  the  right,  with  25,000 
men,  Thomas  in  the  centre,  with  60,000,  and 
Schofield  on  the  left,  with  15,000 ;  in  all  100,000 
men,  with  260  guns.  Opposed  to  this  force  was  a 
Confederate  army  of  65,000  men  strongly  fortified 
at  Dalton,  under  command  of  Joseph  Johnston, 
who  among  the  southern  generals  ranked  next  in 
ability  to  Lee.  Johnston  had  superseded  Braxton 
Bragg,  whom  Mr.  Davis  had  called  to  Richmond 
to  be  chief  of  his  general  staff. 

It  was  generally  understood  by  the  public  that 
Sherman's  grand  object  in  this  campaign  was  the 
capture  of  Atlanta,  the  principal  city  of  Georgia 


Nashville  325 

between  the  mountains  and  the  sea-coast.  But 
Grant  and  Sherman  well  knew  that  a  far  more 
important  object  was  the  destruction  or  capture 
of  Johnston's  army,1  and  this  was  likely  to  be 
no  light  task.  Johnston  was  a  master  of  Fabian 
strategy,  whom  it  was  next  to  impossible  to  bring 
to  battle  unless  he  saw  a  good  chance  of  winning. 

At  the  very  outset,  indeed,  Sherman  seems  to 
have  had  an  opportunity  of  forcing  Johnston  to 
fight  at  a  great  disadvantage,  or  to  retreat  upon 
dangerous  roads.  Johnston  expected  to  be  attacked 
at  Dalton,  but  Sherman  sent  McPherson,  with  his 
25,000  men,  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  to  seize 
Kesaca  and  there  in  full  force  oppose  Johnston's 
inevitably  consequent  retreat  from  Dalton.  If 
this  movement  succeeded,  it  was  hoped  that  John 
ston's  southward  retreat  would  be  deflected  east 
ward  to  Spring  Place,  in  which  event 

•    it  1 1*       i*    i  •       How  Sher- 

we  might  have  captured  half  of  his   man]osta 
army.     "Such  an   opportunity,"  says   solden 

en     '  i  •  opportunity. 

onerman,   "  does  not  occur  twice  in  a 
single  life,  but  at  the  critical  moment  McPherson 
seems   to   have  been  a  little  timid."2      Sherman 
thought  that  McPherson  ought  to   have   put   his 
whole  force  astride  of  the  railroad  at  Kesaca  ;  but 

1  "  Neither  Atlanta,  nor  Augusta,  nor  Savannah,  was  the  objec 
tive,  but  the  '  army  of  Jos.  Johnston,'  go  where  it  might."     Sher 
man's  Memoirs,  ii.  2(5. 

2  Sherman's  Memoirs,  ii.  34. 


326     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Johnston  asserts  that  if  this  had  been  done,  he 
would  himself,  on  letting  go  his  hold  upon  Dal  ton, 
have  thrown  his  entire  army  upon  McPherson  and 
crushed  him.1  This  seems  probable.  For  the 
purpose  which  Sherman  had  in  view,  McPherson's 
force  was  much  too  small,  and  its  commander  did 
wisely  in  taking  up  a  strong  defensive  position 
west  of  Resaca.  Sherman's  mistake  lay  in  not 
following  Thomas's  advice  and  sending  Thomas 
himself,  with  his  60,000  men,  through  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  instead  of  McPherson.  It  would  then 
have  been  difficult  for  Johnston  to  avoid  a  fight 
with  Thomas,  in  the  course  of  which  McPherson 
and  Schofield,  with  40,000  men,  might  have  been 
thrown  upon  his  rear,  achieving  his  destruction. 

Such  a  chance,  as  Sherman  truly  says,  does  not 
occur  twice  in  a  lifetime,  and  the  wily  Johnston 
took  good  care  that  it  should  not  again  be  offered 
to  Sherman.  It  remained  for  the  latter  to  avail 
himself  of  his  numerical  superiority  to  outflank 
his  antagonist  and  push  him  back  by  turning  his 
Johnston  strong  positions  one  after  another, 
piishedback  This  work  was  done  in  masterly 

upon  Atlanta.     faslli(m  until  by  slow    gtages    Johnston 

was  driven  back  upon  Atlanta.  During  all  this 
time,  from  May  5  to  July  17,  the  two  armies 
were  almost  in  contact  with  each  other,  and  there 

1  Battles  and  Leaders,  iv.  266. 


.\  *JJ — vP    "^      \  o,..*....  o     /      IV-51— 

/)  coiu^v  \\  /  ,     y>^ 

XTu>       ,        tre»ce%^g  /•>i,>     /:C^0^; 
fe^^,ask5^^0%^ 


CAMPAIGNS   OF    SHERMAN 


AND   THOMAS   IX    1864 


Nashville  327 

was  frequent  skirmishing,  but  little  waste  of  life, 
except  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27.  On 
that  occasion,  mindful  of  his  primary  object,  Sher 
man  tried  the  effect  of  an  assault,  but  desisted 
when  he  saw  that  he  was  losing  faster  than  the 
enemy.  The  Union  army  lost  3000  men,  the  Con 
federates  scarcely  500. 

In  this  sort  of  campaign,  despite  Sherman's  rare 
skill  and  resourcefulness,  the  element  of  time  was 
working  against  him  and  in  favour  of  Johnston. 
The  victorious  advance  southward  was  daily  length 
ening  Sherman's  line  of  communications  and  short 
ening  Johnston's  ;  and  as  the  former  was  weakened 
by  the  necessity  of  detaching  men  to  guard  the 
long  line,  so  the  latter  was  more  and  more  relieved 
from  such  a  necessity.  Apparently,  then,  the 
time  was  approaching  when  the  Confederate  gen 
eral  might  no  longer  think  it  worth  while  to  de 
cline  battle.  The  experience  of  Fair  Oaks,  in 
May,  1862,  showed  that  Johnston  could  strike 
quickly  and  heavily  when  the  occasion  offered  it 
self.  But  as  the  armies  drew  near  to  Atlanta,  the 
patience  of  Jefferson  Davis  was  ex-  , 

1  m  Johnston 

hausted.     His  feelings  toward  Joseph   superseded 
Johnston  were  unfriendly  and  unfair,   byHood- 
and  appearances  now  seemed  to  justify  the  blame 
which  he  was  ready  to  visit  upon  him.     On  the 
17th  of  July  he  removed  Johnston  from  command, 


328     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

and  appointed  in  his  place  one  of  his  corps-com 
manders,  John  Bell  Hood. 

This  general,  a  native  of  Kentucky,  was  just  en 
tering  upon  his  thirty-fourth  year.  He  had  been 
graduated  at  West  Point  in  1853,  and  had  then 
seen  some  rough  service  fighting  the  Comanche 
Indians,  after  which  he  was  for  some  time  a  cav 
alry  instructor  at  West  Point.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  Civil  War  he  entered  the  Confederate  ser 
vice,  and  soon  attained  the  rank  of  brigadier-gen 
eral.  At  Gaines's  Mill,  where  he  was  severely 
wounded,  his  brigade  lost  more  than  half  its  num- 
Hood's  pre-  her,  and  he  was  bre vetted  major-gen- 

vious  career.      eraj  Qn  the  fi^        JJe   was   in   most   of 

the  Virginia  battles  of  1862.  At  Gettysburg  he 
lost  the  use  of  an  arm ;  afterward,  going  west  with 
Longstreet,  he  was  in  the  thick  of  the  fighting  at 
Chickamauga,  where  he  lost  a  leg.  From  Dalton 
to  Atlanta  he  commanded  a  corps  with  the  rank 
of  lieutenant-general,  and  now,  on  his  promotion 
to  the  command  of  an  army,  he  was  made  a  full 
general. 

When  the  news  of  Hood's  appointment  reached 
the  Union  army,  it  formed  the  subject  of  some 
conversation  between  Sherman  and  McPherson,  as 
they  sat  on  the  steps  of  the  porch  of  a  country 
house.  "  McPherson  had  been  of  the  same  class 
at  West  Point  with  Hood,  Schofield,  and  Sheridan. 


Nashville  329 

We  agreed  that  we  ought  to  be  unusually  cautious 
and  prepared  for  hard  fighting,  because  Hood, 
though  not  deemed  much  of  a  scholar,  or  of  great 
mental  capacity,  was  undoubtedly  a  brave,  deter 
mined,  and  rash  man."  l  This  opinion  what  the 
is  not  discordant  with  that  of  General  Uuion  een' 

erals  thought 

Howard,  who  writes,  "Just  at  this  Ofhisap- 
time,  much  to  our  comfort  and  to  his  pointment. 
surprise,  Johnston  was  removed  and  Hood  placed 
in  command  of  the  Confederate  army." 2  In 
truth,  Hood's  valour  outran  his  discretion,  and  he 
had  one  of  the  gravest  faults  in  a  commander, 
impatience.  His  reputation  was  that  of  a  hard 
fighter,  who  was  put  in  command  in  order  to  fight, 
and  may  be  said  to  have  held  his  command  on 
condition  of  plentiful  fighting.  Mr.  Davis  was 
tired  of  Fabius,  and  preferred  to  try  his  luck  with 
Terentius  Varro. 

On  July  20  Hood  attacked  the  Federal  army  at 
Peach  Tree  creek,  near  Atlanta,  and  a  week  of 
desultory  fighting  ensued,  in  which  he  lost  perhaps 
8000  men  without  accomplishing  anything.3  The 

1  Sherman's  Memoirs,  ii.  75. 

2  Battles  and  Leaders,  iv.  313. 

8  In  one  of  these  fights,  on  July  22,  the  noble  McPherson, 
one  of  the  best  generals  in  the  service  of  the  United  States, 
was  killed.  Howard  was  appointed  by  Sherman  to  succeed 
McPherson  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  much  to 
the  disgust  of  Hooker,  who  resigned  and  went  home.  Sherman 


330     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

superior  skill  of  Sherman  became  more  and  more 
Hood  evacu-  apparent,  until  at  the  beginning  of 
ates  Atlanta.  September,  when  Hood  was  on  the 
point  of  being  cooped  up  in  Atlanta,  he  saved  his 
army  by  evacuating  it. 

With  this  result  Sherman  had  small  reason  to 
feel  pleased.  At  last  Hood  had  really  scored  one 
against  him.  Of  course  it  was  desirable  that  the 
Federals  should  possess  Atlanta.  At  the  North  its 
capture  was  regarded  as  a  great  victory,  and  it 
came  at  a  very  opportune  moment,  just  in  the  heat 
of  the  presidential  canvass.  It  opened  the  eyes 
of  many  people  to  the  silliness  of  the  Democratic 
platform  in  pronouncing  the  war  a  failure.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  acquisition  of  Atlanta 
was  a  very  useful  achievement,  which  reflected 
great  credit  upon  Sherman.  Nevertheless,  the 
escape  of  Hood's  army  was  a  serious  disappoint 
ment  ;  it  contained  the  seeds  of  possible  disaster 
to  the  Union  cause,  and  it  instantly  made  Sher 
man's  situation  more  or  less  awkward.  The  only 
hope  of  the  Confederates,  at  this  late  date,  was  in 
prolonging  the  agony  until  the  patience  of  the 
North  should  be  exhausted.  Should  General  Mc- 
Clellan,  the  Democratic  candidate  for  the  presi 
dency,  be  elected  over  Mr.  Lincoln  in  November, 

was  surely  right,  for  Hooker,  with  all  his  dash,  had  abundantly 
proved  himself  unfit  for  any  high  command  involving1  great  re 
sponsibility. 


Nashville  331 

it  would  strongly  indicate  that  such  a  moment  was 
approaching.    In  Virginia  Lee's  power   j)ifficult 
of  resistance  seemed  interminable,  and   problems  for 
more  than  once  the  idea  of  marching   k 
to   Grant's  assistance,  after  Atlanta  should  have 
fallen,  had  crossed  Sherman's  mind ;  but  how  could 
such  a  feat  be  attempted  without  first  destroying 
Hood's  army  ?     On  the  other  hand,  it  would  not 
do  to  keep  the  victorious  Union  army  inactive  in 
Atlanta ;  that  would  be  acknowledging  a  stalemate. 
While  Sherman  was  considering  the  situation, 
Hood  helped  to  simplify  it  by  assuming  the  offen 
sive  and  threatening  his  long  line  of  communica 
tions.    To  meet  the  exigency  Sherman  sent  Thomas 
back  to  Nashville,  and  left  one  corps,   Hood 
under  Slocum,  to  hold  Atlanta,  while   sumes  the 
he  moved  in  pursuit  of  Hood.      On   offensive 
the    5th    of    October    a    detachment    of    Hood's 
army  attacked  Allatoona,  which  had  been  made  a 
depot  of  supplies  for  the  Federals ;  but  the  Union 
commander  at  that  point,  General  Corse,  made  a 
superb  defence,  and  the  rebels  were  repulsed  with 
heavy  loss.     A  week  later  Sherman  was  at  Rome, 
while  Hood  moved  from  Resaca  to  Dalton,  which 
he  captured  with  its  garrison  of  1000  men.     By 
October  15  Hood  was  a  few  miles  south  of  Lafay 
ette,   and   Sherman  had  arrived  at  Snake  Creek 
Gap,  where  he  had  been  operating  five  months 


332     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

before.  These  retrograde  movements  caused  some 
anxiety  at  the  North,  for  it  looked  as  if  Sherman's 
grip  on  Georgia  might  be  loosening.  But  he  never 
let  go  Atlanta,  nor  did  he  relinquish  his  scheme 
for  marching  to  the  coast  and  dealing  a  blow  at 
Virginia.  After  much  discussion  he  had  prevailed 
upon  Grant  to  sanction  such  a  movement,  pro 
vided  that  Hood's  army  could  first  be  disposed  of. 
There  was  always  a  reasonable  hope  of  entrapping 
the  fiery  Hood  into  a  combat.  Indeed,  on  October 
16  he  came  very  near  offering  himself  as  a  prey 
to  Sherman,  but  all  his  officers  agreed  that  it  was 
not  safe  to  risk  a  battle.  Against  this  unanimous 
opposition  Hood  did  not  feel  like  contending,  and 
thus  the  existence  of  his  army  was  prolonged  for 
two  months  more. 

Still,  Hood  could  accomplish  nothing  by  en 
trenching  himself  and  waiting  upon  events.  Action 
was  as  necessary  for  him  as  for  his  adversary.  So 
he  conceived  the  plan  of  striking  northward  into 
Tennessee,  in  the  hope  of  drawing  Sherman  after 
him.  In  this  case  the  Union  general  would  have  to 
let  go  Atlanta,  and  virtually  surrender 

and  makes 

UP  his  mind  all  the  advantages  he  had  gained  by 
to  invade  h|s  summer's  work.  But  if  Sherman 
should  not  follow  him,  then  Hood  felt 
able  to  demolish  any  force  that  might  oppose  him 
in  Tennessee.  He  believed  that  he  could  capture 


Nashville  333 

and  hold  Nashville,  and  make  it  a  base  from  which 
to  invade  Kentucky.  In  the  latter  state  he  hoped 
to  find  many  recruits  and  to  threaten  Cincinnati, 
as  Kirby  Smith  had  done  two  years  before.  After 
a  victorious  campaign  of  this  sort,  he  might  take 
his  army  eastward  through  some  of  the  gaps  in  the 
Cumberland  Mountains  and  fall  upon  Grant  at 
Petersburg.  Then  after  defeating  Grant,  the  com 
bined  armies  of  Lee  and  Hood  might  either  turn 
and  rend  Sherman,  in  case  of  his  being  within 
reach,  or  else  might  face  to  the  north  and  march 
with  irresistible  majesty  upon  the  city  of  Washing 
ton.  Such  were  the  far-reaching  thoughts  which 
Hood  entertained  on  two  October  nights  in  bivouac 
in  a  beautiful  valley  near  Lafayette.1 

From  that  point  Hood  moved  to  Gadsden,  in 
Alabama,  while  Sherman  followed  as  far  as  Gayles- 
ville.  Hood  felt  it  necessary  to  leave  his  cavalry, 
commanded  by  Wheeler,  in  Georgia,  to  watch  and 
harass  Sherman  ;  and  this  force  he  expected  to 
replace  by  the  cavalry  of  Forrest,  who  was  then  in 
the  western  part  of  Tennessee.  On  the  last  day 
of  October  Hood  arrived  at  Tuscum-  Hood's  fatal 
bia,  where  he  expected  to  find  abun-  delay  at  Tus- 
dant  supplies  for  his  northward  march 
upon  Nashville.  But  the  supplies  had  been  woe 
fully  delayed,  and  the  railroad  from  Corinth  was 

1  See  his  own  account  in  Battles  and  Leaders,  iv.  426,  427. 


334     The  Mississipjn  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

broken  in  places,  so  that  Hood  was  compelled  to 
wait  three  weeks  at  Tuscumbia ;  and  that  delay 
worked  his  ruin. 

By  this  time  Sherman  had  made  up  his  mind 
what  to  do.  He  would  reinforce  Thomas  and  leave 
him  in  Tennessee  to  deal  with  Hood,  while  he  him 
self  would  return  to  Atlanta,  and  thence  move  in 
force  upon  Virginia.  But  as  the  distance  from 
Atlanta  to  Petersburg  is  500  miles  as  the  crow 
flies,  and  the  whole  intervening  space  was  a  difficult 
country  possessed  by  the  enemy,  it  was  desirable 
first  to  march  to  the  sea-coast,  and  there  establish 
Sherman  &  secure  base  for  the  northward  march 
leaves  Hood  to  Virginia.  Qn  the  2d  of  November 

and  marches 

to  the  sea-  Sherman  received  Grants  permission 
coast<  to  undertake  this  great  movement  at 

once,  on  the  understanding  that  Thomas  was  to 
be  left  strong  enough  to  keep  Hood  from  doing 
mischief.  On  the  15th  Sherman  started,  taking 
with  him  four  infantry  corps,  numbering  63,000 
men,  besides  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  5000  in  number. 
The  march  through  Georgia  met  with  little  serious 
opposition.  It  ended  on  December  23  with  the 
capture  of  Savannah,  including  150  heavy  guns 
and  25,000  bales  of  cotton,  as  a  Christmas  present 
for  Uncle  Sam.  From  this  point  the  far  more 
arduous  northward  march  through  the  Carolinas 
was  to  begin. 


Nashville  335 

We  have  now  to  see  how  Thomas  fared  during 
the  critical  weeks  after  Sherman's  departure,  and 
the  question  at  once  arises,  Was  he  left  with  suffi 
cient  strength  for  the  task  assigned  him  ?     It  was 
a  task  of  supreme  importance.     If  Hood  should 
defeat  Thomas,  or  elude  him  and  capture  Nash 
ville,   the   whole   country  would   con-   Oughtnot 
demn    Sherman's    movement   as    fool-   Sherman 
hardy,  involving  an  immense  immedi- 


ate  risk  for  an  ultimate  gain  that  was   men  with 
problematical  until  the  immediate  risk 
should  be  eliminated.    Sherman's  success  was  really 
wrapped  up  in  that  of  Thomas.     Considering  this 
fact,  would  it  not  have  been  more  prudent  in  Sher 
man  to  have  taken  only  three  corps,  say  50,000  men, 
along  with  him,  and  thus  have  spared  an  additional 
13,000  for  Thomas  ?    In  the  light  of  the  ensuing 
events,  it  certainly  seems  that  it  would  have  been 
wiser.1 

The  force  which  Sherman  left  behind  for  Thomas 
consisted  of  the  Fourth  corps,  under 
Stanley,  12,000  men,  the  Twenty-third 
corps  of  10,000  men,  commanded  by   sent  and 
Schofield,  and  about  5000  cavalry,  now   J 
to  be  commanded  by  General  James  Harrison  Wil 
son,  whom  Grant  sent  from  Virginia  with  the  mes- 

1  See  Ropes's  masterly  paper  on  General  Sherman,  in  Papers 
of  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  x.  144. 


336     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

sage,  "  I  believe  he  will  add  fifty  per  cent,  to  the 
effectiveness  of  your  cavalry."  Altogether,  this 
force  of  27,000  was  inadequate  to  cope  with  Hood's 
40,000  infantry  and  10,000  cavalry  led  by  the  re 
doubtable  Forrest.  But  Sherman  sent  to  Missouri 
for  an  additional  force  of  14,000  men,  commanded 
by  Andrew  Jackson  Smith,  of  the  regular  army, 
an  able  general.  In  September  the  irrepressible 
Sterling  Price  had  bounced  up  once  more  in  Mis 
souri,  and  Smith  had  been  busy  in  driving  him  out 
of  the  state.  So  important  was  it  to  get  Smith 
and  his  men  into  Tennessee  without  delay  that 
Grant  sent  his  chief  of  staff  all  the  way  to  St. 
Louis  to  urge  the  business  forward.  It  was  hoped 
that  they  would  be  ready  to  leave  St.  Louis  on 
November  10,  but  the  march  across  the  whole  state 
of  Missouri  consumed  many  days.  Smith  did  not 
arrive  in  St.  Louis  until  the  24th,  and  then  it 
was  not  until  the  last  day  of  the  month  that  he 
arrived  at  Nashville  and  effected  a  junction  with 
Thomas.  At  the  same  time  a  crowd  of  some  5000 
belated  men,  returning  from  various  parts  of  the 
country  to  their  commands,  were  sent  up  to  Nash 
ville  from  Chattanooga  and  organized  into  a  pro 
visional  division,  under  General  Steedman.  Other 
floating  molecules,  aggregating  into  a  mass  of  4000 
or  so,  and  including  several  regiments  of  coloured 
troops,  came  in  early  in  December,  and  likewise 


Nashville  337 

the  cavalry  was  doubled.  So  that  at  last  General 
Thomas  found  himself  at  the  head  of  a  motley 
host,  numbering  from  50,000  to  55,000  men. 

Until  the  end  of  November,  however,  he  had 
only  about  27,000,  so  that  it  was  necessary  to  avoid 
a  battle.  Hood's  long  delay  at  Tuscumbia  —  an 
accident  upon  which  no  one  could  have  reckoned 
—  allowed  the  Union  army  time  for  concentration ; 
but  the  incidents  of  the  anxious  fortnight  after 
Sherman's  departure  abundantly  prove  that  there 
was  an  element  of  rashness  in  not  leaving  one 
more  army  corps  behind.  Thomas  could  have 
placed  such  a  force  at  Eastport  on  the  Tennessee 
river,  which  would  probably  have  spoiled  Hood's 
plans  for  crossing. 

In  the  absence  of  any  such  obstacle  the  Con 
federate  general,  having  obtained  his  supplies  and 
been  joined  by  the  larger  part  of  his  cavalry, 
crossed  the  great  river  at  Florence,  and  began 
his  northward  march  November  19.  Hood's  north- 
Thomas  was  at  Nashville,  intent  upon  ward  march- 
gathering  troops,  and  the  bulk  of  his  little  army 
—  the  Fourth  and  Twenty-third  corps,  with  Scho- 
field  in  command  —  was  at  Pulaski.  By  the  22d 
Hood's  advance  had  reached  Lawrenceburg,  on 
the  Federal  flank,  so  that  Schofield  was  obliged 
to  retreat  upon  Columbia.  After  brisk  marching 
he  reached  that  place  on  the  24th,  barely  in  time 


338     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

to  anticipate  Forrest  in  securing  the  bridges  and 
fords  of  Duck  river.  Had  the  rebel  cavalry  ar 
rived  first  upon  the  scene,  they  might  have  cut 
Schofield  asunder  from  Thomas,  and  thus  have 
brought  swift  ruin  upon  the  Federals.  On  the 
27th  Schofield's  army  crossed  the  river  and  de 
stroyed  the  bridges,  while  Wilson's  cavalry  under 
took  to  hold  the  fords. 

In  spite  of  Wilson's  utmost  efforts  Forrest  got 
his  horsemen  across  the  river  on  the  28th,  and 
pushed  the  Union  cavalry  northward,  leaving  the 
way  clear  for  the  Confederate  infantry  to  cross. 
This  made  it  necessary  for  Schofield  to  retreat 
upon  the  little  town  of  Franklin,  on  the  Har- 
Schofield's  Petn  river-  On  the  way  thither  was 
retreat  situated  the  village  of  Spring  Hill, 

through  „  ,         ,  .   .      . 

Spring  Hill  a  centre  ot  wagon-roads  which  it  was 
to  Franklin,  all-important  to  secure.  On  the  29th 
Stanley  was  sent  ahead  with  two  divisions,  one  of 
which  he  found  it  necessary  to  leave  on  the  road 
to  guard  an  exposed  point,  while  with  the  other 
he  pressed  on  and  occupied  Spring  Hill.  The  sun 
went  down  that  evening  upon  a  most  anxious  and 
critical  situation.  The  Union  cavalry  found  its 
energies  absorbed  in  preventing  Forrest  from  clos 
ing  the  way  to  Franklin  ;  while  at  various  points 
were  caught  glimpses  of  Confederate  infantry. 
There  was  even  some  slight  skirmishing  with  the 


Nashville  339 

division  of  Patrick  Cleburne,  one  of  the  ablest 
and  boldest  officers  in  the  Confederate  service. 
By  two  hours  after  sunset  Hood  had  at  least 
20,000  infantry '  close  by  Spring  Hill,  and  why 
Stanley's  solitary  division  was  not  overwhelmed 
before  daybreak  is  one  of  the  mysteries  that  may 
perhaps  never  be  explained.1  Had  the  enemy  been 
led  by  hesitating  men  of  the  McClellan  type,  or 
by  puzzle-headed  men  like  Burnside  or  Pope,  the 
loss  of  such  an  opportunity  would  not  have  been 
strange;  but  when  we  consider  Hood's  well-nigh 
reckless  audacity  and  the  rare  combination  of  skill 
and  energy  in  Cleburne  and  Forrest,  the  escape  of 
Schofield's  little  army  that  night  seems  marvellous 
indeed. 

Its  march  next  morning,  in  spite  of  an  occasional 
brush  with  the  enemy's  cavalry,  was  not  seriously 
molested.  By  noon  the  whole  force  was  in  position 
in  front  of  the  town  of  Franklin,  excepting  Colo 
nel  Opdycke's  rear-guard,  which  was  still  feeling 

1  Colonel  Henry  Stone,  of  Thomas's  staff,  declares  that  "  a 
single  Confederate  brigade,  like  Adams's  or  Cockrell's  or  Maney's, 
—  veterans  since  Shiloh,  —  planted  squarely  across  the  pike,  either 
south  or  north  of  Spring  Hill,  would  have  effectually  prevented 
Schofield's  retreat,  and  daylight  would  have  found  his  whole 
force  cut  off  from  every  avenue  of  escape  by  more  than  twice  its 
numbers,  to  assault  whom  would  have  been  madness,  and  to  avoid 
whom  would  have  been  impossible."  Battles  and  Leaders,  iv. 
446. 


340     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

the  enemy.     The  Federal  line,   entrenched  upon 
rising   ground,  was   convex  in  shape, 

Position  of 

the  Federal      resting  both  flanks  upon  the  Harpeth 
army  at  riyer       About   half   a   mile    from  its 

Franklin. 

extreme  left  this  line  of  battle  crossed 
the  turnpike  from  Columbia.  The  space  between 
river  and  turnpike  was  occupied  by  Jacob  Cox's 
division  of  the  Twenty-third  corps,  while  beyond 
the  pike  for  another  half  mile  stretched  Ruger's 
division  of  the  same  ;  the  remaining  space  on  the 
right  was  filled  by  Kimball's  division  of  the  Fourth 
corps,  while  Wood's  division  had  advanced  beyond 
the  river  with  the  long  wagon-trains.  On  a  bluff 
beyond  the  river  Federal  batteries  were  planted, 
commanding  the  space  in  front  of  the  Federal 
line.  Wilson's  cavalry  were  also  north  and  east 
of  the  river,  to  check  any  turning  movement  on 
the  part  of  the  rebel  cavalry. 

In  the  Federal  line  of  works,  just  west  of  the 
turnpike,  were  two  regiments  of  Andrew  Smith's 
long-wished-for  corps  from  Missouri.  These  vet 
erans  had  just  arrived,  and  with  them  was  a  raw 
regiment  from  Ohio,  which  had  not  yet  had  its 
"  baptism  of  fire."  There  were  about  forty  pieces 
of  artillery  in  the  works. 

While  these  admirable  arrangements  had  been 
quickly  made  to  receive  the  enemy's  attack,  it  was 
hoped  that  he  might  defer  it  until  the  morrow. 


FRANKLIN,   NOVEMBER  30,  1864 


Nashville  341 

Early  in  the  afternoon  a  telegram  from  Thomas 
asked  Schofield  if  he  could  detain  Hood  at  Frank 
lin  for  three  days.  Schofield  replied  that  he 
thought  not,  whereupon  Thomas  ordered  him  to 
retreat  that  night  as  far  as  the  Brent-  Retreat  upon 
wood  Hills,  in  front  of  Nashville.  Nashville  or- 
1*7-1  M  j_i  •  dered. 

While  these  messages  were  going  over 
the  wires,  the  impetuous  Hood,  who  had  fully 
awakened  to  the  magnitude  of  the  opportunity 
which  he  had  lost  the  previous  night,  was  prepar 
ing  his  charge  —  the  desperate  and  mighty  rush  of 
two  army  corps  —  against  the  strong  Federal  line. 
Excellent  as  the  Federal  position  was  in  nearly 
all  respects,  it  had  in  it  one  element  of  weakness 
which  came  well-nigh  proving  fatal.  Of  Wagner's 
division  of  the  Fourth  corps,  which  had  been  serv 
ing  very  efficiently  as  rear-guard,  the  first  brigade 

—  Colonel     Opdycke's  —  had     taken   ^n  alarming 
position  within  the  lines,  as  a  reserve   ^>lunder- 
just  west  of  the  turnpike.     The  other  two  brigades 

—  Lane's  and  Conrad's  —  had  made  a  temporary 
halt  upon  a  knoll  rather  more  than  a  quarter  of  a 
mile  to  the  front  of  the  lines.     They  were  not  en 
trenched,  as  it  was  of  course  not  intended  to  leave 
them  there,  but  in  the  hurry  of  the  day's  proceed 
ings  they  had  not  yet  been  withdrawn,  when  Cle- 
burne  and  Brown,  with  10,000  men  on  the  double- 
quick,  came  upon  them  like  an  avalanche.     There 


342     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

was  nothing  to  do  but  to  run  for  the  Federal  lines, 
and  (as  the  Koran  would  say)  it  was  an  evil  quar 
ter  of  a  mile  thither.  The  Federal  soldiers  in  line 
for  some  distance  each  side  of  the  turnpike  were 
obliged  to  withhold  their  fire  for  fear  of  killing 
their  comrades,  and  so  the  onward  rush  of  Cle- 
burne's  and  Brown's  divisions  was  virtually  unop- 
A  critical  posed.  In  wild  enthusiasm,  while  the 
moment.  welkin  rang  with  the  "  rebel  yell,"  the 
Confederates  swarmed  into  the  Union  entrench 
ments  along  with  Lane's  and  Conrad's  fugitives,  of 
whom  they  captured  nearly  1000.  In  a  twinkling 
they  scattered  the  raw  regiment  from  Ohio,  they 
seized  the  Union  batteries  right  and  left  of  the 
road,  and  for  just  a  moment  victory  seemed  within 
their  grasp.  A  fatal  rent  seemed  to  have  been 
made  in  the  Union  line  of  battle. 

But  it  was  only  for  a  moment.  The  act  of  over 
whelming  the  Lane  and  Conrad  brigades  and  the 
capture  of  so  many  prisoners  had  slightly  retarded 
the  rush  of  Brown  and  Cleburne,  so  that  Stewart's 
corps,  which  was  likewise  charging  on  the  double- 
quick  between  turnpike  and  river,  was  a  few  min 
utes  before  them  in  approaching  the  Federal  line. 
The  Confed-  ^  withering  fire  from  Cox's  division 
erates  are  re-  soon  made  Stewart  recoil.  Then  as 
Cleburne's  division  rushed  over  the 
Union  works  it  received  a  terrific  oblique  fire  from 


Nashville  343 

Cox's  men  which  shook  it  from  end  to  end.  The 
Lane  and  Conrad  brigades  quickly  faced  about 
and  were  joined  by  Opdycke's,  and  a  general  rally 
about  the  turnpike  soon  expelled  the  Confederates 
and  hermetically  closed  the  temporary  gap. 

It  was  a  bitter  disappointment  for  Hood's  men. 
Again   and  again  they  renewed  the  attack  with 
bravery  and  pertinacity  almost  incredi-   and  de- 
ble.     But  against  the  storm  of  grape   £eated- 
and  canister  and  musketry  in  front,  together  with 
the  enfilading  fire  of  the  batteries  across  the  river, 
no  human  gallantry  could  stand  ;  and  by  nightfall 
the  repulse  of  the  Confederates  was  complete. 

Meanwhile  an  important  cavalry  battle  was 
fought  on  the  further  side  of  the  river.  A  large 
force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  under  Chalmers, 
crossed  from  the  Lewisburg  pike  with  the  design 
of  operating  upon  the  Federal  connections  north 
ward  ;  but  Wilson  met  them  with  a  superior  force, 
and  the  afternoon  was  consumed  in  an  obstinate 
battle,  which  ended  in  driving  the  whole  , 

Chalmers 

rebel  cavalry  to  the  south  side  of  the   defeated  by 
Harpeth.    During  the  night  the  Union   Wilson- 
army  continued  its  retreat   to   Nashville,   taking 
with  it  all  the   wagon-train,   together  with  more 
than  1000  prisoners  and   33  flags  captured  from 
the  enemy. 

When  we  bear  in  mind  that  the  battle  of  Frank- 


344     The,  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

lin  began  at  four  o'clock  in  the  short  afternoon  of 
the  last  day  of  November,  the  destruction  of  life 
seems  positively  awful.  More  than  8000  men  were 
killed  and  wounded,  —  nearly  6000  on  the  Confed 
erate  side,  about  2300  on  the  Union  side.1  The 
Awful  losses  of  the  Confederates  bore  melan- 

slaughter.  choly  testimony  to  their  magnificent 
fighting.  Especially  noticeable  was  their  loss  of 
officers,  including  eleven  generals.  Among  the 
dead  was  Patrick  Cleburne,  the  "bravest  of  the 
brave." 

On  the  1st  of  December,  when  Schofield's  troops 
arrived  at  Nashville,  they  were  joined  by  the  main 
body  of  Andrew  Smith's  veterans  from  Missouri ; 
and  soon  afterward  by  the  Steed  man 
arrives  at  division,  the  negro  regiments,  and  other 
Nashville;  miscellaneous  troops  already  enumer 
ated,  swelling  the  numbers  of  the  army 
to  about  43,000  infantry  and  12,000  cavalry.  •  On 
December  2  Hood's  army  arrived  upon  the  scene 
and  entrenched  itself  upon  a  range  of  low  hills 
about  a  mile  distant  from  the  Federal  lines.  As 

1  I  remember  reading  a  newspaper  account  the  day  after  the 
battle,  in  which  the  writer's  phraseology  unconsciously  gave  a 
delicious  illustration  of  the  purely  professional  point  of  view  of 
a  sensation-monger,  e.  g.,  "  The  carnage  compared  favourably  with 
that  of  any  battle  during  the  war  !  "  The  italicizing  is  mine,  of 
course. 


Nashville  345 

his  force  did  not  exceed  38,000  men,  the  Confed 
erate  general  could  not  now  afford  to  offer  battle. 
He  hoped  for  reinforcements  from  Texas,  and 
should  Thomas  attack  him  before  their  arrival,  he 
believed  that  the  assault  upon  entrenchments  would 
meet  with  a  bloody  repulse,  as  so  often  happened. 
So  Hood  remained  in  his  strong  position  and 
awaited  the  course  of  events. 

The  2d  of  December  was  the  first  day  in  all 
this  campaign  when  the  Union  army  was  strong 
enough  to  assume  the  aggressive.  The  great  and 
decisive  battle  of  Nashville,  about  to  be  described, 
was  fought  on  the  15th  and  16th.  Surely  the  in 
terval  was  not  a  long  one  when  we  consider  the 
preparations  that  were  necessary  to  in- 

.   .  ,  «      ,  ™        Why  Thomas 

sure  a  complete  and  final  success.  The  was  not  ready 
material  of  Thomas's  army  was  mostly  to  attack 
excellent,  but  it  had  been  hastily  scraped 
together,  and  some  work  of  organization  and  equip 
ment  was  required.  Especially  important  were  the 
needs  of  the  cavalry.  Of  this  Thomas  had  a  large 
force,  with  a  very  able  commander,  and  he  intended 
to  make  it  play  a  great  part  in  the  coming  battle. 
He  did  not  contemplate  a  victory  like  Shiloh  or 
Gettysburg,  in  which  the  enemy  should  simply  be 
compelled  to  retire  from  the  field.  Such  victories 
had  been  important  in  their  time  and  place,  but 
something  more  was  needed  now.  Thomas  meant 


346     TJie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

to  make  the  battle  at  Nashville  a  "  crowning 
mercy,"  a  Waterloo  which  should  wipe  the  de 
feated  army  out  of  existence,  and  for  this  work  he 
counted  much  upon  his  cavalry.  But  Wilson's 
men  had  been  toiling  incessantly  for  six  weeks, 
and  the  loss  of  horses  had  been  excessive.  It  had 
been  found  necessary  to  send  officers  through  the 
states  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  impressing 
horses.  The  barns  of  farmers,  the  spacious  stables 
of  street-car  companies,  even  the  circuses,  were 
called  upon,  and  handed  over  their  animals  with 
out  a  murmur.  The  work  went  on  briskly,  and  at 
the  end  of  a  week,  December  9,  the  12,000  cavalry 
men  were  fairly  mounted  and  equipped  for  battle.1 
Meanwhile  there  was  much  excitement,  not  only 
at  Washington,  but  at  Grant's  headquarters  at 
City  Point,  on  James  river.  That  Lincoln  and 
Stanton  should  have  remembered  Bragg's  aggres 
sive  movements  of  two  years  before,  that  they 
should  have  felt  nervously  anxious  lest  the  dash 
ing  Hood  should  contrive  to  elude  Thomas  and 
make  a  rush  into  Kentucky,  was  no  more  than 
natural.  But  it  does  seem  strange  that  Grant, 
usually  so  imperturbable,  should  have  had  his  head 
turned  ever  so  little  by  the  feeling  of  panic.  One 
would  suppose  that  his  own  ample  experience  of 

1  See  General  Wilson's  interesting1  paper,  in  Battles  and  Lead 
ers,  iv.  467. 


Nashville  347 

the  vexations  and  misunderstandings  which  beset 
a  commander  would  have  kept  him  Grant's 
patient  for  at  least  a  week,  especially  imPatience- 
in  dealing  with  a  man  of  the  known  character  and 
calibre  of  Thomas.  But  Grant's  despatches  from 
City  Point  to  Nashville  on  December  2,  5,  6, 
and  8,  show  unusual  anxiety  and  some  irritation, 
along  with  an  imperfect  comprehension  of  the  cir 
cumstances,  as  in  his  second  despatch  of  Decem 
ber  2,  in  which  he  suggested  that  Thomas  ought  to 
have  advanced  to  Franklin  instead  of  withdrawing 
Schofield  to  Nashville.1  On  December  9  Grant's 
patience  gave  way,  and  an  order  was  written  re 
lieving  Thomas  and  appointing  Schofield  in  his 
place.  The  order  was  not  sent,  but  a  telegram 
from  Halleck  informed  Thomas  that  Grant  was 
much  dissatisfied  with  his  delay.  The  grand  old 
soldier  calmly  replied,  "  I  feel  conscious  that  I 
have  done  everything  in  my  power,  and  that  the 
troops  could  not  have  been  got  ready  before  this. 
If  General  Grant  should  order  me  to  be  relieved, 
I  will  submit  without  a  murmur."  The  same  even 
ing  a  telegram  from  Grant  informed  him  that  the 

1  Nevertheless  the  despatch  goes  on  to  say,  with  Grant's  cus 
tomary  candour,  "  At  this  distance,  however,  I  may  err  as  to  the 
best  method  of  dealing-  with  the  enemy."  Grant's  Memoirs,  ii. 
382.  If  he  had  been  on  the  spot,  Grant  would  have  seen  that  our 
position  at  Franklin  could  be  much  more  easily  turned  by  the 
enemy  than  our  position  at  Nashville. 


348     TIte  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

order  relieving  him  was  revoked,  and  thus  he 
learned  of  the  existence  of  such  an  order  without 
knowing  its  exact  purport. 

The  harrowing  ordeal,  however,  was  not  yet 
over.  That  9th  of  December  was  the  first  of  a 
series  of  days  of  freezing  rain.  Koads  and  fields 
were  covered  with  a  glare  of  ice,  making  cavalry 
operations  impossible.  A  council  of  war  on  the 
10th  unanimously  declared  that  a  battle  could  not 
be  prudently  undertaken  until  the  ice  should  melt. 
On  the  llth  the  order  came  from  Grant,  "  Delay 
no  longer  for  weather  or  reinforcements."  But 
Thomas  waited  for  the  indispensable  thaw,  and 
Grant  again  lost  patience.  At  that  moment  Gen 
eral  Logan  happened  to  be  at  City  Point,  and 
Grant  hurried  him  off  to  Nashville, 

Logan's 

journey  to  with  an  order  in  his  pocket  directing 
Louisville  Thomas  to  hand  over  to  him  the  com- 

and  Grrant  s 

journey  to        mand  of  the  army  ;  but  Grant  enjoined 

Washington.      i{.  u()n   LQan   not   to  ma^e   tjie   or(Jer 


known  until  he  should  arrive  upon  the  scene,  and 
then,  if  Thomas  had  moved,  not  to  deliver  it  at  all. 
After  Logan  had  started,  Grant's  restlessness  rose 
to  such  a  pitch  that  he  decided  to  go  to  Nashville 
himself,  and  went  as  far  as  Washington,  where  he 
found  the  following  telegram  from  Thomas  to  Hal- 
leek  :  "  The  ice  having  melted  to-day,  the  enemy 
will  be  attacked  to-morrow  morning."  Thus  was 


Nashville  349 

Grant  saved  from  consummating  a  colossal  piece 
of  injustice.  As  for  Logan,  when  he  had  gone  as 
far  as  Louisville  he  heard  news  which  assured  him 
that  he  need  go  no  further.1 

The  morning  of  December  15  was  soft  and 
muddy,  not  the  best  sort  of  day  for  the  evolu 
tions  of  either  infantry  or  cavalry,  but  infinitely 

1  Grant's  account  of  this  affair  in  his  Memoirs,  chap.  lx.,  shows 
a  coldness  of  appreciation  of  Thomas  which  is  not  creditable  to 
the  writer.  For  instance,  Grant  says  he  was  afraid  that  Hood 
might  make  a  dash  northward,  and  that  "  we  might  have  to  send 
troops  from  the  East  to  head  him  off,  .  .  .  General  Thomas's 
movements  being  always  so  deliberate  and  so  slow,  though  effec 
tive  in  defence."  Such  a  statement,  made  long  after  the  war, 
demands  qualification.  Effectiveness  in  defence  would  hardly 
apply  to  the  handling  of  the  Union  army  at  Nashville  ;  one  might 
as  well  speak  of  Napoleon  as  "  effective  in  defence  "  at  Auster- 
litz.  As  to  "  slowness,"  I  have  been  told  that  there  was  a  delib- 
erateness  about  Thomas's  personal  movements  and  his  manner  of 
speech  very  unlike  the  electric  impulsiveness  which  was  so  charm 
ing  in  Sherman.  But  that  is  a  very  different  thing  from  lack 
of  promptness  or  celerity  in  the  despatch  of  business,  and  Thomas 
was  always  prompt,  while  his  work  in  that  December  fortnight 
while  Grant  was  nagging  him  was  really  a  marvel  of  celerity. 
The  fact  is,  that  ever  since  Shiloh  there  has  been  a  grain  of 
jealousy  between  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  and  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland.  They  sometimes  enjoy  girding  at  each  other, 
and  one  of  the  stock  themes  is  the  alleged  "  slowness  "  of  the 
latter  army  and  its  commanders,  which  is  simply  one  of  the 
numerous  commonplaces  that  are  not  true.  Grant,  I  think, 
,  shared  in  this  jealousy,  perhaps  unconsciously,  and  this  may 
have  affected  his  mental  attitude  toward  Thomas. 


350     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

better  than  the  universal  glare  of  ice  that  had  pre 
ceded.  The  position  of  the  Union  army  was  one 
of  great  excellence,  whether  for  attack  or  for  de 
fence.  The  city  of  Nashville,  situated  in  a  pocket 
formed  by  a  great  double  curve  of  the  Cumberland 
river,  was  encompassed  in  front  by  low  hills,  upon 
which  a  strong  line  of  entrenchments 

Position  of  -111 

Thomas's         Wlt"    occasional    redoubts    had    been 
army,  built  all  the  way  from  the  river-bank 

December  15.  . 

above  the  city  to  the  river-bank  below. 
This  interior  defensive  line  was  manned  with 
"  quartermaster's  forces."  In  front  of  this  line, 
on  the  extreme  Union  left,  between  the  Lebanon 
turnpike  and  the  Chattanooga  railway,  was  sta 
tioned  Steedman's  division.  To  the  rear  arid  right 
of  Steedman,  but  within  the  interior  line,  was 
massed  the  Twenty-third  corps,  commanded  by 
Schofield,  and  intended  to  play  the  part  of  a  re 
serve.  To  the  right  of  Schofield  came  the  Fourth 
corps,  now  commanded  by  the  veteran  Wood,  since 
Stanley  had  been  wounded  in  the  battle  of  Frank 
lin.  A  salient  in  Wood's  line,  where  the  Hills- 
boro  turnpike  crossed  Laurens  Hill,  occupied 
nearly  the  centre  of  the  Union  battle-front.  To 
the  right  of  Wood  came  the  Sixteenth  corps, 
under  Andrew  Smith,  with  its  right  wing  refused 
and  extending  beyond  the  Charlotte  turnpike. 
Both  Wood  and  Smith  were  strongly  entrenched. 


NASHVILLE,   DECEMBER    15,   1864 


Nashville  351 

On  the  extreme  right,  between  the  Charlotte  road 
and  the  river,  was  stationed  Wilson's  fine  corps  of 
cavalry.  Behind  the  city  the  river  was  patrolled 
by  gunboats.  Nearly  the  entire  space  occupied 
by  the  Federal  army  was  enclosed  by  two  small 
streams,  Richland  and  Brown's  creeks,  rising  in 
the  Brentwood  Hills,  four  miles  south  of  Nash 
ville,  and  flowing  into  the  Cumberland  river.  On 
the  high  crest  of  the  Brentwood  range  stood  the 
humble  abode  of  a  venerable  dame,  after  whom 
the  road  passing  by  was  known  as  the  Granny 
White  pike.  About  midway  between  Granny 
White's  house  and  the  city  the  space  between  the 
forks  of  Richland  and  Brown's  creeks  was  occu 
pied  by  a  low  and  somewhat  broken  line  of  hills, 
which  extended  northeastward  as  far  Position  of 
as  the  Chattanooga  railway.  Upon  Hood's  army, 
this  line  of  hills  Hood's  army  was  entrenched. 
Cheatham's  corps  was  on  the  extreme  right,  by 
the  railway ;  the  centre,  commanded  by  Stephen 
Decatur  Lee,  of  South  Carolina,  stretched  across 
the  Franklin  pike ;  and  on  the  left  Stewart's  corps 
reached  to  the  Hillsboro  road,  where  its  left  wing 
was  sharply  refused.  A  stone  wall,  running  along 
the  roadside  for  1000  yards  or  so,  was  utilized  as 
a  screen  for  rifle-pits,  and  at  three  commanding 
points  strong  batteries  were  planted,  while  about 
a  mile  to  the  southwest,  beyond  a  fork  of  Richland 


352     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

creek,  two  detached  hills  were  crowned  with  re 
doubts.  A  further  attempt  was  made  to  strengthen 
the  Confederate  left  by  placing  a  rather  solid  skir 
mish  line  in  front  of  Stewart's  corps,  terminating 
in  an  entrenched  position  on  Montgomery  Hill, 
close  to  the  Hillsboro  pike,  and  not  more  than  half 
a  mile  distant  from  Wood's  salient  upon  Laurens 
Hill. 

The  situation  boded  no  good  to  the  Confederate 
army.  These  defences  of  its  left  wing  were  but 
flimsy  as  compared  with  the  solid  masses  of  Fed 
eral  infantry  and  cavalry  west  of  the  Hillsboro 

pike.  It  was  hardly  prudent  in  Hood, 
Hood's  peril.  *  J  J 

under  the  circumstances,  to  accept  bat 
tle.  If  he  had  been  a  Stonewall  Jackson,  he  might 
have  attempted  to  withdraw  stealthily  from  his 
position  and  verify  Grant's  forebodings  by  slip 
ping  across  the  Cumberland  river  and  dashing 
northward.  But  in  presence  of  the  lynx-eyed 
Thomas  even  Jackson  might  have  proved  unequal 
to  such  an  exploit.  Perhaps  Hood  might  have 
fared  better  had  he  taken  position  in  the  first  place 
back  upon  the  Breiitwood  Hills.  But  in  any  case, 
with  only  38,000  men  against  Thomas's  55,000,  he 
could  hardly  look  for  victory.  Clearly  the  worst 
thing  Hood  could  do  was  to  diminish  the  numbers 
which  he  could  put  into  the  battle,  and  this  mis 
take  he  did  commit.  He  kept  Forrest,  with  the 


Nashville  353 

greater  part  of  the  cavalry  and  three  brigades  of 
infantry,  patrolling  the  country  east  of  Nashville, 
"  to  drain  it  of  persons  liable  to  military  service, 
animals  suitable  for  army  purposes,  and  subsist 
ence  supplies."  l  When  the  battle  was  fought, 
Forrest  was  too  far  astray  to  be  promptly  recalled, 
and  Hood's  only  reliance  against  the  powerful 
Union  cavalry  was  the  division  of  Chalmers,  with 
which  he  watched  the  Charlotte  turnpike. 

Thomas's  plan  of  battle  was  to  make  a  left  wheel 
with  his  whole  right  wing,  pivoting  upon  Wood's 
salient  at  Laurens  Hill.  At  the  proper  moment 
Wood  might  threaten  the  rebel  works  on  Mont 
gomery  Hill,  or  perhaps  attack  and  Thomas's 
carry  them,  and  press  on  against  Stew-  plan< 
art's  angle.  Meanwhile  Steedman  was  to  make  a 
vigorous  demonstration  against  Cheatham's  right 
upon  the  Chattanooga  railway,  and  Schofield's 
reserve  was  to  play  such  a  part  as  circumstances 
might  determine. 

The  early  morning  of  December  15  was  foggy, 
but  a  hot  sun  had  burned  off  the  vapours  before 
nine  o'clock.  The  movements  began  at  daybreak. 
Steedman  crossed  Brown's  creek  and  began  a  de 
monstration  that  was  virtually  an  assault,  and  kept 
Cheatham's  corps  busy  all  day.  This  attack,  more 
over,  neutralized  Lee's  corps  and  made  it  useless ; 

1  Campaigns  of  Forrest,  p.  634. 


354     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

for  when  the  alarming  pressure  was  felt  upon 
Lee  and  Stewart's  left,  Lee  could  not  substan- 

Cheatham  tially  reinforce  either  Stewart  or  Cheat- 
neutralized.  ,  ..,  ,  ,  .  .  , 

ham  without  leaving  either  a  gap  or  a 

very  thin  line  at  the  Franklin  pike,  and  this  he 
dared  not  do  lest  the  garrison  of  the  interior  Fed 
eral  line  opposite  should  sally  from  its  works  and, 
charging  straight  down  the  Franklin  road,  pierce 
the  rebel  centre. 

Observe,  dear  reader,  the  brilliancy  of  Thomas's 
tactics.  Here  at  the  outset,  by  employing  only 
Steedman's  division  and  keeping  his  "  quartermas 
ter's  forces  "  in  their  works,  he  eliminates  Lee  and 
Cheatham,  two  thirds  of  the  rebel  army,  from  the 
Superb  problem !  The  serious  work  before 

tactics.  j1jm  now  js  fo  puiverize  Stewart,  and 

for  this  purpose  he  can  use  Wilson,  Smith,  Wood, 
and  Schofield,  nearly  his  whole  force  !  This  has 
the  true  Napoleonic  flavour;  it  smacks  of  Aus- 
terlitz. 

The  grand  wheel  with  the  Federal  right  wing 
began  early,  but  an  hour  or  more  was  lost  by  some 
of  Smith's  infantry  at  first  getting  in  the  way  of 
Wilson's  cavalry.  No  serious  harm  was  done,  how- 
Advance  of  ever.  Wilson  was  presently  in  position 
the  Federal  on  Smith's  right,  driving  Chalmers 
steadily  back.  By  noon  the  entire  Fed 
eral  right  wing  had  wheeled  past  the  Hardin  pike 


Nashville  355 

and  across  Richland  creek,  and  formed  a  line  paral 
lel  to  the  Hillsboro  pike,  extending  from  the  pivot 
on  Laurens  Hill  southward  to  the  detached  hills  thai 
were  crowned  with  rebel  redoubts.  Thomas  wished 
to  prolong  this  line  still  further,  and  therefore  or 
dered  out  Schofield's  corps,  which  marched  behind 
Wood  and  Smith  until  it  took  position  on  Smith's 
right,  facing  the  Hillsboro  pike  nearly  opposite, 
and  about  a  mile  and  a  half  west  of  Granny 
White's  house.  The  van  of  Wilson's  cavalry  then 
pushed  forward  to  the  Granny  White  pike. 

While  these  things  were  going  on,  Wood  sent 
forward  a  single  brigade,   under  Colonel  Philip 
Sidney  Post,   to  storm  Montgomery  Hill.      This 
work  was  done  quickly  and  well;  the   Outposts 
hill  with   its   guns  was   soon   in   our   taken- 
hands,  along  with  more  prisoners  than  it  was  con 
venient  to  handle. 

At  about  two  P.  M.  the  detached  redoubts  were 
stormed  by  some  of  Smith's  infantry  and  Hatch's 
division  of  cavalry  dismounted,  and  their  cannon 
were  turned  upon  the  enemy. 

Next  came  Wood's  assault  in  force  upon  Stew 
art's  angle  at  the  stone  wall.  By  four  p.  M.  all  the 
works  here  had  been  carried,  and  the  Hood's  left 
Confederate  left  wing  was  pushed  off  ™g  broken, 
the  ground.  Darkness  soon  stopped  the  fighting, 
and  the  men  slept  wherever  they  happened  to  be. 


356     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Stewart's  corps  had  been  driven  southward  two 
miles,  and  lay  across  the  Granny  White  pike.  At 
nightfall  Hood  withdrew  Cheatham's  corps  from 
the  Nolensville  road,  and  transferred  it  to  his  left, 
facing  Schofield.  Stewart  thus  became  the  centre, 
and  Lee  was  placed  on  his  right,  with  wing  refused 
Hood's  new  on  Overton  Hill.  It  was  a  stronger 
position.  position  than  he  had  occupied  in  the 
morning,  but  his  men  were  dispirited  with  the  day's 
work,  while  Thomas's  men,  from  the  major-gen 
erals  down  to  the  privates,  were  aglow  with  the 
instinct  of  victory,  and  felt  themselves  invincible. 

Strong  as  Hood's  position  was,  its  left  wing  was 
in  danger  of  being  turned  by  reason  of  Thomas's 
superior  numbers,  especially  in  his  cavalry.  On 
the  morning  of  the  16th  Thomas  brought  his 
forces  close  up  to  the  enemy  :  Steedman  on  the 
left  by  the  railway  facing  southward,  Wood  next, 
then  Smith  standing  across  the  Granny  White 
The  salient  pike,  then  Schofield  parallel  to  the 
at  Shy  Hill.  Hillsboro  pike  and  facing  eastward, 
finally  Wilson's  cavalry  threatening  the  enemy's 
flank.  In  order  to  save  this  flank,  it  was  necessary 
that  it  should  be  sharply  refused,  and  thus  a  sali 
ent  was  created  at  Shy  Hill,1  the  steep  summit  of 

1  So  called  after  the  gallant  Colonel  Shy  of  the  37th  Georgia, 
slain  there  in  the  decisive  charge  which  wrecked  the  Confederate 
left. 


NASHVILLE,   DECEMBER   16,  1864 


Nashville  357 

which  was  fortified  as  well  as  haste  would  permit. 
Upon  this  salient  Smith  and  Schofield  set  up  a 
deadly  cross-fire,  enfilading  the  Confederate  lines 
in  two  directions. 

So  much  time  had  been  consumed  in  moving  the 
troops  into  position  over  the  execrably  soft  and 
uneven  ground  that  noon  was  past  before  heavy 
fighting  began.  While  Schofield  and  Smith  were 
hammering  at  the  salient  upon  Shy  Hill,  an  at 
tack  was  made  upon  the  Confederate  right  wing  at 
Overton  Hill.  Colonel  Post,  of  Wood's  corps, 
who  had  acquitted  himself  so  nobly  the  day  before, 
undertook  to  storm  the  enemy's  en-  Theassault 
trenchments.  He  was  supported  by  upon  Overton 
Thompson's  brigade  of  coloured  troops, 
from  Steedman's  division.  The  utmost  bravery 
was  shown,  by  negroes  as  well  as  by  white  men, 
but  the  assault  met  with  a  bloody  repulse.  Colo 
nel  Post  received  an  ugly  wound,  and  was  made 
brigadier-general  on  the  field  for  his  gallantry. 
His  unsuccessful  assault  was  not  without  its  effect 
upon  the  result  of  the  battle.  It  made  Hood 
uneasy  about  his  right  wing,  so  that  he  took  one 
of  Cheatham's  divisions  —  the  one  formerly  com 
manded  by  Cleburne  —  and  sent  it  to  reinforce 
Lee's  troops  on  Overton  Hill. 

At  the  same  time  the  pressure   of   the   Union 
cavalry   upon   Chalmers   grew   so   alarming   that 


358     Tfie  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

Hood  withdrew  a  brigade  of  infantry  from  Cheat- 
Total  rout  of  ham  in  order  to  support  Chalmers. 
Hood's  army.  £v  faQSQ  successive  depletions  Cheat- 
ham's  line  was  weakened,  and  the  angle  upon  Shy 
Hill  became  so  thin  as  to  invite  assault.  There 
upon  one  of  Smith's  brigades  scrambled  up  the 
steep  slope  and  with  levelled  bayonets  drove  the 
defenders  from  their  works.  At  the  same  time  a 
few  pieces  of  Federal  artillery,  dragged  up  to  an 
eminence  that  commanded  Shy  Hill,  opened  fire ; 
while  a  brigade  of  Hatch's  cavalry  rushed  along 
the  Granny  White  road  and  poured  in  a  quick 
succession  of  volleys  from  their  repeating  rifles. 
Just  then  Thomas  hurled  forward  the  extreme 
right  division  of  Schofield's  corps,  and  in  a  few 
minutes  the  whole  Confederate  left  had  become  a 
disorderly  mob  running  wildly  for  the  Franklin 
turnpike.  This  was  the  signal  for  a  grand  ad 
vance  along  the  whole  Federal  line.  Stewart  and 
Lee  were  driven  back  in  utter  confusion,  and 
Steedman's  negroes  swept  victorious  over  the  hill 
which  an  hour  before  had  so  sternly  repulsed  them. 
Never  was  rout  more  complete  and  final  than  that 
of  Hood. 

The  pursuit  was  kept  up  for  ten  days,  ending 
at  the  Tennessee  river  below  Decatur,  011  the  day 
after  Christmas.  The  Union  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded,  at  the  battle  of  Nashville,  was  about 


Nashville  359 

3000.     The  total  Union  loss  in  the  whole  cam 
paign  of  five  weeks  was  not  more  than    , 

The  pursuit 

6000.     In  warfare  sound  strategy  and   and  the 
sound  tactics  are  the  great  economizers   losses- 
of  human  life.     The  Confederate  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  cannot  be  estimated  with  accuracy ;  but 
during  the  battle  and  the  pursuit  Thomas  reported 
the  capture  of  at  least  13,000  prisoners  and  72 
cannon.     The  Confederate  army  in  the  West  was 
virtually  annihilated.    Nashville  was  the  most  deci 
sive  victory  gained  by  either  side  in  the  Civil  War, 
and  one  of  the  most  brilliant. 

The  destruction  of  Hood's  army  enabled  Sher 
man  to  march  northward  from  Savannah  through 
the  Carolinas,  and  the  western  situation  was  so 
simplified   that   Schofield's  force  was  transferred 
from  Thomas  to  Sherman.     At  the  eleventh  hour 
the  Confederate  government  appointed  Robert  Lee 
its  general-in-chief ,  and  Lee  appointed   Results  o£ 
Joseph    Johnston    to    command    such   Thomas's 
forces    as  could   be    scraped    together   vlctory- 
to  oppose   Sherman.     Of  these  there  were  about 
15,000  men  (one  third  of  them  being  the  remnant 
of  the  Hood  wreckage)  to  contend  against  Sher 
man's  90,000.    At  Petersburg  and  Richmond,  Lee, 
with  about  60,000,  was  confronted  by  Grant,  with 
125,000.      When    Sherman    arrived    at    Raleigh, 


360     The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War 

within  120  miles  of  Lee,  while  Stoneman,  seizing 
the  railway  between  Lynchburg  and  Knoxville,  cut 
off  the  possibility  of  retreat  from  Virginia  into  the 
Tennessee  mountains,  the  Confederacy  had  evi 
dently  reached  the  last  ditch.  Lee's  position,  so 
long  and  so  skilfully  held,  had  become  untenable. 
The  only  question  was  whether  he  should  succumb 
right  there,  or,  letting  go  Richmond,  should  unite 
his  forces  with  those  of  Johnston.  In  the  latter 
case  the  twain  would  have  been  crushed  between 
the  two  great  Union  armies  as  between  the  upper 
and  the  nether  millstone.  Should  the  Confed 
eracy's  two  foremost  heroes  be  vanquished  sepa 
rately  or  together?  Sheridan's  victory  at  Five 
Forks  cut  away  the  latter  alternative,  and  virtu 
ally  ended  the  aggressive  proceedings  which  began 
on  the  spring  day  in  St.  Louis  when  Grant  and 
Sherman  congratulated  Lyon  and  Blair  upon  the 
capture  of  Camp  Jackson. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Alexander,  Myra,  16, 17. 
Amateur  generalship,  204,  207,  208. 
Ammen's  brigade  at  Shiloh,  87. 
Aiitietam,  battle  of,  151. 
Arkansas,  the  ram,  139,  140. 
Arkansas  Post,  capture  of,  205,  206. 
Athens,  Alabama,  punishment  for  the 

sack  of,  158. 
Austerlitz,  battle  of,  98,  354. 

Bailey,  Theodorus,  123,  127. 

Ball's  Bluff,  50. 

Banks,  N.  P.,  in  the  Port  Hudson 
campaign,  223,  226,  231,  234,  247. 

Baton  Rouge,  surrender  of,  137. 

Bayous  in  the  Mississippi  valley,  180. 

Beauregard,  G.  T.,  70-72;  at  Shiloh, 
84-94  ;  134-136,  145. 

Bell,  Henry,  126. 

Belmont,  battle  of,  47-51. 

Big  Bethel,  50. 

Big  Black  river,  battle  of,  239. 

Big  Sunflower  experiment  at  Vicks- 
burg,  218-220. 

Blair,  Francis  Preston,  1st,  8. 

Blair,  Francis  Preston,  2d,  8-22,  202. 

Blair,  Francis  Preston,  3d,  17. 

Blair,  James,  8. 

Blair,  Montgomery,  8,  116. 

Blockade  of  Confederacy's  coast,  108. 

Bluffs  on  the  Mississippi  river,  their 
military  significance,  181. 

Blunt,  J.  G.,  197. 

Booneville,  skirmish  at,  24. 

Border  states,  importance  of,  2. 

Bo  wen,  J.  S.,  229. 

Bowling  Green,  52. 

Boyne,  battle  of,  41. 

Braerg,  Braxton,  5,  70,  71  ;  at  Shiloh, 
79,  81,  88,  94,  96,  97  ;  seizes  Chat 
tanooga,  145,  146  ;  his  invasion  of 
Kentucky,  148-153 ;  at  Stone  river, 
161-177  ;  sends  reinforcements  to 
Pemberton,  197,  198  ;  loses  a  golden 
opportunity  before  Chickamauga, 
265;  besieges  the  Union  army  in 
Chattanooga,  282-292  ;  what  was  he 
thinking  of  in  sending  Burnside  into 
eastern  Tennessee  ?  293-297  ;  super 
seded  by  Johnston,  324. 


Brannan,  J.  M.,  at  Chickamauga,  270, 

Breckinridge,  John  C.,  42  ;  at  Shiloh, 

79,  94,  97;  at  Stone   river,  162,  163, 

176. 

Brooklyn,  the  frigate,  117,  124. 
Brown's  Ferry,  scheme  conceived  and 

executed  by  W.  F.  Smith,  287-292. 
Buchanan,  F.,  110. 

Buchanan,  James,  58.  • 

Buckner,  S.  B.,  39,  42,  58-63. 
Buell,  D.  C.,  54,  66,  72,    75,  76,  79, 

90-99,  133-147,  149-160  ;  his  alleged 

slowness,   144,    255,   296 ;    punishes 

marauders,  158. 
Burnside,  A.  E.,  supersedes  McClellan, 

156;    224;    at   Knoxville,   256,   257, 

284,  293,  295-297,  314. 
Butler,  B.  F.,  115,  129-132. 

Cable,  G.  W.,  128. 

Cairo,  Illinois,  military  importance  of , 
41. 

Caldwell,  C.  H.  B.,  122. 

Cambronne,  19. 

Camp  Jackson,  13-20  ;  hospitality  at, 
15  ;  surrender  of,  19. 

Carondelet,  the  gunboat,  104,  105, 139. 

Carthage,  fight  at,  25. 

Cavalry  raids  in  Tennessee,  252,  253. 

Cayuga,  the  gunboat,  123,  124. 

Chalmers,  George,  and  the  rebel  cav 
alry  at  Nashville,  354,  357,  358. 

Champion's  Hill,  battle  of,  238. 

Chancellorsville,  battle  of,  95. 

Channel  sawed  through  forest  at 
Island  No.  10,  103. 

Chattanooga,  importance  of,  141-145; 
military  jinportance  of,  248 ;  its 
political  importance,  249. 

Chattanooga,  battle  of.  303-315  ;  not 
fought  as  Grant  had  planned  it, 
308  ;  its  brilliant  tactics,  314,  322  ; 
its  picturesqueness,  315  ;  its  great 
results,  316. 

Cheatham,  B.  F.,  at  battle  of  Nash 
ville,  351,  353,  354,  356-358. 

Cherub,  the  frigate,  115. 

Chickamauga,  battle  of,  267-280  ;  the 
fatal  order  at,  270  ;  rout  of  the  right 


3G4 


Index 


wing,  272  ;  army  saved  by  Thomas, 
273-275;  awful  slaughter  at,  27'J, 
280. 

Chickamauga  valley,  2GO. 

Cleburue,  Patrick,  at  Stone  river, 
107,  168;  339;  his  charge  at  the 
battle  of  Franklin,  342  ;  killed  at 
Franklin,  314. 

Columbus,  Tennessee,  fortified  by 
Polk,  41. 

Confederate  defensive  line,  the  1st, 
38,  52,  65. 

Confederate  defensive  line,  the  2d, 
101  ;  broken  at  Corinth,  136. 

Corinth,  Mississippi,  its  military  im 
portance,  69  ;  evacuation  of,  134. 

Corse,  J.  M.,  his  defence  of  the  Alla- 
toona,  331. 

Covvpens,  249. 

Cox,  Jacob,  at  battle  of  Franklin,  342. 

Crittenden,  G.  B.,  39. 

Crittenden,  J.  J.,  39. 

Crittenden,  T.  L.,  39,  54;  at  Shiloh, 
93,  94,  96  ;  at  Stone  river,  163,  169, 
173,  176 ;  in  the  Chickamauga  cam 
paign,  265,  268,  272,  277  ;  relieved 
from  command,  285  ;  his  character, 
286. 

Cruisers,  Confederate,  111. 

Cumberland  river,  45,  52. 

Curtis,  S.  R.,  35-37. 

Davis,  Charles,  136-139,  186. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  57,  70,  85,  131,  155, 

196,  197,  267,  286,  306,  327. 
Davis,  J.  C.,  at  Stone  river,  162,  167, 

168,  171. 

Dodge,  G.  M.,  187. 
Duncan,  J.  K.,  119,  128. 

Ellet,  Charles,  136. 

Ericsson,  John,  117,  223. 

Essex,  the  frigate,  at  Valparaiso,  115. 

Essex,  the  ram,  139,  140. 

Fair  Oaks,  battle  of,  327. 

Farragut,  D.  G.,  115,  128,  18G,  223, 
224. 

Floyd,  John,  58-63. 

Foote,  A.  H.,f>6,  102,  136. 

Forrest,  N.  B.,  63,  149,  198,  205,  252, 
338. 

Fort  Donelson,  52,  56-66. 

Fort  Henry,  52  ;  capture  of,  56. 

Fort  Jackson,  117-121,  127,  129. 

Fort  Pemberton,  217,  218. 

Fort  Pillow,  46, 106;  evacuation  of,  136. 

Fort  St.  Philip,  117-121. 

Fort  Suniter,  fall  of,  2. 

Forts  on  the  Mississippi  river,  out 
flanked  by  Grant's  advance  up  the 
Tennessee,  190;  importance  of,  in 
warfare,  191-194. 


Fox,  G.  V.,  116. 

Franklin,  battle  of,  position  of  Scho- 
field's  army  at,  340  ;  charge  of  Con 
federates,  341  ;  a  critical  moment, 
342  ;  defeat  of  Confederates,  343 ; 
awful  slaughter  at,  344. 

Frederick  the  Great,  97,  163,  286. 

Fremont,  J.  C.,  25,  26,  28-34  ;  his 
edict  of  emancipation,  29  ;  45,  225. 

Frost,  D.  M.,  13-15,  19. 

Fullerton,  J.,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  312. 

Gantt,  T.  T.,  18,  19. 

Garfield,  J.  A.,  at  Chickamauga,  275- 

Gates,  Horatio,  202. 

Geary,  J.  W.,  his  part  in  the  storming 
of  Lookout  Mountain,  305. 

Gettysburg,  battle  of,  98. 

Grand  Gulf,  evacuation  of,  230. 

Granger,  Gordon,  274,  278  ;  placed  in 
command  of  the  two  corps  of  Mc- 
Cook  and  Crittenden,  285 ;  at  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  312. 

Granny  White's  house  at  battle  of 
Nashville,  351,  355. 

Grant,  U.  S.,  20  ;  his  early  life,  43  ; 
made  brigadier-general  of  voluneers, 
44 ;  seizes  Cairo  and  Paducah,  45;  hia 
remark  on  the  battle  of  Belmont, 
51  ;  his  great  victory  at  Fort  Donel 
son,  58-65  ;  made  major-general  of 
volunteers,  66  ;  ill-treated  by  Hal- 
leek,  66-69 ;  his  love  of  whiskey,  69  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  71-100  ;  in 
command  at  Corinth,  154,  155 ;  his 
movements  at  and  capture  of  Vicks- 
burg,  186-247  ;  insecurity  of  his 
position  at  Oxford,  194  ;  his  retreat 
to  Grand  Junction,  200 ;  his  big 
ditch,  212 ;  the  critical  moment  in 
his  career,  230-234;  appointed  to 
command  all  the  forces  west  of  the 
Alleghanies,  285;  his  victory  at 
Chattanooga,  303-315  ;  appointed 
lieutenant-general  with  chief  com 
mand  of  the  armies  of  the  United 
States,  317-319 ;  in  his  first  Virginia 
campaign  outgeneralled  by  Lee,  320; 
as  a  manoeuvrer,  321,  322 ;  his  impa 
tience  at  the  delay  of  Thomas  in  at 
tacking  Hood  at  Nashville,  346-349. 

Grierson,  B.  H.,  234. 

Haines  Bluff,  fall  of,  240. 

Halleck,  H.  W.,  34,  54  ;  his  unfair 
ness  to  Grant,  66-69  :  71,  133-136, 
138,  140-148,  153,  156,  157,  159  ; 
made  general-in-chief,147 ;  186-189, 
195,  200,  203,  204,  20(5,  234  ;  snubbed 
by  Rosecrans,  254. 

Hamilton,  Schuyler,  106  ;  at  Corinth, 
187. 


Index 


365 


Hampton  Roads,  naval  battle  in,  116. 

Hardee,  W.  J.,  at  Shiloh,  79,  94;  at 
Stone  river,  162. 

Harriet  Lane,  the  sloop,  129. 

Hartford,  the  frigate,  117,  124,224. 

Harvey,  W.  S.,  14,  22. 

Hazen,  William,  seizes  the  heights  at 
Brown's  Ferry,  290  ;  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  313. 

Herron,  F.  J.,  197. 

Hildebrand's  brigade  at  Shiloh,  82. 

Hill,  D.  H.,  2G5. 

Holly  Springs,  capture  of,  198,  199. 

Hood,  J.  B.,  supersedes  Johnston,  328; 
his  early  career,  328.;  his  reputation 
as  a  fighter,  329  ;  evacuates  Atlanta, 
330  ;  assumes  the  offensive,  331 ;  his 
plan  of  invading  Tennessee,  332, 
333;  his  fatal  delay  at  Tusctnnbia, 
333  ;  his  northward  march,  337  ;  ar 
rival  before  Nashville,  344. 

Hooker,  Joseph,  sent  with  two  corps 
to  the  relief  of  Chattanooga,  284; 
takes  possession  of  Lookout  valley 
and  defeats  Longstreet,  291  ;  moves 
against  Bragg's  left  at  Rofsville, 
300 ;  storms  Lookout  Mountain, 
303-306  ;  resigns  and  goes  home, 
329. 

Hornet's  Nest,  the,  at  Shiloh,  84,  85, 
92. 

Howitzers  and  siege  guns  sent  from 
Baton  Rouge  to  St.  Louis,  15. 

Hull,  Isaac,  109. 

Hunter,  David,  33,  225. 

Hurlbut,  S.  A.,  at  battle  of  Shiloh, 
74,  83,  84,  86,  94 ;  at  Bolivar,  187  ; 
in  the  Vicksburg  campaign,  208. 

Indianola,  the  ram,  222. 
Indians,  in  battle  of  Pea  Ridge,  35. 
Island  No.  10,  46,  101-106. 
Itasca,  the  gunboat,  122. 

Jackson,  battle  of,  236. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  116,  127. 

Jackson,  Claiborne,  10-22. 

Jackson,  Stonewall,  264,  352. 

Jefferson  Barracks,  19. 

JenVrson  City,  United  States  flag  raised 
at,  23. 

Johnson,  Andrew,  157,  158. 

Johnston,  A.  S.,  53,  55,  56,  70,  72,  75, 
76,  81,  84-86;  killed  at  Shiloh,  84; 
his  tactical  mistake  there,  85. 

Johnston,  J.  E.,  196,  197,  232-240, 
242-245,  247;  his  Atlanta  campaign, 
324-327  ;  a  master  of  Fabian  strat 
egy,  325. 

Johnston,  W.  P.,  55,  88. 

Katahdin,  the  gunboat,  123. 
Kenesaw  Mountain,  battle  of,  327. 


Kentucky,  importance  of,  in  1861,  5  ; 
her  attempted  attitude  of  neutrality, 
39 ;  defect  in  Bragg's  strategy  in, 
152. 

Kineo,  the  gunboat,  123. 

King's  Mountain,  249. 

Lake  Providence  experiment  at  Vicks 
burg,  213,  214. 

Lee,  R.  E.,  small  progress  made 
against  him,  7  ;  43,  148,  151,  264 ; 
the  only  way  to  dispose  of  him, 
323. 

Lee,  S.  D.,  at  battle  of  Nashville,  351, 
354,  356-358. 

Lexington,  Missouri,  siege  of,  30-32. 
!  Lexington,  the  gunboat,  86. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  8,  10,  12,  22,  29, 
39,  66,  68,  69,  108,  114,  151,  157, 
203-207,  225,  247,  285,  295,  331. 

Liudell's  Meadow  at  St.  Louis,  13. 

Logan,  J.  A.,  his  journey  to  Louis 
ville,  348. 

Longstreet,  James,   at  Chickamauga, 

267,  269,   271,   275,    282;    sent    by 
Bragg  into  eastern  Tennessee,  293- 
297,  314. 

Lookout  Mountain,  258,  281  ;  stormed 
by  Hooker,  303-306. 

Louisiana,  the  ram,  119,  127,  129. 

Lovell,  Mansfield,  119,  127. 

Lusk,  W.  H.,  23. 

Lyon,  Nathaniel,  10-28  ;  visits  Camp 
Jackson  in  disguise,  16,  17 ;  his 
death,  27  ;  great  qualities,  28. 

McClellan,  G.  B.,  34,  55,  67,  147,  148  ; 
superseded  by  Burnside,  156  ;  330. 

McClernand,  J.  A.,  73,  77,  82,  83,  94, 
133 ;  in  the  Vicksburg  campaign, 
202-208;  225;  dismissed  the  ser 
vice,  244. 

McCook,  A.  McD.,  54  ;  at  Shiloh,  94. 
96 ;  at  Stone  river,  162,  165-169 ; 
in  the  Chickamauga  campaign,  265- 

268,  272,  277;   removed  from  com 
mand,  285  ;  his  character,  286. 

McCullough,  B.,  25,  26,  30  ;  death  of, 
36. 

McPherson,  James,  at  Shiloh,  80  :  in 
the  Vicksburg  campaign,  208,  217, 
229,  230,  232,  235,  236,  238,  243  ;  m 
the  Atlanta  campaign,  324-329. 

Madison,  George,  17. 

Madison,  James,  Bishop  of  Virginia, 
17. 

Magoffin,  B.,  39,  42. 

Manassas,  the  ram,  119,  124-127. 

Marlborough's  campaigns,  99. 

Maryland,  important  strategic  position 
of,  5. 

Meade,  G.  G.,  98,  284,  321. 
|  Memphis,  capture  of,  137  ;  as  a  base 


366 


Index 


from  which  to  advance  against 
Vicksburg,  195. 

Merrimac,  the  ram,  117,  139. 

Miller,  John,  at  Stone  river,  176. 

Miller,  P.  T.,  23. 

Mill  Spring,  battle  of,  55. 

Minnesota,  the  frigate,  109. 

Missionary  Ridge,  259. 

Mississippi,  the  sloop,  123,  124. 

Mississippi  river,  its  physical  charac 
teristics,  179-181. 

Missouri,  importance  of,  in  18G1,  5,  6. 

MitcheVO.  M.,  54;  his  raid  in  Ala 
bama,  143. 

Mitchell,  John,  119. 

Monitor,  a  dummy  at  Vicksburg,  222. 

Monitor,  the,  139. 

Montgomery,  Confederate  surrender 
at  Memphis,  137. 

Morgan,  George,  143. 

Morgan,  John  H.,  42,  149. 

Morton,  Oliver,  157,  158. 

Mule  meat  at  Vicksburg,  245. 

Mulligan,  Colonel,  his  gallant  defence 
of  Lexington,  31. 

Mumford,  hanged  by  B.  F.  Butler  for 
hauling  down  the  Union  flag,  129, 
130. 

Murfreesboro,  situation  of,  161. 

Murphy,  Colonel,  commander  at  Holly 
Springs,  199. 

Napoleon  I.,  81,  97-99,  143,  166,  233, 

242,  247,  349. 
Napoleon  III.,  132. 
Nashville  occupied  by  Buell's  troops, 

64. 
Nashville,  battle  of,  1,  55;  delayed  by 

a  great  storm  of  snow  and  ice,  348; 

position  of  Union  army,  350  ;  posi 
tion  of  the  Confederate  army,  351  ; 

result  of  the  victory,  359,  360. 
Navigation  laws,  111. 
Negley,  J.  S.,  at  Stone  river,  162, 163, 

169-172,  176  ;  at  Chickamauga,  270. 
Negro  troops  in  battle  of  Nashville, 

357,  358. 

Nelson,  Horatio,  110. 
Nelson,  W.,  40,  54  ;  at  Shiloh,  85,  87, 

1)0-96;  149. 

New  Madrid,  46  ;  surrender  of,  102. 
New  Orleans,  military  importance  of, 

112. 
Nullification,  116. 

Oglesby,  Richard  J.,  46. 
Oneida,  the  corvette,  123,  124. 
Opdyrke,  E.,  33!),  341. 
Ord,  Edward,  154,  244. 

Pal-ner,    J.   M.,  at  Stone  river,   162, 

163,  171-173,  175, 176. 
Palmerston,  Lord,  111. 


Panic  at   the  North   in    summer   of 

1862,  151. 
Paris,  Count  of,  on  the  Union  position 

at  Shiloh,   72 ;   on  the   hanging  of 

Mumford,   130 ;    on    the    effect    of 

withdrawing  McClellan's  army  from 

the  James  river,  148  ;  on  the  charge 

of    Thomas's    men    at    Missionary 

Ridge,  312. 

Pea  Ridge,  battle  of,  35-37,  197. 
Pemberton,    J.    C.,     supersedes    Van 

Dorn,  155  ;   188,  195,  197,  198,  209, 

232,  233,  235-240,  242,  245-247. 
Pensacola,  the  sloop,  117,  123,  124. 
Perkins,  G.  H.,  128. 
Perry,  O.  H.,  109. 
Perry ville,  battle  of,  153. 
Petersburg,   a  point    from  which    to 

operate  against  Richmond,  148. 
Phoebe,  the  frigate,  115. 
Pickett's  charge  at  Gettysburg,  98. 
Pike,  Albert,  36. 
Pillow,  Gideon,  47,  58-63. 
Pinola,  the  gunboat,  122. 
Pittsburg,  the  gunboat,  105. 
Pittsburg  Landing,  71-100,  133. 
Polk,  J.  K.,  40. 
Polk,  Leonidas,  bishop   and   general, 

40 ;    47,  48,  70  ;   at  Shiloh,  79,  94  ; 

101  ;    at  Stone  river,  162,  164,  173, 

176  ;  at  Chickamauga,  269. 
Pope,  John,  31,  35, 44,  69  ;  his  capture 

of  Island  No.  10,  102-106  ;  133,  135, 

136,  147-149,  152,  156,  190,  321. 
Port  Gibson,  battle  of,  229. 
Port  Hudson,  fortified  by  Van  Dorn, 

140;  its  military  value,  182,  183  ;  its 

enormous  strength,  184,  185. 
Porter,  David,  114. 
Porter,  D.  D.,  114,  116,  120-122,  128, 

129,  196,  219,  221-223,  227. 
Porter,   Fitz   John,   a    scapegoat    for 

Pope,  156. 
Porter,  W.  D.,  139. 
Pos-t,  P.  S.,  storms  Montgomery  Hill, 

355;   is  wounded  on  Overtou  Hill, 

357. 

Prairie  Grove,  battle  of,  197. 
Prentiss,  Benjamin,  35,  73,  78,  81-86, 

92. 

Price,  Sterling,  21-25,  33,  154,  336. 
Pulpit  Rock,  286,  306. 

Queen  of  the  West,  the  ram,  221,  222. 

Rabbit,  how  to  cook  a,  246. 

Raccoon  Mountain,  258,  261,  281. 

Railroads,  inferior  to  rivers  as  lines  of 
communication,  193  ;  without  them 
the  United  States  could  not  have 
suppressed  the  Southern  Confeder 
acy,  193. 

Ravvlins.  John,  80. 


Index 


367 


Raymond,  battle  of,  236. 

Rebel  flag  hauled  down  at  St.  Louis, 

Renshaw,  W.  B.,  124. 

Replevin,  a  writ  of,  18. 

Reynolds,  J.  J.,  at  Chickamauga,  270, 
271. 

Richmond,  battle  of,  149. 

Richmond,  the  frigate,  117. 

River  fleet,  importance  of,  107,  108. 

Rivers,  their  importance  as  lines  of 
communication,  193. 

Roanoke,  the  frigate,  108. 

Roberts,  G.  W.,  at  Stone  river,  170. 

Ropes,  J.  C.,  93,  97,  148, 152,  159,  335. 

Rosecrans,  W.  S.,  succeeds  Pope  at 
Corinth,  147  ;  his  battle  at  luka, 
154  ;  his  victory  over  Van  Dorn  at 
Corinth,  155;  supersedes  Buell,  160; 
his  battle  at  Stone  river,  161-177  ; 
mano3uvres  Bragg  out  of  Chatta 
nooga,  226,  227  ;  snubs  Halleck,  254; 
seeds  of  disaster  in  his  extension 
of  front,  202-264 ;  superseded  by 
Thomas,  285. ' 

Round  Forest,  the,  in  the  battle  of 
Stone  river,  173,  174. 

Rousseau,  L.  H.,  at  Stone  river,  162, 
163,  165,  171,  172. 

Rudge,  Barnaby,  277. 

St.  Louis,  a  committee  of  safety  ap 
pointed  in,  12 ;  Planters'  Hotel  at, 
22  ;  U.  S.  arsenal  at,  10,  13. 

Savannah,  Tennessee,  71,  72,  74-77, 
79,  91,  92. 

Scapegoats  for  the  disasters  of  1862, 
156. 

Schofield,  J.  M.,  in  the  Atlanta  cam 
paign,  324-329  ;  335;  crosses  Duck 
river,  338  ;  retreats  from  Franklin, 
338,  339  ;  retreats  upon  Nashville, 
344;  at  battle  of  Nashville,  350, 
353-358. 

Scott,  Winfield,  12,  34. 

Semmes,  Raphael,  109. 

Seven  Days'  battles,  the,  147. 

Sevvard,  W.  H.,  108. 

Sheridan,  Philip,  at  Stone  river,  162, 
166,  168-171 ;  at  Chickamauga,  278  ; 
at  Missionary  Ridge,  313. 

Sherman,  W.  T.,  20  ;  at  the  battle  of 
Shiloh,  73,  76-78,  82,  83,  92,  94,  99  ; 
on  the  reason  why  the  Confederates 
were  not  pursued  after  Shiloh,  99  ; 
at  Memphis,  187;  his  defeat  at 
Chickasaw  bayou,  200-202  ;  in  the 
Vicksburg  campaign,  208-210,  219, 
226,  229,  232,  234-238,  240-244,  246  ; 
goes  from  Mississippi  to  the  re 
lief  of  Chattanooga,  295-297 ;  his 
stealthy  advance  toward  the  north 
end  of  Missionary  Ridge,  298,  299  ; 


reaches  the  north  end  of  Missionary 
Ridge  and  finds  it  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  301-303  ;  assaults  the  enemy 
before  him,  308;  his  defence  of 
Grant's  hammering  policy,  320 ;  his 
Atlanta  campaign,  323-330  ;  leaves 
Hood  and  marches  to  the  sea-coast, 
330. 

Shiloh,  battle  of,  71-100 ;  terrible 
slaughter  at,  99 ;  significance  of  the 
battle,  100. 

Shy  Hill,  in  battle  of  Nashville,  356- 
358. 

Sigel,  Franz,  24-26. 

Sill,  Joshua,  166. 

Simmons,  Samuel,  14,  16,  17. 

Smith,  A.  J.,  moves  from  Missouri  to 
reinforce  Thomas,  336  ;  his  arrival 
at  Nashville,  344 ;  at  battle  of 
Nashville,  350,  354-358. 

Smith,  C.  F.,  46,  58,  59,  62,  67,  68,  71, 
74  ;  his  charge  at  Fort  Donelson,  62. 

Smith,  E.  K.,  143,  146,  149,  150,  152. 

Smith,  W.  F.,  called  "  Baldy,"  his 
beautiful  scheme  for  raising  the 
siege  of  Chattanooga,  287-292. 

Snake  Creek  Gap,  where  Sherman  lost 
a  golden  opportunity,  325,  326. 

Stanley,  David,  335,  338. 

Stauton,  E.  M.,  185,  203. 

Steedman,  J.  B.,  336. 

Stone,  Henry,  339. 

Stone  river,  battle  of,  161-177 ;  Con 
federate  position  at,  161, 162 ;  Union 
position  at,  162,  163 ;  defect  in 
the  Union  position  at,  163-167  ;  dis 
astrous  beginning,  168 ;  the  day 
saved  by  Sheridan,  169-171  ;  and  by 
Thomas,  172-174;  Union  victory, 
176  ;  terrible  slaughter  at,  173, 177 ; 
results  of,  178. 

Street  car,  colloquy  in,  20. 

Taylor,  Richard,  223. 

Tennessee  river,  44,  52. 

Thomas,  G.  H.,  54,  55;  arrival  at 
Shiloh,  97  ;  refuses  to  take  com 
mand  in  place  of  Buell,  153  ;  his 
high  opinion  of  Buell,  159  ;  at  Chick 
amauga,  268-270,  272-278;  super 
sedes  Rosecrans,  285  ;  captures 
Orchard  Knob  and  neighbouring 
hills,  300;  the  charge  of  his  men 
against  Bragg's  centre  on  Missionary 
Ridge,  310-313  ;  in  the  Atlanta  cam 
paign,  324  ;  sent  back  to  Nashville 
to  look  after  Hood,  331 ;  his  forces, 
335-337  ;  cause  of  his  delay  in  at 
tacking  Hood  at  Nashville,  345  ;  an 
nihilates  Hood's  army  at  Nashville, 
350-359  ;  result  of  the  victory,  359. 
360 ;  brilliancy  of  his  tactics  a« 
Nashville,  354. 


368 


Index 


Tilghman,  commandant  of  Fort  Henry, 

Tiptonville,  102,  105. 
Tyler,  the  gunboat,  86,  139. 

Ulm,  247. 

"  Unconditional  surrender,"  63,  65. 

Van  Cleve,  H.  P.,  at  Stone  river,  1G3, 

1G8,  171,  172,  176. 
Van  Doru,  E.,  35,  71,   134,   138-140; 

left  by  Bragg  to  cover  Vicksburg, 

145 ;  superseded  by  Pemberton,  155  ; 

186,   234;    captures   Holly  Springs, 

198,  199  ;  death  of,  253. 
Varuna,  the  corvette,  123,  124. 
Vicksburg,  fortified  by  VanDorn,  138; 

its  military  importance,  182,    183  ; 

its  unapproachableness,    184,   185 ; 

assaults  upon,   243;    surrender  of 

246,  247. 
Virginia,  importance  of,  in  the  Civil 

War,  2-4. 

Walke,  Henry,  104. 
Wallace,  Lew,  5,  58-62  ;  at  battle  of 
Shiloh,  74,  77,  79-81,  90,  94-97  ;  133. 


Wallace,  William,  74,   83  ;    killed  at 

Shiloh,  86. 
Warren,  Joseph,  27. 
Webster,  Daniel,  68. 
Welles,  Gideon,  116. 
Wellington,  Duke  of,  191. 
Westfield,  the  gunboat,  124. 
West  Virginia,  beginning  of,  3. 
Wheeler,  Joseph,  283. 
Willich,  at  Stone  river,  167. 
Wilson,    J.    H.,    takes    command    of 

Thomas's  cavalry,  33G  ;  his  cavalry 

fight  at  Franklin,  343. 
Wilson's  Creek,  battle  of,  2G-28. 
Wissahickon,  the  gunboat,  123. 
"  Woman  order,"  so  called,  of  B.  F. 

Butler,  131. 
Wood,  T.  J.,  54  ;  arrival  of,  at  Shiloh, 

97;   at  Stone  river,  163,    1C8,    1G9, 

171 ;     at  Chickamauga,    270,    271  ; 

at  Missionary  Ridge,  313  ;  at  battle 

of  Nashville,  350,  351,  353-358. 

Yazoo  Pass  experiment  at  Vicksburg, 
214-218. 

Zollicoffer,  F.  K.,  41,  53,  55. 


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